THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG

Reportable
Case N o: JR874/22
In the matter between:
KENNETH SK HOSANA Applicant
and
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION ,
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION First Responde nt
ABEL VENTER N.O. Second Respondent
ESKOM HOLDINGS SOC (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
Heard : 5 November 2024
Delivered : 9 January 2025 (This judgment was handed down electronically by
emailing a copy to the parties. The 9 January 2025 is deemed to be the date of
delivery of this judgment).
Summary: Application to review jurisdictional ruling. CCMA incorrectly found
that no individual has standing to refer a dispute over the interpretation or
application of a collective agreement in terms of sections 24(2) and (5) of the
LRA. Examination of collective agreement shows that the applicant
misinterpreted its provisions relating to trade union leave. Although applicant
had standing to refer dispute, review application is dismissed on the merits.

2
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
RAMJI , AJ
Introduction
[1] This judgment concerns the applicant’s (Mr Sk hosana ’s) review application. At
the hearing, I granted Mr Sk hosana’s application for condonation for the late
filing of his review application. Both the condonation and review applications
were unopposed . They were served by e -mail on the third respondent and his
employer (Eskom) .
[2] Mr Sk hosana referred a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration (CCMA) concerning the interpretation or application of a
collective agreement, in terms of section s 24(2) and then 24(5) of the Labour
Relations Ac t1 (LRA). The collective agreement (a Recognition Agreement)
bound Mr Sk hosana as a member of a recognised union.
[3] The dispute came before Commissioner Venter on 6 April 2022, with Mr
Skhosana representing himself as he has done in this application, and Eskom
being represented by an industrial relations official.
[4] Eskom raised a preliminary point: It has a collective agreement with three
trade unions, and as Mr Sk hosana is not a shop steward, he is not entitled to
appear as an individual to raise a n individual dispute about the interpretation
or application of a collective agreement.
[5] The commissioner found that Mr Skhosana lacked standing for the above
reason and dismissed Mr Skhosana’s dispute for lack of jurisdiction .
[6] Mr Sk hosana seeks to have the jurisdictional ruling (the ruling) reviewed and
set aside, so that he may proceed in the CCMA with his dispute against

1 Act 66 of 1995 , as amended.
3
Eskom on the interpretation of the Recognition Agreement. He has also
sought various forms of material relief from this Court .
[7] I deal with matters in the following order :
7.1. First, the factual background explaining the dispute and the facts giving
rise to it.
7.2. Second, Mr Skhosana’ s main review grounds.
7.3. Third, the nature of the review papers filed and compliance with the
applicable rules.
7.4. Fourth, whether the commissioner’s ruling was correct.
7.5. Finally, the appropriate order in the circumstances.
Background
[8] On 21 January 2022 , Mr Skhosana referred his dispute to conciliation .
Following conciliation, Mr Sk hosana referred the dispute to arbitration on or
about 18 February 2022.
[9] Mr Sk hosana’s referred his dispute as dispute about the interpretation or
application of a collective agreement. Essentially, the dispute concerned the
interpretation of the trade union leave provisions of the Recognition
Agreement between Eskom, and the following trade unions: National Union of
Mineworkers, the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and
Solidarity. It was not disputed that the Recognition Agreement binds Mr
Skhosana. Mr Sk hosana appears to also rely on an aspect of Eskom’s
Discipli nary Code (the Code) in addition the Recognition Agreement . I will
presume the Code is part of a collective agreement for purposes of
determining this matter .
[10] The facts giving rise to Mr Sk hosana’s dispute about the Recognition
Agreement are the follow ing:
4
10.1. On 25 October 2021, Mr Sk hosana wrote to his manager requesting
“trade union leave” to file documents at the Labour Court the following
day. The documents related to separate litigation which Mr Sk hosana
is pursuing against Eskom in terms of section 6 of the Employment
Equity Act2 (the EEA case) .
10.2. Management responded to Mr Sk hosana stating that Eskom did not
recognise him as a part-time shop steward. He was instructed to apply
for annual leave if he wished to be excused from duty on 26 October
2021 .
10.3. Mr Sk hosana replied stating, “ Please be informed that tomorrow I will
be at the Labour Court for case JS698 filing ”.
[11] Mr Sk hosana also attached a notice, dated 6 September 2021, calling him to
attend a disciplinary hearing on 15 September 2021 . This predates his
present complaint about trade union leave for 26 October 2021, and it
therefore appears to have no bearing on this matter.
[12] Although it is apparent that Mr Sk hosana filed an internal grievance, Mr
Skhosana did not plead to or attach documents about disciplinary action that
was being taken against him regarding 25 to 26 October 2021. I therefore do
not know if Mr Sk hosana went to the Labour Court on 26 October 2021, and if
he did, (a) whether he took annual leave to do so, or (b) whether Eskom took
disciplinary action against him. The question of whether this was actually an
unfair labour practice dispute arose according to the pleadings and record, but
was not dealt with in any detail.
Review grounds
[13] Considering that Mr Sk hosana is a lay person bringing an application on a
complicated legal question, I will extract the main grounds of review from his
pleadings.3 Mr Sk hosana’s grounds of review primarily relate to gross
irregularities :

2 Act 55 of 1998.
3 See: Norkie v Public Protector and Another [2024] ZAWCHC at paras 5 – 6; 30 and 34.
5
13.1. The commissioner committed a material legal error in interpreting
sections 24(2) and 24(5) of the LRA to exclude referrals by “ a single
employee being affected by [the] interpretation and application [of a
collective agreement] ”.
13.2. The commissioner misconceived the issue or dispute that he was to
arbitrate. Expanding on this point, Mr Sk hosana pleaded the following:
‘The commissioner committed a gross irregularity by failing to make [an]
enquiry to understand the merits of the case he was required to arbitr ate.’
13.3. Related to this ground, in his suppleme ntary founding affidavit, Mr
Skhosana stated that the commissioner was “ impatient ” with him and
that he “ rushed ” him.
Review papers
[14] On 16 May 2022, Mr Sk hosana filed a notice of motion seeking that : (a) the
commissioner’s ruling be reviewed a nd set aside ; (b) be substituted with an
order that the CCMA has jurisdiction to hear his dispute; (c) Eskom be
ordered to comply with the Recognition Agreement read with the Code; (d)
Eskom be ordered to compensate Mr Sk hosana by paying him ten months’ of
his salary as “a penalty for victimising and harassing [him] in breach of section
5 of the [LRA] and section 23 of the Constitution of the Republ ic of South
Africa ”; and (e) Eskom be ordered to pay Mr Sk hosana “the maximum
compensation permissible for breach o f contract” among other things.
[15] Mr Sk hosana’s notice of motion was accompanied by the ruling and his
founding affidavit, to which he attached the following documents:
15.1. The arbitration set down notice dated 14 March 2022;
15.2. The request for arbitration signed by Mr Sk hosana on 18 February
2022 , in which he sought the following relief:
‘Eskom to comply with the Recognition Agreement entered into with
trade unions in particular disciplinary procedure … and compensate 10
equal months’ salary as penalty.’
6
15.3. The certificate of outcome dated 18 February 2022, describing the
dispute as a “ section 24(2) [24(5 )] Collective Agreement –
Interpretation or Application ”, and referring the dispute to arbitration;
15.4. The Eskom Recognition Agreement on which his claim to trade union
leave is based;
15.5. Pages 1; 2 and 4 of the Eskom Disciplinary Procedure (including the
cover page , contents page and one of the pages with definitions );
15.6. A notice , dated 6 September 2021, for Mr Sk hosana to attend a
disciplinar y hearing on 15 September 2021;
15.7. An e-mail exchange on 25 October 2021 which preceded Mr Sk hosana
taking the unauthorised leave for which he was disciplined;
15.8. An e-mail exchange on 14 December 2021 in which Mr Sk hosana
again sought leave to represent a fellow employee at the CCMA, to
which management responded that he use “ contingency leaves, since
you don’t have the locus standi” ;4
15.9. An internal grievance lodged by Mr Sk hosana, and dated 28 October
2021, in respect of the refusal to allow him to take trade union leave in
October 2021 ; and
15.10. The authorised manager’s grievance report dated 30 December 202 1,
in which he found that Mr Sk hosana’s claim to union leav e was
misguided, and that Mr Sk hosana had not been denied any labour
rights or discriminated against.
[16] Normally, after this filing, a record of the CCMA proceedings would be filed
with, or followed by, a notice to stand by or to amend the applicant’s founding
papers.

4 This exchange is not relevant to the dispute or to the review application and is not considered.
7
[17] Instead, on 13 June 2022, Mr Sk hosana filed an amendment to the notice of
motion, amending the material relief sought, from a “ penalty ” of ten months of
his salary, to 24 months of his salary.
[18] Mr Sk hosana then filed an amendment to his founding affidavit, in which he
added references to the transcript of proceedings relating to the t ranscript of
proceedings. Mr Sk hosana attached the same annexures to his amended
founding affidavit and added the transcript of the CCMA proceedings.
[19] On 10 October 2022, Mr Sk hosana filed a notice stating that he “ stands by his
notice of motion ”.
[20] The effective resolution of labour disputes would not be served by drawing out
technical mistakes made by Mr Sk hosana: It is apparent that he delivered a
notice of motion and founding affidavit, obtained a transcript of proceedings,
provided this to the Court and to Eskom, and then made minor amendments
to his original notice of motion and supplemented his founding affidavit, as he
is entitled to do. He has also provided other relevant documents to this Court.
Again considering that he is also a lay person working without any
assistance,5 I am therefore satisfied that Mr Skhosana has substantively
complie d with the requirements of rule 7A of the previous Rules for the
Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour Court, which are applicable in this
case, and that this review application may be determined.
The correct approach to the l egal standing of a union member to refer a dispute in
terms of section 24 of the LRA
[21] The issue before this Cour t is the CCMA ruling that Mr Sk hosana, as an
individual, had no standing to raise a dispute about the Recognition
Agreement.
[22] The reason for the commissioner’s finding on standing is not clearly stated in
the ruling, but it appears that the commissioner’s view is that a collective
agreement can only be challenged by a collective (i.e. a trade union) because

5 Ibid GN 1665 of 1996: Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour Court, repealed with
effect from July 2024 .
8
it inherently concerns collective matters. In this regard, I refer to the transcript
which shows that t he commissioner inquired only into what each party meant
by the word “collective” :
22.1. Once Eskom’s representative responded that a collective refers to a
group of some sort, the commissioner took no further interest in the
inquiry and stated that he was done with Eskom’s arguments on
standing.
22.2. Mr Sk hosana had responded that a collective is “ everybody combined
together ”, the commissioner responded, “ Okay, no that is precisely the
point Mr Sk hosana ”.
22.3. When Mr Sk hosana sought to make further submissions on the
substantive aspects of his dispute (being denied trade union leave to
file papers in his EEA action), he correctly stated that the commissioner
rushed him.
[23] The commissioner’s understanding of an individual’s legal standing is borne
out of the following aspects of his ruling:
23.1. “The Applicant was on his own and had no representation from a
union. ”
23.2. Mr Sk hosana “ himself described collective as workers combined
together ”.
23.3. “As an individual the Applicant had no standing to raise a dispute about
collective matters .”
[24] The way the commissioner co nducting the inquiry into Mr Sk hosana’s legal
standing and his ruling leave much to be desired . The record indicate s a
failure to apply his mind, and failure to conduct the hearing in accordance with
clause 5.3 of the Code of Conduct for Commissioners, 2014.6

6 Clause 5.3 requires commissioners to be “ patient and courteous to the parties and their
representatives ” during hearings.
9
[25] That said, the question of standing is a material legal question, and “ a
reasonable arbitrator does not get a legal point wrong ”.7 The question is
therefore whether the commissioner’s finding on standing, however , it was
reasoned, and despite how the hearing was conducted, is ultimately correct :
Did Mr Sk hosana have standing to refer a section 24 dispute or not?
[26] There is Labour Court authority which supports the view that only parties to a
collective agreement may refer disputes on the interpretation or application of
the collective agreement :
26.1. In Arends and o thers v SA Local Gov ernment Bargaining Council and
others (Arends LC )8, Moshoana AJ (as he then was) held that “ party to
a dispute ” in sections 24(2) and (5) of the LRA meant only the parties
to the collective agreement; if the Legislature intended to allow
individual employees to refer disputes about collective agreements, it
would have not used the word “parties”, but rather “employee/s”. He
concluded that employees bound by collective agreements are not
parties but beneficiaries and therefore cannot make referrals under
sections 24(2) and (5) of the LRA. Moshoana AJ continued to explain
how individual employees could invoke collective agreements through
individual rights disputes:
‘For non-parties , a collective agreement may serve as evidence of a
particular contended right. In such instance, if interpretation arises, it
becomes an issue in a dispute and not the dispute.’9
26.2. In South African Police Services v Du Preez and Others In Re: Du
Preez v South African Police Services , (Du Preez )10 Moshoana J
reaffirmed his position in Arends LC. Although Arends LC was taken on
appeal and the Labour Court decision overturned, Moshoana J
reasoned that:

7 MacDonald's Transport Upington (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union
(AMCU) and o thers (2016) 37 ILJ 2593 (LAC) at para 30.
8 (2013) 34 ILJ 2560 (LC) at paras 14 – 17.
9 Arends LC at para 39.
10 [2019] ZALCPE 3 at para 11.
10
‘On appeal, the LAC did not upset the above finding. By necessary
implication, the find ings were approved by the LAC.’
26.3. This approach was followed in other cases, including recently in
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v DS Panza and
Others , which expressly relied on Du Preez .11
[27] I respectfully disagree with the quoted statements in Du Preez . On appeal
(Arends LAC ), 12 the LAC stated the following on the finding on jurisdiction in
Arends LC :
‘It is unnecessary for this Court to decide the jurisdictional issue. It has not
been properly ventilated because of the inept manner in which the parties
presented their cases to the arbitrator. As already discussed, where partie s
wish to proceed by way of a stated case, they are obliged to set out the facts
upon which the proposed legal argument is to rest, to define the questions of
law that the arbitrator is being asked to determine and to set out the parties’
contentions in relation to those questions. Had that been done, the question
of jurisdiction in this case would probably have been addressed more fully
with due consideration to the relevant statutory provisions and the applicable
collective agreements and in particular clause 5 of the collective agreement
which provides that disputes regarding the implementation of the agreement
should be referred to arbitration. ’
[28] The LAC effectively held that in Arends LC , the question of jurisdiction could
not have been pronounced on, and in fact , ought not to have been
pronounced on. Putting it better, Kroon AJ, in reject ing the reasoning in Du
Preez held:
‘The proposition, without qualification, that if an Appellate Court sets aside a
decision but does not deal with part of the ratio underpinning it, it thereby
necessarily endorses the unaddressed reasoning, is without merit. Taken to
its logical conclusion, it would mean that, every time an Appellate Court did
not express a view on an argument embraced by the Court a quo, it should be
taken to have agreed with such argument ... it means no more than that it was

11 [2024] ZALCJHB 158 at para 59.
12 Arends and Others v SA Local Government Bargaining Council and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 1200
(LAC) at para 23.
11
unnecessary for the Appellate Court to consider it in order to come to its
conclusion .’13
[29] Beyond my disagreement with the position in Arends LC and Du Preez , there
is also authority to the contrary , which may suggest or which hold that
individuals bound by collective agreements may refer disputes to the CCMA
about the interpretation or application of these agreements: In Skulpad , Kroon
AJ held that Arends LC and Du Preez were incorrect on the question of
standing of individuals to refer section 24(2) and (5) disputes and that they
may be entitled to do refer these disputes .14 In coming to this conclusion,
Kroon AJ considered a number of factors, including textual, practical, and
purposive or constitutional factors :
[30] I have also had regard to the following cases in which the courts dealing with
cases brought by individual employees (and not trade unions), have found
that the case, or an aspect of it, concerned the interpretation or application of
a collective agreement, and held that such disputes fell first within the
jurisdiction of the CCMA. Although these are no rationes on the question of
the standing of individuals to refer disputes concerning the interpretation or
application of collective agreements, it is significant that none of these courts
contemplated that the fact that the complaints would be raised by individual
employees, would be an obstacle to referral:
30.1. In Ampofo & others v MEC for Education, Arts, Culture, Sports &
Recreation, Northern Province & another ,15 a group of employees (i.e.
individuals) challenged administrative action concerning their
employment status. The applicants raised an aspect of a collective
agreement in support of their review, but the High Court held that the
CCMA was the allocated forum for interpreting a collective agreement.
While it declined to consider the collective agreement for lack of
jurisdiction, it did not expressly state that the applicants were excluded
from referring a dispute about a collective agreement because they

13 Skulpad and Another v Department of Health Eastern Cape and Others [2024] ZALCPE 45 at para
14.
14 Skulpad (above) at para 68.
15 (2001) 22 ILJ 1975 (T) at para 47.
12
were a group of individuals. It stated only that “ such dispute falls to be
determined [by the CCMA ].”
30.2. In Hlophe and others v Minister of Safety and Security and others,16
van Niekerk AJ (as he then was) stated the following in the course of
considering (and ultimately discharging) an interim interdict granted in
favour of a group of police detectives (not their union):
“In terms of section 24, disputes concerning the application and
interpretation of collective agreements, if unresolved, must be referred
to arbitration. On the face of it, the bargaining council is likely
therefore to have the jurisdiction to arbitrate any dispute between the
applicants and the respondents concerning the application of [the
collective agreement].”’
30.3. In Department of t he Premier, Western Cape v Plaatjies N.O & o thers ,
(Plaaitjies)17 Steenkamp J held that a bargaining council did not have
jurisdiction to challenge the terms of a collective agreement on the
basis that they were unfair. He held, however, that the bargaining
council had jurisdiction to “ deal with” the “main dispute [of] the
application [of a collective agreement] ”. This case concerned individual
trade union members who referred a dispute. It was therefore
effectively found that the bargaining council had jurisdiction to
determine these members ’ dispute on the application of a collective
agreement. Also, at the hearing, the Department abandoned this
preliminary point:
“Trade union members not represented by the union did not have
locus standi to litigate an alleged breach of a collective agreement
concluded on their behalf by the union without the assistance of the
union in the proceedings. ”’18
[31] Finally, I am persuaded by the text of the LRA which distinguishes in section
24 between a “ party to a collective agreement ” and a “ party to a dispute ” over

16 (2006) 27 ILJ 1003 (LC) at para 19.
17 (2013) 34 ILJ 2876 (LC) at para 46.
18 Plaaitjies (above) at paras 13.2 and 14.
13
the interpretation or application of the collective agreement : An individual who
disputes the interpretation or application of a collective agreement therefore is
entitled to refer that dispute to the CCMA, because they are the party to the
dispute.19
[32] I therefore find that the commissio ner erred in finding that Mr Sk hosana
lacked standing to r efer a dispute over the interpretation or application of a
collective agreement because he was an individual : an individual is not
automatically precluded from referring such a dispute. (Even if Arends LC and
Du Preez were correct, they hold that only parties to a collective agreement
may refer a dispute about the interpretation or application of a collective
agreement. The commissioner did not give effect to this position in simply
asking each party, “ What do you understand by collective?” and ending his
inquiry when they both responded that it is a group.
[33] The commissioner ought to have conducted the following inquiry in response
to the preliminary poi nt on standing raised by Eskom:
32.1 Did Mr Sk hosana ha ve sufficient connection to and had he suffered
harm from Eskom’s action to support him bringing the case ?
32.2 If he did, then the commissioner was required to proceed to interpret
the Recognition Agreement.
[34] The Constitutional Court has held that “ in determining a litigant’s standing, a
court must, as a matter of logic, assume that the challenge the litigant seeks
to bring is justified ”.20 Assuming then that Mr Skhosana’s interpretation of the
Recognition Agreement has merit, it cannot be denied that he was adversely
impacted by Eskom’s interpretation of it. This gi ves him standing.
[35] The commissioner should have then proceeded to determine the merits of Mr
Skhosana’s cause of action. The Commissioner’s error of law led to his failure
to conduct the proper inquiry, resulting in an outcome that is both incorrect
and grossly unreasonable.

19 See also: Skulpad (above) at paras 26 – 27.
20 Giant Concerts CC v Rinaldo Investments (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (3) BCLR 251 (CC) at para
32.
14
[36] I turn now to the appropriate course of action ,21 given that Mr Sk hosana had
standing to refer his dispute on interpretation of the Recognition Agreement .
Determination of the dispute about the interpretation of the Recognition Agreement
[37] First, I do not consider it appropriate to remit this matter to the CCMA for a
hearing on the merits because I am in as good a positio n to make the decision
on Mr Sk hosana and Eskom’s conflicting interpretations of the Recognition
Agreement based on the documents before me – namely, the Recognition
Agreement and the parties’ respective interpretations of it. Th ere is a
possibility that Mr Sk hosana’s dispute, if he was in fact disciplined, is truly an
unfair labour practice dispute, but because there is insufficient material before
me in both the pleadings and record, I cannot remit the matter to the CCMA
for determination on this basis. I simply do not know how Mr Sk hosana acted
on from 25 to 26 October 2021, and if he was issued a sanction short of
dismissal The reason for this short coming lies not only with Mr Sk hosana but
with the commissioner for what can only be described as a rash and
dismissive approach to the dispute.
[38] Second, it would not serve either party’s interests to have the dispute drawn
out in circumsta nces where the failure of Mr Sk hosana’s referral on the merits
is a foregone conclusion.22
The disputed interpretation of the Recognition Agreement and the Code
[39] Mr Sk hosana believes he was entitled to trade union leave under the
Recognition Agreement to file papers in the Labour Court in his EEA case .
[40] First, Mr Sk hosana argues that he was entitled to leave on 26 October 2021 in
terms of clause 8.2.1.1 of the Recognition Agreement: “ A manager may grant
a maximum of two days special leave on full pay to a bona fide member of a
trade union recognised by Eskom to attend general domestic trade union
meetings or conferences ”. Eskom’s position is that this leave is for “ [s]hop
stewards that are recognized” . Eskom submitted further (at the CCMA) that

21 Section 145(4) of the LRA.
22 See: General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd v National U nion of Metalworkers of SA and o thers (2018) 39 ILJ
1316 (LC) at para 26.
15
this leave is “ where there is a conference of the union organised by the union
and he is a member… and he is invited he is eligible to two days leave… ”
[41] Eskom’s i nterpretation is correct: Mr Sk hosana was not entitled to trade union
leave in terms of the Recognition Agreement, as a member, to file papers in
his own court case or even the court case of another employee.
[42] Second, Mr Sk hosana referred to clause 2.5 of the Code 2.5 which provides
that “ [a]n employee shall, during all disciplinary proceedings be entitled to be
assisted, or advised by a representative ”. He argued that this was to be read
with clause 2.3.4 of the Code which defines a “ Representative ” as “ a fellow
employee, or an official of a recognised trade union appointed by the
employee to assist him/her ”.
[43] This has no bearing on Mr Sk hosana’s request for trade union leave to attend
the Labour Court for his EEA case on 26 October 2021: The EEA case is not
a disciplinary proceeding. As an aside, it also has no bearing on Mr
Skhosana’s request in December 2021 to attend the Labour Court to assist a
fellow employee, for the same reason. The provisions in the Code apply to
disciplinary proceedings. These are internal and involve neither the CCMA nor
the Labour Court.
Conclusion on interpretation
[44] I do not believe that any of the provisions relied on by Mr Sk hosana , or any
others contained in the record support his claim that he was entitled to trade
union leave . Mr Sk hosana has therefore incorrectly interpreted the
Recognition Agreement.
[45] I have already stated that there is insufficient inform ation to indicate whether
Mr Sk hosana has an unfair labour practice dispute. In any case, my decision
still d etermines that dispute: Mr Sk hosana has misinterpreted the Recognition
Agreement, and as a result, Eskom has not committed an unfair labour
practice in disciplining him (if it did so). Further, Mr Sk hosana’s rights under
the Constitution and the LRA have not been violated. He is not entitled to a
mandamus or to compensation.
16
[46] Therefore, despite finding that the commissioner committed a gross
irregularity (not simply in his materia l error of law) and that Mr Sk hosana had
standing to refer his dispute, I can not ultimately find in Mr Sk hosana’s favour .
[47] In the result the following order is made :
Order
1. The application is dismissed.

_______________________
B. Ramji
Acting Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa

17
Appearances :
For the Applicant: Self-represented
For the Respondent: No appearance