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[2019] ZAEQC 3
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P and Another v Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa and Another (EQ1/2019) [2019] ZAEQC 3 (26 August 2019)
EQUALITY COURT IN
JOHANNESBURG
SITTING IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
Case
No. EQ 1/2019
In
the matter between:
Mr
P
First
Complainant
Mrs
P
Second
Complainant
And
THE
DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH OF SOUTH AFRICA
First
Respondent
THE
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL COUNCIL ORGANISATION
First
Respondent
JUDGMENT
SPILG,
J
INTRODUCTION
1.
Mr and Mrs P brought proceedings before the
Equality Court of this division contending that the Dutch
Reformed Church of South
Africa (generally known as
the
NGK
which is its
Afrikaans acronym) and The Christian Social Council Organisation
(whose Afrikaans acronym is
CMR
)
are vicariously liable for the statements of , in particular, a
certain social which they contend constituted unfair
discrimination
based on;
a.
their religious beliefs as Pentecostals;
b.
their gender;
c.
their sexual orientation; and
d.
their economic and social status.
The
complainants contend that as a consequence of the discriminatory
remarks they have suffered damages in an amount of R15 million.
No
corrective or other remedy is sought against the respondents but a
claim for damages appears to be countenanced by s 21(2) (d)
of the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4
of 2000 (
the
Act
) if
the complaint arises from a breach of the Act and no other court
enjoys exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same matter.
[1]
BACKGROUND
2.
The case has its origins in the steps taken by the
complainants to care for their two grandchildren who were born to
their daughter
and then partner/husband. In December 2008 they
obtained an interim order of guardianship from van der Merwe DJP in
the Pretoria
High Court.
3.
They alleged that the biological father had been
assaulting the children and the order directed that the biological
parents could
only visit the children under the supervision of the
complainants. Moreover their daughter was prevented from removing the
children
to her house in Boksburg where the boyfriend was living.
4.
The interim order was made pending investigations
by the Family advocate. Prior to the outcome of the report the
complainants and
their daughter obtained protection orders against
the biological father.
5.
In October 2011 the first complainant sought the
intervention of the Children’s Court on the ground that the
biological father
had traumatised the children. Adv Lindeque was
appointed to represent the children and the first respondent
approached the second
respondent’s offices advising that the
Children’s Court requested that it assess the complaint against
the biological
father.
6.
In April 2012 the matter was referred to the High
Court because it appeared that eth matter was more a custody dispute
which was
still pending before the high court.
7.
The second respondent appeared to have appointed
Mrs JvR as the social worker.
8.
Although there is some confusion as to the
sequence it appears that due to the seriousness of the allegations
against the complainants
the Children’s Court ordered that the
children remain in a place of safety pending eth finalisation of the
matter by eth
high court. However in late September 2012 the
Children’s Court was approached by JvR because during the
course of her investigations
she had received a statement from the
complainants’ own daughter stating that her own father, i.e.
the second complainant,
had sexually abused her as a child.
This
prompted JvR to approach the Assistant Director and Presiding Officer
of the Children’s Court pursuant to which she completed
a Form
36 (under the Children’s Act 38 of 2005) because she was of the
opinion that, as a consequence of the biological mother’s
statement, the children were in need of care and protection and
recommended that the children go back to their biological parents.
9.
Adv Lindeque disagreed as she did not believe that
the children would be safe in the care of their biological father.
10.
The matter came before the Children’s Court
in late September 2012 and it determined that the
children should
be placed temporarily at Carino which is a place of
safety.
11.
The decision was based on the social worker report
prepared by JvR and certain psychologist reports attached to it.
JvR’s
report is one of the documents which forms the subject of
the complaint of discrimination. In para 20 of the report JvR
concluded
that
the negative and
conflicting relationships that the parties involved have with each
other is not in the best interests of the children
concerned. It was
observed during the investigation that they are constantly busy
trying to influence the children concerned about
their future”.
The
parties referred to by JvR were the complainants and the biological
parents of the children.
12.
In her report JvR recommended that;
a.
the children should not be placed back in the care
of either the complainants or the biological parents “
because
of the unstable and conflict relations between the
(present
complainants)
and the biological
parents. This is not in the best interests of the children that
caregivers that must care for them cannot act
in the best interest of
the children concerned”
;
b.
the children be placed in alternative care, such
as a Children’s Home or Youth Centre and that family
re-unification services
be provided to both biological parent’s
with the objective of placing the children, within six months, back
in their care.
c.
The parents and the complainants commit themselves
to parental guidance at a social organisation in their area;
d.
Irrespective of where the children may be placed
that “
there must be care and
contact with the biological parents
and
the maternal and paternal
grandparents”
(emphasis added)
e.
All the parties must obtain police clearance “
to
make sure that all parties involved have no charge against them that
involves children”
.
13.
The complainants were dissatisfied with the
decision and the contents of the reports upon which the court relied.
Of relevance is
the complaint they lodged against JvR with the South
African Council for Social Service Professions (
SACSSP)
.
JvR’s written response is the other document on which the
complainants’ rely in the present matter.
14.
Subsequently the complainants brought an
application before the Children’s Court to rescind and vary its
order of September
2012 on a number of grounds including that the
court did not have jurisdiction because the matter had already been
transferred
to eth high court and because they were not afforded an
opportunity to address the court at that hearing. The matter was
opposed
by the biological father.
15.
Magistrate Verster dismissed the application. In
the course of the judgement the court;
a.
found that it had assumed jurisdiction because the
circumstances differed materially from those when the high court made
its interim
order close to four years prior to the September 2012
variation and that additional allegations of “
emotional,
physical and sexual abuse”
were
made which the court could not simply ignore;
b.
confirmed that the Children’s Court had in
fact transferred the matter back to the high court in Pretoria but,
having regard
to the children’s best interest, was compelled in
the meantime to make the interim order placing the children at a
place
of safety;
c.
held that it had the jurisdiction and authority to
vary and monitor its orders;
d.
was satisfied with the reports that had been
provided by JvR with the supporting reports from psychologists.
16.
For sake of completeness the complainants brought
another application before the Tshwane Children’s Court. The
court requested
the second respondent to again investigate the home
circumstances of the children’s biological mother after a
complaint had
been made by the first complainant. The report included
the comments by a specialist counsellor who believed that the
complainants’
daughter was not fabricating her relationship
with her father, the second complainant
,
“and the events that happened between them”.
The
eldest child, a boy, was with the father but it was recommended that
the other child remain in the care of her biological mother
and that
both “
continue with evaluations to
determine whether or not molestation allegations for both of them are
true or not”.
17.
The eldest child is now a major and the children
have been now living for a considerable period with one or other
biological parent.
PROCEEDINGS
BEFOE THE EQUALITY COURT, GAUTENG DIVISION
18.
The respondents initially attacked the proceedings
before me on the grounds that the matter was still pending before the
Pretoria
High Court sitting as an Equality Court. It was however
evident that the registrar had made an error in appointing a judge
who
had not been appointed an equality court judge and the case
appeared to have got lost within the system. This prompted the
complainants
to withdraw the case before that court. The respondents
contended that without a tender for costs the matter could not be
withdrawn
and was still before that court.
19.
I
disagreed. The Equality Act was enacted t
o
give effect to s 9 read with item 23 (1) of Schedule 6 to the
Constitution in order “
to
prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and harassment; to promote
equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent
and prohibit
hate speech”
.
[2]
20.
It is
now beyond cavil that costs in matters involving the assertion of a
constitutional right will not borne by a complainant save
in
exceptional circumstances where the litigant’s conduct is
“
vexatious,
frivolous, professionally unbecoming or in any other similar way
abusive of the processes of the court
”
.
[3]
The
regulations governing the Act are to similar effect. See Reg 12(2)
which provides that: “
Each party bears his or her own
costs unless the presiding officer directs otherwise”
21.
During argument at the hearing of 27 May 2019 the
respondents did not contend that this is such a case and I was
able to make
an order by consent that there had been a proper
withdrawal of the proceedings instituted by the complainants
against the
respondents in the Gauteng Provincial Division and that
there are no costs implications.
FAILURE
TO FILE AN AFFIDAVIT
22.
The respondents had failed to file any affidavit
or response to the complaint other than a note contending that the
proceedings
before the Equality Court in the Pretoria High Court had
not been finalised. The complainants then brought an application for
default
judgment.
23.
The procedures in the Equality Court differ
fundamentally from those which apply in the ordinary civil courts.
This is also foreshadowed
by s 19 the Act which adopts the Superior
Courts Act and the Uniform Rules (suitably modified) only “
in
so far as these provisions relate to-
(a) the appointment
and functions of officers;
(b) the issue and
service of process;
(c) the execution of
judgments or orders;
(d) the imposition of
penalties for non-compliance with orders of court, for obstruction of
execution of judgments or orders, and
for contempt of court;
(e)
jurisdiction
24.
The Regulations governing the conduct of proceedings in the Equality
Court have their own scheme and the application of any
of the courts
ordinary civil procedures are generally resorted to where it is
necessary to supplement.
[4]
The
guiding principles are that proceedings before an Equality Court are
expeditious, more informal, intended to be conducted in
a conducive
environment and guided by the Regulations dealing with the conduct of
the direction hearing.
[5]
24.
The proceedings before an Equality Court commence
with a complainant by completing a notice which substantially
corresponds to Form
2. The clerk must then notify the respondent by
forwarding a notice which substantially corresponds to Form 3 and in
terms of Reg
6 (2)(b) “
invite the
respondent, if he or she so wishes, to submit the information
contemplated in paragraph C of Form 3 of the Annexure in
writing
within 10 days of the receipt of such notice.”
The
operative word is “
invite
”
.
There is no penalty if a respondent does not wish to do so.
The
clerk then refers the matter to the presiding officer who, if he or
she does not refer the matter to another forum will require
the clerk
to assign a date for a directions hearing. A directions hearing in
terms of Reg 10 is intended to resolve administrative
or procedural
matters relating to the inquiry and the presiding officer will give
directions in respect of the conduct of the proceedings.
25.
There
is no provision for an application for default judgment if a party
fails to appear. The nature of the relief which the legislature
envisages will be granted by an Equality Court does not lend itself
to such a process: The relief sought will ordinarily include
remedial
or corrective measures or the issuing of directives which
in turn may involve other authorities.
[6]
It
is for this reason that irrespective of whether there is an
appearance by a respondent s 21 of the Act obliges the court to hold
an inquiry. An inquiry is peremptory.
26.
It is only in Reg 12 where one finds the
consequences of non-appearance by either a complainant or the
respondent. In the
case of a respondent under Reg 12 (4):
“
(a) If a
respondent, without reasonable excuse, does not attend a directions
hearing or the inquiry and the presiding officer is
satisfied that
proper notice of the directions hearing or the inquiry has been given
to the respondent, the presiding officer may-
(i)
order that the proceedings continue in the
absence of the respondent; and
(ii)
order the respondent to pay the costs of the complainant.
(b) The clerk must in
the event of an order contemplated in paragraph (a) (i) or (ii)
inform the respondent in writing accordingly.
27.
Accordingly the procedure adopted by the
complainant to apply for default judgment was not competent. On 2 May
and again on 27 May
I held directions hearings under Reg 10(5) which
regulated the procedural aspects of the matter in order to hold the
inquiry.
FAIR
HEARING ISSUES
28.
It was also necessary to deal with a number of
issues arising from the fact that the complainants were still not
represented by
lawyers. The first was to deal with their right in
terms of s 10(5)(e ) to obtain legal assistance and establish whether
they had
exhausted all reasonable avenues to obtain
pro
bono
counsel bearing in mind the
criteria they apply. It appeared that they had but were unable to
obtain the services of any and confirmed
that they would proceed
without legal assistance.
29.
In terms of s10 (5) (c) it is only after hearing
the views of the parties to the proceedings, that a court can make
certain orders.
In the present case since one of the parties;
a.
believed that I should hear the case by affidavit
only; and that
b.
the giving of evidence at the hearing, including
whether evidence of witnesses in chief should be given by
affidavit
it
was necessary to hear the views of the other party. This is by reason
of subsection (ix) and (xiii).
30.
I then
advised the parties that it was necessary to explain the content and
implications of any direction or order that may be made
if this court
was to separate the issues and deal with the question of whether a
prima
facie
case
had been made by reference to the affidavits alone and without
leading any evidence. I proceeded to do so.
[7]
31.
The parties considered that it was appropriate to
determine the issue separately and that no evidence other than the
affidavits
already before me would be considered. I considered it
necessary to deal with the question of separation and the nature of
the
evidence before me by reason of the provisions of s 10(5)(d)
which requires that:
“
the presiding
officer must, as far as possible, follow the legislation governing
the procedures in the court in which the proceedings
were instituted,
with appropriate changes for the purpose of supplementing this
regulation where necessary, but may, in the interests
of justice and
if no one is prejudiced, deviate from these procedures after hearing
the views of the parties to the proceedings.”
It
was also necessary to have regard to ss 10(6) and 10(7).
32.
Section
13 of the Act envisages a two stage enquiry, the first part of which
under s13(1) is for the complainant to demonstrate,
on the thin
threshold test of
prima
facie
proof,
that there was a discriminatory act or omission in terms of s
13(1)
[8]
.
Once
I was satisfied that the parties understood and agreed to it I
directed that I would first determine if there was
prima
facie
discrimination on the basis of:
a. Religious belief
b. Gender
c. Sexual orientation; or
d.
Economic and social
status.
[9]
THE
INQUIRY
33.
The inquiry then proceeded. As stated earlier the
complainants rely on the contents of the two reports provided by JvR
at the request
of the Children’s Court to demonstrate that the
respondents through their employee, agent or representative was
guilty of
unfair discrimination against them. The complainants also
relied on certain reports and publications of the first respondent
and
the KMDR.
I
will deal with the facts relied on in respect of each ground of
discrimination separately.
Religious
Belief
34.
The complainants contend that JvR by reason of the
beliefs adopted by the NGK, including in the training given to social
workers
such as her that she provided the two reports which
deliberately contained false allegations in order to destroy and
discredit
them. Its purpose was to remove the complainants’’
grandchildren from them,
“
because
they were members from another church and the complainants were in
her view disqualified to care for children, because the
complainants
practiced a different religious doctrine which is in conflict with
the doctrine of the Dutch Reformed Church.
35.
In JvR’s report (Exhibit K to the
complainants’ papers) under the heading
Religious
and Cultural Aspects
she wrote
“
The
P… family belong to the AGS Lofoord Church. They attend
services on Sundays. The children concerned were part of the
Power
Kids at the church. The P… family said that religion is an
important part of their life”
Then
under the “
Evaluation”
heading which sets out a
summary of each of the preceding headings, which covered employment
history, current circumstances, financial
background religious
aspects and many others JvR wrote “
The P… family
belong to the AGS denomination,”
It
is relevant to point out that the
P
family”
is identified in the
report as comprising not only the complainants but also their three
children including the biological mother
of the minor children whose
circumstances JvR had been requested to investigate.
36.
Finally the complainants rely under this head on a
passage contained in JvR’s reply to the complaint laid against
her before
her professional body by the complainants. In it she
refers to an interview she had on 3 October 2011 with the minor child
who
related that the first complainant had said that “
die
bloed van Jesus oor hulle is en dat ouma ook se dat “cheers”
sonde is”.
In answer to a
question the child told JvR that the first complainant had said that
it was evil because that is what stands in the
Bible.
JvR
did not take this up further with the child but approached the first
complainant who accused her of criticising her belief.
JvR stated
that this was definitely not the case and that she told the first
complainant that she must not use the Bible if it
does not appear in
it and said that she never criticised the “
P…
family’s
”
belief.
37.
The difficulty facing the complainants is that JvR
identified the complainants’ entire family, including
their daughter
and mother of the child as of the Apostolic faith yet
had no difficulty in recommending that a program be implemented that
will
result in the children being returned to either the biological
mother or father, that family re-unification services and
parental guidance programs be implemented in respect not only of the
children’s parents but also between them and the complainants
.
The
explanation for recommending that the children not be placed back
with the complainants has been cited earlier. It had nothing
to do
with belief but everything to do with the divisiveness JvR claimed
the complainants had caused which was not conducive to
the
restoration of the parent/child relationship between the biological
parents and their children.
38.
If regard is had to the reports as a whole and the
recommendations I am satisfied that the identification of the
complainants’
as of the Apostolic faith was neutral. The
confrontation between JvR and the first respondent was not an issue
of discrimination
but a different perspective in relation to
interacting with an impressionable child.
Again
if regard is had to JvR’s report as a whole it is not one
sided. There are many positive findings in relation to the
complainants. By way of illustration JvR refers to the complainants
wishing to provide for their family in the best possible way.
The
report also openly states that that it was difficult to finalise the
report “
because of resistance of
Mrs P .. at times”.
It
is therefore evident that the issues were not about a conflict of
beliefs but rather personality clashes between the first respondent
and JvR.
39.
The decisions regarding the placing of the
children clearly was because of concerns about the children’s
wellbeing where allegations
of abuse and sexual molestation were
levelled against both the biological father and the second respondent
with the psychologist
advising that the children’s mother’s
claim that the second applicant had sexually molested her as a child
could not
be discounted at that stage.
The
decision had to do with the best interests of the children having
regard to these accusations that were as yet untested. It
had nothing
to do with religious intolerance or discrimination. This is also
evident from the findings of the magistrate who relied
on the
psychologist reports attached to JvR’s report.
40.
Finally the complainants relied on the reports and
publications posted by the first respondent and the instructions by
the KMDR
to the second respondent of 1 April 2010 through to 30 March
2011. They suggest that the contents demonstrates a dogma of
intolerance
to any other Christian faiths. I do not agree with this
interpretation. In my view it demonstrates the opening of doors and
acceptance
of other Christian based beliefs.
41.
I am satisfied that the complainants have failed
to make out a
prima facie
case of religious discrimination.
Gender
and Sexual orientation
;
42.
The complainants contend that JvR also unfairly
discriminated against them by referring, in a block she had created
identifying
other the members of the “
P…
family
”
and their relationships;
a.
To the first respondent, who JvR identifies in the
first columns as “Mrs” but in the last column of the same
row under
the heading relationship, as the maternal
grandfather;
b.
To the second complainant, who JvR
identifies in the first columns as “Mr” but in the last
column of the same
row under the heading relationship, as the
maternal grandmother;
c.
To the then male partner of a person who bears the
surname of the complainants and the biological father and identified
as “Mr”
with the same initials as the second complainant
43.
It is evident from the other rows that JvR had
incorrectly cut and pasted names between blocks in the grid. Anyone
reading the blocks
as a whole would know this and that in the last
incident JvR had intended to refer to the biological mother by
reference to both
her maiden name and married surname.
44.
Far from suggesting that the complainants had
entered into same-sex relationships or were involved with the partner
of their daughter
every other reference to the complainants’
relationships was as the children’s grandfather and
grandmother.
45.
These were genuine errors and no incident of
discrimination against gender or sexual orientation can be
found, not even on
a
prima facie basis
Economic
and social status
46.
The complainants contend that JvR belittled their
economic and social status by using it to demonstrate that they were
not worthy
to care for their grandchildren.
47.
They contend that this is demonstrated by the
mention of the number of changes to their respective employment
status, by the use
of the word “
only”
when describing the first respondent’s
academic qualifications and by JvR questioning her employers to
determine whether the
first respondent had provided accurate details
of her employment history.
48.
In regard to the claim that the word “only”
was used disparagingly it is necessary to repeat the sentence as a
whole.
It reads;
“
Mrs
P... obtained grade 11 at … High School and left school in
1974. After school she obtained only her grade 12 typing
qualification, a certificate in a secretarial course, obtained a Real
Estate Agent qualification and a diploma in 2007 as a Business
Broker
at …… Mrs P … obtained her code 10 drivers
licence in 1997 when she worked for … Municipality
as a garden
technician
.”
Read
in its context the word “
only”
signifies that
there was one grade 12 subject she attained in addition to completing
grade 11. Without the inclusion of the word
there may have been lack
of clarity and ambiguity. One must bear in mind that the purpose of
the report was to present to the Children’s
Court at its
request a report and recommendation on the suitability of residence
and care of the children.
49.
The complainants have misunderstood the thrust of
the report and the need for the compiler to set out the employment
and academic
history of those who she is investigating in relation to
their suitability to become guardians of children and the need to do
a
check. I am satisfied that she did so professionally and
dispassionately. It is equally clear that the magistrate understood
it
as such since the reasons for not placing the children in the
continued care of the complainants was for other reasons relative
to
the potential risk posed by allegations of sexual and other abuse
levelled against both the second complainant and the biological
father.
50.
Once again there is nothing in the first
respondent’s publications suggesting the class or social bias
contended for by the
complainants which they allege JvR implemented.
Quite the contrary. It speaks of outreach and upliftment programs
involving the
less fortunate.
51.
I am satisfied that no
prima
facie
case made out on the
complainants’ papers of social or economic discrimination.
GENERAL
52.
The complainants approached the courts for
guardianship and were effectively rebuffed. From taking proactive
steps when the biological
parents appeared to be incapable of caring
for the children they became the target of accusations. But those
accusations were made
by their own daughter.
The
courts and social workers did their job in minimising the risk
inherent in the allegations that were being made and which, at
that
stage, remained disputed. They could not make findings and
consequently only sought to deal with how to protect the best
interests of the children in a very difficult situation where there
were insufficient facilities to get to the bottom of the allegations.
53.
While there were personality clashes I am
satisfied that relying only on the complainants papers they have not
made out a prima
facie case of discrimination.
ORDER
54.
For the reasons I have given the complaint
is dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
________________
SPILG, J
DATES
OF HEARINGS: 27 May, 28 June and 7 August 2019
DATE
OF JUDGMENT: 26 August 2019
FOR
COMPLAINANTS: In person
FOR
RESPONDENTS: Adv D Ungerer Couzyn Hertzog & Horak
[1]
Compare
S
v Neotel(Pty) Ltd
2019
(1) SA 622 (GJ)
[2]
Preamble to the Equality Act
[3]
Per Sachs J in
Trustees
For The Time Being Of The Biowatch
Trust
v Registrar, Genetic Resources and Others
2009 (6) SA 232
(CC) ;
2009 (10) BCLR 1014
(CC) at paras 16-18
[4]
In terms of Reg 10(2):
The regulations
regulating the proceedings of the inquiry must, as far as possible,
be interpreted in a manner that gives effect
to the guiding
principles contemplated in section 4 of the Act.
This
is echoed in Reg 10(5)(d) as one of the guiding principles but which
also accepts that;
“
the presiding
officer must, as far as possible, follow the legislation governing
the procedures in the court in which the proceedings
were
instituted, with appropriate changes for the purpose of
supplementing this regulation where necessary, but may, in the
interests of justice and if no one is prejudiced, deviate from these
procedures after hearing the views of the parties to the
proceedings
.”
[5]
Reg 10(3). See also Reg 10(1) which provides under the heading
“
Powers
and functions of court”:
(1) The inquiry must
be conducted in an expeditious and informal manner which facilitates
and promotes participation by the parties
[6]
See s 21(2) of the Act. By way of illustration; realistically it is
not possible to grant much of the relief under subsection
(g) to (m)
without holding an inquiry. Ss 21(2) (g) to (m) provide:
(g) an order to make
specific opportunities and privileges unfairly denied in the
circumstances, available to the complainant
in question;
(h) an order for the
implementation of special measures to address the unfair
discrimination, hate speech or harassment in question;
(i) an order directing
the reasonable accommodation of a group or class of persons by the
respondent;
(j) an order that an
unconditional apology be made;
(k) an order requiring
the respondent to undergo an audit of specific policies or practices
as determined by the court;
(l) an appropriate order
of a deterrent nature, including the recommendation to the
appropriate authority, to suspend or revoke
the licence of a person;
(m) a directive
requiring the respondent to make regular progress reports to the
court or to the relevant constitutional institution
regarding the
implementation of the court's order;
[7]
I should add that the damages claim for R15 million which included
special; damages would itself have involved considerable time
and
expense and it was to the advantage of both parties that the court
should first establish whether the claim itself had merit.
[8]
Section 13(1) provides that:
13
Burden
of proof
(1) If the
complainant makes out a prima facie case of discrimination-
(a) the respondent
must prove, on the facts before the court, that the discrimination
did not take place as alleged; or
(b) the respondent
must prove that the conduct is not based on one or more of the
prohibited grounds.
“
Discrimination
”
in s1 is defined as;
any act or omission,
including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation
which directly or indirectly-
(a) imposes burdens,
obligations or disadvantage on; or
(b) withholds
benefits, opportunities or advantages from,
any person on one or
more of the prohibited grounds;
[9]
These are all “
prohibited
grounds”
in
terms of the s 1 definition section