Donaldo v Haripersa (29/05) [2007] ZAEQC 3 (5 January 2007)

80 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Equality — Hate Speech and Harassment — Damages — Complainant established a prima facie case of hate speech and harassment against the Respondent. The court considered the Complainant's claims for both patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including financial loss and emotional suffering. The court dismissed claims for financial losses related to an aborted trip and unsubstantiated medical costs but awarded R10,000 for impairment of dignity and emotional suffering. The Respondent was ordered to issue a written apology and make payments in instalments, with penalties for non-compliance.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an Equality Court matter in the District of Durban concerning the appropriate relief to be granted after a finding of hate speech and harassment under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (PEPUDA).


The complainant was H I Donaldo and the respondent was R Haripersa(d). The judgment provided concerns quantum, namely the assessment of damages and related remedial orders, rather than liability.


Procedurally, the court had previously (on 20 October 2006) found that the complainant had established her complaint of hate speech and harassment on a prima facie basis, as contemplated in section 13 of PEPUDA. The court then heard argument and evidence directed at quantum on 29 November 2006, reserved its decision on that aspect, and delivered this ruling on 5 January 2007.


The dispute at this stage concerned the extent to which the complainant had proved financial loss and/or non-patrimonial harm (including impairment of dignity and emotional and psychological suffering) attributable to the respondent’s conduct, and what remedial orders would be appropriate in the circumstances under section 21 of PEPUDA.


2. Material Facts


The court approached the facts through two broad categories drawn from the complainant’s evidence: alleged patrimonial loss (proven financial loss) and alleged non-patrimonial harm (impairment of dignity and emotional/psychological suffering).


As to alleged patrimonial loss, the complainant testified that in 2005 she was preparing for an extended study visit to the United Kingdom. She produced documentation (admitted by agreement) reflecting that amounts of 2 500 pounds sterling and USD 930 were expended in anticipation of that trip. She further testified that, due to delays in the processing of the matter and advice received from an investigating officer concerning the consequences of withdrawing related criminal charges or absenting herself, she did not proceed with the trip and lost the amounts paid.


The complainant also testified that her legal expenses were approximately R15 500, and that she incurred further costs in obtaining sick-leave certificates from medical practitioners in order to attend court hearings, though these medical-related expenses were not fully quantified.


As to non-patrimonial harm, the complainant testified that she was 38 years old and the respondent 20 years old at the time. She was a married educator. She described the incident as occurring in a shop in the presence of customers, where the respondent swore and shouted at her in a manner she experienced as degrading. The respondent’s words included the expression “Kaffir Bitch”. She stated she felt shocked and violated, and further indicated that the incident continued to affect her because others who witnessed it, or heard about it, repeatedly reminded her of it, which she experienced as a continuing reminder of the trauma.


The court recorded that cross-examination did not dislodge the complainant’s testimony on patrimonial loss, and that she was not cross-examined on the portion of her evidence dealing with impairment of dignity and emotional/psychological suffering.


The respondent did not rely on a substantive factual defence on the merits at this stage. The court recorded that the respondent’s sole defence had been that he was not present, and that the substance of the complaint was therefore not put in dispute. The respondent also gave evidence about his personal circumstances relevant to the relief, stating that he was unemployed, did casual electrical repair work, lived with his mother and stepfather, contributed to a household with accounts in arrears, and had been unable to take up an employment opportunity due to needing to attend court proceedings.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the proper application of section 21(2)(d) of PEPUDA to the facts established in the quantum enquiry. In particular, the court was required to determine whether the complainant had proved:


Whether there was proven financial loss causally attributable to the respondent’s conduct for which damages could be awarded under section 21(2)(d).


Whether, and in what amount, damages should be awarded for impairment of dignity, pain and suffering, emotional and psychological suffering as a result of the hate speech and harassment.


Whether additional remedial orders (not limited to monetary relief) were appropriate in the circumstances, given the Equality Court’s remedial framework and the respondent’s personal circumstances.


The dispute at this stage largely concerned the application of law to fact, particularly issues of causation and the sufficiency of proof for claimed financial loss, as well as an evaluative assessment of appropriate non-patrimonial damages and remedial measures.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began by analysing section 21(2)(d) of PEPUDA, which empowers an Equality Court, after an inquiry, to make an appropriate order including damages for proven financial loss (including future loss) and damages for impairment of dignity, pain and suffering, or emotional and psychological suffering resulting from unfair discrimination, hate speech, or harassment.


In approaching damages, the court noted that the concept of damages is rooted in civil court practice, and that although the Equality Court has a “quasi-constitutional” character, it applies a civil standard of adjudication. The court referred to academic writing for this proposition and aligned its understanding of “damages” with civil-law conceptions, while locating the Equality Court’s function within the broader constitutional context of the right to equality (section 9 of the Constitution) that PEPUDA was enacted to advance. The court also indicated that practitioners should appreciate the Equality Court’s distinctive ethos, described as a continuum from constitutional rights to courtroom adjudication.


Turning to the complainant’s claimed patrimonial losses, the court rejected the claim based on the aborted study trip. The court’s reason was one of causation: it held that this loss was not occasioned by any action of the respondent and therefore could not ground an award of damages against him under section 21(2)(d). On the same footing, the court disallowed the claim for legal expenses, reasoning that the respondent could not be held responsible where the complainant chose to engage an attorney. It also disallowed the medical-related costs because they were unsubstantiated.


The court then addressed the complainant’s claim for non-patrimonial harm. It upheld the claim for impairment of dignity and emotional and psychological suffering, noting in substance that the respondent had not meaningfully contested the complaint’s substance. The court emphasised that an award of damages is an intricate assessment and that, in this context, the court had to pay particular attention to the impact of hate speech and harassment on the complainant. It stated that the impact must, of necessity, be viewed from a subjective perspective, and it treated the complainant’s evidence in that regard as significant, particularly given the absence of cross-examination on that portion of her testimony.


In determining an appropriate remedy, the court indicated that it also had to be cognisant of the effect of financial orders (including costs) on the respondent. The respondent’s personal circumstances were therefore relevant to structuring relief. This was reflected in the instalment structure of the monetary award and in the inclusion of apology-based remedies, which the court considered necessary to meaningfully address the complaint and provide appropriate redress.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court made an order designed to address both the complainant’s non-patrimonial harm and the broader remedial objectives of the Equality Court.


The claim for damages arising from the complainant’s aborted trip was dismissed because the court found the loss was not caused by the respondent’s conduct. The complainant’s claimed legal expenses were also disallowed, as were the unsubstantiated medical costs.


The court granted relief for impairment of dignity and emotional and psychological suffering. It ordered the respondent to provide a written apology admitting use of the words “Kaffir Bitch”, retracting them, acknowledging that they were harmful and hurtful, and apologising unconditionally. This apology was required to be signed and delivered to the Clerk of the Equality Court within 21 days, failing which the Clerk was directed to lodge a complaint of contempt with the Director of Public Prosecutions.


The court further ordered the respondent to pay damages of R10 000 to the complainant, payable in ten monthly instalments of R1 000 each, with specified payment mechanics through the Clerk of the Equality Court. The order stipulated that failure to comply would result in a civil judgment being noted against the respondent without notice.


In addition, the respondent was ordered to address a separate letter of apology to the Presiding Officer of the Equality Court, apologising unconditionally for stating (to a witness, Timothy Tshabalala) that he did not care about the law, and affirming respect for the constitutional principle that everyone is equal before the law and entitled to equal protection. This apology was also due within 21 days and subject to the same contempt-related enforcement mechanism.


The judgment did not make a separate costs order.


Cases Cited


No reported cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (sections 13, 21(2)(d), and 23(1)).


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 9).


Rules of Court Cited


Regulation 19(1) relating to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000.


Held


The court held that damages under section 21(2)(d) require proof of loss that is attributable to the respondent’s conduct, and it rejected the complainant’s claimed financial losses for the aborted trip, legal expenses, and unsubstantiated medical costs on that basis.


The court held that the complainant had established compensable non-patrimonial harm, specifically impairment of dignity and emotional and psychological suffering, arising from hate speech and harassment, and that appropriate redress included both monetary damages and apology-based remedies. The respondent was ordered to pay R10 000 in damages in instalments and to deliver two written apologies, with enforcement consequences stipulated for non-compliance.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Damages under section 21(2)(d) of PEPUDA may be awarded for proven financial loss (including future loss) and for impairment of dignity, pain and suffering, emotional and psychological suffering resulting from unfair discrimination, hate speech, or harassment; however, claimed financial loss must be shown to have been occasioned by the respondent’s conduct to justify an award.


Although the Equality Court has a quasi-constitutional character and operates within a constitutional continuum linked to the right to equality, it applies a civil standard of adjudication when determining damages, drawing on civil-law conceptions of damages while pursuing the Act’s remedial objectives.


In assessing damages for hate speech and harassment affecting dignity and psychological well-being, the enquiry requires an evaluative assessment attentive to the impact on the complainant, which the court stated must be viewed from a subjective perspective, and the court may craft non-monetary remedies (such as apologies) as part of an appropriate order.


In determining the structure and effect of financial relief, the court may take into account the respondent’s personal circumstances in shaping orders (for example, permitting instalment payments), while still providing meaningful redress for proven non-patrimonial harm.

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[2007] ZAEQC 3
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Donaldo v Haripersa (29/05) [2007] ZAEQC 3 (5 January 2007)

IN
THE EQUALITY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DURBAN
HELD AT DURBAN
CASE
NO: 29/05
DATE:05/01/2007
In
the matter between
H
I
DONALDO
...................................................................................................
COMPLAINANT
And
R
HARIPERSA
...................................................................................................
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
ON QUANTUM
TO:
MRS H I DONALDO
C/O
ATTORNEY S P KUNENE (FOR COLLECTION)
AND
TO: MR R HARIPERSAD
C/O
ATTORNEY S BALGOBIND DURBAN JUSTICE CENTRE (FOR COLLECTION)
INTRODUCTION
On
20 October 2006 the court found that the Complainant had established
(as set out in the provisions of section 13 of the Promotion
of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the
Act)) the complaint of Hate Speech and Harassment on a prima
facie
basis. The court heard the
respective
submissions on quantum on 29 November 2006 and the ruling on this
aspect was reserved.
I
now deal with this aspect.
AN
ANALYSIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21(2) (d) This section
provides as follows.
(2)
"After holding an inquiry, the court may make an appropriate
order in the circumstances, including;
(d)
An order for the payment of any damages in respect of any proven
financial loss, including future loss, or in respect of impairment
of
dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and psychological suffering
as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or
harassment
in question"
The
concept of damages has its foundation in the civil court practice,
and although this court has a "^^/-constitutional"

character it applies the civil standard of adjudication. (See S
Jagwanth, The constitutional roles and responsibilities ofLower

Courts (2002) 13SAJHR201 at 212)
The
authors Visser and Potgieter define Damages or Damage as "the
diminution as a result of a damage-causing event, in the
utility or
quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the
legally recognised needs of the person involved "(Law
of Damages
Juta & company Ltd 1993 at 22). This is the civil court usage,
read together with section 21(2) (d) that this court
will apply.
In
his address Mr Kunene referred to both the personality as well as the
patrimonial interests of the complainant in the sense that
it was
complainant's testimony that she had incurred both proven
financial/quantifiable patrimonial loss as well as infringements
of
her rights to dignity and emotional and psychological suffering.
Rather, this is the construction that the court put on his

submissions that were subsumed under the traditional captions of
Special Damages and General Damages, which are, strictly speaking,

concepts that only relate to actions founded in delict. They are
really not suited to meet the definitional criteria of section
21 (2)
(d). Apart from this Mr Kunene dealt adequately with the evidential
aspects.
I
divert slightly at this point to suggest that practitioners
consciously re-orientate themselves to an understanding of the
court's
"quasi-constitutional" character. This is seminal
to the aims and objects of the Act, that itself was legislated to
give
substance to the Right to Equality that is found in section 9 of
the Constitution.
There
is therefore a continuum that begins with the Constitution and runs
into the courtroom adjudication process. An appreciation
of this
truism distinguishes the Equality Court's ethos from the Rules and
Act-bound practice in the civil courts.
THE
EVIDENCE FOR COMPLAINANT
I
deal firstly with what I shall refer to her testimony on her
patrimonial damages/proved financial loss. I will refer to this as

"the first inquiry".
Thenjiwe
Immaculata Donaldo testified that at the time that the complaint
arose in 2005 she was in the throes of preparing to undertake
an
extended study visit to the United Kingdom. These preparations,
together with the accompanying expenses involved were amply

documented in papers that Ms Balgobind agreed were admissible. In
essence these indicated that the sums of 2 500pounds sterling
and
$930. 00 were expended in anticipation of embarking on the study
visit.
Complainant
also testifies that she expected that the complaint would have been
dealt with timeously in order to allow her to undertake
the visit.
When she became aware of the delays that (then) could have
potentially impeded her plans she discussed the withdrawal
of the
criminal charges against the Respondent that were then pending, with
the investigation officer. She was advised that if
were to do so or
were she to absent herself that she would face criminal charges. This
dissuaded her from this course of action.
In the circumstances she
was clearly poorly advised, however she followed this advice and in
the process forfeited the visit and
the monies she had paid. She also
testified that her legal expenses amounted to approximately R15 500
00.
In
addition she had to pay for a number of sick-leave certificates from
various medical practitioners in order to attend court hearings.
She
could not quantify these payments fully.
She
then testified to her non-patrimonial damages/impairment of her
dignity, emotional and psychological suffering. This segment
will be
referred to as "the second inquiry".
She
stated that she was thirty eight years old, whilst the respondent was
twenty years old. She was then a married educator who
taught scholars
who were in the same age grouping as Respondent and the fact that he
had sworn and shouted at her in a shop filled
with customers degraded
her as a person and as a woman. At the time she felt shocked and
violated and also thereafter when Respondent
remarked that he did not
care about the law or the constitution and that he swore at about ten
people a day.
An
aftermath of this is that she was constantly being reminded of this
incident by those who witnessed the incident or who had heard
about
it. This amounted to a constant reminder of the trauma related to the
incident.
All
of these matters impelled her to lay the complaint and when there was
no meaningful progress with the complaint after four months
she
decided to engage the services of Mr Kunene.
Ms
Bafgobind's cross-examination focussec! on the Complainant's
testimony in relation to the first inquiry that ultimately did not

impugn her earlier testimony. Crucially, she was not cross examined
on what I refer to as the "second inquiry"
THE
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT
Ms
Balgobind referred to an affidavit wherein Respondent set out his
personal circumstances. The court required him rather to testify
to
these. He stated that he was presently unemployed and was casually
engaged to repair electrical appliances and it wad for this
reason
that he applied for legal aid assistance.
He
was living with his mother and stepfather and was required to
contribute to the upkeep of the household where many accounts for

services were in arrears. He was planning to seek employment in
Johannesburg after the hearing. He was about to have been employed
in
Johannesburg in October 2006 but was not appointed as he had to
attend an earlier hearing in this court on 20 October 2006.
THE
COURT'S FINDING ON QUANTUM
The
court does not take the expenditure relating to Complainant's aborted
trip into account. This loss was not occasioned by any
action of the
Respondent and this aspect of the claim is dismissed.
The
Respondent chose to engage an attorney's services and Respondent
cannot
be held to account for this.
The
unsubstantiated medical costs too are disallowed.
The
court sustains the Complainant's claim for impairment of her dignity
and emotional and psychological suffering. The court must
also be
cognisant of the impact of an order for costs on the Respondent.
The
Respondent's sole defence was that he was not present and the
substance of the complaint was therefore not put into dispute
and the
Respondent
abandoned the contents of an affidavit dated 29 June 2005 wherein he
stated that he was not person who committed the
offence.
The
court is under these circumstances duty bound to make an award for
damages- which is always an intricate and demanding assessment.
In
the present case the court is obliged to take particular note of the
impact of the Hate Speech and Harassment on the Complainant
and the
court must of necessity view the impact from a subjective
perspective.
It
is found that in order to meaningfully address the complaint and
adequately compensate the Complainant as best as the court can,
the
following order is made:
1.
Respondent is ordered to make a written apology to the Complainant
wherein he admits the use of the words "Kaffir Bitch"
that
he retracts the words whilst admitting that these were harmful,
hurtful and apologises unconditionally for their usage. This
signed,
written apology is to be forwarded to the Clerk of court within 21
(twenty one) days of this Order. Failure to do so will
amount to the
Clerk lodging a complaint of Contempt of the Court's Order with the
Director of Public Prosecutions.
2.
Respondent is ordered to pay damages in the sum of R10 000.00 (Ten
Thousand Rands) to the Complainant. This is to be paid in
ten
instalments of R1 000.00 each in cash or by bank guaranteed cheques
to the Clerk of the Equality Court, Durban who wil! issue
a receipt
to the payer. The first payment is due on or before 7 March 2007 and
each further payment will fail due on or before
the 7th day of each
succeeding month. Failure to comply with any payment as stipulated
will result in a civil judgment being noted
against the name of the
Respondent without any notice to him.
3.
Respondent is further ordered to address a letter of apology to the
Presiding Officer of the Equality Court, Durban wherein he
apologises
unconditionally for the use of the words (directed at witness Timothy
Tshabaiala) namely, that he did not care about
the law. This apology
is to assert that everyone is equal before the law and is also
entitled to the equal protection of the iaw
and that he respects
these provisions of the Constitution. This too must be forwarded to
the Clerk of the court within 21 days
and is subject to the same
penalty provision as in clause 1 (above)
DATED
AT DURBAN ON 05 JANUARY 2007
G
L ABRAHAMS:
PRESIDING
OFFICER
PLEASE
NOTE: Any person who is dissatisfied by an order made by the Equality
Court may appeal against such order in the required
manner and time
to either the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal, as the case
may be. An appeal can also be made directly
to the Constitutional
Court. In terms of Regulation 19(1) any person wishing to appeal
against any order made by the court as contemplated
in section 23( 1)
of the Act, must within 14 days of such order being made, deliver a
notice of appeal to the clerk and to the
complainant or the
respondent as the case maybe. (See Regulation 19 relating to the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
2000
)