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[2007] ZAEQC 3
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Donaldo v Haripersa (29/05) [2007] ZAEQC 3 (5 January 2007)
IN
THE EQUALITY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DURBAN
HELD AT DURBAN
CASE
NO: 29/05
DATE:05/01/2007
In
the matter between
H
I
DONALDO
...................................................................................................
COMPLAINANT
And
R
HARIPERSA
...................................................................................................
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
ON QUANTUM
TO:
MRS H I DONALDO
C/O
ATTORNEY S P KUNENE (FOR COLLECTION)
AND
TO: MR R HARIPERSAD
C/O
ATTORNEY S BALGOBIND DURBAN JUSTICE CENTRE (FOR COLLECTION)
INTRODUCTION
On
20 October 2006 the court found that the Complainant had established
(as set out in the provisions of section 13 of the Promotion
of
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (the
Act)) the complaint of Hate Speech and Harassment on a prima
facie
basis. The court heard the
respective
submissions on quantum on 29 November 2006 and the ruling on this
aspect was reserved.
I
now deal with this aspect.
AN
ANALYSIS OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21(2) (d) This section
provides as follows.
(2)
"After holding an inquiry, the court may make an appropriate
order in the circumstances, including;
(d)
An order for the payment of any damages in respect of any proven
financial loss, including future loss, or in respect of impairment
of
dignity, pain and suffering or emotional and psychological suffering
as a result of the unfair discrimination, hate speech or
harassment
in question"
The
concept of damages has its foundation in the civil court practice,
and although this court has a "^^/-constitutional"
character it applies the civil standard of adjudication. (See S
Jagwanth, The constitutional roles and responsibilities ofLower
Courts (2002) 13SAJHR201 at 212)
The
authors Visser and Potgieter define Damages or Damage as "the
diminution as a result of a damage-causing event, in the
utility or
quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in satisfying the
legally recognised needs of the person involved "(Law
of Damages
Juta & company Ltd 1993 at 22). This is the civil court usage,
read together with section 21(2) (d) that this court
will apply.
In
his address Mr Kunene referred to both the personality as well as the
patrimonial interests of the complainant in the sense that
it was
complainant's testimony that she had incurred both proven
financial/quantifiable patrimonial loss as well as infringements
of
her rights to dignity and emotional and psychological suffering.
Rather, this is the construction that the court put on his
submissions that were subsumed under the traditional captions of
Special Damages and General Damages, which are, strictly speaking,
concepts that only relate to actions founded in delict. They are
really not suited to meet the definitional criteria of section
21 (2)
(d). Apart from this Mr Kunene dealt adequately with the evidential
aspects.
I
divert slightly at this point to suggest that practitioners
consciously re-orientate themselves to an understanding of the
court's
"quasi-constitutional" character. This is seminal
to the aims and objects of the Act, that itself was legislated to
give
substance to the Right to Equality that is found in section 9 of
the Constitution.
There
is therefore a continuum that begins with the Constitution and runs
into the courtroom adjudication process. An appreciation
of this
truism distinguishes the Equality Court's ethos from the Rules and
Act-bound practice in the civil courts.
THE
EVIDENCE FOR COMPLAINANT
I
deal firstly with what I shall refer to her testimony on her
patrimonial damages/proved financial loss. I will refer to this as
"the first inquiry".
Thenjiwe
Immaculata Donaldo testified that at the time that the complaint
arose in 2005 she was in the throes of preparing to undertake
an
extended study visit to the United Kingdom. These preparations,
together with the accompanying expenses involved were amply
documented in papers that Ms Balgobind agreed were admissible. In
essence these indicated that the sums of 2 500pounds sterling
and
$930. 00 were expended in anticipation of embarking on the study
visit.
Complainant
also testifies that she expected that the complaint would have been
dealt with timeously in order to allow her to undertake
the visit.
When she became aware of the delays that (then) could have
potentially impeded her plans she discussed the withdrawal
of the
criminal charges against the Respondent that were then pending, with
the investigation officer. She was advised that if
were to do so or
were she to absent herself that she would face criminal charges. This
dissuaded her from this course of action.
In the circumstances she
was clearly poorly advised, however she followed this advice and in
the process forfeited the visit and
the monies she had paid. She also
testified that her legal expenses amounted to approximately R15 500
00.
In
addition she had to pay for a number of sick-leave certificates from
various medical practitioners in order to attend court hearings.
She
could not quantify these payments fully.
She
then testified to her non-patrimonial damages/impairment of her
dignity, emotional and psychological suffering. This segment
will be
referred to as "the second inquiry".
She
stated that she was thirty eight years old, whilst the respondent was
twenty years old. She was then a married educator who
taught scholars
who were in the same age grouping as Respondent and the fact that he
had sworn and shouted at her in a shop filled
with customers degraded
her as a person and as a woman. At the time she felt shocked and
violated and also thereafter when Respondent
remarked that he did not
care about the law or the constitution and that he swore at about ten
people a day.
An
aftermath of this is that she was constantly being reminded of this
incident by those who witnessed the incident or who had heard
about
it. This amounted to a constant reminder of the trauma related to the
incident.
All
of these matters impelled her to lay the complaint and when there was
no meaningful progress with the complaint after four months
she
decided to engage the services of Mr Kunene.
Ms
Bafgobind's cross-examination focussec! on the Complainant's
testimony in relation to the first inquiry that ultimately did not
impugn her earlier testimony. Crucially, she was not cross examined
on what I refer to as the "second inquiry"
THE
EVIDENCE OF RESPONDENT
Ms
Balgobind referred to an affidavit wherein Respondent set out his
personal circumstances. The court required him rather to testify
to
these. He stated that he was presently unemployed and was casually
engaged to repair electrical appliances and it wad for this
reason
that he applied for legal aid assistance.
He
was living with his mother and stepfather and was required to
contribute to the upkeep of the household where many accounts for
services were in arrears. He was planning to seek employment in
Johannesburg after the hearing. He was about to have been employed
in
Johannesburg in October 2006 but was not appointed as he had to
attend an earlier hearing in this court on 20 October 2006.
THE
COURT'S FINDING ON QUANTUM
The
court does not take the expenditure relating to Complainant's aborted
trip into account. This loss was not occasioned by any
action of the
Respondent and this aspect of the claim is dismissed.
The
Respondent chose to engage an attorney's services and Respondent
cannot
be held to account for this.
The
unsubstantiated medical costs too are disallowed.
The
court sustains the Complainant's claim for impairment of her dignity
and emotional and psychological suffering. The court must
also be
cognisant of the impact of an order for costs on the Respondent.
The
Respondent's sole defence was that he was not present and the
substance of the complaint was therefore not put into dispute
and the
Respondent
abandoned the contents of an affidavit dated 29 June 2005 wherein he
stated that he was not person who committed the
offence.
The
court is under these circumstances duty bound to make an award for
damages- which is always an intricate and demanding assessment.
In
the present case the court is obliged to take particular note of the
impact of the Hate Speech and Harassment on the Complainant
and the
court must of necessity view the impact from a subjective
perspective.
It
is found that in order to meaningfully address the complaint and
adequately compensate the Complainant as best as the court can,
the
following order is made:
1.
Respondent is ordered to make a written apology to the Complainant
wherein he admits the use of the words "Kaffir Bitch"
that
he retracts the words whilst admitting that these were harmful,
hurtful and apologises unconditionally for their usage. This
signed,
written apology is to be forwarded to the Clerk of court within 21
(twenty one) days of this Order. Failure to do so will
amount to the
Clerk lodging a complaint of Contempt of the Court's Order with the
Director of Public Prosecutions.
2.
Respondent is ordered to pay damages in the sum of R10 000.00 (Ten
Thousand Rands) to the Complainant. This is to be paid in
ten
instalments of R1 000.00 each in cash or by bank guaranteed cheques
to the Clerk of the Equality Court, Durban who wil! issue
a receipt
to the payer. The first payment is due on or before 7 March 2007 and
each further payment will fail due on or before
the 7th day of each
succeeding month. Failure to comply with any payment as stipulated
will result in a civil judgment being noted
against the name of the
Respondent without any notice to him.
3.
Respondent is further ordered to address a letter of apology to the
Presiding Officer of the Equality Court, Durban wherein he
apologises
unconditionally for the use of the words (directed at witness Timothy
Tshabaiala) namely, that he did not care about
the law. This apology
is to assert that everyone is equal before the law and is also
entitled to the equal protection of the iaw
and that he respects
these provisions of the Constitution. This too must be forwarded to
the Clerk of the court within 21 days
and is subject to the same
penalty provision as in clause 1 (above)
DATED
AT DURBAN ON 05 JANUARY 2007
G
L ABRAHAMS:
PRESIDING
OFFICER
PLEASE
NOTE: Any person who is dissatisfied by an order made by the Equality
Court may appeal against such order in the required
manner and time
to either the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal, as the case
may be. An appeal can also be made directly
to the Constitutional
Court. In terms of Regulation 19(1) any person wishing to appeal
against any order made by the court as contemplated
in section 23( 1)
of the Act, must within 14 days of such order being made, deliver a
notice of appeal to the clerk and to the
complainant or the
respondent as the case maybe. (See Regulation 19 relating to the
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
2000
)