Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions (202/2002) [2003] ZASCA 74; [2003] 4 All SA 16 (SCA) (4 September 2003)

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[2003] ZASCA 74
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Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions (202/2002) [2003] ZASCA 74; [2003] 4 All SA 16 (SCA); 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA); 2003 (2) SACR 410 (SCA) (4 September 2003)

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
OF SOUTH AFRICA
REPORTABLE
CASE NO: 202/2002
In
the matter between
:
ANDREW LIONEL PHILLIPS First
Appellant
LADDIES
LARK (PTY) LTD Second Appellant
JANVEST
CLOSE CORPORATION Third Appellant
APVEST
CLOSE CORPORATION Fourth Appellant
MAYVEST
CLOSE CORPORATION Fifth Appellant
JUNVEST
CLOSE CORPORATION Sixth Appellant
AUGVEST
CLOSE CORPORATION Seventh Appellant
DECVEST CLOSE CORPORATION Eighth Appellant
PORTION 1 of 247 EDENBURG CLOSE CORPORATION Ninth Appellant
SUSHIMI INV CLOSE CORPORATION Tenth Appellant
SWINGING TRADING TWISTER CLOSE CORPORATION Eleventh
Appellant
FEBWEST CLOSE CORPORATION Twelfth Appellant
D MORNINGSIDE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Thirteenth Appellant
STEPHEN WERNER CLOSE CORPORATION Fourteenth Appellant
MOONLIGHT IMPORT & EXPORT CLOSE CORPORATION Fifteenth
Appellant
and
THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent
CORAM: HOWIE P, ZULMAN, NUGENT, CONRADIE JJA
et
MLAMBO AJA
HEARD: 15 AUGUST 2003
DELIVERED:
4 SEPTEMBER 2003
Summary:
Restraint order under
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998
– appealability of such order
J U D G M E N T
HOWIE P/
HOWIE P:
[1] For many years first appellant
has owned and operated a business called the Ranch. It is conducted
on suburban premises in Sandton.
The business involves providing a
venue and facilities where men can go to have sexual relations with
women prostitutes, or sex workers.
The women are not employees of the
business. They are free agents. However, they work there in shifts
and to gain access to the premises
they each have to pay first
appellant a certain sum per shift. Each customer has to pay him an
admission charge. In addition, the
customers pay the women for sexual
services rendered but first appellant receives no part of those
payments. The current amount each
of the women has to pay is R450 per
shift and a customer’s entry fee is R250.
[2] Arising out of his conduct of
this business first appellant is presently facing criminal
prosecution on several counts. Two are
based on the provisions of the
Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957. Under s 2 he is charged with keeping
a brothel and, under s 20 (1)
(a), with living off the earnings of
prostitution. It is unnecessary for present purposes to refer to the
other charges.
[3] In December 2000 the present
respondent, the National Director of Public Prosecutions, applied
ex
parte
to the High Court in Johannesburg for a restraint order in
terms of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘the
Act’).
Cited as respondents were first appellant and 14 companies
or close corporations of which he is either sole shareholder or sole
member.
The application came before Labe J in chambers who issued a
provisional restraint order in the form of a rule
nisi
, with
immediate effect pending the return day, in respect of all first
appellant’s realisable property and the property owned by
his
companies and corporations. That same day the property was seized
and attached, some of it at first appellant’s home. On
the return
day appellant sought the discharge of the order. Having heard
argument, Heher J confirmed the rule but subsequently granted
first
appellant and the other erstwhile respondents leave to appeal to this
Court. The judgment of Heher J is reported as
National Director of
Public Prosecutions v Phillips and Others
2002 (4) SA 60
(W).
[4] Of the various issues raised on appeal the first
that requires consideration is the contention on behalf of the
respondent that
the order made by Heher J is not appealable.
[5] As the learned judge confirmed
the rule without modification, regard must be had to the contents of
the provisional order. Summarised,
its three elements relevant to the
present point were these. First, having described the property to
which the order related, it
prohibited first appellant, and anyone
having knowledge of the order, from ‘dealing in any manner with the
property, except as
required or permitted by this order’. Second, a
curator
bonis
was appointed to seize the property, to take
control and care of it and to administer it. Third, any of the
restrained property in
the possession of the appellants had to be
surrendered to the curator.
[6] These three elements were
variously based on provisions of the Act. Consideration of
respondent’s contention therefore requires
analysis of the material
sections. They are contained in Chapter 5 and embody a scheme
structured to enable the State to obtain confiscation
of the proceeds
by means of which convicted criminals have succeeded in making crime
pay.
[7] Chapter 5 comprises sections 12 to 36. In s 18 (1)
it is provided that in the event of any conviction the trial court
may hold
an enquiry to determine whether the accused (referred to in
the Act as ‘the defendant’) derived any benefit from his offence.
If so, that court may make a confiscation order against him.
[8] To ensure in advance that the
offender’s assets, or any of them, are available at the time of
trial so as to satisfy a confiscation
order, respondent is empowered
by s 26 to apply to the High Court for a restraint order prohibiting
the defendant from dealing in
any manner with his assets. The making
of a confiscation order is within the exercise of a wide discretion
accorded the trial court.
Although I refer to ‘the trial court’
for convenience, it is made clear in s 13 that proceedings for a
confiscation order, and
for a restraint order, are in all material
respects civil proceedings,
inter alia
, in regard to the rules
of evidence and the requirement that facts be established only on a
balance of probabilities.
[9] In terms of s 18 (2) the quantum
of a confiscation order may not exceed the lesser of two amounts. One
is the value of the benefit
which the defendant derived either from
the offence or offences of which he is convicted and, according to s
18 (1) (c), from any
other criminal activity which the court finds to
be ‘sufficiently related’ to those offences. The second
determinative amount
is that which might be attained by realising,
among other things, such assets as the defendant has at the time of
the confiscation
order. For convenience I shall refer to the assets
subject to the restraint order as ‘the restrained assets’.
[10] In terms of s 25 the High Court
hearing an application for a restraint order has a discretion to
grant it only if certain jurisdictional
facts are established. The
most important one for present purposes is that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a confiscation
order may be made against the
defendant.
[11] If a restraint order is made the
Court must at the same time make an order authorising seizure of all
movable restrained assets
(s 26 (8)); may at any time appoint a
curator
bonis
to take control and care of the restrained
assets (s 28(1)); and may at any time order the endorsement of
restrictive conditions
on the title deeds of any immovable
restrained assets (s 29(1)).
[12] A restraint order has only
temporary duration. It operates pending the outcome of later events.
In terms of s 26(10)(b) it must
be rescinded by the High Court when
the proceedings against the defendant are concluded. Conclusion, says
s 17, occurs on acquittal
(whether at trial or on review or appeal)
or if no confiscation order is made despite conviction, or if the
confiscation order is
satisfied.
[13] Apart from rescission in those
instances the Act makes provision for variation or rescission by the
High Court of restraint orders
and related orders in other
circumstances. In terms of s 26(10)(a) the court may vary or rescind
a restraint, seizure or other ancillary
order on the application of
any person affected, provided it is satisfied on each of two
particular grounds. The first is that the
operation of the order will
deprive the applicant of the means to provide for his reasonable
living expenses and cause him undue
hardship. The second is that such
hardship outweighs the risk that the restrained assets may be
destroyed, lost, damaged, concealed
or transferred.
[14] There is no such restriction on
the High Court’s power in relation to orders appointing curators
bonis
and orders for the surrender of property which may be
varied or rescinded at any time (s 28(3)), and orders for the
endorsement of
restrictive conditions on title deeds, which may
rescinded at any time (s 29(7)).
[15] The only provisions of Chapter 5
that concern appeals in some presently relevant measure are s 24A and
s 29A. S24A states that
if a restraint order is in force when a
confiscation order is made, the restraint order remains in force
pending the outcome of any
appeal against the confiscation order.
(The latter order is by nature and effect obviously an appealable
order and the statute recognises
that, albeit in passing.)
[16] S29A provides that the noting of
an appeal against variation or rescission of any order under sections
s 26(10) (restraint),
28(3) (curator
bonis
or surrender) and
29(7) (restrictions on title deeds) shall suspend such variation or
rescission pending the outcome of the appeal.
The aggrieved party in
the event of a variation would normally be the respondent and, in the
case of rescission, could only be the
respondent. Moreover the
section does not refer or extend to appeals against refusing
variation or rescission. Has only the respondent
an appeal? If both
parties can appeal would it not be extraordinary if the defendant
could appeal against a refusal to vary or rescind
but not against the
restraint order itself? I shall revert to these questions.
[17] Turning to the respondent’s
argument, its starting point was that Heher J had rightly held that a
restraint order was analogous
to an application for an interim
interdict or for attachment of property pending litigation.
Consequently in the same way that at
common law a judgment or order
granting interim relief was in principle not appealable, a restraint
order, being a statutory interim
remedy and altogether comparable,
was also not appealable. Counsel for respondent emphasised in this
regard that a restraint order
was variable or rescindable by the
court that made it; that an appeal could only be aimed at a decision
that was final and definitive
and not at what was, in effect, a
‘moving target’; and that a restraint did not finally dispose of
any issue that would arise
for decision in either the criminal or the
confiscation proceedings. Moreover, so it was urged, to entertain an
appeal against a
restraint order would defeat the purpose of the
remedy.
1
Accordingly, said counsel, when Heher J granted leave to appeal and,
held that his order was final in the sense of that word in
the
present legal context, the learned Judge had erred. (I may point out
that Heher J did not actually hold that a restraint order
is
analogous to an interim common law restraint
pendente lite
.
He merely commented (at 76I-J of the reported judgment) that there is
a similarity.
[18] In weighing up these
submissions, the first consideration to be borne in mind is that to
be appealable a judicial decision of
the High Court must be a
judgment or order.
2
Generally speaking, a judgment or order is -
1. Final in effect, ‘final’
meaning unalterable by the court whose judgment or order it is.
2. Definitive of the rights of the
parties in that it grants definitive and distinct relief.
3. Dispositive of at least a
substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main
proceedings.
3
[19] Clearly, if the decision in
issue has none of those attributes it is difficult (one need put it
no higher) to see how it could
be susceptible of appeal. But what
if it has one or some but not all? The answer, apart from the fact
that the
Zweni
formulation itself contains the qualification
‘generally speaking’, is that this Court has held that the
formulation is illustrative,
not immutable, and that a decision
having final jurisdictional effect can be appealed against even if it
is not definitive or dispositive
in the sense meant in
Zweni.
4
[20] Counsel for the respondent is
right, in my view, in submitting that a restraint order is only of
interim operation and that,
like interim interdicts and attachment
orders pending trial, it has no definitive or dispositive effect as
envisaged in
Zweni.
Plainly, a restraint order decides
nothing final as to the defendant’s guilt or benefit from crime, or
as to the propriety of
a confiscation order or its amount. The
crucial question, however, is whether a restraint order has final
effect because it is unalterable
by the court that grants it. In
this regard counsel for respondent argued that the provisions of s
26(10)(a) deprived a restraint
order of the finality required for
appealability because it permitted variation and even rescission.
[21] Orders respectively appointing
curators, requiring surrender of property and burdening title deeds
are all rescindable at any
time. Presumably the unstated
requirement is that sufficient cause must be shown but otherwise,
unlike the case of s 26(10)(a),
no limits are placed on their
susceptibility to rescission. And in the case of a common law
interim interdict or attachment
pendente lite
there is no
reason why, for sufficient cause, they would not, generally, be open
to variation, if not rescission.
[22] Absent the requirements for
variation or rescission laid down in s 26(10)(a) (and leaving aside
the presently irrelevant case
of an order obtained by fraud or in
error) a restraint order is not capable of being changed. The
defendant is stripped of the restrained
assets and any control or use
of them. Pending the conclusion of the trial or the confiscation
proceedings he is remediless. That
unalterable situation is, in my
opinion, final in the sense required by the case law for
appealability.
[23] Returning to the implications
of s 29A, it seems to me that its only purpose is to ensure a
restraint order’s existence where
an order for variation or
rescission (including under s 26(10)(a) ) is granted and there
is an appeal against the latter order.
The order for variation or
rescission would ordinarily be suspended by noting the appeal but the
defendant could apply under Rule
49(11) for an order that the
variation or rescission be not suspended. There is on the other
hand no need for the section to deal
with the case where the
defendant fails to obtain variation or rescission. The restraint
order would obviously continue to exist
in that situation. It is
not to be inferred from the section, therefore, that a defendant does
not have an appeal against refusal
of either variation or rescission.
An order for rescission is clearly appealable on ordinary
principles, for it has all the characteristics
referred to in
Zweni’s
case. A variation of a restraint order, however, like the restraint
order itself, is neither definitive of the rights of the parties,
nor
dispositive of any of the relief claimed in the main proceedings.
Yet the legislature clearly contemplated that such an order
should be
appealable notwithstanding that it lacks those characteristics. It
is difficult, in those circumstances, to see why the
legislature
should have intended that a restraint order itself should not be
appealable merely because those characteristics are
lacking. In my
view the section, while not decisive in itself, lends support to the
conclusion that a restraint order was intended
to be appealable
because it is final (in the sense in which the term was used in
Zweni’s
case) notwithstanding that it is not definitive or
dispositive of any of the issues that will arise in the main
proceeding.
[24] I also see no reason why the recognition of the
appealability of such an order will necessarily undermine the purpose
of the
Act. An appeal from such a decision lies only with the leave
of the court concerned or, where that is refused, with the leave of
this Court, and where such leave is granted, the court concerned may
attach appropriate conditions (see s 20(5)(a) of the Supreme
Court
Act 59 of 1959). Properly applied, those limitations upon an appeal
provide ample scope for adequate protection to be afforded
to the
respondent in appropriate cases.
[25] The respondent’s appealability
argument must consequently fail.
[26] Turning to the appeal itself, it
was first appellant’s argument in the Court below, and in his
counsel’s heads of argument,
that the assets of the second to
fifteenth appellants – the companies and close corporations –
were wrongly subjected to the
restraint order. Counsel indicated at
the commencement of his address that this point, and two others it is
unnecessary to mention,
were not being pursued. For convenience I
shall therefore refer from now on to first appellant as ‘appellant’.
[27] The submissions advanced on
appellant’s behalf may be shortly summarised as follows:
1. Respondent, as
ex parte
applicant before Labe J, failed to make disclosure of various
matters which it was his duty to include in his papers. Heher
J
ought therefore to have discharged the rule on that ground alone.
2. Respondent brought the
application with the ulterior motive to have the Ranch closed down
and to put appellant out of business.
3. The provisional order was
executed unlawfully and in violation not only of the order itself
but also in conflict with appellant’s
rights to privacy and
dignity.
4. There are no reasonable grounds
for believing that a confiscation order might be made.
5. The provisional order should have
been amended by placing a value limitation on the assets to be
restrained.
[28] The non-disclosure argument
involves a number of points which were raised before Heher J
in
limine.
The learned Judge heard argument on them before hearing
counsel on the other issues. He gave a judgment dismissing all the
points,
with costs. That judgment does not form part of the
reported judgment and was only presented to this Court shortly before
the day
of the appeal.
[29] It is trite that an
ex parte
applicant must disclose all material facts which might influence the
court in deciding the application. If the applicant fails in
this
regard and the application is nevertheless granted in provisional
form, the court hearing the matter on the return day has a
discretion, when given the full facts, to set aside the provisional
order or confirm it. In exercising that discretion the later
court
will have regard to the extent of the non-disclosure; the question
whether the first court might have been influenced by proper
disclosure; the reasons for non-disclosure and the consequences of
setting the provisional order aside.
[30] Counsel for appellant detailed
what he submitted were nine separate instances of non-disclosure in
the founding papers which,
individually or cumulatively, should have
persuaded Heher J to set aside the provisional restraint order. It
is unnecessary, in
my view, to say anything more about eight of them
than this. In his unreported judgment the learned Judge considered
them all.
He found that one did not require disclosure. He held
that five were such that if disclosure had been made it could not be
found
that the omitted material might have influenced Labe J to
refuse relief. The remaining two concerned disputed issues of fact
and
were not susceptible to disposal as points
in limine.
I
am not persuaded that Heher J erred in any respect in exercising his
discretion not to discharge the rule on these grounds.
[31] The ninth instance of
non-disclosure was not raised in the founding papers and consequently
respondent never had the opportunity
to deal with it. It was raised
for the first time on appeal. Therefore it could not possibly have
influenced Heher J to discharge
the provisional restraint order.
The only reason for discussing this point further is that in argument
counsel contended there
had been bad faith on the part of a senior
member of respondent’s staff, Mr Hofmeyr. The point arises in this
way. Appellant
was a State witness in an earlier prosecution against
three men charged with extorting him to organise what were called
‘sex holidays’
overseas. In the course of his evidence he
admitted that the Ranch was a brothel. The admission was part of the
evidential matter
in the founding papers on which respondent relied
for the allegation that there were reasonable grounds to believe
appellant might
be convicted on the charges under the Sexual Offences
Act.
[32] In appellant’s papers he said
that he had not been warned before testifying of his right against
self-incrimination or offered
an indemnity against prosecution under
the Sexual Offences Act. (The evidence supports him.) He went on to
add that Mr Hofmeyr
had been present at court when he gave the
evidence in question and that this was no coincidence but an
indication that Mr Hofmeyr
was intent, with others, on pursuing a
vendetta against him. Heher J duly concluded that in view of the
omission to give appellant
the appropriate warning it was most
unlikely that the admission would be admitted against him at his own
trial. Before us the argument
for appellant had become this: it was
respondent’s duty to disclose in the
ex parte
application
that appellant’s admission was inadmissible and Mr Hofmeyr’s
presence at the extortion trial somehow or other warranted
the
conclusion that appellant had, in effect, been set up to incriminate
himself so that his evidence could be used against him in
the present
proceedings. Mr Hofmeyr, in the replying papers, fully explained his
presence and denied the allegation. To add fuel
to the conflict
appellant’s counsel contended that the matter ‘reeks of
mala
fides
’. I shall revert to the imputation of bad faith when
dealing with costs.
[33] This non-disclosure point has no
merit. There was no duty on respondent to raise the possible
inadmissibility of appellant’s
evidence. It was not a matter of
fact but of law. For all the reasons stated above, the
non-disclosure argument fails in all respects.
[34] The next argument for appellant
is that the restraint proceedings were prompted by the ulterior
motive to have the Ranch closed
down. In the hearing before Heher J
this aspect was raised
in limine
. The learned Judge dealt
with it fully in his unreported judgment and concluded that had Labe
J been informed that this was respondent’s
purpose it would not
have influenced him to refuse relief. In my view Heher J was right.
His reasons dispose of this point whether
as a component of the
non-disclosure argument or an independent ground of appeal. The
learned Judge held that the closure of the
business of the Ranch was
an inevitable concomitant of the restraint given the nature of the
business and that the curator could
not seriously have contemplated
running the business economically without the prostitution, or
lawfully if there was prostitution.
Accordingly, even if respondent
contemplated or wanted the closure of the business this does not
vitiate his actions or the
ex parte
proceedings.
[35] It is then argued that the
execution of the provisional order was unlawful and in violation of
appellant’s rights of privacy
and dignity. There are two factual
allegations which underlie this argument. The first is that
representatives of the news media,
with photographers, were present
at the very beginning of the execution operation and the inference
is, says appellant, that respondent
invited their attendance with the
purpose of ridiculing or embarrassing him. The second is that the
search and seizure process resulted,
inter alia
, in his home
and personal effects being left in an unacceptable state of disorder
and uncleanliness. In the replying papers Mr Hofmeyr
says the media
were informed of the restraint order after it had been granted and
denied what he called the insinuation that the
media were invited to
the implementation of the order. Apart from the fact that this
version cannot, in these proceedings, be rejected,
the media point
was not raised in appellant’s papers as a ground for discharging
the rule and respondent was not called on to reply
to it in greater
detail than was done.
[36] As regards the state of
appellant’s home and personal possessions, a large scale removal
operation would no doubt inevitably
involve resultant disarray.
However, the implementation of the order was not the task or
responsibility of respondent but the curator.
Any unlawful conduct
by employees or agents of the curator are irrelevant to the issues in
this appeal. The argument founded on
alleged unlawfulness of the
execution of the provisional order therefore cannot succeed.
[37] Turning to the requirements of s
25(1) of the Act, respondent has to show in a restraint application
reasonable grounds for believing
a confiscation order may be made.
This involves reasonable grounds for believing that the defendant may
be convicted as charged,
that the trial court may find that he
benefited from the proved offence or related criminal activity, and
that a confiscation order
may be made in that court’s discretion.
[38] Analysis of the evidence
proffered by respondent in support of the charges levelled against
appellant, and the latter’s responses,
took up much time in the
Court below and a material portion of the parties’ heads. It is
enough for purposes of this judgment,
however, to point to what
appellant himself said in his papers. He has operated the Ranch
since 1987. He aims to attract ‘executive
patrons’ who want
‘personal stress relief’ in a ‘private, clean and secure
environment’. There are women sex workers there
at any time. He
‘assumes’ that the service they render is sex in some form. They
are paid for the favours they provide. I
have recounted at the
beginning of the judgment the various sums payable by the women to
him and those payable by the patrons. Appellant
claims that the
Ranch has a reputation for being the best establishment of its kind
‘probably in the southern hemisphere’.
[39] I do not propose to discuss the
meaning of ‘brothel’ and ‘keeping a brothel’. Heher J did so
fully in the reported judgment
at 99D-H. Counsel for appellant was
unable to offer any convincing reason for saying that the Ranch was
not a brothel. He could
only venture that the women were not
oppressed employees in thrall of a domineering employer. That is
irrelevant.
[40] Also on his own version,
appellant has earned substantial financial reward from his conduct of
the ranch.
[41] In my view, therefore, there are
reasonable grounds for believing that appellant might be convicted on
at least two of the charges
preferred : keeping a brothel and living
on the earnings of prostitution.
[42] That appellant has earned
handsomely from his enterprise is reflected in the considerable
number and range of assets seized by
the curator. It is unnecessary
to attempt to guess at their value. It suffices to say that on the
evidence he is a person of considerable
financial substance.
[43] There are therefore reasonable
grounds for believing that he benefited within the meaning of the Act
and that a confiscation
order may be made.
[44] The final submission for
appellant is that because the charges cover only the period 30 June
1999 to 2 February 2002 there cannot
be a reasonable possibility that
the reach of any confiscation order might extend to assets acquired,
or assets acquired from income
received, prior to that period. I
disagree. There are reasonable grounds to believe that the trial
court may find earlier conduct
‘sufficiently related’ criminal
activity within the meaning of s 18(1)(c) of the Act. It would seem
to me to be no answer to
say that because earlier conduct was exactly
the same it cannot, linguistically or otherwise, be the same as
‘sufficiently related’
conduct. In the absence of any feasible
suggestion that the restrained assets were to any material extent the
product of any venture
other than that for which the Ranch has,
apparently, become so well known, there is no sensible basis on which
to limit the assets
hit by the restraint to any particular sum. The
appeal must accordingly fail.
[45] As to costs, counsel for
respondent sought a special order. They relied on appellant’s
imputations of deliberate non-disclosures
in the founding papers and
the insinuation of
mala fides
on the part of Mr Hofmeyr. In
the latter respect, they said, no basis for the allegation existed.
The tenor of their argument
as to the alleged
mala fides
seemed to convey that this accusation had come somewhat out of the
blue. I am not at all sure this is so. It had already been alleged
in appellant’s papers that respondent was conducting a vendetta
against him and had brought the proceedings with an ulterior motive.
An accusation of
mala fides
is not far removed. Appellant’s
case could of course have been stated in the papers and in argument
without resorting to insinuation,
baseless accusations or extravagant
language. Why should respondent and his staff have to bear the sting
of such excesses if they
are only trying, in the public interest, to
combat organised crime? On the other hand, respondent operates in a
tough environment
especially in so far as the areas in which asset
forfeiture and related matters are concerned. If those he accuses
are indeed criminals
they will be in the game to obtain rich rewards.
They will not use kid gloves. They might well resort to
exaggerated vehemence
to add weight to their protestations of
innocence. In all the circumstances I am unpersuaded, but only just,
that a special order
is warranted.
[46] The appeal is dismissed with
costs, including the costs of two counsel.
__________________
CT HOWIE
PRESIDENT
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL
CONCURRED
:
ZULMAN
JA
NUGENT
JA
CONRADIE
JA
MLAMBO
AJA
1
Cf
Cronshaw and another v Coin Security Group
(Pty) Ltd
1996(3) SA 686(A) at 691 C-D
2
S 20 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
3
Zweni v Minister of Lw and Order
1993 (1)
SA 523
(A).
4
Moch v Nedtravel (Pty) Ltd t/a American
Express Travel Service
1996 (3) SA 1
(A) at 10E-11B.