SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIG H COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISIO N, CAPE TOWN )
Regional Court c ase number : RCC/MOS: 84/23
Appeal case number: A207/2024
In the matter between
H[...] G[...] W[...] Appellant
and
M[...] W[...] (née B[...] ) Respondent
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON 26 MARCH 2025
VAN ZYL AJ (LEKHULENI J concurring) :
Introductio n
1. Jurisdiction is fundamental. A court must have jurisdiction in a matter for its
judgment or order in that matter to be valid. Without jurisdiction the judgment
or order is a nullity. No pronouncement to that effect is required. It is simply
treated as such.1 Once a court has jurisdiction, it retains that jurisdiction until
the suit is concluded.2
2. The appellant appeals against the judgment handed down by the Mossel Bay
Regional Court on 4 July 2024 , dismissing the appellant's special plea of lack
1 Trade Fairs and Promotions (Pty) Ltd v Thomson and another 1984 (4) SA 177 (W) at 183D -
E.
2 Mills v Starwell Finance (Pty) Ltd 1981 (3) SA 84 (N) at 88A -B.
of jurisdiction in the divorce action pending between the parties. The
appellant had pleaded that the court lacked jurisdiction over the persons of the
parties as required in section 28(1A) of the Magistrates’ Courts Act
3. The issue before this Court is whether the regional court was justified in its
dismissal of the special plea, given the contents of the pleadings in the action
in relation to jurisdiction, coupled with the fact that neither of the parties
furnished oral evidence in this respect at the hearing.
The pleadings in the divorce action
4. Section 2(1) o f the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides as follows:
“2. Jurisdiction. – (1) A court shall have jurisdiction in a divorce action if
the parties are or either of the parties is ---
(a) domiciled in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the date on which
the action is instituted;3 or
(b) ordinarily resident in the area of jurisdiction of the court on the said
date and have or has been ordinarily resident in the Republic for a
period of not less than one year immediately prior to that date. ’
5. The respondent, as plaintiff, instituted a divorce action against the appellant,
as defendant, on 20 April 2023 in the Mossel Bay Regional Court. In her
particulars of claim, the respondent alleged in relation to jurisdiction that she
and the appellant “ are currently residing within the area of jurisdiction of this
Honourable Court ”. No further allegations are made as to the basis for that
particular court’s jurisdiction.
6. Ex facie the particulars of claim, therefore, the respondent relied solely on the
issue of ordinary residence to establish the Mossel Bay Regional Court’s
jurisdiction. She did not rely on domicile as contemplated in section 2(1)(a) of
the Divorce Act.
3 In terms of section 1(2) of the Divorce Act a divorce action ”shall be deemed to be instituted
on the date on which the summons is issued”.
7. It is apparent from the particulars of claim, too, that the respondent did not
make any allegation as to the second part of section 2(1)(b) of the Divorce
Act, namely ordinary residence in the Republic for at least a year prior to the
institution of the action. It is, in fact, common cause that neither party had
been so resident at the relevant time. The respondent’s reliance on section
2(1)(b) of the Divorce Act was therefore misplaced from the outset. In this
regard, it appears from the counterclaim and replication that the parties had
resided in Australia for some time prior to the institution of the divorce action ,
and had relocated to S outh Africa with the int ent either to settle in Namibia or
in South Africa .
8. The appellant disputed th e court’s jurisdiction to entertain the action by way of
a special plea , which was subsequently amended. The amended version of
the special plea reads as follows:
“1. As on the date on which the divorce action had been instituted neither
of the parties were domiciled or ordinarily resident within the area of
jurisdiction of the honourable court and ordinarily resident within the
Republic of South Africa for at least one year prior to the date on which
the action was instituted.
2. The Defendant therefore denies that this honourable court is enjoined
with jurisdiction to grant a decree of divorce and associated relief
herein .”
9. The question thus arose whether the Mossel Bay Regional Court had
jurisdiction to entertain the divorce action, and specifically whether the
respondent was domiciled in its area of jurisdiction on the date when
summons was issued by the registrar of that court. As indicated, n either of
the parties furnished any evidence at the hearing of the special plea.
10. The regional court, after considering the pleadings and hearing argument on
the matter, dismissed the special plea, with costs. The magistrate found that
it "can be inferred " from the pleadings that the respondent was domiciled
within the Court's area of jurisdiction, and that the regional court accordingly
had jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. It is this finding that gave rise to the
appeal.
Did the respondent establish that she was domiciled within the area of
jurisdiction of the Mossel Bay Regional Court?
11. It is trite that jurisdiction is determined with reference to the allegations in the
pleadings , and not by the substantive merits of the case. In the event of the
court's jurisdiction being challenged at the outset, the plaintiff's pleadings are
the determining factor since they contain the legal basis of the claim under
which the plaintiff has chosen to invoke the court's competence.4
12. A summons (whether simple or combined) must indicate that the court has
jurisdiction.5 Generally in action proceedings, a plaintiff must allege and prove
the facts necessary to establish that the court has jurisdiction in the matter
and over the person of the defendant.6 It does not suffice merely to allege
the legal conclusion of jurisdiction. The onus of establishing jurisdiction
ordinarily rests on the plaintiff as dominus litis.7
13. It is not necessary in the ordinary course to make any specific allegation
concerning jurisdiction, provided that the underlying facts establishing
jurisdiction appear from the pleading. For instance, an allegation that the
defendant resides within the area of jurisdiction of the court may be an
adequate prima facie allegation of jurisdiction. Likewise, an allegation that the
delict was committed within the court's area of jurisdiction is sufficient to
establish jurisdiction .8 Where, as in the present matter, a statute prescribe s
the bases upon which a court exercises jurisdiction, it must appear from the
pleading that the requirements posed by such statute – the Divorce Act, in the
present matter – have been met. The plaintiff in a divorce action must thus
4 Gcaba v Minister for Safety and Security 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC) at para [75].
5 See Kikillus v Susan 1955 (2) SA 137 ( W).
6 Communication Workers Union v Telkom SA Ltd 1999 (2) SA 586 (T) at 594G -H.
7 Malherbe v Britstown Municipality 1949 (1) SA 281 (C) at 287.
8 See the discussion in Erasmus Superior Court Practice (online version, RS 23, 2024 ) at D1
Rule 22 -26, and the authorities cited there.
allege and prove that the court has jurisdiction on the basis of either domicile
or residence.9
The appellant’s case
14. The appellant contends, correctly, that respondent does not make an
averment in her particulars of claim that the Mossel Bay Regional Court has
jurisdiction on the basis of domicile. As indicated, she also does not plead
that either party has been ordinarily resident in the country for at least one
year prior to institution of the proceedings.
15. The appellant therefore argues that the regional court erred in dismissing the
special plea, on the following two grounds . First, the court erred in finding that
it had jurisdiction based on the respondent's domicile, when no averments or
factual foundation as to domicile was made by the respondent in her
particulars of claim. Reference was merely made to where the parties reside d.
Second, the court erred b y having regard to matter not on the pleadings, and
not given in evidence, in reaching its decision as regards the respondent’s
domicile.
16. A consideration of the judgment indicates that the regional court found that it
was “common cause ” that the respondent had been resident in Mossel Bay for
a period of 3 days at the time of institution of the divorce . This is not the case
on the pleadings. The only reference s to “3 days ” is in the replication, in
which the respondent pleads that she had informed the appellant within 3
days of arriving in South Africa that she intended to stay in South Africa and
not return to Namibia with him. A similar reference appears in the unamended
special plea, and it is possible that the regional court had regard to the
unamended pleadings.
17. Any averments in the original special plea however became irrelevant when
the pleading was successfully amended without objection , and the regional
9 See Rousalis v Rousalis 1980 (3) SA 446 (C) at 449F -450B.
court should not have had regard to the unamended pleadings in reaching a
decision :
"It is a general rule that a pleading into which words have been incorporated
by amendment must be read as if the incorporated words had been there in
the first place, i.e. when the pleading was filed in the first instance. " 10
18. The regional court found that the respondent ha d not given up her domicile of
origin in South Africa in favour of another country, had not established a
domicilium other than her domicilium of origin, and therefore retain ed her
domicile as South Africa. As mentioned earlier, the pleadings merely indicate
that the parties had relocated from Australia shortly before the institution of
the divorce action, seemingly with the intent to settle in Namibia (on the
appellant’s version in the counterclaim) or South Africa (on the respondent’s
version in the replication) . There are thus insufficient allegations on the
pleadings to come to th e conclusion that the magistrate had come to in
relation to the respondent and, as indicated, no evidence was led in this
respect. In fact, the respondent avers in her particulars of claim that the
parties had emigrated to Australia in May 2018, which likely affected her
domicile.
19. The regional court found, further, that the parties ha d not set up residence nor
taken up employment in Namibia as of yet. Here, again, the court seemingly
considered the appellant's original special plea of jurisdiction, which had
referred to the parties' plans to move to Namibia . After the amendment of the
special plea, t he only averment on the pleadings as they stand, pertaining to
Namibia, is the appellant's averment in his counterclaim that he does in fact
reside in Namibia.
20. The regional court found that it was common cause between the parties that
the respondent regarded South Africa as her permanent residence at the time
of institution of the proceedings. There is no indication thereof from the
10 Cordier v Cordier 1984 (4) SA 524 (C) at 533B.
pleadings. The regional court also found (seemingly contradictor ily) that the
parties had been resident in Australia for over 5 years prior to institution of the
proceedings. This is not on the pleadings as they stand .
21. The regional court found that "from a proper reading of the file contents " it
seem ed that the respondent ha d no intention of returning to Australia or taking
up residence in Namibia, but ha d decided to remain in South Africa for an
indefinite period. This is not evident from the pleadings in their amended
form.
22. The magistrate found that " it is apparent from the facts and the particulars of
claim " that :
22.1. The appellant was resident within the Court's jurisdiction when
proceedings were instituted. This is however the opposite of what the
appellant alleges in his counterclaim.
22.2. The respondent “avers in her particulars of claim ” that the Court has
jurisdiction. No such averment is made in the particulars of claim.
22.3. Prior to institution of the proceedings, the respondent was resident in
Australia, but never considered Australia to be her permanent place of
residence and was never issued with Australian citizenship. This does
not appear from the pleadings.
22.4. The respondent ha d decided that Mossel Bay would be her domicile of
choice b ecause of t he fact that she d id not intend to relocate to
Namibia and would remain in South Africa for an indefinite period of
time. Apart from the fact that the respondent did not rely on domicile in
her particulars of claim, and no evidence on these issues had been led,
this is a finding that contradicts the court’s earlier finding that the
respondent had not given up her domicile of origin.
23. I agree with the submissions made by the appellant’s counsel that the regional
court erred in coming to the conclusions that it did on the material available to
it. The appellant had placed the question of jurisdiction in dispute by pleading
that neither of the parties were domiciled or ordinarily resident in the area of
the court’s jurisdiction at the time of the institution of the action. In the
absence of evidence having been led on the question of domicile,11 the
allegations in the pleadings (as amended) were insufficient to support the
ultimate finding that the Mossel Bay Regional Court had jurisdiction to
determine the divorce action.
The respondent’s submissions
24. The respondent relies on a report delivered by the Family Advocate under
another case number, which dealt with an investigation conducted into the
best interests of the parties’ minor child. According to the respondent’s
counsel, a copy of the report was on the divorce action file, and the regional
court had regard to it in deciding the question of jurisdiction. The report
apparently considered aspects of the minor child’s residence.
25. The respondent argue s that on the authority of Thompson v South African
Broadcasting Corporation12 the re gional court was entitled to rely on the report
in reaching a decision. Counsel relies on the following extract from
Thompson , where the Supreme Court of Appeal stated :13
"The function of oral argument, especially in a Court of appeal, is
supplementary to the written argument. If a party chooses not to raise an
obvious issue in his head, he does so at his peril. The court is entitled to base
its judgment and to make findings in relation to any matter flowing fairly from
the record, the judgment, the heads of argument or the oral argument itself. "
26. This is not, however, authority for the proposition that a court may accept as
evidence (or as pleadings where reference is to be made to the pleadings)
11 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at 2871 -288D.
12 2001 (3) SA 746 (SCA).
13 Thompson supra at para [7].
material that constitutes neither evidence nor pleadings. This includes facts
and submissions made in heads of argument which do not arise from the
pleadings or from the evidence before the court.
27. The question in Thompson was whether the Court could accept that factual
matters not raised in the heads of argument were no longer in issue between
the parties . This appears from paragraph [4] of the judgment, read with
paragraph [7] in its entire ty:14
“[4] Although the finding of the Court a quo was attacked by the applicant
when applying for leave to appeal, it is noteworthy that in the heads of
argument filed on his behalf it was not alluded to at all. Instead, the argument
focused on legal issues. This Court was therefore justified in assuming that
the applicant accepted these findings. Factual findings of trial courts are in
any event presumed to be correct unless shown otherwise. At the hearing in
this Court the argument was directed towards the legal issues.
[7] There is an underlying assumption in the applicant's submissions to the
effect that unless something was raised or dealt with during oral argument, the
matter can be reopened and that the Court can amend its judgment in relation
thereto. This is a misconception. The function of oral argument … ”.
28. The family advocate’s report is not part of the pleadings of the divorce action,
and it is not before this Court as part of the appeal record. No evidence was
led in relation thereto at the hearing of the special plea. It was, therefore, not
open to the regional court to have regard thereto in deciding the fate of the
special plea .
29. The respondent argues further that e very South African who was born in
South Africa has South Africa as their domicile by operation of law, in this
instance referred to as their domicile of origin. Persons – such as the
respondent - who have South Africa as their domicile of origin and have not
given up South Africa as their domicile in favour of another country, retains
14 Thompson supra at paras [4] and [7]. Emphasis added.
their domicile as South Africa. The regional court was therefore entitled to
accept that the respondent had been domiciled in South Africa at all relevant
times, including on the date of the institution of the divorce action.
30. Section 1 of the Domicile Act 3 of 1992 provides as follows:
“Domicile of choice. ---(1) Every person who is of or over the age of
18 years, and every person under the age of 18 years who by law has the
status of a major, excluding any person who does not have the mental
capacity to make a rational choice, shall be competent to acquire a domicile of
choice, regardless of such a person’s sex or marital status.
(2) A domicile of choice shall be acquired by a person when he is lawfully
present at a particular place and has the intention to settle there for an
indefinite period. ”
31. The respondent ’s counsel argues that the respondent never lost her original
domicile, as one cannot be without a domicile at any given time .15 Her original
domicile was South Africa. This was also her domicile of choice.
32. The respondent is correct on the law relating to domicile , but where a person’s
domicile is is a factual question . Whether a party is domiciled in South Africa
depends on the facts of each unique case. T he point remains that the
regional magistrate had no evidence before him to support a finding that the
respondent was in fact domiciled in South Africa , and within the area of
jurisdiction of the Mossel Bay Regional Court,16 on the date of the institution of
the divorce action.
33. The respondent argues that this Court should follow a “flexible approach” as
set out in OB v LBDS17 in which a Full Bench of this Division stated as follows:
“[37] In LAWSA: Conflict of Laws (2ed 2(2)) at para 301 the author, relying on
15 Smith v Smith 1970 (1) SA 146 (R) a t 147G.
16 As required by section 2(1)(a) of the Divorce Act.
17 2021 (6) SA 21 5 (WCC) at para s [37]-[38]. Emphasis added.
the opinion expressed in para 3.44 of the South African Law Commission
Working Paper 20 on the issue of domicile of choice, states:
‘Whilst the strength of an intention to settle in a country may be easy enough
to gauge… and thus satisfy the test of intention, the just resolution of hard
cases will require a more flexible approach for determining the acquisition of a
domicile of choice than can be provided by the test of intention which serves
legal certainty alone .’
[38] Having regard to the evidence before the court a quo I am persuaded
that, although the facts in this matter may constitute a “hard case” on domicile,
a flexible approach is called for, and that to lean on legal certainty alone would
militate against the interests of justice. It would follow, on this reasoning, that
the appellant established on a balance of probabilities that at the time of
institution of the divorce proceedings she was domiciled within this court’s
area of jurisdiction, and the court a quo thus had the requisite jurisdiction to
grant the decree of divorce. ”
34. The problem for the respondent in the present matter is that the situation in
OB v LBDS is distinguishable from the situation that pertained in the present
case . In OB the Court had scope to follow a flexible approach, because the
parties had furnished evidence on the issue of domicile at the hearing of the
action. The Court therefore had facts at its disposal upon which it could
decide whether a case had properly been made out to the effect that the court
had jurisdiction to entertain those parties’ divorce action .
35. The authorities are clear that to establish a domicile of choice the person
concerned, besides expressing a mere intention to reside permanently at a
proposed domicile, must also establish such choice of domicile from all the
surrounding circumstances, and that she has in fact done so:
“Factors to be considered in determining whether a new domicile has been
acquired are the (probably questionable) assumption that a spouse who
leaves the other spouse behind at a place does not change his or her domicile
there; the period of residence at the alleged domicile; the motive for residing
there; the ownership of property there (or sale of property in the previous
domicile); the application for permanent residence or citizenship there; any
circumstantial evidence indicating the presence or absence of an animus
manendi; direct evidence about the subjective intention to be domiciled in a
certain area; and evidence of past expressions of intention .”18
36. The regional court in the present matter did not have the benefit of any
evidence upon which to find that the respondent had established that she was
domiciled within the court’s area of jurisdiction at the time of the institution of
the divorce action .
37. In these circumstances, I respectfully borrow the following dictum from the
minority judgment in OB,19 which dictum seem s to me to be apposite in the
present matter given the absence of evidence on the question of domicile :
“In this regard I am mindful of the reference by the majority to LAWSA:
Conflict of Laws (Vol 7(1) 3rd Ed para 326), where reliance is placed on the
opinion expressed by the South African Law Commission Working Paper 20
on the issue of domicile of choice. While this may indeed be a ‘hard case’ on
domicile, I am not persuaded that a flexible approach, in respect of the facts
of this matter, can be adopted in the interests of justice. In my view, the
interests of justice are more properly served when a domicile of choice is
properly established on the facts and on the evidence presented, rather than
on an overly generous interpretation of the evidence, or by a lack thereof. ….”
38. At the hearing of the appeal the Court raised with counsel the possibility,
should the appeal be upheld, of re mitting the issue to the regional court to
hear evidence on the question of domicile , and to decide the issue afresh.
Section 19(c) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 provides as follows:
“The Supreme Court of Appeal or a Division exercising appeal jurisdiction
may, in addition to any power as may specifically be provided for any other
law – … (c) remit the case to the court of first instance, or to the court whose
18 Joubert et al LAWSA Vol. 7(1) (3ed) at para 328.
19 OB v LBDS supra at para [16] (minority judgment). Emphasis added.
decision is the subject of the appeal, for further hearing, with such instructions
as regards the taking of further evidence or otherwise as the Supreme Court
of Appeal or the Division deems necessary; … ”
39. Simil ar provision for the remittal of matters is made in section 8 7(b) of the
Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 :
“The court of appeal may … (b) if the record does not furnish sufficient
evidence or information for the determination of the appeal, remit the matter to
the court from which the appeal is brought, with instructions in regard to the
taking of further evidence or the setting out of further information… ”
40. The app ellant contends that this route is not open to the Court because the
respondent did not plead, in her particulars of claim, that she was domiciled
within the jurisdiction of the Mossel Bay Regional Court . Domicile is therefore
not an issue on the pleadings. Counsel relies on Minister of Safety and
Security v Slabbert20 in which the S upreme Court of Appeal held as follows:
“[11] A party has a duty to allege in the pleadings the material facts upon
which it relies. It is impermissible for a plaintiff to plead a particular case and
seek to establish a different case at the trial. It is equally not permissible for
the trial court to have recourse to issues falling outside the pleadings when
deciding a case. ”
41. The appellant argues that i t will therefore be impermissible for the respondent
to adduce evidence regarding her domicili um to establish jurisdiction. She will
be seeking to establish a different case to the one pleaded in her particulars of
claim. Should this Court remit the matter to the Regional Court, it would
effectively be directing the magistrate to allow the hearing of inadmissible
evidence.
42. I am, however, of the view that although the issue of domicilium had not been
20 [2010] 2 All SA 474 (SCA) at para [11].
pleaded in the particulars of claim, it became an issue between the parties
when the appellant, in his special plea (as amended), alleged that “ as on the
date on which the divorce action had been instituted, neither of the parties
were domiciled … within the area of jurisdiction of the honourable court … ”
43. To this, the respondent replicated as follows:
“1.1 Plaintiff denies that she was not domiciled within the jurisdiction of the
honourable court when the action was instituted.
1.2 In amplification of the aforesaid denial plaintiff, who is South African by
birth, avers that within 3 days upon the parties’ arrival in South Africa
from Australia and prior to the institution of the divorce action, she
conveyed to defendant that she and the parties’ minor child will not
accompany defendant to Namibia and that she will permanently remain
in Mossel Bay, South African (sic) with the parties’ minor child ”.
44. In Minister of Safety and Security v Slabbert21 the Supreme Court of Appeal
qualified the statement in paragraph [11] of its judgment (quoted above ) by
pointing out that:
“[12] There are, however, circumstances in which a party may be allowed to
rely on an issue which was not covered by the pleadings. This occurs where
the issue in question has been canvassed fully by both sides at the trial.
In South British Insurance Co Ltd v Unicorn Shipping Lines (Pty) Ltd,3 this
court said:
‘However, the absence of such an averment in the pleadings would not
necessarily be fatal if the point was fully canvassed in evidence. This means
fully canvassed by both sides in the sense that the Court was expected to
pronounce upon it as an issue'. ”
45. The issue of domicile was squarely raised by the appellant in his special plea,
replicated to by the plaintiff, and the regional court was asked to make a ruling
21 Supra at para [12].
in relation to jurisdiction after consideration of the issues of both ordinary
residence and domicilium . Full argument in relation to these aspects were
addressed to the regional court, and it was expected to pronounce upon the
issue.
46. The fact that the regional court pronounced on the issue of domicile is
therefore not the problem per se . The difficulty lies in the absence of evidence
supporting the regional court’s finding in relation to the respondent’s domicile.
It seems to me, in any event, that a remittal is not necessary. The regional
court was incorrect in its finding on the special plea, and that is the end of the
matter. In summary, the regional court lacked the necessary jurisdiction to
hear the matter based on the filed pleadings.
Conclusion
47. In the premises, the respondent has failed to establish that the Mossel Bay
Regional Court has the necessary jurisdiction to determine the divorce action ,
and the regional court erred in finding, on the material at its disposal, that it
had jurisdiction over the divorce action on the basis of the respondent’s
domicile at the time of the institution of the action .
48. As an aside, I must question the parties’ decision to pursue this appeal to
finality, rather than to effect an appropriate amendment to the particulars of
claim at the time when the special plea was delivered . The parties were , and
are, both assisted by experienced attorneys and counsel, and there is no
reason why the action should have been delayed because of the issue at the
core of this appeal.
49. Although a decision to amend was the respondent’s prerogative, I blame both
parties for this sad state of affairs. The divorce action was instituted almost
two years ago, and the regional court delivered its judgment nearly 8 months
ago. The parties h ave incurred significant legal costs, and wasted time,
without resolving the real disputes between them. This is not a well -
considered manner in which to conduct litigation in which the emotional costs
are already high.
Costs
50. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event . Counsel for both
parties submitted that counsel’s fees should be taxed on Scale C.
51. In the exe rcise of my discretion on the available facts as a whole, I regard an
award of counsel’s fees on Scale B as warranted in the present matter . The
issue of jurisdiction is fundamental to the event ual validity of an order granted in
the divorce action, but I do not think that the issues were so complex as to
warrant a higher scale.22
Order
52. In the circumstances, I would grant the following order:
52.1. The appeal is upheld, and the order dated 4 July 2024 of the Mossel
Bay Regional Court , dismissing with costs the appellant’s special plea,
is set aside and replaced with the following order:
“The defendant’s special plea is upheld, with costs. ”
52.2. The respondent shall pay the costs of the appeal, including counsel’s
fees taxed on Scale B .
P. S. VAN ZYL
Acting judge of the High Court
I agree, and it is so ordered.
22 See Uniform Rule 67A(3).
J. LEKHULENI
Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
For the appellant : Mr M. van der Merwe , instructed by VST
Attorneys
For the respondent : Ms T. le Roux , instructed by Natascha
Pretorius & Associates