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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN CAPE DIVISION: MTHATHA]
CASE NO: CA& R115/2024
In the matter between:
ANDILE KWELETA 1ST APPELLA NT
NKOSOMZI NDLUNG ANA 2ND APPELLA NT
NKOSINATHI NOK HOTSOYI 3RD APPELLA NT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT - BAIL APPEAL
________________________________________________________________
MTSHABE AJ
Introduction.
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1. This is an appeal in terms of the provisions of Section 65 of the Criminal
Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 (the Act) against the decision of Magistrate ’s
Court , at Dutywa on 7 October 2024 refusing to release the appellant s on bail
pending their trial.
Back ground.
2. The three appellants are facing charges involv ing possessions of firearms and
ammunition s.
3. The appellant s number one and three are charged with an offence referred to
in Schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and appellant number two is
charged with an offence referred to in Schedule 6 of the Act.
4. Schedule 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for various offences, one
of which is an offence in contravention of section 36 of the Arms and
Ammunition Act, 1969, (Act No. 75 of 1969 ). Section 36 of the Arms and
Ammunition Act provides that:
“…no person shall be in possession of any ammunition unless he is in
lawful possession of an arm capable of firing that ammunition.”
5. On 9 September 2024, the appellants applied to be released on bail after they
were charged with two Counts of Possession of prohibited firearms in
contravention of Section 4(1)(f)(iv) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000 , two
Counts of possession of firearms in contravention of Section 3 of the same
Act. They were further charged with four Counts of possession of
ammunitions in contravention of Section 90 of the same Act.
6. Andile Kweleta (first appellant), during the bail proceedings, testified that he
was 44 years old and married. He stated that he resides at No. 1 [...] B[...]
Road , Amalinda, East London. He informed the court a quo that presently he
is staying at New Homes Tsolo as he was looking for employment. He is not a
skilled person other than that he has a public driving license. He informed the
court that out of his marriage he has two children . The first child is 19 year s
old, and the second child is 13 years old. He inform ed the court that the 19-
year-old child is a child with special needs and is studying in a special school
and the 13 year old is doing grade 5.
7. He has no previous convictions; however, he confirmed that he has a pending
case of possession of ammunition. At the time of hearing the bail application,
he informed the Court that on the pending case of possession ammunition he
is out on bail. He has attended the court consistently ha s never absconded
court attendance. He denied the allegations contained in the present case.
8. Mr Kweleta informed the Court that on the day of his arrest he was coming
from Tsolo to Ngqamakhwe. Ac cording to him whilst they were in Idutywa,
there was an acc ident. He was during the motor vehicle as he observed the
accident, he slow ed down his motor vehicle. According to him the motor
vehicle he was driving belong ed to his friend. He was ar rested at Idutywa by
the police. He denied charges against him and the knowledge of the fire arms
or ammunition that were found in the motor vehicle . He stated that during the
trial pleading not guilty.
9. I must mention at this stage that during the hearing of th is appeal the
respondent (state advocate ) informed me that the pending case of possession
of firearm which emanates from M aclear has been withdrawn.
10. Nkosomzi Dlungana (second appellant) , testified that he is a permanent
resident of Ntshiqo Administrative Area, Tsolo . He informed the court that he
is 54 years old and informed the court that he has a house in Ngcolosi
Administrative Area Tsolo. He is married and has two children . He informed
the court that he has the previous conviction of murder, of which he was
sentenced to 57 years imprisonment . He informed the court that in respect of
that offence he has been released on parole during October 2023. The
second appellant has no pending cases. He also denied being involved in the
commission of an offense in the current case.
11. Mr Dlungana further denied that he was found to be in possession of any
firearms and or ammunition on the day in question. He also informed the court
that during the trial he will plead not guilty. On the day in question, that is, that
the day he was arrested, he inf ormed the court that he was on his way to East
London to consult with his doctors as he had a medical condition. According
to him he was given a lift by the first appellant, who had found him hitchhiking
on the road at Tsolo junction. The a ppellant informe d the court he is suffering
from kidney failure. He informed the court that in vehicle that was driven by
the first appellant, he joined three occupants . As I have indicated above, he
denied charges against him.
12. Nkosinathi Nokhotsoyi (third appellant) adduced his evidence by way of an
affidavit. In his affidavit he stated that he is 50 years old, being born on 12
October 1974. He is residing at Nontyakashe Administrative Area, Qumbu
and has four children from his deceased wife. He inf ormed the court that he is
not educated . The highest education is standard 1 . He informed the court that
he is self-employed as director in construction work and is receiving an
income of R8 000.00 ( Eight Thousand Rand per month. ) He testified that he
had previous conviction of being found in possession of unlawful firearms of
which he was convicted in 2002 and sentenced to a fine of R2 000.00 (Two
Thousand Rand .) His second conviction was of stock theft, for which he paid
a fine of Six Thousand Rand . He stated that he has no pending cases except
the one which is before Court. He also informed the court that he intends to
plead not guilty to the charges level against him and wished to reserve the
basis of his defense . He informed the Court that if he is released on bail, he
shall n either danger the safety of the public nor any particular person no r will
commit a schedule one offen ce. He informed the court that he shall not
attempt to invade trial. He will not influence or intimidate the state witness or
conceal or destroy evidence. He informed the court that he shall not
undermine or jeopardize the objectives of the proper functioning of criminal
justice including the bail system. He shall not disturb public order or
undermine the public peace or security. He informed the court that he does
not have a document a nd has never been resistant at any arrest effected
upon him. He informed the court via his affidavit that he will attend the trial to
its finality.
13. On be half of the state, during the bail proceedings, the Investing Officer
Sergeant Pieters informed the Court that he was not involved during the arrest
of the appellant. His evidence is based on the statement s contained in the
docket. Therefore, according to the statement s in the docket the State has a
strong case against the appellants. He informed the court that as the
appellants were travelling from Tsolo to East London , they were in possession
of firearms. According to him the appellants together with othe r accuse d were
traveling in two vehicles, a white Ford Ranger and white Mercedes Benz.
These vehicles were stopped by the police at Dutywa and upon search , they,
the police found two 9mm pistols, one A refill and R5 refill as well as
ammunitions. He confirmed that the police have verified the address of the
first appellant and that he is married. He also confirms that the first appellant
has a pending case at Maclear in which he’s out on bail. This is the case I
have stated that it has been since withdrawn.
14. In respect of the second appellant S ergeant Pieters testified that he had no
pending case s. He confirmed that he had a previous conv iction and confirmed
that he had verified.
15. In respect of the third appellant Sergeant Pieters confirmed that he has no
pending cases, and he had previous conviction of which he paid a fine on that
conviction. He also confirms the address on the third appellant and that he
has four children.
16. The basis for the state to oppose the release of the appellants on bail was
mainly on the basis that the State has a strong case against and that i f they’re
convicted, they would face long term of imprisonment .
Judgment of the court a quo.
17. In evaluating t he evidence before the court, the magistrate refused bail on the
basis that the appellants could evade trial. In this regard the Court in respect
of first appellant relied on the pending case at Maclear. Then he arrived at the
conclusion that his release on bail will not be in the interest s of justice. As I
have indicated above the case in Maclear has been withdrawn and this was a
common cause during the he aring of this appeal.
18. In refusing bail for the second appellant the court relied on previous
convictions and the fact that he is again implicated in an unlawful possession
of a firearm a nd ammunition s. The court concluded that the second appellant
has failed to discharge the onus on him to be release d on bail. The court
stated that the appellant has failed to discharge the onus rested on him that
exceptional circumstances exist in which it is in the interest of justice for him
to be rel eased on bail . Therefor e, bail was refused.
19. In respect of the third appellant, the court a quo refuse d bail on the basis that
he has t wo previous convictions although these do not appear on the system ,
however , the appellant is the one who knows very well that he has been
convicted of crimes in the past. The court stated that , in view of past his
conduct i t is not in the interest of justice that bail should be granted. Bail was
refused .
Grounds of appeal .
20. The Notice of Appeal consists of fourteen grounds of appeal. They appear to
have been d erived from provisions of Section 50(6) and 60 of the Criminal
Procedure Act , (Act No. 51 of 1977).
21. On reading the grounds of appeal it transpires that they can be summarized
as four small headings.
21.1 The contention that the magistrate failed to consider the factors set out
in Section 60 (4) (a -e) Criminal Procedure Act.
21.2 The second ground is that the magistrate failed to apply her mind to the
relevant considerations applicable to the interest s of justice .
21.3 Thirdly, the magistrate misdirected herself regarding the charges that
have been leveled up against the appellant in that she introduced her
own charges , namely, possession of stolen motor vehicle.
21.4 The fourth ground is that the magistrate has failed to take into account
the Constitutional Right s of the appellant s, especially the children’s
interest as is required by case law.
Analysis of evidence and applicable law.
22. It is common cause that the charges against the appellants fall in the
category of offences listed in schedules 5 and 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act
51 of 1977.
23. As the results of the charges levelled against the appellants, the provision s of
Section 60(11) of the Act are applicable to currently bail application . Section
60(11) provides as follows :
“Notwithstanding any provision of the Act, where an accused is charged
with an offence -
(a) referred to in Schedule 6, the Court shall order that the accuse d be
detained in custody until he/she is dealt with in accordance with the
law, unless the accuse d, havin g been given a reasonable opportunity
to do so , adduces evidence which satisfies the Court that exceptional
circumstances exist in which in the interest of justice and made his/her
release ;
(b) referred to in Schedule 5 but not in Schedule 6, the Court shall order
that the accused be detained in custody until he/she is dealt with in
accordance with the law, unless the accuse d, having been given a
reasonable opportunity to do so, a dduces evidence which satisfies that
the Court that the interest s of justice permit his/her release .
24. Section 60(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act reads as follows -
“An accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall subject to
the provisions of section 50(6), be entitled to be release d on bail at any
stage preceding his/her conviction in respect of such offence, if the
court is satisfied that the interest s of justice permit’’.
25. Further, Section 6 0(4) of Criminal Procedure Act provides as follows :
“The interest s of justice do not permit the release from de tention of an
accused where one or more the following grounds are established :
(a) Where there is likelihood that the accused , if he/she were released
on bail , will endanger the safe ty of the public or any particular
person or will com mit Schedule 1 offence: or
(b) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will attempt to evade his or her trial; or
(c) where there is likel ihood that the accuse d, if he or she were
released on bail, will attempt to influence or intimated witness es or
to conceal or destroy evidence ; or
(d) where there is the likelihood that the accused, if he or she were
released on bail, will undermine or jeopardize the objectives or the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system, including the bail
system.
(e) where in exceptional circumstances there is the likel ihood that the
release of the accused will disturb the public order or undermine the
public peace or security.”
26. In S v Dlamini1, the Constitutional Court defined the in terpretation of the term
‘interest s of justice ’ and how it is to be applied. The Court held :
“… must also be the sense in which interest s of justice concept is used
in ss (4). That subsection actually forms part of a functional unity with
ss (9) and (10). Between them they provide the heart of the evaluation
process in a bail application, ss (9) being predominant. If it is read first
and th e interest s of justice bears the same narrow meaning akin to
interest s of society (or the interest s of justice minus the interest of the
accused), the interpretation of three subsections falls neatly into place.
The open ing words of ss (9) (in consider ing the question in ss (4)) refer
to question whether it should be refused. That question, so the
presiding officer is told, is to be answered by weighing up the s ociet al
interest s listed in ss (4) and detailed in ss (5) – (8A) against the
personal interests adverted t o ss (9). And whenever the parties may
contend , ss (10) obliges the presiding officer to ultimate ly assume
whom responsi bility for that evaluation.”
27. In paragraph 6 of the Constitutional court in the matter of S v Dlamini (supra)
dealing with Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution of Republic of South Africa2,
the Court stated the following :
“Section 35(1(f) in its conte xt, makes three things pla in. The fact is that
the Constitution expressly acknowledges and s anctions that people may
be arrested for allegedly having committed offences and may for tha t
reason be detained in custody . The Constitution itself therefore places a
limitation on the liberty interest protected by s12. The second is that
notwithstanding lawful arrest, the person concerned has the right , but a
circumscribed one, to be released from custody subject to reasonable
conditions. The third basic proposition flows from second and really sets
1 S v Dlamini and others 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) PARA 48
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ,1996 , section 35
the normative pattern for the law of bail. It is that the criterion for release
is whether the interest s of justice permit it”.
27.1 From the above paragraph, it is clear that the starting point dealing with
bail proceeding s is Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution which provides
the principal template against which the whole of Chapter 9 of the
Criminal Procedure Act must be measured . The said section reads as
follows :
‘’Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offen ce
has the right -… to be released from the detention i f the interest s
of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions .”
27.2 It is clear from the reading of section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution that
there are limitations placed by it on the rights of liberty, dignity and
freedom of movement of individuals . That limitation is contained in the
last part that provides that the release of an arrested person from
detention can be granted if interest s justice of permit .
28. The common law inherent jurisdiction power to grant bail must be exercised
consistently with the nature and purpose of section 39(2) of the Constitution,
which provides that a Court ‘must promote’ security purport and objects of the
Bill of Rights and enjoins the Courts to develop common la w in the interests of
justice when dealing with matters involving the fundamental Constitutional
issue of liberty. This context ‘to promote’ means to develop or adv ance the
Constitutional imperative of taking in to proper account for fundamental rights
provided in section 12(1)(a)(1)(f) of the Constitut ion.
29. In my view, when I consider section 60 of the C riminal Procedure Act, I
should take every effort to take full account of the Constitution in the light of
the requirements of section 39(2).
30. Section 12( 1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees everyone’s right to freedom
and security of the person, which includes the right is not deprived of freedom
arbitrary or without cause. However , the Constitution does not create an
absolut e right to personal freedom. The liberty is qualified and circums cribed
by provisions of Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution.
31. It is clear that the approach to bail by a judicial officer must be considered
within the parameters of the Constitution. Section 35(1 )(f) of the Constitution
postulates a judicial evaluation of d ifferent factors that make up the criterion of
the interest s of justice. The application of Const itutional norms to the law and
practice of bail obliges judicial officers to harmonize s ection 6 0 Criminal
Procedure Act when dealing with bail provisions and Constitutional norms and
practice.
32. The purpose of bail is to strike a balance between the interest of society and
liberty of an accused person , who pending the outcome of his trial presumed
to be innocent3.
33. Further, the basic purpose of bail, from society’s point of view, has always
been and still is to ensure the accused ’s reappearance for trial. But p retrial
releases serve other purposes as well. The purposes recognized over the last
decades and often dispositive of the fairness of the entire criminal
proceedings.
34. Pre-trial release allows a man accused of crime to keep the fabric of his family
intact, to maintain employment and family ties in the event he is acquitted or
given a suspended sentence or probation. Further it spares his family the
hardship and indigni ty of wel fare and enforced separation. It permits the
accused to take an effective part in planning his defen se with his legal
representative, locating witnesses , improving his capability of staying free in
the community without getting into trouble.
3 Majali vs S (unreported, GSJ Case No.41210/2010, 19 July 2011 @ para 17
35. In S v Peterson 4 the court pointed out that the purpose of bail is to minimize
interference in the lawful activity of an accused. In S v Branco 5 the court
observed :
“The fundamental objective of the institution of bail in a democratic
society based on freedom is to maximized personal liberty”.
36. It is trite that a bail application should be impressible be heard as a matter of
urgency because it affects personal liberty. In Magistrate, Stutterheim v
Mashiya6, the court held:
“It is evident that finalizing an application for bail is always a matter of
urgency……and if bail is refused the decision can be appealed . The
right to prompt decision is thus a procedur al right independent of
whether the right to liberty actually the entitles the accuse d to bail.”
37. The deprivation of a person’s liberty due to arrest pending trial is subject to
judicial supervision and control. In exercising such oversight, in regard to bail
proceedings, a court is exp ressly enjoined by the provision s of section 6 0, in
particular s(4) and no to act as passive bystander but to take the initiative in
the bail proceeding s.
38. It must be mentioned that in S v Acheson 7, Mohamed J (as he then was) said
the following :
“An accused person cannot be kept into de tention pending his trial as
form of anticipatory punishment. The presumption of the law is that he
is innocent until h is guilty has been established in Court. The court wi ll
therefore ordinarily grant bail to an accused person unless this is lightly
to prejudice the ends of justice.
4 1999 (2) S ACR 52 (C)
5 2002 (1) SACR 531 (w)
6 2003 (2) SCR 106 (SCA)
7 1991 (2) SA 805 PARA 822 A -B
This has been the position then and still is. The Constitution has
codified the conditions for the release of an accused person from
detention. ”
39. The provision s of Section 6 0(11)(a) apply to the second appellant (Nkosomzi
Dlungana .) The appellant was therefor e expected to show on a balance of
probabilities by a dduce evidence which satisfies the Court that exceptional
circumstances exist which in the interest s of justice perm it his release. The
appellant, unlike the State which can place information formally at the
disposal Court, has an onus and is therefore enjo ined in terms of section
60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In support of his bail application, he
is pertinently averse that such is the case for him to be released on bail.
40. In S v Jonas 8, the court dealing with exceptional circumstances stated the
following :
“The term exceptional circumstances is not defined. There can be as
many circumstances which are exceptional as the term in essence
implies . An urgent serious medical operation necess itating the
accused ’s absence is one that springs to min d. A terminal illness may
be another. It should be futile to attempt to provide a list of possibilities
which constitute such circumstances. ”
41. Further, court in the same matter of S v Jonas (supra) state that :
“Where a man is charged with a commission of Schedule 6 offence
when everything points to the fact that he could not have committed the
offence because he has cast -iron alibi this would likewise was
constitute an exceptional circumstance.”
He evidence was that he did not commit any offence relating to the
possession of firearms and ammunitions. This was not refuted by the
State.
8 1998 (2) SACR 677 (SEC ) at 678 A-A
42. The evidence of the three appellants was not refuted by the State. In respect
of the appellants (one and three) who were charged with regard to Schedule 5
offences, the y bear the onus to demonstrate that the interest s of justice favo ur
the granting of bail. In doing so the factors listed in Section 60(4) of the
Criminal Procedure Act must be taken i nto account and the accused must
demonstrate that they have met them. These are :
42.1 They are not a danger to the public.
42.2 Will not evade their trial.
42.3 Will not intimidate or influence witness es.
42.4 Will not undermine or jeopardize the objects or the proper function ing of
criminal justices , including the bail system.
43. In terms of Section 60(4) the refusal to grant bail shall be in the interests of
justice where one or more of the ground s set out in s60(4)(a) to (e) are
established . In S v Diale 9 court stated the following :
“A court will not find that the refusal of b ail is in the interest s of justice
merely because there is a risk o r possibilit y that one or more of the
consequences mentioned in s60(4) will result . The court must no t
speculate, a finding on probabilities must be made. Unless it can be
found that one or more of the consequences is probabl e occur , the
detention of the accused is not in the interest s of justice , and the
accused should be released.”
44. In Pineiro 10, the court stated the following:
9 2013 (2) S ACR 85 (GNP)
10 S v Pineiro 1992 (1) S ACR 577 (NM) at 580 C -D
“In evaluating the factors in section 60(4) of the Criminal Procedure
Act, the Court in the exercise of its discretion to grant or refuse bail, the
court does in principle address one or embracing issue, will the
interest s of justice be prejudice d if the acc used is granted bail? In this
context, it must be borne in mind that if an accused person is refused
bail in circumstances where he will stand trial, the interests of justice
are also prejudices . Four sub sidiary questions arise. If released on bail,
will the accused stand his trial? Will he interfere with the State witness
or police in vestigation ? Will he commit further crimes? Will his release
be prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order and the security of
the state? At the same time , the court should determine whether any of
objective release on bail cannot suitably be met by appropriate
conditions pertaining to release on bail…”
45. If none of these factors mentioned above are satisfied, then it i s in the
interest s of justice that bail be granted, and a magistrate is required to grant
bail as a mat ter of law.
46. A Judge hearing an appeal shall not set aside the decision against which the
appeal is brought, unless the Judge is satisf ied that the decision was wrong ,
in which even the judge shall give the decision which in his opinion the lower
court should have given 11.
47. In S vs Barber 12 the court stated the following:
“It is well known that the powers of this Court are largely limited where
the matter come s before it on appeal and not as substantive
application for bail. This Court has to be persuaded that the magistrate
exercised the dis cretion which he has wrongly. Accordingly, although
this Court may have a different view, it should not su bstitute its own
view for that of the magistrate because that would be an unfair
interference with magistrate’s exercise of his dis cretion . I think it should
11 Bechan and Another v SARS Customs Investigation s Unit and others 2024 (5) SA 1 (SCA)
12 1979 (4) SA 21A €
be stress ed that, no matter what this Court’s own view s are, the real
question is whether it can be said that the magistrate who had the
discretion to grand bail exercised that dis cretion wrong ly.”
48. It is accepted that interfer ence is also justif ied where the lower Court
overlook ed some important aspects in coming to the decision to refuse bail13.
49. Section 65(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides the following :
“The court or judge hearing the appeal shall not set the decision
against which the appeal is brought , unless such court or judge is
satisfied that the decision was wrong, in which event court or judge
shall give the decision which in its o r his opinion the lower court should
have given. ”
50. In this case the magistrate merely considered the general stateme nt of the
investigating officer which was not subs tantiated at all. What influence d the
magistrate is the previous convection and the pending cases the appellants. I
must mention at stage as I have in the previous paragraphs that the pending
case for appe llant number 1 has been withdrawn. The case of the first
appellant is that he was not involved in the commission of any offence , and he
had no knowledge of the fire arms and ammu nitions .
51. Furthermore, the magistrate misdirected himself in finding that the appellants
have been charged with theft of motor vehicle or possession of stolen motor
vehicle . This does not appear from the charge sheet.
52. I find that the magistrate misdirected himself in fact in law . He failed to
appreciate provisi ons of Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution.
53. I find that it is in the interest s of justice that the accused should be release d
on bail and that there the exceptional circumstances that warrant the same.
13 Alehi v S 2022 (1) SACR 271 (G P) para 21
54. Consequently, in applying the High C ourt’s inherent common law,
Constitutional jurisdiction, I am satisfied that the appellant s have compl ied
and satisfied the requirement s Section 60(11) and are entitled to be released
on bail.
ORDER:
55. I consequently make the following order :
1. The bail appeal of the app ellants is upheld.
2. The m agistrate ’s court order refusing bail to the appellants is hereby set aside
and substituted with the following order:
1. Bail is granted in the amount of R10 000.00 ( Ten Thousand Rand ), in respect
of each appellant , subject to the following condition s:
(a) The first and second appellant s must report in person at the Tsolo
police station between 08H 30 and 16H30, every Monday and Friday
of each week , not unless they are attending their trial at Dutywa or
any place determined by the trial court , in which event they will
produce proof thereof.
(b) The third appellant must report in person at the Qumbu police station
in 08H30 and 16H30 , every Monday and Friday of each week ,
unless he is attending his trial at Dutywa or at any place determined
by the trial court, in which event he shall produce proof thereof.
(c) The appellant s must not leave their homesteads situated in Tsolo
and Qumbu for more than 5 consecutive days without infor ming the
investigating officer under Case No. 333/2024 held in Dutywa or the
branch commander of the detective of South African Police Services
in Tsolo in respect of the first and second appellant and Qumbu in
respect of third appellant.
(d) The appellants s hall not travel beyond the borders of Republic of
South Africa without prior written con sent of the investigating officer
or in his absence written con sent of the branch commander the
detective of South African Police Services at Tsolo in respect of the
first and second appellant and Qumbu in respect of third appellant .
(e) The appellants are restricted or prohibited from applying or to be in
possession of passports while on bail. In the event that they have
such passports, or travel documents they must surr ender them to
the Investigating Officer.
(f) The appellants are not allowed to change their addresses without
reporting/informing the Investing Officer or Branch Commander of
the detectives of South African Police Services in Tsolo in respect of
the first and second appellants and Qumbu in res pect of the third
appellant.
(g) The a ppellants are ordered to attend trial court until the finalization of
the criminal matter, and remain in such attendance, wherever the
matter is before court, unless they are excused from such
attendance by the court .
(h) The appellant s shall not interfere with the investigation and shall not
interfer e, contact, communicate or intimidate any of the State
witness es, whether known or unknown to them.
_________________________
N.R MTSHABE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel for the appellant : M Notyesi
Instructed by : Mvuzo Notyesi Inc. Attorneys
MTHATHA
Counsel for the respondent: B Bidla
Instructed by : National Director of Public Prosecution
MTHATHA
Date heard : 31 January 2025
Date delivered : 27 February 2025