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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
NOT REPORTABLE
Case no: CC 65/2024
In the matter between :
THE STATE
and
ALUTA HATI Accused No. 1
LUNGISILE YEKANYE Accused No. 2
__________________________________________________________________ _
SENTENC E
___________________________________________________________________
Govindjee J
[1] The accused acted in the execution of a common purpose and were convicted
on charges of robbery with aggravating circumstances, unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition in contravention of legislation, two counts of kidnapping and
two counts of attempted murde r. Accused No. 2 ( Mr Yekanye ) was, in addition,
convicted of arson.
[2] The state proved that the two counts of attempted murder (counts 6 and 8)
were planned or premedi tated and committed in circumstances where the victims
were persons likely to give materi al evidence at criminal proceedings with respect to
the offences of robbery that had been committed , by persons acting in furtherance of
a common purpose .1 In terms of s 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997,2
read with Part I of Schedule 2, and only since 5 August 2022, prescribed sentences
of life imprisonment apply in respect of t hese two counts. The robbery with
aggravating circumstances (count 1) attracts a prescribed minimum sentence of 15
years imprisonm ent for both accused, who are first offenders.3
[3] Section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 19774 provides for the sentences
which courts can impose. A sentencing court’s discretion must be exercised judicially
and properly, and courts are enjoined to t emper the punishment with a measure of
mercy .5 The sentencing court must attempt to achieve a balance in its sentence, and
not approach its task in a spirit of anger, but in one of equity. Hastiness, the striving
after severity and misplaced pity are out of place, as are so -called exemplary
sentences designed to use the crime to set an example for others in society.6 Still,
more serious cases clearly require severity, with a certain moderation of generosity
where appropriate , for the appropriate balance to be struck. The object of sentencing
is not to satisfy public opinion, but to serve the public interest.7
[4] In the final analysis, the well -known triad of factors to be considered consists
of ‘the crime, the offender and the interests of society ’,8 and these factors must be
applied, in accordance with S v Malgas ,9 to consider whether substantial and
1 This is an offence referred to in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.
2 Act 105 of 1997.
3 Part II of Schedule 2 read with s 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 19 9
4 Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’).
5 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G –H.
6 See S v Khulu 1975 (2) SA 518 (N) 521 –522.
7 S v Mhlakhaza and Another [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) at 189. Also see S v M (Centre for Child Law as
amicus curiae ) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC).
8 S v Zinn [1969] 3 All SA 57 (A) at 540G –H.
9 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA).
compelling circumstances exist to deviate from any prescribed minimum sentence.10
In S v Matyityi ,11 Ponnan JA held that Parliament:
‘…has ordained minimum sentences for certain specified offences. Courts are
obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly convincing reasons
for departing from them. Courts are not free to subvert the will of the
legislature by resort to vague, ill -defined concepts…and ill -founded
hypotheses that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer’s personal notion
of fairness. P redictable outcomes, not outcomes based on the whim of an
individual judicial officer, [are] foundational to the rule of law which lies at the
heart of our constitutional order’.
Nature of the crime and surrounding circumstances
[5] In convicting the accused I found that Accused No. 1 (Mr Hati) had taken the
lead in perpetrating the various offences. He contacted his aunt, Mrs M[...] , and,
pretending to act kindly, requested to stay at her home. Once the accused arrived
there, however, Mrs M[...] and her 16-year-old son, S[...], were bound with cable ties
placed around their hands and neck. The firearm was displayed, and they were
given various instructions. Motivated by financial gain, the accused robbed Mrs M[...]
of money from her cred it facility and took both complainants phones. They
kidnapped the complainants and used Mrs M[...] ’s vehicle to transport them to a
secluded area. When Mrs M[...] prayed and pleaded during the journey, she was
untied only so that she could attempt to access ad ditional funds for Mr Hati . When he
testified, Mr Hati admitted that he had only referred to an amount of R200 000 as the
price of his forgiveness ‘so that she can realise that she is the person who led to her
silence not me’.
[6] It was Mr Hati who instructe d his partner to ‘work and work properly’ prior to
Mr Yekanye taking her into her forest. Following further interaction with Mr Hati, Mr
10 See Radebe v The State [2019] ZAGPPHC 406 para 12.
11 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) para 23. Also see S v Malgas above n 9, in respect of the
prescribed period of imprisonment in the Minimum Sentences Act ordinarily being imposed for the
commission of the listed crimes in the specified circumstances, in the absence of weighty justification,
as quoted in Otto v S [2017] ZASCA 114 at para 21.
Yekanye choked her with the cable tie and stabbed her repeatedly. She pretended
not to breath which likely saved her li fe. S[...] was taken back to his home where he
observed the accused take a blender, television and microwave. Mr Yekanye, now
acting at his own behest, and knowing that S[...]’s younger brother was sleeping
inside, set fire to the home before exiting . With the cable tie still around his neck,
S[...] was then taken to various ATMs to draw money for the accused. He too was
then taken to a secluded area. A cting in terms of Mr Hati’s general instructions, Mr
Yekanye placed the firearm to S[...]’s head and pulled the trigger. When it failed to
fire, he was suffocated by Mr Yekanye with the cable tie and struck with the firearm
on the back of his neck and head. A knee was forcibly placed on his chest and he
was tram pled on for a minute or two before he passed out. The evidence presented
confirmed that these attempts on his life were designed to ensure that the accused
were not identified as the perpetrators of the robbery .
The accused’s circumstances and interests
Mr Hati
[7] Mr Hati is 30 years of age. He has only completed primary schooling and
attained a certificate in security . The pre -sentence report accepted into evidence,
prepared by Dr Andrews , a clinical psychologist, reflects that he also learned how to
build computers while living in Cape Town and he was assessed in the ‘high average
range’ of general intelligence . He was raised without a father and believed that his
grandfather was in fact h is father. He lived in his mother’s flat on her property in
Butterworth, with his wife and their four children, aged 13, 12, 7 and 2. Two of the
children were brought into the marriage by his wife. Trained in electrician work, and
running his own business, he was the sole breadwinner for the family and, it may be
accepted, treated them well . His absence from the household since his arrest has
caused hardship for his wife and family.
[8] Dr Andrews’ report also reflects that Mr Hati’s personality functioning c ontains
a so -called ‘split -off’ aspect, which makes him unpredictable and dangerous to
others. In his favour is his plea explanation and admission to being the main
perpetrator , despite having acted in common purpose with Mr Yekanye . He is a first
offender and expressed deep regret regarding his conduct .
Mr Yekanye
[9] Mr Yekanye had just turned 18 at the time of the incident and had completed
only primary school education . He is single with no children. His mother is a
domestic worker, and h e lived with his father, who is mentally disabled . He only
came to know his father for the first time in 2019. A few years prior to this he lost his
step-father, which impacted his behaviour negatively. In his words to Dr Andrews, his
relationship with his mother deter iorated and he became a gangster , aged 10 , also
smoking cannabis .
[10] Mr Hati was perceived to be Mr Yekanye’s boss by the latter’s paternal uncle,
who provided information to Dr Andrews. He had attached himself to Mr Hati, who he
perceived as an older brothe r, often staying with him, learning electrical skills from
him and working as his assistant. Dr Andrews commented as follows:
‘His general behaviour was characterised by his quiet and friendly
demeanour. He was polite and forthcoming with information. He i mpressed as
an immature 19 -year-old person who was overcome with shame for his
behaviour towards an aunt and her young son. The letter of apology he was
writing to [both of them] for his shameful behaviour was observed by the
clinician . “I am so ashamed of myself that I cannot even look these people in
the eyes. I have to write to them instead”. His immaturity was observed in the
sense that [he] had no insight into his idealisation of his older cousin, Aluta.
He tried to create the impression that he was on the same maturity level as
Aluta. After having assessed both Aluta and Lungisile, it is cl ear that Aluta is
the mature leader in the relationship. Aluta has a commanding personality,
whereas Lungisile’s personality is immature, with low self -esteem. His
aggressive behaviour in this case is a defensive behaviour to cover up a poor
self-concept. Unfortunately, the extent to which Lungisile is prepared to go to
defend against his low self -esteem and poor self -concept is antisocial and
dangerous to others. Lungisile is assessed to have the potential to benefit
from correctional supervision. His yout h is to his advantage in this respect.’
[11] The accused have been in custody since February 2024.
The impact on the complainants and the interests of society
[12] Both complainants experienced what Dr Andrews terms as a ‘significant
negative life event’, meaning that their psychological lives and functioning are forever
changed and negatively impacted. Mrs M[...] is 54 years of age. As her home was
destroyed by virtue of the arson, she has no home of her own and struggles to
provide for her family. This has impacted on her self -esteem. She is also now
indebted because of the money taken from her credit facility by Mr Hati. Life is
difficult for her family, particularly S[...]. She had been on good terms with the
accused prior to the incident but has now l ost any trust in her family members. She
has clearly been scarred by the attempt on her life , also being unwilling to accept
any apology and fearful of the accused.
[13] In addition to the various physical injuries suffered by S[...], he too has been
impacted by the after -effects of the incident. The financial situation in his home is
poor and his living conditions have deteriorated , which has impacted on his
schooling . His mood has changed, he struggled to socialise and even attempted to
commit suicide in 2024. He is now taking sleeping and anti -depression medication.
He too testified that he was unable to forgive the accused for their conduct. A report
prepared by a r egistered social worker and accepted into evidence confirms the
impact of the incident on both complainants.
[14] As for the interests of society, one need only look to the recent amendments
to the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997. Attempted murder, in circums tances
such as the present, attracts the most severe prescribed minimum sentence
possible. That the complainants were accosted by family members in the sanctity of
their home compounds matters. The evidence reflects that they were most fortunate
to survive , particularly considered that the accused were armed and inten ded to
murder them . Society’s interests, bearing in mind the various established purposes
of punishment, would be served by lengthy periods of incarceration, if not sentences
of life imprisonme nt.
Analysis
[15] Sentencing courts are obliged to consider the ‘sentencing triad’ to arrive at a
just outcome.12 Punishment must be proportional to the criminal and the crime and
be fair to society. As indicated, it should not be imposed out of a spirit of anger or
retribution and should also, where circumstances permit, be blended with a measure
of mercy.13
[16] While all considerations should be carefully weighed, discretionary minimum
sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons.14 It may be
accepted that the legislature has amended the Criminal Law Amendment Act to
include life imprisonment for attempted murder, in certain circumstances, in
recognition of the prevalence and seriousness of this offence. This is aimed at
ensuring a severe standardised and consistent response from the courts to the
commission of such crimes, unless there were, and could be seen to be, truly
convincing reasons for a differen t response.
[17] Several cases have provided non -binding guidance to courts as to when it
would be appropriate to make a finding confirming that the ‘composite yardstick’
(substantial and compelling circumstances) has been met.15 There is, however,
seemingly something of a dearth of jurisprudence pertaining to cases of attempted
murder after the 2022 legislative amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
1997. While there are examples of apparent departure from the prescribed minimum
sentence for attempted m urder, in all the cases brought to my attention this appears
to have been predominantly because the court’s focus was on determining a suitable
punishment for a murder charge, with the punishment for attempted murder
12 S v Zinn above n 8 at 540G –H. On the functions to be served by sentence, see S v Matyaleni
[2021] ZAECGHC para 13. In this context, these factors must be applied to consider whether
substantial and compelling circumstances exist to deviate from a prescribed minimum sentence: S v
Malgas above n 9 para 18.
13 S v Rabie above n 5 at 862G–H.
14 S v PB 2011 (1) SACR 448 (SCA) para 21; S v Matyityi above n 11 para 23.
15 See, for example, D v S [2016] ZASCA 123 para 11.
inevitably running concurrently. The ef fect is that, at least in the decisions brought to
my attention, there was little need to conduct an in -depth analysis of the appropriate
sentence for attempted murder .
[18] It must also be appreciated that life imprisonment is the heaviest sentence
that a pe rson can legally be obliged to serve.16 The court must consider the
traditional mitigating and aggravating factors cumulatively and as part of determining
whether the minimum prescribed sentence is so disproportionate to the sentence
that would be appropri ate, to the extent that an injustice would be done by imposing
that sentence.17 If, after considering all the factors, the court has not merely a sense
of unease but a conviction that injustice will be done if the prescribed sentence is
imposed or, put dif ferently, that the prescribed sentence would be disproportionate to
the crime, the criminal and the legitimate needs of society, there will be substantial
and compelling circumstances requiring the court to impose a lesser sentence than
the prescribed mini mum.18 Aversion to imprisoning an offender, even for a first
offence, is not, on its own, a factor intended to qualify as a ‘substantial and
compelling’ circumstance warranting deviation from the prescribed minimum
sentence.19
[19] An aggravating feature of the present crimes is the manner the complainants
were accosted in their home, by individuals they ought to have been able to trust,
only to be robbed, kidnapped, attacked and abandoned. The conduct perpetrated
violated various constitutional rights of the complainants , includin g their human
dignity, bodily integrity and privacy. The robbery and what followed was planned and
16 Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA).
17 See Dyantyi v S [2010] ZAECGHC 120; 2011 (1) SACR 540 (ECG) para 14.
18 S v GK 2013 (2) SACR 505 (WCC) para 9 , 14: ‘I thus must not approach the present appeal with a
mind that a life sentence is a priori a just punishment … Instead, I must examine all the circumstances
of the case and then ask myself whether I am not merely uneasy at the imposition of a life sentence,
but have a conviction that such a sentence would be unjust, ie disproportionate to the crime, the
offence, and the legitimate needs of the community. Inevitably that entails forming a view as to what a
just sentence would be in all the circumstances of th e case … If the just sentence, approached in this
manner, falls materially below the prescribed sentence, there will be substantial and compelling
circumstances to depart from the prescribed sentence. As was held in Malgas , substantial and
compelling circu mstances are not confined to circumstances where the prescribed sentence would, in
relation to the sentence the court would have imposed, be ‘disturbingly’ inappropriate or ‘induce a
sense of shock’. In other words, a discrepancy falling short of the latte r test … may justify a finding
that substantial and compelling circumstances exist to depart from the sentence prescribed by the
Act.’
19 The Director of Public Prosecutions, Grahamstown v T M 2020 JDR 0652 (SCA) (‘TM’) para 11.
brazen. Balanced against these features of the offence are the personal
circumstances of the accused and other aspects of the nature of the offence , which I
have carefully considered .
[20] It is a settled principle of our law that persons convicted of the same offences
must, generally, receive the same punishment. The rule does not apply where the
circumstances justify differential treatment. In the present circumstances, the court
has found on the evidence that the degrees of participation were unequal an d that
Mr Hati was the most blameworthy offender. As explained below, t here are also clear
differences in the personal circumstances of the accused that warrant differential
treatment.20
Mr Hati
[21] As indicated, t here are various aggravating features of the crime. In particular,
the accused were family members of the complainant s, a woman in her mid -fifties
and a child aged 16, and trusted to the point that Mrs M[...] was willing to offer them
accommodation in her home on the night of the incident.21 The state proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the crimes were premeditated and planned by Mr Hati.22 On
the accepted evidence, these were not impulsive actions caused by rage associated
with Mr Hati’s own issues about the identity of his father and the fate of his
grandfather. Motivated by financial gain, a rmed, and with Mr Yekanye following his
command, he clearly intended to rob Mrs M[...] and, thereafter, attempted to ensure
that he was not caught by kidnapping and attempting to murder her and S[...]. None
of his crimes was on the spur of the moment , rather they were committed o ver the
course of the evening , Mr Hati acknowledging that he appreciated the wrongfulness
of his actions .
[22] On his own version, Mr Hati attempted to obtain an additional R200 000 from
Mrs M[...] knowing that she would be unable to obtain such funds, and to make her
20 S v Giannoulis 1975 (4) SA 867 (A) at 871A –873H.
21 See S v Matoewa 2009 (2) SACR 303 (ECG) at 307G –H.
22 See Kekana v S [2014] ZASCA 158 para 13: it is not necessary to have thought or planned an
action a long period of time in advance before carrying out a plan. Time is not the only consideration
because even a few minutes are enough to carry out a premeditated action.
feel that she was to blame for what was to follow. In fact, the decision to attempt to
murder her ha d already been taken and Mr Hati trusted that Mr Yekanye would
execute the task to completion , having instructed him accordingly . He ignored Mrs
M[...] ’s prayers and pleas , which included reminding the accused that they were her
family and that she was willi ng to discuss matters and assist . Later, h aving dealt with
Mrs M[...] , no mercy was shown to S[...], who was driven away to suffer the same
fate. The severe impact of the ordeal on both complainants is reflected, above, and
speaks for itself.
[23] In these circumstances, can it be said that Mr Hati manifested genuine
remorse following the incident, based on his plea explanation and testimony? The
definitive test has been explained as follows:23
‘There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse . Many accused
persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more
translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for
the plight of another. Thus genuine contrition can only come from an
appreciation and acknowled gment of the extent of one’s error. Whether the
offender is sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or
herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding
actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should
rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence
must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her
confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition
alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find that an
accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper
appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed;
what has since provoked his or h er change of heart; whether he or she does
indeed have a true appreciation of the consequences of those actions.’
[24] It is clear from his plea explanation, testimony and from the evidence of Dr
Andrews, that Mr Hati now regrets his conduct. While his plea explanation indicated
23 S v Matyityi above n 11 para 13.
‘deep regret’, he attempted to justify his conduct in both his plea explanation and
testimony based on a fabricated version, suggesting that his actions had been ‘born
out of anger because my aunt did not admit responsibility for the death of my
grandfather when I confronted her with the allegation on the night of the incident’.
That version has been rejected by this court. Mr Hati also failed to take the court into
his confidence, at times justifying his conduct with reference to the traditional healer
he had consulted and, with reference to the firearm charge, to Mr Yekanye. He also
suggested that Mrs M[...] ’s shock at what was transpiring explained her inability to
recall her discussion with him. Those contrived explanations , toge ther with h is
version that there had been a change of heart after the firearm malfunctioned, so
that the accused had decided to spare the lives of the complainants, were rejected
on the evidence following the credibility assessment of those who testified. Such
attempts at distorting the truth are contrary to genuine acts of contrition. While an
apology was offered during testimony , this was directed equally , and briefly , to Mrs
M[...] and his wife, with little or no mention of S[...]. A general expression of remorse,
also towards S[...], is reflected in Dr Andrews ’ report . Other than the impending
sentence, however, there is no explanation of what has provoked the change of
heart.
[25] I have considered the balance of Dr Andrews’ report, as well as her testimony,
carefully. Mr Hati appears to have been more forthright in his interview with Dr
Andrews , also admitting that his financial problems had been a factor in the
commission of the crimes . This contrasts with the explanation he pre sented to court
a day or two previously. While Dr Andrews considered his expression of remorse to
be sincere, her evidence linked this to the possibility of a sentence of life
imprisonment. She also conceded that she was not able to offer expert testimony on
the nuances of the distinction between regret and remorse, as her assessment was
restricted to what she had been told by Mr Hati. Dr Andrews’ testimony and report
must also be considered bearing in mind her conclusion that Mr Hati has a ‘pleasing
person ality’ and comes across to others as ‘highly trustworthy’ which, given the ‘split -
off’ aspect of his personality functioning makes him unpredictable and dangerous to
others. It also cannot be ignored that Mr Hati’s criminality escalated as events
unfolded, with little concern as to the consequences for either his aunt or S[...].
Considering all the available evidence, and applying the set test, I am constrained to
conclude that genuine remorse has not been demonstrated. Applying the test, h is
various attempts to justify his conduct and the lack of an explanation as to what has
provoked his change of heart count against him, and I am unconvinced that he has a
true appreciation of the consequences of his actions on the lives of his victims.
[26] Abse nt genuine remorse, the question is whether Mr Hati’s clean record, plea
explanation and subsequent testimony , financial responsibility and care for his minor
children and time spent in custody constitute substantial and compelling
circumstances. None of t hese factors on their own suffice . In respect of the plea
explanation, it remains to be noted that the evidence against Mr Hati was
overwhelming, the complainants being family members well -known to him and ,
having managed to survive the attempts on their lives, able to describe their ordeal in
detail. Considered cumulatively, these factors also do not amount to convincing
reasons for depart ure from the discretionary minimum sentence s prescribed. The
few factors in Mr Hati’s favour are wholly outweighed by t he nature of the crimes and
the interests of society, so that the imposition of the strictest sanction possible is
proportionate, justified and the only suitable punishment considering the applicable
legislative framework.
Mr Yekanye
[27] Dr Andrews’ assessment of Mr Yekanye finds support in the available
evidence. It must be accepted that he was under the thumb of his older cousin and
that h is blameworthiness must be reduced as a result. His age, the fact that he was
a first offender and, in effect, pleaded guilty must be added to this.24 It may be
accepted that his conscience and sense of remorse motivated the admissions he
made, which curtailed the present proceedings . As Dr Andrews explained, t here
appear to be prospects of corrective rehabilitation. I consider these factors to qualify
as ‘substantial and compelling ’ and note these reasons on the record. The imposition
of the prescribed minimum sentences would be disproportionate in the
circumstances.25
24 S v Mendile 2016 JDR 2010 (ECG) para 11.
25 See, in general, S v Sekonyela 2020 JDR 1614 (ECM).
[28] Given the facts of the matter, it is, however, clear that a lengthy period of
imprisonment is warranted, notwithstanding consideration of these mitigating
circumstances. I need not reiterate the various dimensions of the offences, and their
likely long -lasting impact on the complainants. It was Mr Yekanye, after all, who
followed the prompts and instructions of Mr Hati and who perpetrated the various
acts of violence for which he has been convicted. Furthermore, and now acting at his
own behest, he has been found guilty of arson, with the intention to injure N […]
M[...] . This conduct has compounded the woes of the complainants. I have
considered the sentencing triad , including the year already spent in custody , and the
legislative provisions already described in imposing various periods of imprisonment
on Mr Yekanye , to run concurrently so that the cumulative impact remains
proportionate.
Order
[29] The following sentence s are imposed:
1. Accused no. 1 is sentenced to :
a) 15 years imprisonment for robbery with aggravating
circumstances (count 1);
b) 5 years imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm
(count 2);
c) 5 years imprisonment for unlawful possession of
ammunition (count 3);
d) 5 years imprisonment for kidnapping (count 4);
e) 5 years imprisonment for kidnapping (count 5);
f) Life imprisonment for attempted murder (count 6);
g) Life imprisonment for attempted murder (count 8).
As a sentence of life imprisonment has been imposed, the other
sentences automatically run concurrently.
2. Accused no. 2 is sentenced to :
a) 12 years imprisonment for robbery with aggravating
circumstances (count 1);
b) 4 years imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm
(count 2);
c) 4 years imprisonment for unlawful possession of
ammunition (count 3);
d) 4 years imprisonment fo r kidnapping (count 4);
e) 4 years imprisonment for kidnapping (count 5);
f) 20 years imprisonment for attempted murder (count 6);
g) 7 years imprisonment for arson (count 7);
h) 20 years imprisonment for attempted murder (count 8).
The sentences in respect of counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 , 7 and 8 are to run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in respect of count 6, so that
the effective period of imprisonment imposed is 2 0 years.
_______________ __________
A. GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard : 25, 27 March 2025
Delivered : 28 March 2025.
Appearances:
For the State: Adv NP Phikiso
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions
94 High Street
Makhanda
For Accused No. 1 Adv J McConnachie
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa
69 High Street
Makhanda
For Accused No. 2: Adv H Charles
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa
69 High Street
Makha nda