IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA )
NOT REPORTABLE
Case no: CC69/2024
In the matter between
THE STATE
and
NEIL CRAMFORD ACCUSED
___________________________________________________________________
SENTENCE
___________________________________________________________________
GOVINDJEE, J
Background
[1] Mr Cramford pleaded guilty and was convicted of two counts of rape in
contravention of section 3, read with various sections of the Criminal Law (Sexual
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007.1
[2] The Director of Public Prosecutions relied on s 51(1), read with Part I of
Schedule 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 19972 (‘the Minimum Sentences
1 Act 32 of 2007 (‘the Act’).
Act’) in seeking life imprisonment for the rape conviction s in respect of both, on the
basis that the incidents involved a victim under the age of 16 .
[3] Section 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 19773 provides for the sentences
which courts can impose. The imposition of sentence is pre -eminently a matter for
the discretion of the trial court, which is free to impose whatever sentence it deems
appropriate provided it exercises its discretion judicially and properly. The general
purpose of imposing a sentence is fourfold: retributive , preventative, rehabilitative
(reformative) and to act as a general deterrent.4
[4] This court has often had occasion to remark that a sentencing court must
attempt to achieve a balance in its sentence, and not approach its task in a spirit of
anger, but in one of equity. While the retributive aspect tends to dominate, courts are
enjoined to temper the punishment with a measure of mercy.5 Hastiness, the striving
after severity and misplaced pity are out of place, as are so -called exemplary
sentences designed to use the crime to set an example for others in society.6 Still,
more serious cases clearly require severity, with a certain moderation of generosity,
for the appropriate balance to be struck. The object of sentencing is not to satisfy
public opinion, but to serve the public interest.7
[5] In the final analysis, the well -known triad of factors to be considered consists
of the crime, the offender and the interests of society,8 and these factors must be
2 Act 105 of 1997 (‘the Minimum Sentences Act’). In terms of s 51(3)( a) of the Minimum Sentences
Act, a court that is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist to justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than that prescribed by the M inimum Sentences Act must impose a
lesser sentence, entering the relevant circumstances on the record of proceedings. In terms of Part I
of Schedule 2, a prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment is also triggered when rape is
committed by an accuse d who ‘has been convicted by the trial court of two or more offences of
rape…’.
3 Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’).
4 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A).
5 Ibid at 862G -H.
6 See S v Khulu 1975 (2) SA 518 (N) 521 -522.
7 S v Mhlakhaza and Another [1997] 2 All SA 185 (A) at 189. Also see S v M (Centre for Child Law as
amicus curiae ) 2007 (2) SACR 539 (CC).
8 S v Zinn [1969] 3 All SA 57 (A) at 540G -H.
applied, in accordance with S v Malgas ,9 to consider whether substantial and
compelling circumstances exist to deviate from the prescribed minimum sentence s.10
Nature of the crime s and surrounding circumstances
[6] Mr Cramford and the complainant resided in the same area and were
acquainted. During 2023, he called the complainant and asked her to clean his
house. He locked the door once she had entered, took her to his room and
undressed her before un dressing himself. Despite the complainant’s attempts to
push him away, Mr Cramford raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina. After
he had finished doing so, the accused instructed the complainant to dress and
threatened to beat her if she reported what had occurred.
[7] Later that week, Mr Cramford again raped the complainant , in an almost
identical manner. She was again threatened with a beating if she reported the
incident. She was 10 years of age at the time.
[8] On 23 July 2024, approximately 15 months after the previous incidents, Mr
Cramford came across the complainant , who was now 12 years of age, and asked
her to accompany him. He undressed her near the swimming pool in Michausdal
before raping her and repeati ng his previous threat s.
[9] On this occasion Mr Cramford’s conduct came to light and he was arrested
the same day. A report on a medico -legal examination by a health care practitioner
confirms that the child’s hymen was broken and that semen was flowing out of her
vaginal entrance. Redness was observed around the vulva / perianal region .
[10] As part of consideration of an appropriate sentence, it is also important to
consider the eff ect of the crimes on the victim , particularly in cases of gender -based
9 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) ; 2001 (2) SA 1222; [2001] 3 All SA 220; [2001] ZASCA 30
(Malga s).
10 See Radebe v The State [2019] ZAGPPHC 406 ; [2019] 3 All SA 938 (GP); 2019 (2) SACR 381
(GP) (‘ Radebe ’) para 12.
violence .11 A psychological assessment report , dated 23 January 2025, prepared by
Ms Karen Andrews, and accepted into evidence , confirms that the complainant’s
behaviour was characterised by ‘restricted behavioural functioning’, meaning that
she did not have a normal ‘aliveness’ of affect and mood. According to the clinical
psychologist, her thought content and thought process were ‘bland’ . The emotional
restriction observed was assessed as consistent with the presence of emotional
trauma.
[11] The complainant reported to the clinician that she suffer ed intrusive memories
of the rapes. These ‘flashbacks’ happened whenever she tried to concentrate her
mind and she was unable to prevent or inhibit these intrusive memories. This
resulted in abnormal behaviour in the classroom, including hostility and episodes
where the child isolated herself from her peers.
[12] The clinical psychologist report linked the complainant’s repeated sexual
violation by an adult person known to the family to the concept of Sex ual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome. Reporting the rape, after the third incident, was ‘a
moment of significant traumatic upheaval for a child aged 12’. To quote Ms A ndrews:
‘She felt violated and abused and ‘guilty’ at the same time. A child [her] age
does n ot have the mental and emotional maturity to process these complex
and conflicting emotions. This has a negative impact on normal personality
and emotional functioning that would otherwise take place. Instead,
personality and emotional functioning and grow th became “restricted”. This
was observed in the Mental State Examination. Such “restriction” inhibits
normal personality and emotional growth.’
[13] The consequence is that the complainant will require further counselling /
mental health services during adolescence and into adulthood. According to the
expert report, Mr Cramford’s criminality and the sexual abuse perpetrated is ‘highly
11 See A Spies ‘The judicial relevance and impact of victim impact statements in the sentencing of
rape offenders’ (2018) SACJ 212 at 231 as cited in S v Dyonase [2020] ZAWCHC 137 para 21. Also
see Radebe above n 10 para 10 and the authorities cited there.
associated with f uture personality problems , psychosexual developmental issues,
and addiction issues in adulthood’.12
[14] The complainant conveyed her sentiments towards Mr Cramford, during her
interactions with Ms Andrews, as follows:
‘Jy het my kinderdae weggevat (You have taken my childhood away).
Hoekom het jy dit aan my gedoen? (Why did you do this to me?). Ek voel nie
lekker nie. (I don’t feel right). Jy het my baie seer gemaak. (You have hurt me
very much). Dit is reg dat jy moet gevonnis word. (It is right that you must get
punished). ’
The accused’s circumstances and interests
[15] Mr Cramford testified in mitigation of sentence. He is a 46 -year-old widower.
Two of his three sons are adults. The youngest is 16 years of age and lives with his
sister in Cradock. Mr Cramford was employed by the Department of Correctional
Services for 23 years , holding the position of warrant officer prior to his arrest . He
has no pending matters but admitted that he was convicted of assault with intent to
do grievous bodily harm more than 10 years ago.13
[16] Mr Cramford explained that he had pleaded guilty as a sign of remorse, and
mindful that what he had done was wrong. He had decided to plead guilty on the day
of his arrest and made a statement to that effect , immediately acknowledging that he
had committed the offenc es. He knew the complainant’s father well, having played
rugby against him, and accepted that he had broken the trust placed in him by the
complainant and her family. He conveyed an apology to them and asked for their
forgiveness.
12 Also see Director of Public Prosecutions, Free State v Mashune [2018] ZASCA 60 paras 17 –18.
13 Mr Cramford was fined R3000 or, in default of payment, to undergo six months imprisonment half of
which was suspended for the period of five years on condition that he was not convicted of another
offence committed during the period of suspension. He was declared ‘not unfit to possess a firearm’ in
terms of the relevant legislation.
[17] When asked what had driv en him to commit the first offence, Mr Cramford
replied that he could attribute his conduct to boredom. He testified that he realised
that the offences were serious . He knew that raping the complainant on the first
occasion was wrong but could not explain why he had done so again within a period
of a week. He accepted that the child had tried to push him away on the first
occasion and testified that he could not control himself. He also appeared to accept
that the first two incidents were not on the spur of the moment: he had called the
child on both occasions to clean his house, before locking the door and raping her
each time. To make matters worse, he had then threatened her to remain silent ,
although he attempted to deny this aspect during his testimony.
[18] As for the third incident, Mr Cramford suggested that he had negotiated to
have sex with the child when he met her at a shebeen. This had not been his plan for
the day , and s he had simply been in the wrong place at the wrong time . He knew
that his conduct was wrong. When asked why he had not reconsidered in between
his discussion with the complainant and proceeding to the chosen location, he again
explained that he had a cted out of boredom. Such occurrences, he explained,
happened unexpectedly and he regretted what had occurred . He also understood
that the child and her mother would never forgive him or want to see him, and that
the complainant would always carry the scar of his treachery.
The interests of society
[19] Incidents of rape always evoke outrage and revulsion from the c itizenry.14
Courts have repeatedly reflected on the horrific nature of the offence of rape, given
that it constitutes a humiliating, degrading and brutal invasion of the privacy, dignity,
and person of the victim.15 In S v Vilakazi ,16 the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed
that rape is a repulsive crime. The Constitutional Court has also explained the link
between rape, sexual entitlement, male power and control over women as part of the
14 Director of Public Prosecutions Eastern Cape v Coko 2024 (2) SACR 113 (SCA) para 6.
15 See, for example, Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu -Natal v Ndlovu 2024 (1) SACR 561
(SCA) para 73. Some recent statistics are contained in R Matlala ‘Rape myths and the language of
the law: The need for a feminist jurisprudential approach’ Constitutional Court Review (2024) vol 14,
137–152.
16 S v Vilakazi 2012 (6) SA 353 (SCA); [2008] 4 All SA 396; [2008] ZASCA 87 2009 (1) SACR 552
(SCA) (Vilakazi ) at 555h.
social construction of masculinity in South Afric a.17 Society expects that the scourge
of gender -based violence must be addressed and must cease. In addition, children’s
rights are constitutionally protected, and rape of a child , let alone repeated rape, is
by its nature one of the worst kinds of offence s imaginable.
[20] Society’s opprobrium has translated into the Minimum Sentences Act, which
by way of a prescribed, albeit discretionary minimum sentence regime, has
drastically impacted upon the exercise of a court’s discretion in imposing a
sentence.18 As the SCA has clarified, it is no longer business as usual. A court does
not have a clean state to determine whatever sentence it deems fit. It must sentence
fully conscious of the fact that the legislature has specified life imprisonment as t he
sentence which should ordinarily be imposed for this type of crime.19 As the court
held in S v Ncheche :20
‘A woman’s body is sacrosanct and anyone who violates it does so at his peril
and our Legislature, and the community at large, correctly expects of our
courts to punish rapists severely.’
Count 1 a nalysis : is life imprisonment a proportionate punishment?
[21] A sentence of life imprisonment is the ultimate punishment and requires
extremely careful consideration prior to imposition. The court has received sufficient
evidence to undertake this difficult enquiry.21 Mr Charles , representing Mr Cramford,
argued that his personal circumstances, considered cumulatively, justified a
departure from the prescribed minimum sentences. Indeed, none of the
considerations taken in isolation may be classified as ‘substantial and compelling’ in
17 S v Tshabalala and Another 2020 (2) SACR 38 (CC) para 1 ; Masiya v Director of Public
Prosecution, Pretoria and Another (Centre for Applied Legal Studies and Another; Amici Curiae) 2007
(2) SACR 435 (CC); 2007 (8 BCLR 827; [2007] ZACC 9. Also see Matlala above n 15 at 140.
18 S v September [2014] ZAECGHC 38 para 8.
19 Malgas above n 9 paras 7 –9.
20 S v Ncheche 2005 (2) SACR 386 (WLD) para 35. S v Chapman 1997 (2) SACR 3 (SCA) at 5B. In
Vilakazi above n 16 para 54, Nugent JA noted that ‘there comes a stage at which the maximum
sentence is proportionate to an offence and the fact that the same sentence will be attracted by an
even greater horror means only that the law can offer nothing more.’
21 See s 274 of the CPA. I have specifically considered whether a probation officer’s report might aid
the enquiry and determined that this is unnecessary in the circumstances. Also see S v EN 2014 (1)
SACR 198 (SCA); [2012] ZASCA 148.
my view.22 The question remains whether the imposition of the minimum sent ence s
are proportionate to the particular offence s.23 Courts are not vehicles for injustice and
disproportionate sentences are not to be imposed.24 In order to justify the deprivation
of Mr Cramford’s freedom for life, it must be shown that it is reasonably necessary to
curb the offence and punish the offender , so that the length of punishment is
proportionate to the offence.25
[22] It is important to consider the various circumstances cumulatively, and with
specific focus on Mr Cramford’s plea of gui lty, expression of remorse, and treatment
as a first offender. I have also considered the time spent in custody and his years
spent in the public service, performing the work of rehabilitation and safekeeping of
prison inmates. I consider each of these dim ensions in further detail, below, before
highlighting aspects of the other factors relevant to the enquiry .
[23] As for the admission of guilt and plea of guilty, it must be accepted that this is
only a neutral factor when an accused person faces an ‘open and shut’ case , as in
the present circumstances.26 It is a factor in favour of Mr Cramford that his plea of
guilty at least negated the need for the complainant to have to relive her ordeal by
testifying and being subjected to cross -examination in court.
[24] The suggestion that Mr Cramford is genuinely remorseful requires more
detailed consideration. As Ponnan JA held in S v Matyityi :27
‘There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused
persons might well regret their conduct, but that does not without more
translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a gnawing pain of conscience for
the plight of another. Thus genuine cont rition can only come from an
appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one’s error. Whether the
offender is sinc erely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or
22 See S v MM 2023 (1) SACR 415 (MM) para 14.
23 S v Vilakazi above n 16 para 15 ; S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC); 2001 (3) SA 382; 2001 (5)
BCLR 423; [2001] ZACC 16 paras 37 –38.
24 Vilakazi above n 16 para 18.
25 S v Dodo above n 23 para 37.
26 S v Barnard 2004 (1) SACR 191 (SCA) at 197.
27 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) (Matyityi ) para 13 (footnotes omitted) .
herself at having been caught, is a factual question. It is to the surrounding
actions of the accused, rather than what he says in court, that one should
rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the penitence
must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her
confidence. Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition
alleged to exist cannot be determined. After all, before a court can find that an
accused person is genuinely remorseful, it needs to have a proper
appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed;
what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he or she
does indeed have a tru e appreciation of the consequences of those actions …’
[25] Mr Cramford ’s explanation of what transpired was curt and bereft of detail ,
particularly in respect of the first two incidents . While he apologised and asked the
complainant and her family for forgiv eness, he failed to take the court fully into his
confidence as to his state of mind at the time . His nonchalant explanation that he had
violated the complainant, on the first occasion, out of boredom raises serious
questions as to the genuineness of his c ontrition. There was also no correlation
between the expressions of remorse and his conduct within a week after the first
incident, Mr Cramford being unable to explain the repeated modus operandi leading
to the complainant being raped for a second time. Given that this court is obliged to
look at the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than only at what he says in
court, to determine genuine remorse, this is particularly problematic for Mr Cramford.
In addition, h ow he had reconciled his own behaviour towards the complainant and
emerged repentant and remorseful was left unexplained. Mr Cramford also failed to
demonstrate a true appreciation of the consequences of his actions, particularly in
respect of the victim h erself. His belated attempt during testimony to deny his threats
of physical violence towards the complainant on both occasions, in the face of his
plea explanation to the contrary, reflects negatively on his expression of remorse.
Taken together, I am una ble to conclude that the testimony in mitigation constitutes
genuine remorse, rather than mere regret at the thought of his own plight. This
impacts upon the prospects for rehabilitation.
[26] It stands in Mr Cramford’s favour that he is a first offender. The time spent in
custody is not unusual or particularly lengthy and adds little to the analysis.28 It is
apparent from his occupation and rank that he cannot be said to be a marginalised
individual and there is no suggestion that his socio -economic or family circumstances
warrant special consideration. The stability suggested by his years in service is offset
by the nature of his work and society’s expectation that persons in his position would
not themselves cause such repeated harm to vulnerable children.
[27] Little more needs to be said about the nature of the crime. The aggravating
features of the matter are undeniably severe. In S v MM , Laing J, reflecting on similar
circumstances, described the offences committed as ‘nothing short of horrendous ’,
given that the accused had abused the complainant’s trust, taken complete
advantage of her vulnerability and used her to meet his own needs.29 This includes
the fact that the complainant, a vulnerable child aged 10, was raped twice within the
space of a week by a person known to her as a trusted friend of the family. To make
matters worse, the behaviour was, at least to some extent, calculated. Mr Cramford
identified the child, who was well -known to him as the daughter of a friend and lived
near him. He lured her under the pretence that he required her to clean his home. He
then locked the door behind her to prevent her escape and proceeded to rape her.
The violence associated with the violation of the complainant’s dignity, bodily integrity
and rights a s a child , through rape, was compounded by both the manner in which he
overcame her attempt to push him away and by the threat of further violence in the
event that she gave expression to her ordeal , which I accept on the evidence is what
occurred . And then, within a week, he did precisely the same again , taking
advantage of her vulnerability as a child to repeat the pain and suffering already
inflicted for his own benefit, and with no consideration of the impact of his conduct on
the victim and her fami ly.30
[28] The legislature has directed that, when imposing a sentence in respect of
rape, an apparent lack of physical injury to a complainant cannot constitute
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying the imposition of a lesser
28 See S v Ngcobo 2018 (1) SACR 40 (SCA) para 14.
29 S v MM above n 22 para 16.
30 On the expected pause and reflection in respect of incidents a few days apart, see Matyityi above n
27 para 19.
sentence.31 Althou gh there is no medical report to explain the physical impact of
those actions, the psychological implications have been detailed. The course of the
complainant’s life has been altered by Mr Cramford’s actions, and the impact will
continue to be felt by her and her family in the years to come. Every child is meant to
enjoy the constitutional rights to be protected from maltreatment, abuse and
degradation, to freedom and security, which includes the right to be free from all
forms of violence and to have thei r privacy and dignity respected and protected.32
The reasons for the high premium placed on the rights of children by society is
apparent from the significant adverse effects already experienced by the
complainant , and by the reality that her future will be marred by her experiences at
the hands of Mr Cramford .
Count 2
[29] There is little to add in respect of the circumstances in count 2. If anything, and
as is apparent from the photo album accepted into evidence, th e crime was even
more brazen given its public location and proximity to nearby homes. Mr Cramford’s
failure to accept responsibility for his conduct was apparent from his evidence
regarding what had transpired. Contrary to his plea explanation, he now attempted to
place some distance between his conduct and the complainant’s age and inability to
consent to sexual intercourse, now alluding to her conduct to explain what had
transpired. The suggestion that the complainant had given him some sort of
ultimatum to meet her at the location for the rape that followed must be rejected ,
bearing in mind that t he complainant was now still only 12 years of age. This attempt
to place blame on the complainant again reflects an absence of any genuine remorse
for his conduc t or proper reflection as to its impact . Coupled with this, w hat is
apparent is that, despite the passage of time, Mr Cramford had continued with life as
normal following the first two incidents. When the opportunity arose, h e again picked
on a vulnerable child whom he had previously forced into submission, raped her
again, seemingly , given the medical report, without a condom, this time in a public
space, and again followed this by threatening to beat her to ensure that she did not
31 S 51(3) (a A)(ii) and (iv) of the Minimum Sentences Act. See S Estrich ‘Rape’ 95 Yale Law Journal
(1986) 1087 as cited in D Smythe et al Sexual Offences Commentary: Act 32 of 2007 (Revision
Service 4) (2022) ch20 -10.
32 Ss 28(1)( d), 12(1)( c) 14 and 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
report the incident .33 That he again suggested that he did so out of boredom beggars
belief.
Conclusion
[30] The prescribed minimum sentence may only be departed from if, having
regard to all the factors that play a role in determining a just sentence, the court
concludes that the imposition of the prescribed minimum would in the particular case
constitute an injustice or would be ‘disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the
interests of society…’.34 In S v Matyityi ,35 Ponnan JA held that Parliament:
‘…has ordained minimum sentences for certain specified offences. Courts are
obliged to impose those sentences unless there are truly convincing reasons
for departing from them. Courts are not free to subvert the will of the
legislature by resort to vague, ill -defined concepts…and ill -founded
hypotheses that appear to fit the particular sentencing officer’s personal notion
of fairness. Predictable outcome s, not outcomes based on the whim of an
individual judicial officer, [are] foundational to the rule of law which lies at the
heart of our constitutional order’.
[31] That said, I am also cognisant that a finding of an absence of substantial and
compelling circumstances will result in the gravest of sentences being passed and
that the consequences of this run deep , effectively removing an individual from
society .36 It requires a m eticulous weighing of all relevant factors before a decision to
impose it can be justified.37 And, as held in Vilakazi , custodial sentences are not
merely numbers and familiarity with the sentence of life imprisonment ‘must never
blunt one to the fact that its consequences are profound’.38
33 Failure to use a condom is an aggravating factor: see S v PB 2011 (1) SACR 448 (SCA) para 20.
34 See MM above n 22 para 13, citing S v GN 2010 (1) SACR 93 (T) para 6.
35 Matyityi above n 27 para 23. Also see Malgas above n 9 para 10, in respect of the prescribed
period of imprisonment in the Minimum Sentences Act ordinarily being imposed for the commission of
the listed crimes in the specified circumstances, in the absence of weighty justification, as quoted in
Otto v S [2017] ZAS CA 114 para 21.
36 S v Bull 2001 (2) SACR 681 (SCA) para 21.
37 S v Dodo 2001 (1) SACR 301 (E).
38 Vilakazi above n 16 para 21.
[32] Mr Cramford’s conduct , in respect of both counts, has been found to fall within
the purview of this Act. A court should not lightly, or for ‘flimsy reasons’ and
‘speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender’ deviate from the minimum
sentence prescribed, or apply their personal notion of fairness.39 There is no place for
‘maudlin sympathy’ or aversion to imprisoning first offenders for life as part of the
proper approach.40 In the final analysis, I am obliged to impose the minimum
sentence prescribed by the legislature unless there are truly convincing reasons for
departure.41 Courts will not shirk this responsibility, however agonising it may be to
do so , and even though the result will have a tremendous impact o n the rest of Mr
Cramford’s life.42 In all the circumstances, I must conclude that there is an absence
of substantial and compelling reasons or weighty justification for a departure from the
prescribed minimum in respect of either of the counts . The few considerations in
favour of Mr Cramford , described above, are wholly outweighed by the various
factors that, in the circumstances, demand the strictest sanction possible. The
ultimate result is that sentence s of life imprisonment for the offences in counts 1 and
2 are proportionate and justified , and, as Mr Mtsila argued, the only suitable
punishment for what has transpired . I am constrained to agree that a more merciful
sentence would be misplaced considering all the circumstances . Given the nature of
the offence s, various other consequences emanating from legisla tion follow.43 These
have been included as part of the order to follow.
Order
[33] The following sentence is imposed:
1. The accused, Neil Cramford , is sentenced to life imprisonment in
respect of the conviction s of rape for both counts 1 (rape of a 1 0-year-
old girl) and 2 (rape of a 1 2-year-old girl) .
39 See, for example, Rammoko v Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (1) SACR 200 (SCA); [2002] 4
All SA 731; [2002] ZASCA 122 para 13.
40 Malgas above n 9 paras 7 –9. Also see PB above n 33 para 21; Matyityi above n 27 para 23.
41 Matyityi above n 27 para 23.
42 S v Zitha 1999 (2) SACR 404 (WLD) at 418 h-i.
43 In terms of s 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, the accused is automatically
considered unfit to possess a firearm.
2. In terms of section 50(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007, the particulars of the
accused, as a convicted sexual offender, must be included in the
National Register for Sex Offenders.
3. In terms of section 120(4) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and section
41 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters )
Amendment Act 32 of 2007 , the accused is declared to be unsuitable
to work with childr en, and it is directed that his particulars be entered in
Part B of the National Child Protection Register.
_______ ________
A. GOVINDJEE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Heard: 3 and 4 February 2025
Delivered: 7 February 2025
Appearances:
Counsel for the State: Adv S Mtsila
Director of Public Prosecutions
Makhanda
046 602 3000
Attorney for Accused: Mr H Charles
Legal Aid of South Africa
Makhanda
046 622 9350