IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU -NATAL LOCAL DIVISION ,
NORTH -EASTERN CIRCUIT, MTUBATUBA
Case number: CCD55 /2023
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
NTOMBIZODWA GERTRUDE NTINGA FIRST ACCUSED
SAMKELO NCAMISA MPANZA SECOND ACCUSED
Coram: Mossop J
Heard (sentence) : 27 March 2025
Delivered: 28 March 2025
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT ON SENTENCE
______________________________________________________________________
MOSSOP J :
Introduction
[1] Having sat through five weeks of evidence and having been in your presence for
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that period of time , I have acquired a degree of knowledge about you bo th. I must be
frank , however, and indicate that this experience has left me with a far from impressive
image of both of you as human beings. A person is a human being because of the genes
contained within 23 pairs of chromosomes. Your wicked conduct causes one to question
whether you are truly human or whether you are both monsters , devoid of human
qualities . One of the qualities of being a human being is empathy. Empathy is an ability
to identify with or vicariously experience the emotions, thoughts or attitudes of another.
You both appear to lack any empathy. You certainly did not display it in relation to WO
Ntinga or the deceased Mr Mdluli on 1 August 2023 .
[2] Your conduct in involving yourselves in the death of these two men shows a
complete indifference to the value of human life , the most valuable thing that a human
being possesses. You snuffed out two lives without a second thought. Your conduct
violated all notions of ubuntu. In S v Mankwanyane ,1 the Constitutional Court recognised
the African customary principle of ubuntu as one of the values underpinning the
Constitution when dealing with the question of criminal punishment. In that matter , six of
eleven judges identified ubuntu as being a key c onstitutional value that:
‘… places some emphasis on communality and on the independence and on the interdependence
of the members of a community. It recognises a person ’s status as a human being entitled to
unconditional respect, dignity , value and acceptance . . . The person has a corresponding duty to
give the same. . . ’ 2
[3] Ubuntu is an important component in the way that we interact and live together. In
Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers ,3 Sachs J said:
‘The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population, suffuses
the whole constitutional order. It combines individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is
a unifying motif of the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a st ructured, institutionalised and
operational declaration in our evolving new society of the needs for human interdependence ,
respect and concern. ’
1 S v Mankwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC).
2 Ibid para 224.
3 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) para 30.
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[4] Ubuntu clearly means nothing to you. You displayed no respect to either of the
deceased men ’s status as human beings. You treated them in an entirely unacceptable
manner, stripping them of any of their dignity. WO Ntinga was forced into the boot of a
motor vehicle, a part of a motor vehicle that was not designed to convey human beings.
It is not possible to compre hend what terror he must have experienced in the boot as you ,
accused two, drove him off to his death. When it was decided to kill him, his lifeless body
was left partially naked , exposed to the elements . Why? You had killed him. Why strip
away , literally, the last piece of dignity that he possessed?
[5] As far as the deceased Mr Mdluli is concerned, accused two and your associate ,
Mira Khoza (Mira) , took umbrage at the fact that he tried to escape from the captivity that
you had imposed upon him against his will. He was subjected to crushing blows to his
head from a metal crowbar. While i t is a wonder that he did not perish immediately , it is
no wonder that he ultimately did not survive that beating . But he did not die immediately.
The process of dying took a pproximately four days. To make matters worse, if that was
at all possible, you simply left him at the side of the road as if he was a pie ce of trash. He
was not that . He was, like you , a member of the human race. He was a human being.
[6] Considering your cruel treatment of the two deceased men , it is abundantly clear
to me that you have fallen very far from the standards of conduct espoused by the
philosophy of ubuntu and it is obvious how singularly lacking in compassion and mercy
your conduct towards you r two victims was . Addressing accused two, your counsel, Mr
Mkhwanazi , urged me to be merciful in imposing sentence upon you. You seek mercy
from this court, but you showed none of that to the deceased men. But, because we have
a civilized and sensitive legal system, and because we do not sentence in anger, you will
be granted mercy where that is possible despite your unwillingness to grant it to the two
men that you kidnapped and killed. But you should be under no illusions that a light
sentence will be imposed upon you. The sentence to be imposed will have to be a heavy
one because of the seriousness of your acts of criminality.
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[7] That the crimes that you have committed are extremely serious brooks of no doubt.
It is difficult to conceive of a more serious offence th an the murder of another person. In
the not -too-distant past it was possible for a sentence of death to be imposed upon
someone found guilty of the murder of another citiz en. That demonstrates to you how
seriously this offence is regarded by the law. Thankfully, we no longer have the death
penalty and so another form of sentence needs to take its place. It is my duty to determine,
based on the specific facts of this case, w hat that sentence should be. To do so, I must ,
inter alia, have regard to your personal circumstances.
[8] I have heard , and taken note, of your personal circumstances from your respective
counsel. Speaking now to accused one, you had a career in the South African Police
Services (SAPS) . You had a young son. The photographs show that you lived in a nice,
new home. You had a motor vehicle. You had a husband. Yet, it appears that this was not
enough for you. You wanted something more . I do not know what it was that you wanted.
You may have truly desired a relationship with Mira , although I doubt that this was the
case. Whatever it is that you wanted, it is very clear that you did not want your husband.
And thus you arranged for him to be kidnapped and killed.
[9] Accused two , you have very different personal circumstances. You claim to have
been 19 at the time of the events in question. At that young age you were already the
father of three children, one aged two and two aged one year eac h, although the latter
two were not twins. You left school before completing grade 9 and you have no
recollection of your father , who was killed when you were very young. While accused one
had everything going for her, it appears that you had very little g oing for yourself . Yours
was a hard scrabble existence .
[10] As you are aware , the law prescribes a minimum sentence for murder where it is
planned or premeditated . That was undoubtedly the case in this matter. Section 51(1) of
the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act) provides as follows:
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‘Notwithstanding any other law, but subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a High
Court shall sentence a person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to
imprisonment for life. ’
Premeditated murder is mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Act. Thus, each of you
faces the possibility of life imprisonment.
[11] I am, however, not compelled to impose the minimum sentence referred to by the
Act. I can impose a lesser sente nce if I am satisfied that substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. The Act does not
define what ‘substantial and compelling’ circumstances are. This is a matter left to the
sentencing court to deter mine. The facts of each case will determine whether such
circumstances exist.
[12] Yesterday you may have heard both Mr Qulo and Mr Mkhwanazi refer to the case
of ‘Malgas ’ when they addressed me in mitigation of sentence . This was a reference to
the matter of S v Malgas ,4 a leading case in our law on the issue of substantial and
compelling circumstances. That case held that it is incorrect to hold the view that for
circumstances to qualify as substantial and compelling they must be ‘exceptional’ in the
sense of being seldom encountered or rarely encountered. But the court held that where
a minimum sentence is specified , it should not be departed from lightly and for flimsy
reasons which cannot withstand scrutiny. If such a de parture occurs, there must be
‘weighty justification ’ for not applying the minimum sentence. In making that point, the
court in Malgas observed that there is no reason to conclude that the legislature intended
a court to exclude from consideration, any or all of the many factors traditionally and rightly
taken into account by courts when sentencing offenders .
[13] At the end of the day, a sentencing court is required, after evaluating all the
competing factors, to impose a sentence that is just . In doing so, it is important , in my
view, not to commence this most difficult exercise by starting with the mindset that the
prescribed minimum sentence is always a just sentence. The prescribed minimum
4 S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA).
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sentence may be a just sentence. But i t may also not be. All the circumstances of the
case must be identified, considered and evaluated and then it should be considered
whether the prescribed sentence is disproportionate to the crime, the offence and the
legitimate needs of the community. That will require the court to consider what a just
sentence would be in all the circumstances of the case. If a just sentence falls materially
below the prescribed sentence , there will be substantial and compelling circumstances to
depart from the prescribed sentence.5
[14] The facts of this case are most distressing and disturbing. It would not be remiss
of me to remark that the conduct , particularly of accused one , can only be described as
being exceptionally wicked. Two aspects of what happened on the evening of 1 August
2023 justify this extreme description of her conduct . When you, accused one, returned to
your home after going to the nearby tavern to purchase liquor for your soon to be
murdered husband, you realised that he was no longer wearing his SAPS uniform. On
the version contained in your confession, you stepped out of the house and telephoned
Mira to alert him to the fact that your husband was no longer in uniform and was wearing
different clothing . You told Mira what he was then wearing and you told him where he was
seated in the television lounge. The meaning of this is clear: you did not want the wrong
person taken away and killed. The intruders had to know who their principal target was
and where he could be found. The cruelty and ruthlessness of your conduct is shocking .
[15] But the second aspect is almost as brutal as the first. The deceased Mr Mdluli
unexpectedly arrive d at your home , bringing with him Mr Ndimande. Their arrival changed
the dynamic of what was to occur. There was no reason for the deceased Mr Mdluli to be
drawn into your evil plan. You had a cellular telephone dedicated to communicating with
Mira and accused two. All you needed to do wa s to use it and tell them that the plan could
not be given effect to that night and would have to be done at another time. You did not
make that call. And as a direct consequence, a man with no connection at all to your plan
to kill your husband forfeited his life. And that brought misery to his family and loved ones,
5 S v GK 2013 (2) SACR 505 (WCC) para 14.
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as shall shortly be con sidered.
[16] The existence of these two facts would in any ordinary person weigh down upon
their conscience most heavily and cause them immense distress and mental difficul ties
for it is not an easy thing , I imagine , to accept that you are responsible for the untimely
and unnecessary deaths of two human beings. I suspect, however, that you , accused
one, are not an ordinary person and I suspect that you believe that you bear no
responsibility for what occurred. I have had the opportunity of observing you over the five
weeks of this trial , as I mentioned earlier . But for one moment in the proceedings , you
have shown no emotion whats oever. You have sat scowling and stone faced in the dock ,
generally unresponsive to even the most horrific evidence that has been led. The moment
that you did display emotion was when the State advocate requested you during cross -
examining you to look at the photograph of th e body of your husband . You appeared to
weep, and the court adjourned for a short while to allow you to compose yourself , but I
harboured the suspicion that the tears were more apparent than real.
[17] There is no doubt that you , accused one, bear responsibility for the death of the
two men and what led up to that occurring and all that followed . But in saying so , I must
acknowledge that I am not certain why you decided that killing your husband would be a
solution to whatever difficulty it was that you were experiencing. You have not taken the
court into your confidence and explained this.
[18] A potential reason was advanced in your confession, namely that you had been
assaulted by your husband and that he generally treated you poorly . That could explain
your conduct , as I observed in my earlier judgment . But you then recanted your
confession and said that you were told what to say by Lt Col Mkhabela. In other words,
you did not tell him what was recorded in your confession and therefore it was not true .
You then , before this court , and after admitting that your husband did assault you,
immediately rejected the fact of this having occurred, sa ying that the injuries to you r lower
lip were ca used by you falling onto a hoe in the garden. Then yesterday morning, your
counsel, Mr Qulo , urged me to find that you were in a n abusive relationship and that your
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husband had hurt your lip by pushing you ag ainst a concrete pillar. You will appreciate
from these contradictory versions that what exactly happened is as clear as mud, if
anything did happen at all. But in my view, you cannot reject the contents of your
confession as being something that you were told to say and which is untrue and then
ask me to accept it as being the truth and to then to proceed to further argue that it
discloses a mitigating feature. Such reasoning would be false.
[19] In addition, you have exhibited not an atom of remorse for what happened. Mr Qulo
indicated yesterday that there is nothing before this court to show that you have any
contrition for what occurred. He was correct in making that submission. Remorse, or an
acknowledgement of a deep and painful regret for your conduct, would have assisted the
court in attempting to find substantial and compelling circumstances that could have
supported a sentence other than the prescribed minimum sentence on the two counts of
murder. But no sig ns of contrition have been shown by you. You may regret having been
caught and you may feel sorry for yourself because of where you now find yourself, but
that does not equate to remorse. In S v Matyityi ,6 Ponnan JA had the following to say on
the issue of remorse:
‘There is, moreover, a chasm between regret and remorse. Many accused persons might well
regret their conduct, but that does not without more translate to genuine remorse. Remorse is a
gnawing pain of conscience for the plight of another . Thus genuine contrition can only come from
an appreciation and acknowledgement of the extent of one’s error. Whether the offender is
sincerely remorseful, and not simply feeling sorry for himself or herself at having been caught, is
a factual question. I t is to the surrounding actions of the accused, rather than what he says in
court, that one should rather look. In order for the remorse to be a valid consideration, the
penitence must be sincere and the accused must take the court fully into his or her co nfidence.
Until and unless that happens, the genuineness of the contrition alleged to exist cannot be
determined. After all, before a court can find that an accused person is genuinely remorseful, it
needs to have a proper appreciation of, inter alia: what motivated the accused to commit the deed;
what has since provoked his or her change of heart; and whether he or she does indeed have a
true appreciation of the consequences of those actions.’ (Footnotes omitted)
6 S v Matyityi 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA).
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[20] None of the factors mentioned by Ponnan JA appear in this matter. You have not
explained your conduct and I can therefore not find that you display any remorse for your
destructive conduct. I can find no redeeming qualities in you , nor can I find any
circumstances that would constitute substantial and compelling grounds to avoid the
minimum sentences applicable in this matter.
[21] After deep consideration, I do not think that the same can be said about accused
two. Addressin g you accused two, your position is, I think, distinguishable from accused
one. I am prepared to accept that there is a measure of remorse to be discerned in the
fact that you made certain limited admissions at the commencement of the trial and then
the next day made further substantial admission s that confirmed your guilt on the robbery
and kidnapping charges. That had the effect of shortening the trial and the State was not
required to spend unnecessary time on proving th ose offences. That stands to your credit .
[22] A further factor that I find to assume some importance , is your age. It must be
accepted that you were 19 years old when you committed these offences, being barely a
year into adulthood . You wer e, in all likelihood , influenced to an extent by Mira , an older
man. These two factors, namely the admissions that you made and your age, are
accordingly adjudge d by me to constitute substantial and compelling reasons to deviate
from the prescribed minimum sentence s.
[23] I am fortified in coming to that decision by my assessment that you, accused one ,
are more morally blameworthy than accused two. In so finding, I do not diminish the
enormity of accused two ’s conduct. But you set up the scheme together with your lover
and cold blooded ly watched your husband be taken to his death. Accused two , you were
part of the mechanism that caused that death. But had it not been for accused one ’s
conduct, in my view accused two would not have involved himself with WO Ntinga and
the deceased Mr Mdluli. I have found that there are no compelling and substantial factors
that count in accused one ’s favour and that the minimum sentences applicable must be
imposed. If your conduct , accused two, is adjudged to be less blameworthy , it is just that
you receive a severe , but slightly lesser, sentence.
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[24] In this matter, there are more victims than just the two deceased men. The victim
impact statements handed in by consent are particularly upsetting. Ther e can be nothing
more disturbing than reading of the anguish and despair of a family member lamenting
the loss of a loved one. And let there be no mistake: both the men who were murdered
were deeply loved by many people. The cou rt gallery has been filled on all the many days
of this trial. That demonstrates the importance of these two men in the lives of the ir
respective families and in their communities and workplaces.
[25] Both mothers of the deceased men have deposed to affidavits. Their despair is
overwhelming and their submissions show that the wounds caused to each of them by
your conduct remain raw and painful 18 months after the death of their sons . The mother
of WO Ntinga correctly states that she could never imagine that her daughter -in-law,
accused one :
‘… was going to have intentions that are so evil against my son at a later stage .’
[26] The deceased Mr Mdluli had been married for but a month when he was killed. Hi s
wife, in a series of submissions that are suffused with anguish and a feeling of
hopelessness, makes the point that her husband was :
‘… killed on purpose and for nothing …’
In that , she is entirely correct. The murder of the deceased Mr Mdluli was senseless and
for nothing. The victim impact state ments reveal the enormity of what you have done and
the void that you have left in the lives of a number of people.
[27] In sentencing you, I take into account that you have been detained in custody while
awaiting trial for approximately 18 months. I also acknowledge that you have been
convicted of a number of offences and the cumulative effect of the m ultiple sentence s that
will be imposed upon you must be controlled so that the total effect of the sentences do
not become excessive.
[28] All things having been considered, I believe the following sentences will be in the
interests of justice:
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Accused one
1. Count 1, being the murder of Mr Nkosinathi Protus Ntinga: life imprisonment .
2. Count 2, being the murder of Mr Mpendulo Mdluli: life imprisonment .
3. Count 3, being the robbery with aggravating circumstances of Mr Nkosinathi Protus
Ntinga, Mr Mpendulo Mdluli and Mr Lindani Ndimande: 1 5 years ’ imprisonment.
4. Count 4, being the kidnapping of Mr Nkosinathi Protus Ntinga: 5 years ’
imprisonment.
5. Count 5, being the kidnapping of Mr Mpendulo Mdluli: 5 years ’ imprisonment.
6. In terms of the provisions of s 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 it is
directed that the sentences imposed on counts 2, 3, 4 and 5 shall run concurrently with
the sentence imposed on count 1.
7. Accused one will thus serve a sentence of life imprisonment .
8. No determination is made in terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act
60 of 2000 and accused one is consequently declared unfit to possess a firearm.
Accused two
1. Count 1 , being t he murder of Mr Nkosinathi Protus Ntinga: 25 years ’ imprisonment.
2. Count 2 , being t he murder of Mr Mpendulo Mdluli: 25 years ’ imprisonment .
3. Count 3 , being t he robbery with aggravating circumstances of Mr Nkosinathi Protus
Ntinga, Mr Mpendulo Mdluli and Mr Lindani Ndimande: 1 4 years ’ imprisonment.
4. Count 4 , being th e kidnapping of Mr Nkosinathi Protus Ntinga: 4 years ’
imprisonment.
5. Count 5 , being t he kidnapping of Mr Mpendulo Mdluli: 4 years ’ imprisonment.
6. In terms of the provisions of s 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 it is
directed that the sentences imposed on counts 2, 3 , 4 and 5 shall run concurrently with
the sentence imposed on count 1.
7. Accused two will thus serve a prison sentence of 25 years ’ imprisonment.
8. No det ermination is made in terms of section 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act
60 of 2000 and accused two is consequently declared unfit to possess a firearm.
Do you each understand?
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I wish you good luck.
_______ ______ ______________
MOSSOP J
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APPEARANCES
Counsel for the State : Ms P T Ntsele
Instructed by : Director of P ublic Prosecutions
Pietermaritzburg
Counsel for accused one : Mr M W Qulo
Instructed b y: Legal Aid South Africa
Counsel for accused two: Mr D C Mkhwanazi
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa