IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU -NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case No: 9101/2023 P
In the matter between:
GOLD CIRCLE PROPRIETARY LTD APPLICANT
and
THE KWAZULU -NATAL GAMING AND
BETTING BOARD FIRST RESPONDENT
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, TOURISM AND
ENVIRO NMENTAL AFFAIRS,
KWAZULU -NATAL SECOND RESPONDENT
MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE FOR FINANCE,
KWAZULU -NATAL THIRD RESPONDENT
MBALI PEARL MYENI FOURTH RESPONDE NT
CHARLOTTE NKOSINATHI MHLONGO FIFTH RESPONDENT
NALINI MAHARAJ SIXTH RESPONDENT
BRUCE STAMFORD STOBIE SEVE NTH RESPONDENT
SHARON FIKILE MK HIZE EIGHTH RESPONDENT
2
LUCKY SIFISO GABELA NINTH RESPONDENT
MPUMELELO GIFT MAHLASE ZIKALALA TENTH RESPONDENT
PORTIA BALOYI ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Delivered on :
POYO DLWATI JP
Introduction
[1] This application concerns the issue of whether the first respondent , the
KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Board (the Board) , is entitled to withhold a
3% tax deduction from the amount won by bettors in respect of fixed -odds bets
on horse races placed with a bookmaker at racecourses operated by the applicant,
Gold Circle (Pty) Ltd (Gold Circle ), and in premises other than a racecourse, in
respect of horse races st aged by Gold Circle and whether doing so is contrary to
the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Act 8 of 2010 (the Gaming Act) , read
with the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Tax Act 9 of 201 0 (the Tax Act)
and whether that constitute s self-help which is inimical to the rule of law.
[2] Gold Circle operates racecourses for thoroughbred horse races from its
Greyville racecourse in Durban and f rom its Scottville racecourse in
Pietermaritzburg. It also operates training centres for thoroughbred racehorse s at
training centres in Ashburton and Summer veld in KwaZulu -Natal. It also operates
betting facilities for horse racing and other contingencies from various locations
in KwaZulu -Natal. It averred in its founding affidavit that it is the only racecourse
operator licensed in KwaZulu -Natal to run thoroughbred horse racing eve nts,
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including the world -renowned Hollywoodbets Durban July. It also broadcasts
international horse racing events at its own cost.
[3] Gold Circle prides itself on being a non -profit company, established as
such for the sustainability of the horse racing industry in KwaZulu -Natal , and,
therefore , whatever profits are made are ploughed back into the maintenance ,
development and transformation of the horse racing industry. It is also a licensed
totalisator operator in term s of s 110 of the Gaming Act. This enables it to operate
a totalisator betting system in KwaZulu -Natal and to offer totalisator bets to
punters from a number of physical locations in the province and by way of
telephone and online betting offerings.
[4] Gold Circle launched an application on an urgent basis seeking an order
directing the Board to effect distribution to it, alternatively to the KwaZulu -Natal
Provincial Treasury, of the 3% tax deduction from the amount won by bettors in
respect of fixed -odds bets on horse races placed with a bookmaker: (a) at
racecourses operated by Gold Circle and (b) in premises other than a racecourse
in respect of horse races staged by it, as contemplated in s 128 of the Gaming Act,
read with part D.1 of the Schedule to the Tax Act for the months of March, April
and May 2023. Gold Circle also sought a personal costs order against the
members of the Board.
[5] The Board is the licensing authority for, and regulates , inter alia, certain
aspects of horse racing and betting operated in this province. The second
respondent, being the MEC for Economic Development, Tourism and
Environmental Affairs, KwaZulu -Natal (the MEC) is the designated MEC
responsible for gaming and betting in this province. The MEC for Finance (the
Finance MEC) , the third respondent , was cited as he is responsible for finance in
this province and is also responsible for the Provincial Treasury Department
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(Treasury) , which is in charge of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial Revenue Fund
(the Revenue Fund ) in terms of s 21(1) of the Public Finance Management Act 1
of 1999 (the PFMA). The Chief Executive Officer of the Board , Ms Portia Baloyi ,
as well as all the Board members, were cited in their personal capacit ies.
Gold Circle’s case
[6] According to Gold Circle ’s understanding of the relevant legislation , a
bookmaker must deduct a 6% tax from winning bets placed with it at a racecourse
or at premises other than a racecourse . A bookmaker must pay the aforesaid 6%
tax into the Revenue Fund . The Revenue Fund must in turn effect payment of 3%
of the tax received by it from winning bets placed on horse races staged by Gold
Circle ( irrespective of whether these races were staged at racecourses at which
Gold Circle is licensed to stage race meetings) to Gold Circle (in the form of the
3% distribution) , within 20 days after the end of every calendar month . If any
other racecourse operator stages horse races in KwaZulu -Natal, the Revenue
Fund must effect payment of 3% of the tax received by it from winning bets
placed on horse races staged by that racecourse operator, within 20 days after the
end of every calendar month . The Board bears the legislative responsibility in
terms of the Schedule to the Tax Act to effect the payment of the 3% distribution
to the racecourse operator.
[7] According to Gold Circle , it has for decades been entitled to and did receive
half of the 6% tax levied by the province on amount s won by punters. The reason
for this arrangement was a quid pro quo to compensate the racecourse operator
from the bets which are p laced on its events by bookmakers. This arrangement ,
according to Gold Circle , was confirmed in 2010 with the enactment of the
Gaming Act and the Tax Act, especially s 77(3) of the Gaming Act, read with
part D.1 of the Schedule to the Tax Act.
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[8] Gold Circle complained that it had not received the 3% distribution for the
months of March and April 2023 , which became due on 20 April and 20 May
2023 , respectively. The amount owed was approximately R8.5 million , which
was a calculation based on prior experience and reasonable assumptions made by
Gold Circle . Gold Circle contended that it was reliant on the 3% distribution to
continue its operations and sustain thoroughbred horse racing in KwaZulu -Natal.
[9] According to Gold Circle, the practice has been that each month the Board
imposed and collected 6% of all winning bets from bookmakers (rather than the
bookmakers paying directly into the Revenue Fund ), as contemplated in s 77(1)
of the Gaming Act. The Board then paid 3% (half of this 6%) into the Revenue
Fund and the remaining 3% was redistributed to Gold Circle . This practice was
also reflected in the Board’ s annual report of 31 March 2022.
[10] Gold Circle contended that regardless of who collects the 6% tax from the
bookmakers, its rights as a racecourse operator were clear. It is entitled to be paid
its 3% within the prescribed time frame of 20 days after each calendar month. If
it does not receive the 3% distribution, it will run at large and unsustainable
losses , which would result in it shutting down its operations. Gold Circle
tabulated in detail and provided a summary of its income and expenditure for the
past financial years since 202 0. It demonstrated how it would have suffered
financial loss es had these a mounts not been paid to it.
[11] Gold Circle further contended that despite engaging the Board in an
attempt to secure payment, those attempts have not been fruitful . Instead, during
March 2023, Gold Circle received a letter from the Board advising that ‘the
Board’ had decided that all taxes received by it from bookmakers w ould, with
effect from that month, and in the manner contemplated in s 77(1) read with s s
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128(1) and 129(1) of the Gaming Act , as amended by the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming
and Betting Amendment Act 4 of 2017, be paid into the Revenue Fund .
[12] According to Gold Circle, it was not to o concerned by this letter as it
believed that the Revenue Fund would pay it the 3% distribution it was obliged
to be paid in terms of s 77(3) of the Gaming Act. This , according to Gold Circle ,
was subsequently confirmed in its meetings with representatives of the Finance
MEC , where an undertaking was made that the February 2023 payment would be
effected within four weeks from the date of those payments . Indeed , the 3%
distribution for February 2023 was received but nothing thereafter .
[13] It turned out that the Board had failed to pay any amounts to the Revenue
Fund and the Finance MEC would not, therefore, be in any position to pay any
distribution to Gold Circle . Gold Circle then caused a letter to be addressed to the
Board and enquire d about the reasons for the failure to make payments .
According to Gold Circle , the Board did not adequately respond to its concerns
but instead raised issues about a second licensed operator which was also entitled
to the 3% distribution.
[14] Gold Circle contended that the second licensed operator did not stage horse
races in KwaZulu -Natal upon which bookmakers offer ed fixed -odds bets and
would accordingly not be entitled to any distribution. It, therefore, warned the
Board of litigation in order to find redress. According to Gold Circle , the Board ’s
actions in withholding the taxes were in line with proposed amendments to the
Tax Act which were vehemently opposed or objected to by the gambling industry.
It therefore believed that the Board resort ed to ‘self-help’ which was inimical to
the rule of law , hence the launching of this application .
The Finance MEC’s position
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[15] The Finance MEC filed an explanatory affidavit and indicated that she
would abide by the decision of the court. In her explanatory affidavit, deposed to
by Ms Carol Coetzee , she reiterated the provisions of the Gaming Act and Tax
Act in relation to the 6% tax distribution. She explained that in terms of s 77 of
the Gaming Act, the licensees who would receive the distribution would be the
racecourse operators licensed in terms of s 89 of the Gaming Act. She further
explained that she recently learnt that the Board had taken the view that Gold
Circle was not the only licensee entitled to the distribution in terms of the Tax
Act, even though there was an issue with the licen ce of that other licensee. In this
regard , Ms Coetzee submitted that Treasury was concerned that distributions
should not be made to any racecourse operator who was not proper ly licensed .
She r aised this concern with the CEO of the Board.
[16] Ms Coetzee also stated that she reminded the CEO of the Board that funds
received by the provincial government ought to be promptly paid into the
Revenue Fund and that all fees and taxes payable under the Tax Act were to be
paid timeously and correctly. She also reminded the CEO that there was no
authority to withhold funds from the Revenue Fund and that urgent steps ought
to be taken to rectify the situation. Ms Coetzee averred that the CEO of the Board
disputed that the Board had not complied with the PFMA or any gambling
legislation and proposed that the matter be referred to the respective MECs, in
line with the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005 (the
Intergovernmental Act). Ms Coetzee made it clear that Treasury would comply
with any order granted by this court but can only do so if the funds in question
have been paid into the Revenue Fund in terms of s 77(1) of Gaming Act.
The Board’s opposition
[17] The Board, its CEO and its members, save for the 6th and 7th respondent s,
opposed the application. It filed two answering affidavits and later a counter -
8
application. I will not deal in much detail with the answering affidavits, save to
mention the gist of what they entail. The Board contended that Gold Circle had
no statutory right to seek payment of the 3% tax deductions from it, as that right
statutor ily exist s against the Revenue Fund. The fact t hat the Board was collecting
tax deductions and distributing them on behalf of Treasury was an incidence of
intergovernmental arrangements.
[18] The gist of the Board ’s opposition was that Gold Circle was not entitled to
the full 3% tax distribution as it was not the only racecourse operator in KwaZulu -
Natal. It was for this reason that at a meeting held in March 2023, the Board
resolved that a letter be sent to Treasury advising it that the Board would no
longer distribute taxes to the racecourse operator s but w ould transfer the funds to
the Revenue Fund. Treasury would then be requested to transfer the taxes to the
transformation fund , where Gold Circle could then apply for them .
[19] According to the Board , Treasury responded to their letter by stating that
payment to I thotho would be improper , as, in their view , it was not an operati onal
racecourse operator. According to the Board , this should not have been
Treasury’s concern , as the Board is the regulator of the provincial gambling
industry , and in its view , Ithotho was compliant and a licensed racecourse
operator . The Board then decided to withhold payment of any distribution - even
to Treasury and the Revenue Fund .
[20] The Board raised various points in limine . It contended that Ithotho ought
to have been joined in these proceedings , as it had a direct and material interest
in the outcome of the proceedings. Another point in limine includ ed the fact that
its decision not to pay over the funds ha d not been re viewed and set aside , as it
was an administrative decision in terms of the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). Flowing from the previous point was t he further
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point in limine that Gold Circle was entitled to appeal the decision of the Board
and had therefore not exhausted the internal remedies available to it . It further
stated that the provisions of the Intergovernmental Act were applicable , as there
was a disagreement between the Board and Treasury on how distribution should
be effected. Th at process ought to be finali sed first, before Gold Circle can seek
any relief in court. The Board also critici sed Gold Circle for launching its
application on an urgent basi s, as it contended that the urgency was purely
commercial.
Gold Circle’s reply
[21] Gold Circle responded to the Board’s opposition. Nothing new was
canvassed in the replying affidavit , save that it reiterated the Board’s unilateral
act of unlawfulness by withholding taxes from Treasury. Gold Circle disputed
that the Board’s decision to withhold payment was tantamount to an
administrative action. It also disputed the Board’s contention that it was not using
the distribution for transformation purposes. In any event, so went the contention,
there was no legal provision requir ing Gold Circle to use the tax distribution for
transformation purposes. According to Gold Circle , the determination for the use
of those funds was the prerogative of Treasury and not the Board. It disputed that
the 2020 transformation fund for the gaming and betting industry document had
any legal status. It contended that it has a clear statutory right to the 3% tax
distribution on horse races it stages and that the Board had no legal right or basis
for withholding th ose taxes.
[22] Whilst Gold Circle admitted that Ithotho is the holder of a racecourse
operator licen ce for standardbred and harness racing horse races , it denied that
Ithotho staged such horse races or that bookmakers in KwaZulu -Natal offer fixed -
odds bets to punter s in connection with standardbred and harness racing horse
races. If it did , then it would be entitled to its own 3% distribution in accordance
10
with the relevant legislation but not to Gold Circle’s distribution . Gold Circle also
denied that Ithotho ought to have been joined in these proceedings as Gold Circle
only sought payment to it of the deduction from bets on horse races placed with
a bookmaker at a racecourse operated by it or horse races staged by it. However,
out of caution , it had also served the application papers on Ithotho .
[23] Ithotho sent an email to Gold Circle after the papers were served on it. It
advised that it would not be joining the proceedings but would abide by any order
granted by the court. Gold Circle also contended that the Board ’s reliance on
s 1401 of the Gaming A ct was misplaced. This was so as the decision being
challenged was that of the Board and not the CEO as envisaged in the Gaming
Act. In any event, so went the contention, any internal remedy under PAJA did
not need to be exhausted prior to bringing an urgent interdict but needed to be
exhausted prior to bringing a review of a decision. Gold Circle also d isputed that
it ought to respect the intergovernmental disputes resolution process , as the
question was not whether the Board should withhold payments to Treasury but t o
it, which is not part of government . It stated that it would be unjust and not in the
interest s of any party for t he funds to be held by the Board indefinitely.
The Board’s counter -application
[24] After the filing of Gold Circle ’s replying affidavit , the Board launched a
counter -application. It sought an order that
‘3. In the event that this Court grants the applicant relief in the main application, then the
first respondent seeks an order declaring as follows:
3.1 Gold Circle (the applicant) is entitled to payment of 3% of the distributable tax,
provided for in I tem D1 of the Schedule to the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Tax
Act 9 of 2000, deducted from the amount won by bettors in respect of fixed -odd bets
which are:
1 Section 140 deals with appeals.
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(a) placed with a bookmaker at the racecourse s which are specified in the
racecourse operator licen ce, issu ed to Gold Circle, in terms of section 89(1) of
the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Act no.8 of 2010 ( “Betting Act ”);
and/or
(b) placed with a bookmaker in premises other than a racecourse, in respect of
horseraces specified in the racecourse op erator licence, issued to Gold C ircle in
terms of section 89 of the Betting Act.’
The Board also sought a costs order against Gold Circle if it opposed the counter -
application.
The Board’s tender
[25] The Board sought to supplement its initial answer and set out its tender to
Gold Circle in order to resolve the matter and stated that the counter -application
would only be persisted with if the Board’s tender was not acceptable. This was
done a fter the Board received further advice to resolve the application . Its tender
to resolve the matter was, however, rejected by Gold Circle . In th e counter -
application , the Board stated that it accepted that it must pay Gold Circle the
distributions in respect of horse races at racecourses which it was licensed to
operate. As a result, it resumed payments. For these payments, i t relied on the
provisions of s 7(2)(l) of the Gaming Act.
[26] What remained at issue , according to the Board , was how much Gold
Circle was entitled to as a licensed racecourse operator, and whether it was
entitled to any distribution in respect of horse races that it does not stage. That
issue, according to the Board , was the subject of the inter governmental dispute
resolution process , which was still on the way . According to the Board, Gold
Circle was claiming distributions in respect of taxes raised on horse races that it
had not staged at its licensed racecourses , as well as those that arose from bets
placed on horse races in other provinces and internationally.
12
[27] On this basis, the Board tendered a settlement to Gold Circle as follows:
‘(a) the Board will pay to Gold Circle 3% of the tax deduction amount won by betters in
respect of fixed - odds bets on horse races, which are: -
(i) placed with a bookmaker at the racecourses which are specified in the
racecourse operator license, issued to Gold Circle, in terms of s89 of the
KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Act, No. 8 of 2010, as amended (“the
Betting Act”); or
(ii) placed with a bookmaker in premises other than a racecourse, at the racecourses
which are specified in the racecourse operator license, issued to Gold Circle in
terms of s89 of the Betting Act. ’
This tender , according to the Board , encapsulated the relief sought by Gold Circle
in terms of para 2 of its notice of motion and is consistent with the racecourse
operator’s licenc e granted to Gold Circle by the Board. The Board also proposed
that each party pays its own costs.
Gold Circle’s response to the tender and the counter -application
[28] Gold Circle did not accept the tender but there were interactions between
the legal representatives , hence the delay in filing the counter -application. In
response to the counter -application, Gold Circle stated that the Board was
attempting to have the court declare that it ( Gold Circle ) was not entitled to certain
taxes which the Board intended to retain unlawfully for itself, being the 3% on
winning bets , which related to races other than those at one of Gold Circle ’s two
racecourses and this, according to Gold Circle, the Board had been attempting
even though the proposed statutory amendments were not persisted with by the
provincial legislature. It reiterated its entitlement to the 3% distribution and stated
that this was in accordance with the provisions of the Tax Act and that t he Board
and Treasury had always, for more than 10 years, adhered to the legislation until
March 2023.
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[29] Gold Circle did not oppose the granting of the relief sought by the Board
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of its counter -application, save that it sought a punitive
costs order against the members of the Board personally. It, however, opposed
the granting of the declaratory relief sought in paragraph 3. It contended that the
granting of such relief would allow the Board, without any statutory basis , to
unlawfully retain those taxes for itself. This is so as the 3% tax payable to
racecourse operators under the Tax Act is a quid pro quo for the costs of putting
on the show, namely, making available to the bookmaker s the horse races on
which bets may be placed, thereby facilitating the maintenance, development and
sustainability of horse racing in the province.
[30] According to Gold Circle , ‘the show’ on which a fixed -odds bet is placed
does not only take place at one of its licensed racecourses. It takes place e ither
through Gold Circle organising and hosting a race meeting at one of its licensed
racecourses or by it broadcasting and making available the data in KwaZulu -Natal
for races that occur internationally or throughout South Africa in terms of
agreements with other racecourse operators, through Gallop TV, and the National
Racing Bureau database. Therefore , as the only operational racecourse operator
in KwaZulu -Natal that stages these shows, it becomes entitled to the 3% when
the show it delivers , and on which the bet is placed , is by a KwaZulu -Natal
bookmaker or punter and takes place at a venue other than its licensed
racecourse s.
[31] Furthermore, Gold Circle believed that the declaratory relief sought by the
Board had no basis in the Tax Act , as same does not distinguish between bets
placed on horseracing events at its venues and non -venues nor does it distinguish
between races happening in South Africa or internationally. It stated that the
Board had changed tact, as it initially , in its opposition, relied on Gold Circle not
being the only race course operator in KwaZulu -Natal and therefore not being
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entitled to the full 3% , to now, in its counter -application, focussing on where
those races were staged. For all these reasons, Gold Circle urged the court to grant
a just and equitable order as envisaged in s 172(1) (b) of the Constitution , in that
the order need not follow the prayers sought in the notice of motion. It also
persisted with a punitive costs order against the Board members , as it believed
that the Board’s conduct was egregious and unconstitutional and that its defence
and counter -application were meritless and an abuse of the court processes.
[32] It emerged in the papers in the counter -application that prior to the
launching of the counter -application, the Board also paid the taxes it withheld and
had not been dis tributed from March to December 2023 to the Revenue Fund . As
a consequence, the relief for payment was amended by Gold Circle so that
Treasury and the Finance MEC would effect payment , as they were in possession
of the funds.
[33] In reply to Gold Circle ’s answering affidavit in the counter -application, the
Board sought an order that various sections of Gold Circle’s answering affidavit
be struck out , as it believed that they were frivolous , vexations and scandalous to
it.
[34] It became evident in the Board’s replying affidavit in the counter -
application that the bone of contention remained the interpretation of s 128 of the
Gaming Act , with relation to the distribution of the 6% tax. The Board contended
that Gold Circle knew as far back as 2013 that the Board disputed it s claim to the
distribution of these taxes , particularly as they relate to horse races staged outside
the province and internationally. The Board reiterated that Gold Circle was only
entitled to the 3% distribution in respect of horse races held at the two racecourses
at which it is licensed to hold race s. This stance is quite contrary to the Board’s
answering affidavit filed in the main application. It persisted with its views that
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Gold Circle ought not to use the taxes to support its private commercial business
operation s. It conte nded that it f ell upon the provincial government and the
provincial legislature to decid e how best to allocate taxes raised in the provincial
fiscus and that the court ought not to lightly interfere with the principl e of
separation of powers.
Issues for determination
[35] The issues to be determined are :
(a) Whether Gold Circle is entitled to recover the full 3% tax distribution from
winnings at horse races staged at r acecourse s that it is not licens ed to operate , in
particular those that are held outside KwaZulu -Natal and internationally.
(b) Whether certain alle gations and averments should be struck out from Gold
Circle ’s answering affidavit.
(c) Whether the members of the Board should be held personally liable for the
costs of t he main application.
Gold Circle’s entitlement to the full 3% tax distribution
[36] Whilst the Board initially vigorously opposed Gold Circle ’s application at
the commencement of the proceedings, it changed its stance after Gold Circle
filed its replying affidavit. It , instead , launched a counter -application seeking
different relief and, in the process, made various concessions in respect of the
main application . It is for this reason that I do not believe that it is necessary for
me to deal ex tensive ly with the issues raised in the main application. I will do so
to the extent that it is relevant to the counter -application. I also opine that it
became evident from a reading of the papers and during argument that the
following issues were not in serious dispute :
(a) Gold Circle is a licens ed racecourse operator as provided for in s 89(1) of
the Gaming Act; and is licensed to stage thoroughbred horseracing events at the
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two racecourses that it operates , namely Greyville (Durban) and Scottsville
(Pietermaritzburg).
(b) A 6% tax is collected by bookmakers from winning bets placed by bettors
on fixed -odds bets on horse races , staged by different racecourse operators
throughout South Africa and worldwide , including those staged by the Gold
Circle at its racecourses.
(c) 3% of the tax collected by bookmakers is to be distributed to the racecourse
operator , whilst the other 3% is kept by the Revenue Fund.
(d) For approximately three decades, Gold Circle has been receiving the entire
3% of the taxes collected from winnings on bets placed on horse races , which
include those staged by other racecourse operators throughout South Africa and
internationally.
(e) On 29 May 2023 , the Board took a resolution to withhold payment of the
entire 3% of the taxes to Gold Circle , pending the outcome of the
intergovernmental dispute about how much of the distribution Gold Circle is
entitled to receive.
(f) In November 2023, during the course of litigation, the Board tendered an
interim payment constituting 50% of the taxes collected from bets placed on horse
races staged in South Africa to Gold Circle . Gold Circle accepted the tender and
an amount of R9 .2 million was paid to it.
(g) A final tender was made to Gold Circle consisting of 3% of taxes collected
from bets placed with bookmakers on races staged by it at its two licensed
racecourses (regardless of whether the bets are placed with bookmakers at the
racecourses or at other premises). This tender was rejected by Gold Circle .
[37] I propose to deal with the issues in two parts, the first being the events prior
to May 2023 and the second being the events after the launching of the counter -
application. It is evident from the papers that for some time , the Board had been
contemplating implementing transformation measures and development
17
initiatives within the gaming and betting industry. This , it wanted to enforce when
it took a resolution in May 2023 that the a mount distributable to racecourse
operators, which had never been recorded as revenue by the Revenue Fund,
would not be transferred , either to the Revenue Fund or the racecourse operator,
until a decision pertaining to the con tinued unequitable distribution of taxes to
Gold Circle was made by the relevant MECs. It , therefore , decided that the
portion of punters ’ taxes that were currently in dispute, would not be transferred
with the monthly taxes.
[38] Whilst the Board initially took a stance , in opposing the main application ,
that Gold Circle was not the only rac ecourse operator in the province , this,
however , changed in the counter -application. I will revert to this later in the
judgment. Th e opposition to the main application was without merit and this is
evident from the Board’s founding affidavit in the counter -application . The Board
had always paid Gold Circle the whole 3% of tax distributions for more than ten
years prior to May 2023 . It could not, without any due notice , unilaterally decide
to withhold these payments from Gold Circle . It also had no right or basis in law
to withhold payments to the Revenue Fu nd either. I t acted contrary to the internal
arrangements it had with Treasury o ver the payment of these taxes.
[39] Section 128 of the Gaming Act provides that
‘A bookmaking business must deduct from the amount won by a bettor, exclusive of the
amount staked by the bettor, the taxes and deductions determined in terms of the KwaZulu -
Natal Gaming and Betting Tax Act, 2010, and must pay such monies into the Provinci al
Revenue Fund in accordance with the provisions of section 77 .’
However, because there is no provision in the PFMA for the Revenue Fund to
interact with the individual accounts, Treasury determined that the licensees
would deposit taxes in an account determined by the Board. The Board would
18
then make monthly deposits of these taxes into the relevant department’s pay
master general account and thereafter to the Revenue Fund.
[40] It was further agreed that instead of Treasury making distributions, this
would be done by the Board after submitting a verified schedule relating to the
distribution for approval by Treasury within 10 days of submitting same. The
distribution would thereafter be made no later than 20 days after the end of every
tax period , as provided for under s 77(3) of the Gami ng Act. The Finance MEC ,
in the explanatory affidavit filed by Ms Coetzee , stated that she reminded the
CEO of the Board, the eleventh respondent, that she ought to ensure that funds
received by the provincial government are promptly paid into the Revenue Fund
and that all fees and taxes payable under the Tax Act are paid timeously and
correctly. Obviously, this was after the Board had decided to withhold the
payment of the funds - both from the Revenue Fund and Gold Circle .
[41] Therefore, even if the Board believed that Gold Circle was not entitled to
the whole 3% distribution, at the very least, it should have paid Gold Circle what
it believed was due to it. The total withholding of any payments was unlawful
and totally unacceptable. Even if there was some disagreement between the Board
and Treasury about how those taxes ought to be distributed, Gold Circle could
not be expected to wait until the finalisation of any intergovernmental dispute
resolution , as it is not part of government . It should further be noted that this
process has not been finalised for almost two years since it started and that is
despite this application.
[42] It is evident from the papers filed in this matter that the Board attempted to
have the gambling legislation amended so that the 3% tax deduction can be
distributed in the manner preferred by it , but it has failed to achieve this due to
the objection s raised by the various stakeholders. It then resolved to act
19
unilaterally and withhold payment s to Gold Circle , which I believe was
impermissible. It had no authority to do this as it , in any event, was merely
performing an act on behalf of Treasury. Gold Circle therefore had a legitimate
expectation of these payments. Even if Gold Circle was not using the funds for
what the Board believed it ought to have used them for, then a proper process
ought to have been followed , which includes a right of hearing and due notice of
whatever steps the Board intended to take. In any event, neither the Gaming Act
nor the Tax Act set s out or prescribe s a purpose for which Gold Circle or a
racecourse operator ought to use the funds .
[43] It must follow, therefore , that Gold Circle has succeeded in establishing its
clear right to the payment of the 3% deduction of the distributable tax provided
for in part D.1 of the Schedule to the Tax Act, which tax has been deducted from
the amount s won by bett ors in respect of fixed -odds bets, which are placed with
a bookmaker at racecourses Gold Circle operate s. This is so because Gold Circle
is entitled to same in terms of the legislation and this has been the practice for
more than ten years. The irreparable harm , which is the financial loss throughout
this period, has also been established in my view. T here was no other remedy
available to Gold Circle as it tried to engage the Board and Treasury prior to
launch ing this application but to no avail . The Board had no legal basis to
withhold the payments. This order would be applicable from the period before
the lau nching of the main application up to and including the date of this
judgment .
[44] This leads me to the counter -application. Perhaps it suffices to mention
here that the issues raised by the Board as points in limine no longer feature due
to its stance in the counter -application. The Board , in its counter -application,
asserted that it did not dispute Gold Circle ’s entitlement to a portion of the
distributable taxes at issue in this application. It also stated that it accepted that it
20
must pay Gold Circle the distributions in respect of horse races at racecourses
which it was licensed to operate. To this extent, it resumed interim payment
arrangements , which were accepted by Gold Circle . What remained at issue ,
according to the Board , was how much Gold Circle was entitled to as a licensed
racecourse operator and whether it was entitled to any amount in respect of races
that it did not stage. Th e Board’s assertion, therefore, is obviously a concession
to a large extent of the main application. This then narrows the issue to whether
Gold Circle is entitled to the full 3% distribution , especially in races it did not
stage and those that happen outside the province and internationally .
[45] This leads me to the applicable relevant legislation. S ection 77(1) of the
Gaming Act is clear :
‘All persons licensed in terms of this Act must pay the taxes imposed in terms of the [Tax Act],
into the Provincial Revenue Fund, in the manner prescribed and at the same time, must lodge
a tax return with both the Board and the Provincial Treasury, in the manner prescribed.’
Section 77(3) of the Gaming Act provides that
‘The Treasury must effect any required distribution of a portion of the taxes received, as
prescribed by the [Tax Act ], no later than 20 days after the end of every tax period. ’
Section 89(1) of the Gaming Act reads as follows :
‘The Board may, on application in the manner prescribed by the Board and subject to the
provisions of subsection (3), approve the issue of a racecourse operators' licence to any
corporate body, or bodies, to hold race meetings on one or more racecourses specified in the
licence, which approval may be conditional or unconditional: Provided that, when considering
such application, the Board must consider the economic, social development and competition
issues contemplated in sections 53 and 54 of the National Gambling Act.’
[46] Section 128(1) of the Gaming Act provides that
‘A bookmaking business must deduct from the amount won by a bettor, exclusive of the
amount staked by the bettor, the taxes and deductions determined in terms of the KwaZulu -
Natal Gaming and Betting Tax Act, 2010, and must pay such monies into the Provincia l
Revenue Fund in accordance wi th the provisions of section 77 .’
21
Part D .1 of the Schedule to the Tax Act reads as follows :
‘The tax deduction and their distribution referred to in section 128 of the KwaZulu -Natal
Gaming and Betting Act, 2010, in respect of fixed -odds bets on horse races placed with a
bookmaker at a racecourse, or in premises other than a racecourse, are as prescribed in the table
hereunder:
Beneficiaries to which the
Board must effect
distribution Deductions from the amount won by a bettor, exclusive of
the amount staked by the bettor, when a bettor wins a bet
taken with a bookmaker
Provincial Revenue Fund 3 per cent
Racecourse Operator 3 per cent
TOTAL 6 per cent’
[47] All the above -mentioned provisions must be read together and in the
context of regulating gamin g and gambling activities in KwaZulu -Natal. Statutes
dealing with the same subject matter, or which are in pari materia , should be
construed together and harmoniously .2 This was recently confirmed by the
Constitutional Court in Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs ,3 when it held that
statutes must be read ‘alongside each other , so as to make sense of their provisions
together ’. How much Gold Circle is entitled to and under what circumstances lies
in the interpretation of all these provisions.
[48] It is trite that
‘Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it
legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract , having regard to the context provided
by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and
the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence .’4
2 Commander v Collector of Customs 1920 AD 510 at 513 .
3 Ruta v Minister of Home Affairs [2018] ZACC 52; 2019 (2) SA 329 (CC) para 42.
4 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) .
22
A contextual and purposive approach must be applied to statutory interpretation .5
A consideration of the purpose of the relevant statutes in this matter is thus
necessary . The purpose of the Tax Act is
‘To provide for the payment of tax by persons licensed in terms of the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming
and Betting Act, 2010; and to provide for matters connected therewith. ’6
On the other hand, the purpose of the Betting Act is:7
‘To provide for the regulation of gaming, horse racing and betting in the Province of KwaZulu -
Natal; restrictions on gaming and betting; the establishment of a provincial Gaming and Betting
Board; the licensing of persons conducting casinos and bingo games; the licensing of gaming
machine operators, racecourse operators, totalisators and bookmakers; the registration of
certain persons; the imposition of fees, taxes, levies and penalties on the various gambling
activ ities; the appointment and authorisation of inspectors and their powers and duties; the
establishment of a Horse Racing and Betting Transformation Fund; and to provide for matters
connected therewith. ’
[49] Section 89(1) of the Gaming Act makes it plain that the licen ce must
specify where the race meeting must be held. Gold Circle ’s licensed racecourses
are Scottsville and Greyville racecourses. There is therefore no doubt in my mind
that Gold Circle is entitled to 3% of the tax distribution in respect of the races it
stages at these two racecourses. This is in line with the context and purpose of the
licen ce for which it was issued. The Gaming Act and part D .1 of the Schedule to
the Tax Act must be read together with the provisions of the licen ce. Th is must
have been the reason why there is a need to specify the racecourses in the licen ce,
and this is in line with regulating the activities of the racecourse operators. As
alluded to above, context includes, amongst others, the mischief which the
legislation aims to address, the social and historical background of the
5 Road Traffic Management Corporation v Waymark Infotech (Pty) Ltd [2019] ZACC 12; 2019 (5) SA 29 (CC)
para 29.
6 The long title of the Tax Act.
7 The long title of the Betting Act.
23
legislation ,8 and most pertinently for the purpose of this case, other legislation
(thus the external context) , including the transformation purpose , as mentioned in
the long title of the Gaming Act.
[50] Furthermore, it can only be in line with the purpose of the legislation that
a racecourse operator must benefit from its operations , as provided for in its
licen ce. It is sensible and business -like to believe that t he benefit arises from the
operations in respect of fixed -odds bets on horse races placed with a bookmaker
at a racecourse, or in premises other than a racecourse. The racecourse or
premises other than a racecourse must surely be those that are specified i n the
operator’s licen ce. The Gaming Act is clear about the formulation of these
payments , as illustrated above. There is no basis in law for Gold Circle to benefit
from any tax distribution from an operation not staged from any of its racecourse s.
It is significant in this context not to lose sight of t he grammatic al meaning of the
word s ‘racecourse operator ’ and ‘ racecourse operator's licence ’.9
[51] What is envisaged in the Gaming Act is that a licensed operator of a
racecourse must be compensated for hosting such an operation. The Gaming Act
is clear and unambiguous in this regard. It is also important to note that the
Gaming Act is titled ‘KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and B etting Act ’ which must mean
that it is meant to regu late gaming and betting in the p rovince of KwaZulu -Natal.
It is only sensible then to limit its operations to this province. This will also be in
line with s 104(1) (b)(i) of the Constitution which sets out the legislative authority
of provinces and it allows for the legislative authority ‘to pass legislation for its
province ’(my emphasis) for matters listed in Schedule 4, which include
8 Department of Land Affairs and others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd [2007] ZACC 12; 2007 (6) SA
199 (CC) para 53.
9 Section 1 of the Gaming Act defines ‘racecourse operator’ as: ‘ corporate body, or bodies, licensed in terms of
section 89 to hold race meetings at one or more racecourses ’, while ‘ racecourse operator's licence ’ is defined as:
‘a licence issued, in terms of section 89, to a corporate body and which authorizes the licence holder to hold race
meetings at one or more racecours e’.
24
‘[c]asinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding lotteries and sports pools’.
The fact t hat the provisions of the Gaming Act were previously not complied with
cannot be left to continue unabated , even when the Board has sought the
assistance of this court through its counter -application to correct its misfortunes.
An irregularity cannot be perpetuated with the assistance of the court. Through
this counter -application , the Board has given reasonable notice to Gold Circle of
the proposed change in the manner in which it was conducting itself. The time
that the matter has taken to be heard , and eventually for this judgment to be
handed down, has given Gold Circle sufficient notice to rearrang e its affairs.
[52] As was held in Khumalo and another v MEC for Education , KwaZulu -
Natal ,10 ‘[i]t is the duty of the courts to insist that the State, in all its dealings ,
operate within the confines of the law and, in so doing, remain accountable to
those on whose behalf it exercises power ’. That Gold Circle , the Board , and
Treasury have operated in a n unlawful manner does not mean that this is the law
and must be condoned. It is for this reason that the order sought in the counter -
application ought to be granted.
Strik e out application
[53] This brings me to the issue of the striking out of various averments in Gold
Circle’s answering affidavit to the Board ’s counter -application. The Board
contended that the answering affidavit itself was attacking the integrity of the
Board and was prepared in an intemperate manner. It was further stated that the
contents of the affidavit were prejudicial , defamatory and would injure the
reputation of the Board if they were not removed from the proceedings. Various
words and phrases , including but not limited to ‘egregiously unlawful ’,
‘rapacious ’, ‘perverse argument ’, ‘robber -baron fashion ’, ‘argument suffer
10 Khumalo and another v MEC for Education , KwaZulu -Natal [2013] ZACC 49; 2014 (5) SA 579 (CC) para 29 .
25
fundamental lapses in logic ’, ‘argument opportunistically made ’, ‘feather its own
nest’, ‘funds being pocketed and mislaid or misused by the Board ’, ‘absurd
outcome ’, ‘tiptoeing around absurdity ’, ‘retentionist habits of the Board ’ and
‘unlawful ly snaffle for itself monies ’, were deemed by the Board to be scandalous
and vexatious.
[54] Gold Circle opposed the application to strike out on the basis that it was
excessively and unreasonably late , and without an apology, or explanation or
application for condonation from the Board. It contended that the Board failed to
make out a case for the relief it sought , as it failed to identify why those words or
phrases met the applicable test required for st riking out. It was further argued that
the words and phrases ought to be read in the context of the pleadings as a whole ,
and if that is done, neither those words nor phrases were scandalous, vexations or
irrelevant nor would the Board be prejudiced.
[55] According to Gold Circle , those words and phrases complained of by the
Board serve d to highlight the Board’s gross disregard for their professional
responsibilities , as they acted inappropriately and egregiously. They were
therefore relevant to the issue of personal costs orders being sought against the
members of the Board. Furthermore, so went the contention, the words were not
scandalous or vexatious , as some are used even by the highest court of our
country, the Constitutional Court. Gold Circle was therefore justifiably strident
in its criticism of the Board. There was also no explanation as to how the Board
would be prejudiced if the words and /or phrases remained.
[56] Rule 6(15) of the Uniform Rules provides that
‘The court may on application order to be struck out from any affidavit any matter which is
scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant, with an appropriate order as to costs, including costs as
26
between attorney and client. The court may not grant the applica tion unless it is satisfied that
the applicant will be prejudiced if the application is not granted. ’
As was held in Beinash v Wixley ,11
‘What is clear from this Rule is that two requirements must be satisfied before an application
to strike out matter from any affidavit can succeed. First, the matter sought to be struck out
must indeed be scandalous, vexatious or irrelevant. In the second place the Court must be
satisfied that i f such matter was not struck out the parties seeking such relief would be
prejudice d.’
[57] I have considered all the papers in this application at least more than twice .
Indeed, I align myself with what Olsen J said in MEC for Transport, Community
Safety and Liaison and another v Transport Appeal Tribunal and another :12
‘Concerning the role of the lawyers who represented the applicants in these proceedings, they
drafted or allowed the presentation on affidavit of statements of that kind without any factual
basis to support them. (Where the language is merely insulting, it s use is forbidden and can
never be justified.) A re-reading of the judgment in Findlay v Knight 1935 AD 58 illustrates
that, to all intents and purposes, since time immemorial it has been so that the privilege granted
to lawyers in the presentation of the cases of their clients may not be misused . . . The following
appears at page 71 of the judgment.
“The other principle of public policy which underlies qualified privilege is that the
process of the court shall not be wantonly used for the purpose of defaming either
litigants or third parties. The courts cannot allow advocates or attorneys to use the
process of the courts for an illegitimate purpose; for manifestly the law cannot
countenance an abuse of the privilege.”
[58] Whilst I understand the frustration that this litigation brought upon Gold
Circle , the use of abusive language cannot be condoned. Words insinuating deceit
or untruthfulness without a basis for that accusation should have no place in our
courts. In particular , words like ‘veiled attempt ’ (meaning not expressed directly
11 Beinash v Wixley 1997 (3) SA 721 (SCA ) at 733A -B.
12 MEC for Transport, Community Safety and Liaison and another v Transport Appeal Tribunal and another
[2016] ZAKZPHC 90 para 52 .
27
or clearly); ‘egregious ’ (extremely bad in a way that is very noticeable); ‘perverse
argument ’ (deliberate and determined to behave in a way that most people think
is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable); ‘robber -baron fashion ’ (being rich
through illegal means and without having regard for others); ‘fundamental lapse
in logic ’ and a few others should be struck out of the affidavits. There must be a
tenable factual basis before using them and that has not been established by Gold
Circle .
[59] These terms and phrases are vexatious and , in my view , not relevant in
deciding any of the issues before me . One need not be scandalous or use emotive ,
unacceptable terms to p rove a cost s order against another. The dignity of the
members of the Board must be protected until proven otherwise . I am, therefore,
satisfied that if these words are not struck out, the members of the Board will be
prejudiced , as the words are damaging to their reputation . The issue about the
delay in bringing the application to strike out has not effect on whether the words
are scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant as the rule does not provide any time
limits for the launching of such application. I do not believe that the Boa rd’s
application to strike out is witho ut merit or that it is done to increase costs .13
[60] The words , in my view, are intended to annoy the Board and are abusive
and defamatory , if considered as a whole and in their context .14 Emotive language
cannot be a consideration for a cost award , such an award it to be based on the
facts of the matter . Some of the words , in my view , for instance , ‘kept for itself ’
or ‘snuffle funds ’ are meant to convey criminality, which is defamatory and
prejudicial. It follows that the application to strike out must succeed.
Costs
13 Anderson and another v Port Elizabeth Municipality 1954 (2) SA 299 (E) at 309.
14 Tshabalala -Msimang and another v Makhanya and others 2008 (6) SA 102 (W).
28
[61] This brings me to the last issue and that is whether a personal costs order
against the members of the Board is warranted. The basis for seeking this order
was that the Board ha d acted in bad faith in keeping the tax distribution that Gold
Circle is entitled to receive. It was argued that w hilst the Boa rd had disclosed that
it acted on advice, it ha d failed to disclose fully and properly the advice it received
and when it had received that advice . It was also submitt ed that the Board h ad
been dilatory in th is litigation and th at its counter -application was intended to
better their opposition to the award of a personal cost order , whilst its opposition
to the main application was an abuse and waste of public resources , which was
also prejudicial to Gold Circle .
[62] As was held by Mogoeng CJ in Public Protector v South African Reserve
Bank ,15
‘[c]osts on an attorney and client scale are to be awarded where there is fraudulent, dishonest,
vexatious conduct and conduct that amounts to an abuse of court process. As correctly stated
by the Labour Appeal Court –
“[t]he scale of attorney and client is an extraordinary one which should be reserved for
cases where it can be found that a litigant conducted itself in a clear and indubitably
vexatious and reprehensible [manner]. Such an award is exceptional and is inten ded to
be very punitive and indicative of extreme opprobrium.”’ (Footnote omitted.)
[63] I agree that up until the time that an offer was made to Gold Circle , the
Board ought to pay punitive costs , as there was no basis whatsoever for keeping
the whole amount of the distribution instead of paying what it thought Gold Circle
was entitled to and thereafter withhold ing the amount that was in dispute. It had
no legal basis for withholding the whole amount and for that , costs on an attorney
and client scale are warranted . Furthermore, t he Board’s opposition amounted to
15 Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank [2019] ZACC 29; 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) para 8 . Although this
was a minority judgment from Mogoeng CJ, it appears as if the majority judgment did not differ on this aspect –
see Tjiroze v Appeal Board of the Financial Services Board and others [2020] ZACC 18; 2021 (1) BCLR 59 (CC)
para 23.
29
an abuse of the court process . For all of these reasons, costs on the attorney and
client scale are warranted for the main application . Such costs will address the
delays and prejudice suffered by Gold Circle throughout this litigation . However,
I do not believe that a case has been made out for a personal costs order against
the members of the Board .
[64] Whilst the Board has succeeded in it s application to strike out and the
counter -application, as a sign of displeasure in how it has conducted this
litigation, I will not award it any costs. It has been dilatory, provided meritless
defence s to the main application, and belatedly launched its counter -application
and the application to strike out. None of its papers were filed timeously and this
is not the way that a government department should conduct itself. Accordingly,
an order that each party shall pay its own costs for those application s will be
appropriate in the circumstances.
Order
[65] Accordingly, I make the following order :
1. In relation to the main application and up to the date of this order :
1.1 The first respondent is directed to effect distribution to the applicant ,
alternatively the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial Treasury, of the 3% deduction from
the amount won by bettors in respect of fixed -odds bets on horse races placed
with a bookmaker :
(a) at racecourses operated by the applicant ; and
(b) in premises other than a racecourse, in respect of horse races staged
by the applicant ,
as contemplated in s 128 of the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Act 8 of
2010, read with part D.1 of the Schedule to the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and
Betting Tax Act 9 of 2020 ( ‘the Gold Circle deduction ’) for the months of March,
April and May 2023, within five days of the date of this order .
30
1.2 In all future months up to the date of this order , the first respondent is
directed to effect distribution to the applicant , alternatively the KwaZulu -Natal
Provincial Treasury, of the Gold Circle ’s deduction on or before the 20th day of
the month following the month in question.
1.3 The first respondent is directed to pay the costs of th e main application on
the attorney and client scale, such costs to include the costs of two counsel where
employed.
2. In relation to the counter -application and from the date of this order :
2.1 The applicant is entitled to payment of 3% of the distribution of tax
provide d for in part D.1 of the Schedule to the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and
Betting Tax Act 9 of 20 10, deducted from the amount won by bettors in respect
of fixed -odds bets which are:
(a) placed with a bookmaker at the racecourse s which are specified in
the racecourse operator ’s licen ce issued to the applicant in terms of
s 89(1) of the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and Betting Act 8 of 2010;
and/or
(b) placed with a bookmaker in premises other than a racecourse, in
respect of horseraces which are staged by the applicant at the
racecourse s specified in the racecourse operator ’s license issued to
the applicant in terms of s 89 of the KwaZulu -Natal Gaming and
Betting Act 8 of 2010 .
2.2 Each party shall pay its own costs in the counter -application.
3. In relation to the application to strike out :
3.1 The following allegations contained in the applicant’s answering affidavit
in the counter -application and the further replying affidavit in the main
application are hereby struck out:
(a) The word ‘veiled’ in paragraphs 7 and 8;
(b) The words ‘egregiously unlawful’ and ‘rapacious’ in paragraph 8;
(c) The words ‘perverse argument’ in paragraph 10;
31
(d) Paragraph 12;
(e) The last sentence in paragraph 47;
(f) The first sentence in paragraph 51 and the first sentence in
paragraph 55;
(g) The last sentence of paragraph 63;
(h) Paragraph 84.2;
(i) Paragraphs 100.2 and 102;
(j) The first sentence in paragraph 133.4 and the last sentence in
paragraph 135;
(k) Paragraph 138 and the last sentence of paragraph 141;
(l) Paragraph 177 and the last two sentences in paragraph 212.
3.2 Each party shall pay its own costs in the application to strike out .
_____ ______
POYO DLWATI J P
32
APPEARANCES
Date of Hearing: 2 August 2024
Date of Judgment: 14 February 202 5
Counsel for applicant : Adv M Du Plessis SC with Advocates
Coutsoudis, Palmer and Mncube
Instructed by: Barker’s Attorney
c/o Cajee Setsubi Chetty Inc.
Counsel for 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th,
9th, 10th & 11th respondent s: Adv A Gabriel SC with Advocates Gounden,
Shazi and Mdletshe
Instructed by: Xaba Attorneys
Counsel for 3rd respondent : Adv Dickson SC
Instructed by: PKX Attorneys