In the matter between
TSHEDISO MARIUS LETUMA
and
THE STATE
Coram:
Heard:
Delivered: Greyvenstein AJ
15 November 2024
17 March 2025 Reportable / Not reportable
Appeal number: 40/2024
APPLICANT
RESPONDENT
2
ORDER
The application for leave to appeal, on both the merits and the sentence, is dismissed.
JUDGMENT
Greyvenstein AJ
[1] The applicant was convicted in the Welkom Circuit Court on the 18 October
2024 on Count 2 -Assault (Common) and Count 3 -Murder. He was sentenced
on Count 2 to 12 months' direct imprisonment and on Count 3 to 15 years' direct
imprisonment. The sentence in Count 2 was ordered to run concurrently with the one
imposed in Count 3. This is an application by the applicant for leave to appeal on both
the conviction and sentence.
The Legal position.
[2] Leach JA, the scribe of a unanimous court, stated the following in S v Kruger:1
'(2] Before dealing with the merits of the appeal, it is necessary at the outset to deal with
the test applied by the high court in granting leave to appeal to this court. Despite dismissing
the appellant's appeal, the high court concluded that it was "possible" that another court might
arrive at a different conclusion and that leave to appeal should not be "lightly refused" where
the person concerned is facing a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. This is an incorrect test.
What has to be considered in deciding whether leave to appeal should be granted is whether
there is a reasonable prospect of success. And in that regard, more is required than the mere
"possibility" that another court might arrive at a different conclusion, no matter how severe the
sentence that the applicant is facing. As was stressed by this court in S v Smith 2012 (1)
SACR 567 (SCA) para 7:
1 S v Kruger [2014] ZASCA 198; (1) SACR 647 (SCA).
3
"What the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a dispassionate decision,
based on the facts and the law, that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion
different to that of the trial court. In order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince
this court on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal and that those
prospects are not remote but have a realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be
established than that there is a mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal
or that the case cannot be categorised as hopeless. There must, in other words, be a sound,
rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal."
[3] The time of this court is valuable and should be used to hear appeals that are truly
deserving of its attention. It is in the interests of the administration of justice that the test set
out above should be scrupulously followed. In the present case, it was not, and this court has
had to hear an appeal in respect of which there was no reasonable prospect of success.'
(Emphasis added.)
[3] Naidoo J, in Tsolo v S,2 stated the position as follows in paras 6 and 7:
The test applicable to an application for leave to appeal was correctly set out in the Heads of
Argument on behalf of the applicant, with which the state agreed. For the sake of
completeness, I repeat the legal position as it currently stands. Section 17 of the Superior
Courts Act 1 O of 2013 regulates the test to be applied in an application for leave to appeal.
The relevant provisions of section 17( 1) provide as follows:
"( 1) Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges concerned are of the opinion
that.
(a) (i) the appeal would have a reasonable prospect of success; or
(ii) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter under consideration;" (my emphasis and underlining)
[7] It has been held in a number of cases that an applicant was, previously , merely required to
show that there is a reasonable possibility that another court, differently constituted, would find
differently to the court against whose judgment leave to appeal is sought. It is clear
from section 17(1 ), set out above, that the situation is now somewhat different, and an
applicant for leave to appeal is required to convince the court that there is a reasonable
prospect of success and not merely a possibility of success.
2 Tsolo v S [2024] ZAFSHC 139.
4
[See in this regard The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen+ 18 2014 JDR LCC, which was
cited with approval in a number of cases, such as Matoto v Free State Gambling and Liquor
Authority (4629/2015) [2017) ZAFSHC 80 (8 June 2017), a decision emanating from this
Division, and also a Full Court decision in Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions and
Others v Democratic Alliance (19577/2009) (2016) ZAGPPHC 489 (24 June 2016))'
[4] In Mekgoe v S,3 Daffue J, with Naidoo J concurring, referred to a court's
obligation to observe the principle of stare decisis, or, the doctrine of precedents, as
discussed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in paras 21 and 22 of First Rand Bank v
Kona and Another.4 Paragraph 22 is of particular importance:
'The Constitutional Court, in Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association & another v
Harrison & another 2011 (4) SA 42 (CC), paras 28-30, expressed itself in no uncertain terms
about observance by courts of the maxim stare decisis or the doctrine of precedent. Brand AJ,
in delivering the unanimous judgment of the court said:
"Considerations underlying the doctrine were formulated by Hahlo & Kahn [Hahlo & Kahn The
South African Legal System and its Background (Juta), Cape Town 1968) at 214-15). What it
boils down to according to the authors, is: "(C)ertainty, predictability, reliability, equality,
uniformity, convenience: These are the principal advantages to be gained by a legal system
from the principle of stare decisis." Observance of the doctrine has been insisted upon, both
by this court and by the Supreme Court of Appeal. And I believe rightly so. The doctrine of
precedent not only binds lower courts, but also binds courts of final jurisdiction to their own
decisions. These courts can depart from a previous decision of their own only when satisfied
that that decision is clearly wrong. Stare decisis is therefore not simply a matter of respect for
courts of higher authority. It is a manifestation of the rule of law itself, which in turn is a founding
value of our Constitution. To deviate from this rule is to invite legal chaos."'
[5] It is therefore a clear guidance to all courts to follow the maxim of stare decisis.
For me, a stricter approach is needed than just a reasonable prospect of success. In
this regard, I note what was said by Daffue J in S v Sel/o.5
'On 26 August 2022 the applicant was convicted in the regional court, Welkom on a charge of
murder. On 2 September 2022 he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The honourable
regional magistrate dismissed his application for leave to appeal the conviction and sentence.
The applicant sought leave to appeal from this court. On 27 January 2023 two judges of this
3 S v Mekgoe [2015] ZAFSHC 60
4 First Rand Bank v Kona and Another [2015] ZASCA 11; 2015 (5) SA 237 (SCA).
5 S v Se/lo [2023] ZAFSHC 83.
5
division granted him leave to appeal in respect of his conviction and sentence. There is no
guarantee that the appeal will succeed, but reasonable prospects of success on appeal have
been found.'6 (Emphasis added.)
[6] This was my first matter of its kind in the High Court. I was, unfortunately, not
aware that the Application must be decided in chambers. This was only explained to
me in February 2025 by Mr Van Vuuren. In the rough and tumble of a regional Court
role, where I am in court on a daily basis, I have opened my first judgement document
on the 14th 01 February 2025. I was forced to do all the research at home because no
internet or Wi-Fi system is working at the Magistrate Court. I am always trying to finish
off work as quick as possible. I regret the unfortunate delay.
The application on leave to appeal on the merits.
[7] The applicant is of the opinion that the trial court erred in convicting the him on
a charge of murder with direct intent, and that there are prospects of success in his
application. This prospect is based on the following summarised grounds:
1. Not considering the totality of the evidence which was led during trial.
2. Not considering the contradictions in the State witnesses' evidence.
3. That the evidence of ltumeleng Lenka was riddled with exaggerations and
fabrications and that she was under the influence of liquor that day.
4. That the trial court failed in the finding that the applicant has made an admission
to the police and that the evidence of the applicants uncle did not support the
mentioned notion.
5. That the trial court erred in convicting the applicant on murder in the form of
direct intent.
[8] The State, as respondent in this matter, is opposing this application . It is the
submission of the State that the Court has given 'a full and detailed judgment
pertaining to all the grounds that the appellant has raised in this application '. According
to the respondent more is needed than just a possibility of success and it is their
submission that 'the appellant did not cross that hurdle'.
6 Ibid para 3.
6
[9] With regards to the above, I believe that the conviction of the applicant on count
3 -Murder, as a Part 2 Schedule 2 offence in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act 105 of 1997 (the Act), is correct. Every aspect raised by the respondent was
covered in my comprehensive judgement. The application on merit is therefore
dismissed.
The application on leave to appeal on sentence.
[1 O] With regards to the sentence, the applicant is of the opinion, as far as the 15
years' imprisonment is concerned, that the court has erred in not finding that there
were substantial and compelling circumstances present to deviate from the prescribed
minimum sentence for a Part 2 Schedule 2 matter in terms of the Act. Furthermore,
the applicant maintains that the court also erred by not taking the following specifics
into account:
1. That he was twenty-nine years old at the time of the commission of the offence;
2. That he has been in custody for approximately two years awaiting trial;
3. That he has two children, aged 9 and 4 respectively, in need of a father-figure
in their lives. (I place emphasise on this aspect.)
4. That the mothers of his children are unemployed, and that he was the sole
provider of these children prior to his arrest;
5. That liquor played a role in the commission of the offence.
6. That he could be rehabilitated.
7. That the acted in the spur of the moment in an argument with the deceased
over money to buy liquor and a cellular phone.
[11] The applicant submitted that these circumstances, individually and
cumulatively, constitute substantial and compelling circumstances which should have
been taken into consideration by the court when the sentence was imposed. Further,
he submitted that the court over-emphasized the seriousness of the offence, the
interests of the community and the deterrent effect, and not giving any due
consideration to the factors in his favour. In addition, he was of the view that the court
'was angered by the manner in which the offence was committed, as well as the fact
that it was committed against a woman, a vulnerable person, in the Women's
month.' Therefore, with regards to the sentence imposed, the applicant is of the view
that there may be prospects of success in his application.
7
[12] The State, as respondent in this matter, naturally opposed this application. It is
the submission of the State that the court took in consideration . the personal
circumstances of the applicant, the interest of the community as well as the
seriousness of the offence. The court also took into consideration the age of the
applicant and the fact that he has two children, each residing with their mothers. The
trial court also took into consideration the time spent by the appellant in custody. It is
the submission of the State that the court correctly took into account that the
aggravating circumstances of this offence far outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
In S v Vi/akazi,7 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that in cases of serious crimes,
the personal circumstances of the offender, by themselves, will necessarily recede
into the background. Once it becomes clear that the crime is deserving of a substantial
period of imprisonment. the questions whether the accused is married or single,
whether he has two or three children, whether he is employed or not, are themselves
largely immaterial to what the period should be, and those seem to be the kind of
'flimsy' grounds that the case of S v Malgas8 (Ma/gas) said should be avoided.9
[13] Despite all the principles applicable to sentencing, it remains a highly subjective
process. I believe most presiding officers will differ in their approach, depending on
their personality and background. This, on its own, posits a difficult conundrum when
considering whether a presiding officer will make a different finding when faced with
similar circumstances. Presently, all relevant aspects have been taken into account,
particularly the personal circumstances of the applicant. In Mokoena v S, 1° Rampai JP
stated the position in para 13 as follows:
'It is of paramount importance to have an offender adequately profiled before the sentence is
imposed. Unless this is seen to have been done, it cannot be said that the punishment fits an
offender- S v RABIE 1975 (4) SA 855 (AD).'
[14] As indicated above, the offence forming the subject matter of the appeal of
resorts under Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Act. For a first offender, the prescribed term
7 S v Vilakazi [2008] ZASCA 87; 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA).
8 S v Ma/gas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) (Ma/gas).
9 Footnote 7 para 58.
10 Mokoena v S [2012] ZAFSHC 12
8
of imprisonment in terms of s 51(2)(aJ is one of at least 15 years. The only possible
exception to this is in terms of s 51(3) or (6) of the Act, namely whether there are
substantial and compelling circumstances to deviate from the above directive. Marais
JA, in oft-cited Ma/gas, 11 provides excellent guidelines for courts in how to deal with
the prescribed "minimum sentences". In Para 25, the honourable judge stated the
position as follows:
'What stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good deal freer to depart from the
prescribed sentences than has been supposed in some of the previously decided cases and
that it is they who are to judge whether the circumstances of any particular case are such as
to justify a departure. However, in doing so, they are to respect, and not merely pay lip service
to, the legislature's view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be
ordinarily appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed. In summary -
A Section 51 has limited but not eliminated the courts' discretion in imposing sentence
in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2 (or imprisonment for other specified
periods for offences listed in other parts of Schedule 2).
B Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that the
legislature has ordained life imprisonment (or the prescribed period of imprisonment) as the
sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the
listed crimes in the specified circumstances.
C Unless there are, and can be seen to be, truly convincing reasons for a different
response, the crimes in question are therefore required to elicit a severe, standardised, and
consistent response from the courts.
D The specified sentences are not to be departed from lightly and for flimsy reasons.
Speculative hypotheses favourable to the offender, undue sympathy, aversion to imprisoning
first offenders, personal doubts as to the efficacy of the policy underlying the legislation, and
marginal differences in _personal circumstances or degrees of participation between
co-offenders are to be excluded.
E The legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to decide whether the
circumstances of any particular case call for a departure from the prescribed sentence. While
the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the type of crime and the need for effective
sanctions against it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to be ignored.
F All factors (other than those set out in D above) traditionally taken into account in.
sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt) thus continue to play a role; none is
excluded at the outset from consideration in the sentencing process.
11 Footnote 8.
9
G The ultimate impact of all the circumstances relevant to sentencing must be measured
against the composite yardstick ("substantial and compelling") and must be such as
cumulatively justify a departure from the standardised response that the legislature has
ordained.
H In applying the statutory provisions, it is inappropriately constricting to use the concepts
developed in dealing with appeals against sentence as the sole criterion.
If the sentencing court on consideration of the circumstances of the particular case is
satisfied that they render the prescribed sentence unjust in that it would be disproportionate
to the crime, the criminal, and the needs of society, so that an injustice would be done by
imposing that sentence, it is entitled to impose a lesser sentence.
J In so doing, account must be taken of the fact that crime of that particular kind has
been sentence should be assessed paying due regard to the benchmark which the legislature
has provided.' (My emphasis added.)
The fact that Ma/gas was confirmed, merely a week later, by the Constitutional Court
in S v Dodo,12 is an indication of its importance in our sentencing policy. The Act was
meant to be in place for a year. It has now been renewed for 28 consecutive years.
[15] In this instance, I have decided that there were substantial and compelling
circumstances present to deviate from the prescribed sentence. In S v Robertson, 13
Kusevitsky J stated:
'In S v Selli the court pointed out that section 51 (3) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105
of 1997 calls for a "purposeful enquiry by a sentencing court" into the presence or absence of
substantial and compelling circumstances. The court stated thus:
"Self-evidently, this is intended to avoid visiting an accused with the severest sentence except
in circumstances where there are no weighty or cogent facts which call for a less severe
sentence."'14
In custody awaiting tria16
[16] It seems to me that the applicant is of the opinion that the two years in custody
awaiting trial should be deducted from the prescribed minimum sentence. This refers
to the Gravino-principle or the so-called 'mechanical rule of thumb' that was referred
12 S v Dodo [2001) ZACC 16; 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC).
13 S v Robertson [2022) ZAWCHC 104; 2023 (2) SACR 156 (WCC).
14 Ibid para 9.
to and followed in S v Stephen and Another.15 In Radebe and Another v S16 (Radebe)
and OPP v Gcwa/a17 it was held that the period spent in prison awaiting trial cannot
on its own constitute 'substantial and compelling circumstances' justifying a departure
from the minimum sentence prescribed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 107 of
1997. Lewis JA, who was the scribe in both Court of Appeal matters, stated in Radebe:
' ... the period in detention pre-sentencing is but one of the factors that should be taken into
account in determining whether the effective period of imprisonment to be imposed is justified:
whether it is proportionate to the crime committed'.16
Applicant a primary caregiver/ bread winner of Minor children.
[17] Lewis JA in De Villiers v S11 stated the position as follows:
'[29] In S v M the court asked whether, in sentencing a primary caregiver, a child's interests
should be one of the factors considered under what has come to be known as the Zinn triad -
in sentencing a court must consider the crime, the offender and the interests of society (S v
Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H), a formula followed time without number in this court and
others. The triad is well-explained by Friedman J in S v Banda & others 1991 (2) SA 352 (B)
at 355A-C:
"The elements of the triad contain an equilibrium and a tension. A court should, when
determining sentence, strive to accomplish and arrive at a judicious counterbalance between
these elements in order to ensure that one element is not unduly accentuated at the expense
of and to the exclusion of the others. This is not merely a formula, nor a judicial incantation,
the mere stating whereof satisfies the requirements. What is necessary is that the Court shall
consider, and try to balance evenly, the nature and circumstances of the offence, the
characteristics of the offender and his circumstances and the impact of the crime on the
community, its welfare and concern."'
[18) It is clear that the mothers of the children have acted as the primary caregiver
of the two children and not the applicant. It is a typical matter where the applicant was
living on his own with a new girlfriend, utterly uninvolved with the day-to-day care of
the minor children. He might have contributed financially but was absent physically
15 S v Stephen and Another 1994 (2) SACR 163 at 168E.
16 Radebe and Another v S [2013] ZASCA 31; 2013 (2) SACR 165 (SCA).
17 Director of Public Prosecutions North Gauteng: Pretoria v Gcwala and Others [2014] ZASCA 44;
2014 (2) SACR 337 (SCA).
18 Footnote 16 para 14.
11
and emotionally. In a significant decision of the Constitutional Court S v S19 Cameron
J stated:
'S v M has revolutionized sentencing in cases where the person convicted is the primary
caregiver of young children. It has reasserted the central role of the interests of young children
as an independent consideration in the sentencing process. Yet it would be wrong to apply S
v M in cases that lie beyond its ambit. The mother in S v M was a single parent, and was
almost exclusively burdened with the care of her children. There was no other parent who
could, without disruption, step in during her absence to nurture the children, and provide the
care they need, and to which they are constitutionally entitled.'
That is not the case here. Mrs S is not the children's sole caregiver. She is not "almost wholly
responsible" for their care. Despite heartache and turbulence ... Mrs S is united with the
father of her children. He is their co-resident parent. And he is willing to care for them during
her incarceration .... A non-custodial sentence is therefore not necessary to ensure their
nurturing. And a custodial sentence will not inappropriately compromise the children's best
interests.'20 (Footnote omitted.)
Murder in a domestic relationship:
[19] In this instance, the State erred before the start of the proceedings. The charge
sheet indicated that this was an offence in terms of Part 2 Schedule 2. From the day
of the offence, the death of the victim resulted from physical abuse, as contemplated
in paras (a) and (b) of the definition of domestic violence in s 1 of the Domestic
Violence Act 116 of 1998, by the accused who is or was in a domestic relationship
with the victim. This falls under Part 1 Schedule 2, and this error was not explained to
the applicant. Had it been explained to him, he would have been sentenced to life
imprisonment. That is an indication of how serious the legislator is in its fervent quest
to curb domestic violence murders. In order to appreciate the severeness of this type
of offence, it is important to look at the definition of a domestic relationship and
domestic violence, as defined in the Domestic Violence Act. In this Act, domestic
violence is defined as follows:
"'domestic relationship"' means a relationship between a complainant and a respondent in any
of the following ways:
(a) they are or were married to each other, including marriage according to any law, custom
or religion.
1s S v S [2011] ZACC 7; 2011 (2) SACR 88 (CC).
20 Ibid para 62-63.
12
(b) they (whether they are of the same or of the opposite sex) live or lived together in a
relationship in the nature of marriage, although they are not, or were not, married to each
other, or are not able to be married to each other.
(c) they are the parents of a child or are persons who have or had parental responsibility for
that child (whether or not at the same time).
(d) they are family members related by consanguinity, affinity, or adoption.
(e) they are or were in an engagement, dating or customary relationship, including an actual
or perceived romantic, intimate, or sexual relationship of any duration; or
(f) they share or recently shared the same residence.'
And domestic violence is defined as:
"'domestic violence" means-
(aJ physical abuse.
(b) sexual abuse.
(c) emotional, verbal, and psychological abuse.
(d) economic abuse.
(e) intimidation.
(f) harassment.
(g) stalking.
(h) damage to property.
(i) entry into the complainant's residence without consent, where the parties do not share the
same residence; or
(j) any other controlling or abusive behaviour towards a complainant, where such conduct
harms, or may cause imminent harm to, the safety, health, or wellbeing of the complainant.'
[20] In light of the definitions, it is clear that the applicant was in a domestic
relationship. He was lucky that he incorrectly stood trial on the grounds of a murder
under Part 2 Schedule 2 as opposed to Part 1 Schedule 2.
[21] I reiterate the significance of South Africa's legislative commitment to curbing
domestic violence by prescribing certain minimum sentences with regards to certain
crimes, particularly murders in the setting of domestic violence. In S v H.J. W,21
Govindjee J held:
'Importantly, society's outrage at the senseless loss of life in the domestic setting has
translated into a prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for conduct of this nature.
21 S v H.J. W[2025] ZAECMKHC 7.
13
The relentless plague of gender-based violence, including so-called intimate femicide, is a
cause for deep societal concern and anger. As the court held in S v Robertson:
"It is so easy to glibly use the phrases and terminology of femicide and gender-based
violence, in part because of the relentless frequency of its occurrence in our society,
communities and homes, that it hardly causes anyone to bat an eyelid or to raise an eyebrow
... this disease of gender-based violence and femicide ... permeates the psyche of our
country."
The Domestic Violence Act, 1998, recognises that domestic violence is a serious social evil,
that there is a high incidence of domestic violence within South African society and that victims
of domestic violence are among the most vulnerable members of society. In S v Rohde, the
court expressed itself as follows:
"Crime based on gender is an affliction in our society. Crimes against women are a social ill
and efforts by government and society are increasing in light of a steady increase in these
types of offence. The rate of murder of women in South Africa is alarmingly high, compared to
the global average. Attitudes to women determine how women are treated in society. It is the
lowered perception of women as human beings, all of whom are entitled to human dignity and
equality, which results in the unhealthy social paradigm that they can be victims, and in fact
end up as victims of crime because they are women. The judiciary must guard against such
perceptions and creating the impression that the lives of women are less worthy of
protection."'22 (Footnotes omitted.)
Whether the court was angered?
[22] I was alarmed by the entire incident, as can be expected from any reasonable
person. In S v Kekana,23 Mosopa J stated the position as follows:
'In S v SMM 2013 (2) SACR 292 (SCA) at paragraph 13 the court dealt with what has to be
considered when imposing a sentence and stated that:
"I hasten to add that it is trite that each case must be decided on its own merits. It is also self
evident that sentence must always be individualised, for punishment must always fit the crime,
the criminal, and the circumstances of the case. It is equally important to remind ourselves
that sentencing should always be considered and passed dispassionately, objectively and
upon a careful consideration of all relevant factors. Public sentiment cannot be ignored, but it
can never be permitted to displace the careful judgment and fine balancing that are involved
in arriving at an appropriate sentence. Courts must therefore always strive to arrive at a
sentence which is just and fair to both the victim and the perpetrator, has regard to the nature
22 Ibid paras 12-13.
23 S v Kekmw [2024] ZAGPPHC 1223
14
of the crime and takes account of the interests of society. Sentencing involves a very high
degree of responsibility which should be carried out with equanimity. As Corbett JA put it in S
v Rabie:
"A judicial officer should not approach punishment in a spirit of anger because, being human,
that will make it difficult for him to achieve that delicate balance between the crime, the
criminal, and the interests of society which his task and the objects of punishment demand of
him. Nor should he strive after severity; nor, on the other hand, surrender to misplaced pity.
While not flinching from firmness, where firmness is called for, he should approach his task
with a humane and compassionate understanding of human frailties and the pressures of
society which contribute to criminality."'
[23] I have dealt with the different grounds of appeal. I must take into account the
rather restrictive approach explained above when dealing with an application for leave
to appeal. I am of the view that the applicant has not satisfied the threshold of the
requirement that there is a reasonable prospect of success on appeal and that another
court could or would come to a different conclusion in respect of the merits or the
sentence in this matter.
(24] In the circumstances, I make the following order:
The application for leave to appeal, on both the merits and the sentence, is dismissed.
Appearances
On behalf of the applicant: Mr Phineas Mokoena
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa
On behalf of the
respondent:
Instructed by: 4th Floor, Fedsure Building
49 Charlotte Maxeke Street
Bloemfontein
Adv S Tunzi
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Bloemfontein 15