SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MBOMBELA MAIN SEAT

CASE NO: 4063 / 2021
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED.
DATE 18 March 2025
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:

T[...] X[...] S[...] PLAINTIFF

And

ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT

_______________________ _______________________ ________ __________ _

J U D G M E N T
_____________________________________________________ ___________ _


RATSHIBVUMO DJP:

Delivered : This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the part ies'
representatives by email . The date and time for hand -down is deemed to be on 18
March 2025 at 10H00.

[1] Introduction
This is a claim for loss of earnings following a motor vehicle accident involving the
Plaintiff which took place on 20 July 2019. When summons was issued, the claim
included general damages and hospital and medical expenses . These have since
been settled and the trial proceeded on determination of future loss of earnings.
When summons was issued , the Plaintiff claimed a total of R2 million in loss of
earnings. This figure has since been adjusted to align with the expert reports to
reflect the amount of R8 879 613.75. The Defendant conceded the merits and
agreed to the handing in of expert re ports contained in the affidavits in terms of
Rule 38(2) of the Uniform Rules . Four of them however, gave viva voce evidence.
In the trial, the Defendant di sputed that the Plaintiff suffered any loss of earnings,
alternatively, not in the amount claimed.

[2] Evidence:
Khetani S Bila : The report by this witness was handed in as part of evidence
admitted in terms of Rule 38(2) as indicated above. According to this report, he is
an Orthopaedic Surgeon . He consulted with the Plaintiff on 26 March 2021 . At the
time, the Plaintiff who was a minor at the time of the accident and consultation, was
accompanied by her mother, Ms. P[...] S[...] . The child’s date of birth was reported
to him to be 19 May 2005.

[3] The Plaintiff was fast asleep in a front seat passenger in a sedan motor vehicle
when it collided with another motor vehicle, leaving four fatalities . The witness
noted in the report that the Plaintiff had not repeated a grade at school in the past,
and that she was doing Grade 8 at the time of accident. At the time of examination ,
she was doing Grade 10. Scars were noted on the right shoulder, right knee with
loss of sensation, left elbow and laparotomy scars. The witness also recorded the
following injuri es as reported to him by the Plaintiff:
a) Blunt abdominal trauma with visceral injuries, done laparotomy.
b) Right knee injury .
c) Right hip laceration.
d) Left and right humerus fracture.
The following injuries were noted from the records presented to him:
a) Blunt abdominal trauma with bowels pe rforation.
b) Right femur fracture.
c) Left and right humerus fractures.

[4] Wilfred Goodwill Nkabinde : This witness gave viva voce evidence while his report
was also accepted as an exhibit. He testified that he was a neurosurgeon and that
he examined the Plaintiff some 20 months after she was involved in a motor
vehicle accident. He recorded that the Plaintiff had no recollection of how the
accident happened. She was initially treated at Tonga Hospital and was further
treated at Kiaat Hospital. She used crutches for one year after the accident. He
recorded that she has positive hi story of loss of consciousness. The witness
concluded the report by recording the deductions from Plaintiff’s history and clinical
records as follows: “Clinical records indicate that [the Plaintiff] presented as poly -
traumatised patient; and the injuries sustained indicate a high impact accident with
increased likelihood of a mild diffuse axonal injury.”

[5] The reason he used the words “likelihood” instead of being definite sure of this
condition is that the patient was not subjected to sufficient medical examination and
tests that could exclude a margin of error regarding this conclusion . In this
instance, the only way one could tell if the Plaintiff suffered defuse axonal injury
would be after her death and her brain is sliced and placed under microscope for
examination. The hospital records did not reflect the diffuse axonal injury on the
Plaintiff because it is difficult to diagnose a mild one at that stage. I t is only when it
is serious (and not mild) that it could be detected by means of computerised
tomography scan or through the GCS score.

[6] All the other experts who examined the Plaintiff henceforth, and prepared reports,
they relied on this opinion for their consultation and to prepare their reports. In fact
those reports suggest that the Plaintiff actually suffered diffuse axonal injury – not
mild. After all, according to this witness, the impact of a mild diffuse axonal injury
cannot be distinguished from a serious one as it equally damages the nerves, and
the brain functionality is no longer optimal. He further recorded that the p atient is
forgetful and endures headaches with neurocognitive decline. This has impacted
negatively on her quality of life an d her ability to compete fairly in an open labour
market.

[7] Evans Mandla Mhlanga , the Clinical Psychologist, also testified for the Plaintiff . The
Plaintiff was in the company of her mother when she came for consultation. He was
informed by the Plaintiff and her mother that before the accident , she was doing
well at school and that her academic performance has since dropped. According to
his findings, her working memory was below average. He had with him the clinical
records and report s from the neurosurgeon and orthopaedic surgeon at the time of
examination . He also did his own objective tests. His findings were in line with
those of the neurosurgeon. He also testified that although he was not given the
Plaintiff’s school reports, it was reported to him that she failed and repeated Grade
1.

[8] Zenzele Leonard Kubheka , the Educational Psychologist testified that he too,
examined the Plaintiff. He noticed that her performance had declined to below
average meaning she was a child with special needs. He had hospital records
when he examined her. The information about the Plaintiff failing Gr ade 1 was not
relayed to him. He only learned of such from the other expert witnesses when they
testified in this trial. That information would however not make him amend his
report because, the Plaintiff must have been 6 years old at the time she did Gr ade
1 which was before the right school starting age which is 7 years old . Failing a
grade at the time one was not even supposed to be at school does not reflect much
on a learner ’s capabilities . He was not presented with the school reports for her
pre-accident academic performance, but the school reports for the period after the
accident we re made available to him.

[9] The Plaintiff’s Grade 10 report reflects that she failed all the terms but was
condoned to Gr. 11 and proceeded to fail all the terms in Gr 11. This according to
the witness , reflected that the Plaintiff’s academic performance dropped drastically.
The family history reflected that the Plaintiff’s father passed matric and her siblings
had tertiary qualifications. He concluded therefore on the available information that ,
prior to her involvement in a motor vehicle accident , the Plaintiff had an average
intellectual potential. He concluded further that the Plaintiff would have probably
progressed in a mainstream school and passed Grade 12 with a diploma
admission and registered at a TVET college and completed N6 with in -service
training, thereby attaining NQF level 6 in a field of her choice . With her current
condition, the Plaintiff was unlikely to go beyond Grade 12 and would remain with a
condoned Grade 11 .

[10] Bathobile Prosperity Nkambule , the Industrial Psychologist , testified that she
prepared a report after consultation with the Plaintiff. In it, she opined that the
Plaintiff would have progressed to a chieve a university degree (NQF level 7) , had
it not been for the accident. She also opined that the Plaintiff would have entered
the open labour market at Paterson B4 in corporate sector and that at the age of
45, she would have progressed to Paterson C4. She admitted that her report had a
wrong founda tion bec ause of her conclusion on how far the Plaintiff would have
progressed academically, as it was based on a conclusion she was not qualified to
opine, and one which differs from that of the Educational Psychologist, who
concluded that the Plaintiff would have completed N6 with in -service training,
thereby attaining NQF level 6. With this admission, s he was given an opportunity to
rectify this error and corrected her report in this regard.

[11] The unfortunate result of this exercise is that those who prepared further reports
relying on her opinion, did not have the opportunity to read her corrected report.
From the amended report, the witness conclude d that the Plaintiff would have been
active in seeking employment in the open labour market and would have secured a
job as an entry in the open labour market (internship) which would have been at
Paterson B3 in the corporate sector. Her earnings would have probably been in the
lower quartile (basic package). At the age of around 45 years she would have
progressed up to Paterson C4.

[12] Her post-morbid conclusion which remain s unchanged was that the Plaintiff will not
be able to reach her pre -accident learning potential. She will not reach her pre -
accident career potential. She will likely reach a career ceiling in the unskilled non -
corporate sector. She will not be able to compete equally with her uninjured peers
in the open labour market. As such, her performance review will always be affected
which will also affect her promotional opportunities. In addition, it will take her
longer to find employment in the labour mark et as she will need to be reasonably
accommodated. She will suffer loss of future earnings as employers often prefer to
hire uninjured candidates. She will be capable of working until reaching the normal
retirement if at some point she will be lucky to be employed where she will be
reasonably accommodated, and h er earnings will be in the median scale .

[13] P[...] S[...] , the Plaintiff’s mother testified that t he Plaintiff was her daughter. She
was still a minor when she was involved in the accident and when she consulted all
the experts whose reports were before the court. She therefore accompanied her
when she consulted all the se expert witnesses . She is the one who gave the
information about the Plaintiff’s pre -accident academic performance. That
information was to the effect that she had resided with the Plaintiff from the date
she was born . The Plaintiff was born on 1 9 May 2005. She did Grade 1 in 2011 ,
which s he repeated and passed the following year . When she was involved in an
accident , she was doing Grade 8. She failed Grade 8 but was condoned to Gr ade 9
which she passed. She failed and repeated Gr ade 10 and was condoned to Gr ade
11 the following year . She failed Grade 11 twice . She decided to stay at home and
not study any further .

[14] The Plaintiff has a big sister who , at the time she gave evidence, was doing
practical work at the Department of S ocial Development. The sister in question
holds a diploma in journalism. According to the witness, the Plaintiff had no head
injuries noted at the time she was admitted in hospital . Head injuries were however
discovered later by a doctor in Kiaat Hospital. She conceded that she did not
present any of the experts with the pre -accident school reports because she
believed these would not be found as th e Plaintiff had changed the schools a few
times and that so much time had since lapsed.

[15] The court was not satisfied with th is explanation especially because these reports
would have guided the experts to give a precise view , based on facts, of what
could have happened had it not been for the accident, as opposed to giving
thumbs -suck predictions. It also created an impression that information was being
deliberately withheld in order to influence the experts’ opinions. The witness was
therefore allowed an opportunity to go to the schools where the Plaintiff attended
and obtain the school reports and avail them the following day, which she did.

[16] The reports were availed to the Court and the legal practitioners representing the
Plaintiff and the Defendant. As these were not presented to the Court as evidence
by the Plaintiff or the Defendant, their handing over would not serve to advance the
case of any of the litigants. The contents of the reports remain relevant and
important to the extent that they would have swayed the experts who prepared
their reports without the privilege of seeing the contents thereof . The Educational
Psychologist , in partic ular, prepared the report with the understanding that the
Plaintif f had the pre -accident “average intellectual potential” based on the word of
mouth from her mother.

[17] In his report, the Educational Psychologist indicated that his view that the Plaintiff
had “average intellectual potential” could be amended if the school reports become
available in the future. That never happened. With the available school reports, the
Plaintiff did not ask to have the Educational Psychologist prepare an addendum or
indicate the extent to which the new information would impact his report. One thing
that is clear from the reports availed by this witness is that her performance was
way belo w class average and that besides failing and repeating Grade 1, there is
another grade which the Plaintiff failed, in the pre -accident era, but was condoned
to do the next grade. This information was withheld from the Educational
Psychologist and all the other experts.

[18] Other experts reports handed in by the Plaintiff in terms of Rule 38(2) are those
prepared by the Occupational Therapist, Maryanne Nkabinde and by the Actuary,
David Mureriwa. Relying on the report prepared by the Industrial Psychologist, the
Actuary put the future pre-accident loss of earnings at R11 353 190 and the future
post-accident loss of earnings at R1 185 535, with a difference of R10 167 655,
without contingenc ies. If one applies the proposed contingency of 15% on the
future pre -accident figure and the 35% on the future post -accident figures , the total
comes to R8 879 613.75 which is the amount being claimed by the Plaintiff.

[19] With this evidence, case for the Plaintiff was closed and the Defendant also closed
its case without leading evidence.

[20] The Plaintiff submit ted that the Court should first make a finding that the Plaintiff
suffered future loss of earnings. Once that is done, it can apply the contingency on
the amount presented by the Actuary and order the Defendant to pay that as the
loss of earnings suffered by the Plaintiff . In the alternative, so it was argued, the
Court can adopt the global estimates approach of what appears to be a reasonable
and fair amount to compensate the Plaintiff’s loss of earnings, without any reliance
on expert evidence presented.1

[21] Although the global estimates approach has been done by the courts in the past, it
remains entirely a matter of guesswork, a blind plunge into the unkno wn. The last
alternative presented by the Plaintiff is for the court to direct how the calculations
should be done and presented before it, as was done in Bosman N.O obo W.T.M v
Road Accident .2

[22] It was submitted by the Plaintiff that the amendment to the Industrial Psychologist ’s
report should have no impact on the actuarial calculations as both, NQF level 6 and
NQF level 7 have entry level of Paterson level B4, which is the same scale utilised
by the Actuary. The fact that the Plaintiff could have completed her studies exiting
with NQF7 (university degree) or NQF 6 (a diploma) should therefore make no
difference in the actuarial calculations.

[23] The Defendant on the other han d wants the Court to determine if the motor vehicle
accident caused the alleged diffuse axonal injury and the impact of the absence of
certain information that was not presented to the experts, particularly the school
reports. Having made this determination, it was submitted that the Court should
find that the Plaintiff failed to discharge its onus and as such, the claim should be
dismissed . In the alternative, the D efendant submitted that the Court should award
the amount of R567 659.50 as the total amount of future loss of earnings suffered
by the Plaintiff. In reaching this figure, the Defendant relies on the Plaintiff’s
actuarial calculations and puts the pre -morbid future earning s at the same figure as
the post -morbid future earnings, save for the contingency to be applied, which is

1 See Mlotshwa v Road Accident Fund (9269/2014) [2017] ZAGPPHC 109 (29 March 2017) at para 17
2 (80735/2019) [2024] ZAGPPHC 855 (26 August 2024) .
20% on the pre -morbid and 25% on the post -morbid. The difference between the
two make s the amount above .

[24] Discussion .
There is no tangible basis on which the Defendant’s alternative submission is
made. This coupled with the fact that the Defendant relies on the Plaintiff’s expert
reports takes the alternative argument by the Defendant to a quick dead end and
should be rejected as such .

[25] In the main contention, the Defendant questions whether the Plaintiff suffered any
diffuse axonal injury , mild or otherwise . The neurosurgeon who gave evidence says
so. There is no other expert presented as a witness to counter that opinion. The
Defendant tried hard under cross examination to poke holes on that piece of
evidence, and all it managed to create was doubt in the mind of the Court. Doubt
alone is insufficient to reject an expert opinion.

[26] The Defendant had to bring another expert who can counter the opinion made by a
counterpart in answering the following: a) Can person suffer mild diffuse axonal
injury and get through the hospital treatment without it being diagnosed ? b) Can
mild diffuse axonal injury be diagnosed by merely inquiring how the patient
behaved and performed pre and post the accident, without being subjected to
medical tests? c) Is there no way to tell if the patient suffered mild diffuse axonal
injury without having to slice the brain and plac e it under microscope , meaning, in
one’s lifetime ? And e) Are the neurological consequences of diffuse axonal injury
similar even when the injury thereof is mild?

[27] The only expert opinion before the Court answers all the questions positively and
the courts, or legal practitioners for that matter, lack the necessary expertise to
present a counterview. The Court shall therefore accept the evidence presented by
the Plaintiff in this regard and find that the Plaintiff indeed suffered a mild diffuse
axonal injury . Flowing from this is a conclusion that this injury impacted the
Plaintiff’s brain functionality to the extent that her academic performance was no
longer at its pre-accident state. Th is consequently caused her to suffer future loss
of earnings or earning capacity as quantified by the experts.

[28] The next question is the reasonable amount that should be awarded in this regard.
It is worth mentioning that the evidence making up the claim for loss of earnings
started as a vague suspicion that can be likened to thin vapour which developed to
solid roc k when it reached the conclusion . When the Plaintiff was in hospital, no
head injuries that could form the basis of this claim were recorded. Several months
later, when the Plaintiff consulted the neurosurgeon, without any medical
examination or tests on the person of the Plaintiff and based on the doctor’s
reading of the notes and the answers given by the Plaintiff and her mother, a
picture puzzle was drawn, albeit not so clear, painting a “possibly” mild diffuse
axonal injury . Several experts worked on this picture puzzle to give it colour and
shape to the extent that when it was finally presented to the court, the Plaintiff had
suffered a definite diffuse axonal injury .

[29] How this picture managed to get its colours in the process of compilation of all
these reports is rather puzzling but not worth of rejecti on. Not in the absence of any
counter opinion. I hold a view that this gradual change from a possibility that the
Plaintiff may have suffered a mild diffuse axonal injury , which started as being
remote and turned to being very likely, can be cured by the application of the
necessary contingenc ies. Contingencies take into consideration the possibility as to
how likely could one suffer an injury and the medical staff that stayed with her while
hospitalised, for several days, were unable to diagnose it; only for it to be detected
by a neurosu rgeon long after she had been discharged from the hospital .

[30] The Defendant argues that the Court should not even consider the contents of the
school reports that were presented outside the expert reports as these were not
properly discovered or presented in terms of the rules. I have no quals with this
submission. The Defendant h owever must make its choice clear . It cannot argue
that the Court should not look into the reports and at the same time submits that
the experts were misled, based on the contents of the same reports. How does one
realise that the experts were m isled without looking into the i nformation contained
in the reports? Either the contents are ignored, and no reference is made - to the
contents there of, or the Court considers the contents only for purposes of
evaluating if the expert opinions were based on correct information. I hold a view
that the later approach is correct non-prejudicial .

[31] It is clear that while the Plaintiff or at least, her mother painted a picture of a person
whose intelligence was of average intellectual ability, the school reports paints a
picture of someone whose academic performance was way below class average.
With the school reports withheld from the experts, I have no hesitation in
concluding that the experts were misled in this regard ; in particular, the Educational
Psychologist . It was worse with him because he was made to believe that the
Plaintiff never failed a nd/or repeated a grade prior to the accident , something that
was false. The Plaintiff had failed at least twice before. I say at least, because
many more reports were not furnished even after the Court afforded the Plaintiff’s
mother , time to avail them.

[32] Of all the experts who examined the Plaintiff, the Educational Psychologist needed
the accurate information more than any other person in this regard. While I find that
the information presented to him was not entirely accurate, I am unable to find that
the report presented to the Court would have been any differed had the remaining
accurate information been made available to him . This I say in the light of the
vigorous stance he presented saying even after discovering that he was not told
the truth about t he Plaintiff repeating Grade 1, that would change nothing in his
report. After all, average intellectual capacity does not always depend on the class
average of a learner.

[33] This now leads me into the weight the Court should attach to the reports by the
experts. The Actuary concluded that the Plaintiff was likely going to enter labour
market on Paterson level B4 and not B3 . He made the se calculations relying on the
reports presented to him, in particular, that of the Industrial Psychologist , who
amended her report while giving evidence . This was when she seemed to reject
some of the conclusions therein in that when preparing her report , she delved in a
field of expertise she was not qualified to opine. Moreover, t he Industrial
Psychologist had relied on the report by the Educational Psychologist who , as
indicated above, was not furnished with full accurate information that he required
when compiling his report .

[34] The court’s approach to experts’ evidence has been described by Nicholaas JA
in Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO3 as follows :
“Any enquiry into damages for loss of earning capacity is of its nature
speculative, because it i nvolves a prediction as to the future, without
the benefit of crystal balls, soothsayers, augurs or oracles. All that the
Court can do is to make an estimate, which is often a very rough
estimate, of the present value of the loss. It has open to it two
possible approaches. One is for the Judge to make a round estimate
of an amount which seems to him to be fair and reasonable. That is
entirely a matter of guesswork, a blind plunge into the unknown. The
other is to try to make an assessment, by way of mathematical
calculations, on the basis of assumptions resting on the evidence.
The validity of this approach depends of course upon the soundness
of the assumptions, and these may vary from the strongly probable to
the speculative. It is manifest that either approach involves
guesswork to a greater or lesser extent. But the Court cannot for this
reason adopt a non possumus attitude and make no award.
See Hersman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367 at
379 per STRATFORD J:
‘Monetary damage having been suffered, it is necessary for the Court
to assess the amount and make the best use it can of the evidence
before it. There are cases where the assessment by the Court is little
more than an estimate; but even so, if it is certain that pecuniary
damage has been suffered, the Court is bound to award damages’

[1] In Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic PTY LTD4 the Supreme Court
of Appeal held said,
“[I]t is perhaps as well to re -emphasise that the question of
reasonableness and negligence is one for the Court itself to
determine on the basis of the various, and often conflicting, expert
opinions presented. As a rule, that determination will not involve

3 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) at p.113G -H and p.114A -B.
4 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA) para 34 & 40.
considerations of credibility but rather the examination of the opinions
and the analysis of their essential reasoning, preparatory to the
Court's reaching i ts own conclusion on the issues raised. ” This
essential difference between the scientific and the judicial measure of
proof was aptly highlighted by the House of Lords in the Scottish
case of Dingley v The Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 200 SC
(HL) 77 and the warning given at 89D - E that:
‘(o)ne cannot entirely discount the risk that by immersing himself in
every detail and by looking deeply into the minds of the experts, a
Judge may be seduced into a position where he applies to the expert
evidence the standards which the expert himself will apply to the
question whether a particular thesis has been proved or disproved -
instead of assessing, as a Judge must do, where the balance of
probabilities lies on a review of the whole of the evidence .’

[2] The Court approaches the question of the award for compensation for loss
of income, mindful of what Fisher J said in MS v Road Accident Fund5to wit,
“The evaluation of the amount to be awarded for the loss does not
involve proof on a balance of probabilities. It is a matter of estimation.
Where a court is dealing with damages which are dependent upon
uncertain future events - which is generally the case in claims for loss
of earning capacity - the plaintiff does not have to provide proof on a
balance of probabilities (by contrast with questions of causation) and
is entitled to rely on the court’s assessment of how he should be
compensated for his loss. ”

[35] Although the Court ha d reservations on using the presented actuarial calculations
as the basis for the award, it would appear the Defendant accepted the Plaintiff’s
argument , to the effect that either of the levels (NQF 6 and NQF7), qualify the
Plaintiff to enter the labour market on Paterson B4 scale . This is evident when in
the alternative argument, the Defendant present ed its own calculations based on

5 [2019] 3 All SA 626 (GJ) para 36 -41.
that actuarial report. I will therefore accept th e Plaintiff’s argument and apply the
necessary contingencies I have already alluded to above.

[36] I am of a view that it would be improper for the Court to order how the calculations
should be redone as suggested by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff had the opportunity to
present the case the way she wanted and that is how she chose to. The
information referred to as having been withheld from the experts , was always
known to her and her mother. The reprints of the school report s was only a
replacement of what she had already had in her possession, from the school s.
There was nothing new in the reprints . Even after the reprints were brought to the
attention of the Court, she chose to close her case with the evidence as it exited at
that stage . Any other approach could be seen as the Court descend ing into the
arena where it does not belong. While the reports remain relevant and important,
the court should consider the necessary contingency given the possibilities they
present therein .

[37] The Court further takes into consideration that the Defendant has always been
aware that the pre-accident school reports were not made available to the experts.
It could have conducted its own investigations and acquired them and depending
on the contents, obtain ed its own expert reports , which it elected not to do. The
contingencies should therefore talk to the various possibilities regarding where the
Plaintiff would have ended in her career had it not been for the accident, and where
she will likely end up n ow that there was an accident. I am of a view that a
reasonable amount to be awarded can be attained when applying contingencies of
60% on the pre -morbid loss of earnings, and 10% on the post morbid loss of
earnings.

[38] The Order:
For the aforesaid reasons, I make the following order :
The Defendant is ordered to pay :
38.1 R3 474 294.50 (three million, four hundred and seventy -four, two hundred
and ninety -four rand fifty cents) to the Plaintiff for her loss of earning
capacity , within 180 days from the date of this order .
38.2 Interests on the amount above at the prescribed rate if this is not paid within
180 days from the date of this order .
38.3 Costs on party and party, scale A.



TV RATSHIBVUMO
DEPUTY JUDGE PRESIDENT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT



FOR THE PLAINTIFF : ADV. K SHAI INSTRUCTED BY:
QQ MKHTSHWA INCORPORATED
MBOMBELA

FOR THE DEFENDANT MR. TO MGWENYA INSTRUCTED BY :
STATE ATTORNEY
MBOMBELA

DATE S HEARD : 17-21 FEBRUARY 2025
DATE HEADS OF ARGUMENT WERE
SUBMITTED : 03 MARCH 2025
JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 18 MARCH 2025