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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2025 -052925





In the matter between:

JO-ANNE HELEN PAUL (WATSON) Applicant


And


CANDICE SAMANTHA ADAMS 1st Respondent
MAGISTRATE PALESA SETSHEDI N.O. 2nd Respondent
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND 3rd Respondent
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT


JUDGMENT

(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO


________________
DATE : 08/05/2025 SIGNATURE

DATE 30/01/2024 SIGNATURE

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FISHER J

Introduction
[1] This matter involves a complaint laid in terms of the Protection from Harassment
Act 17 of 2011 (PHA or the Act ) and a resultant interim order which was sought
and granted against the applicant without notice .

[2] The women concerned in this litigation are strangers. They have been brought
together by chance on the basis that one witnessed a crime being perpetrated
by the other.

[3] The applicant in these proceedings twice tried to anticipate the return date to
challenge the interim order , the first time on anticipation on forty eight hours ’
notice on 01 April 2025 and then on the assigned return date, 10 April 2025 .

[4] The applicant was not afforde d a hearing on either the anticipated return d ate or
the set return date. Instead the interim order was extended to 10 June 2025, for
the hearing of the application for the final protection order .

[5] The applicant alleges that she has had no option but to approach this court in a
bid to free herself of the constraints of the interim order which she contends
represent a serious incursion into her constitutional rights.

[6] The facts of the matter are not disputed in any material way . I turn to setting them
out.

Material f acts

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[7] On 17 February 2025, in a so -called ‘road rage’ incident, the applicant , Ms
Watson witnessed the respondent, Ms Adams assaulting another woman
motorist (“Ms Mbazima”) . The assault is not disputed, and it is not appropriate
that I comment on the extent thereof as it is the subject of criminal proceedings .
It suffices for these purposes that the assault appeared to Ms Watson as a
sustained and unwarranted attack on Ms M bazima .

[8] Ms Watson then stopped her own vehicle and began recording the assault on
her Smartphone. This precipitated Ms A dams turning her attention to Ms Watson.
There is footage which is part of the case which shows Ms Adams in an angry
exchange with Ms Watson during which she shouts expletives and strike Ms
Watsons vehicle with her bare hand.

[9] Ms W atson then left the scene. She felt aggrieved by what she had witnessed
for her own part and that of Ms M bazima . She states that she was particularly
upset by the fact that both drivers each had a child in their vehicles both of whom
witnessed the incident.

[10] It has emerged that Ms A dams had her teenaged daughter with her and Ms
Mbazima was performing her work, which is to transport children to school , and
thus had a young boy with her.

[11] An attempt was later made by Ms Watson to make a report to the police , but the
absence of particulars as to parties involved made this impossible.

[12] Miss Watson continued to be troubled by the incident. She was determined that
the criminal activity witnessed and experienced by her should not go
unaddressed.

[13] Aided by a private investigator and facial recognition software Ms Watson was
able to trace and identif y Ms Adams.
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[14] Ms Watson is an author and has a public and media presence. Ms Watson
published three videos on the online video -sharing application known as TikTok,
discussing the incident with those who followed her content .

[15] It is important that she refrained from identifying Ms Adams as the alleged
perpetrator and did not post the footage taken by her.

[16] She expressed that she hoped the person who was assaulted would come to
know of her details and that she had video footage of the incident.

[17] Social media being what it is, the Tik Tok posts did reach Ms Mbazima . The two
women met, and Ms M bazima expressed that she wanted to use the evidence
and to lay a charge of assault.

[18] The two women then attended at a police station and made statements.

[19] By this time, there was considerable public interest in the (until then anonymised)
discussion of the assault . Ms Watson was approached by the Sunday Times .

[20] Pursuant to the statements given to the police Ms Adams was arrested and
charged on 26 February 2025 . Ms Mbazima and Ms Watson gave interviews to
the Sunday Times , as well as a copy of the video.

[21] The Sunday Times then, on 2 March 2025, published two articles identifying Ms
Adams, as well as the video .

[22] It is important that it was not Ms W atson who disclosed the identity of Ms A dams
but the journalist dealing with the matter at the Sunday Times .

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[23] Ms Watson then published three further TikTok videos, reflecting on road rage
and violence in our society generally, as well as victim -shaming and victim -
blaming . She also encourag ed people to donate to a fund to support Ms
Mbazima. Ms Watson did name Ms Adams in these video posts , as her identity
was by then in the public domain.

[24] On 9 March 2025, the Sunday Times published another article about Ms Adams,
reporting that they had gone to visit her at her workplace.

[25] On 10 March 2025, a TikTok account named The Scent Central , with no
connection to Ms Watson, published a copy of the assault video taken from the
Sunday Times’ YouTube page, naming Ms Adams in the caption . This video
“went viral” meaning it was shared and reshared on various social media and
news platforms, such that the exposure thereto grew exponentially.

[26] On 11 March 2025, over a week after the expos e in the Sunday Times , Ms
Adams, sought and obtained the interim protection order in issue.

[27] It is uncontested that, when Ms Adams approached the Magistrates’ Court on
an ex parte basis, she did not disclose that:

a. she had assaulted Ms Mbazima;
b. she had been arrested and charged for such assault;
c. Ms Watson was due to be a State witness in the prosecution against her; and
d. Ms Watson did not publish her identity until it was in the public domain (after
she had been arrested and charged, and identified by the Sunday Times );

[28] It seems that the ex parte application was precipitated by two events namely the
Sunday Times’ visit to her workplace, and the viral video published by The Scent
Central.

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[29] Ms Watson had no control over either of these events.

[30] In fact, Ms Watson had actively discouraged other TikTok users from trying to
seek Ms Adams out and asked that the law be allowed to take its course.

[31] Ms Adams further did not present the Court with a copy of the Sunday Times
article she complained of, which would have revealed the assault.

[32] Ms Adams sought and was granted an order in terms of which she was ordered
not to threaten, harass and intimidate Ms A dams and not to publish any of her
personal information on social media platforms.

[33] In addition , she was ordered to remove all posts disclosing Ms Adams’ personal
information on any social media platform.

The arguments

[34] Ms Watson argues that the existence of the interim order constitutes a serious
and ongoing violation of her rights to personal liberty and dignity, to freedom of
expression, and to be heard in legal process . A constitutional imperative attaches
to all these rights . Ms Watson conte nds that whilst this order remains in force,
she faces an ongoing abuse of these fundamental rights . She makes the point
that such a position is contrary to the rule of law and unsustainable and argues
that this court has the power and indeed the obligation to put an end to it.

[35] Ms Adams , on the other hand, argues that Ms Watson infringed her right to
privacy by undertaking the investigation into her identity. She argues , in any
event , that the matter is not urgent and should be struck from the roll with costs .
In limine she argues that this court is without jurisdiction to interfere with orders
of the Magistrates Court save on appeal.

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Applicable l egal principles

[36] The preamble to the Protection from Harassment Act 17 of 2011 (Act/PHA) states
that equality, the right to privacy, the right to dignity, the right to freedom and
security of the person, which incorporates the right to be free from all forms of
violence from either public or private sources, and the rights of children to have
their best interests considered to be of paramount importance .

[37] “Harassment ” is defined in the Act as
“the engaging in conduct that the respondent knows or ought to know —(a) causes harm
or inspires the reasonable belief that harm may be caused to the complainant or a
related person by unreasonably —
(i) following, watching, pursuing or accosting of the complainant or a related person, or
loitering outside of or near the building or place where the complainant or a related
person resides, works, carries on business, studies or happens to be;
(ii) engaging in verbal, electronic or any other communication aimed at the complainant
or a related person, by any means, whether or not conversation ensues; or
(iii) sending, delivering or causing the delivery of letters, telegrams, packages,
facsimiles, electronic mail or other objects to the complainant or a related person or
leaving them where they will be found by, given to, or brought to the attention of, the
complainant or a related person; or
(b) amounts to sexual harassment of the complainant or a related person; ”

[38] The purpose of the Act is stated to afford victims of harassment an effective
remedy against such behaviour and to introduce measures which seek to enable
the relevant organs of state to give full effect to the provisions of th e Act.

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[39] The purposes of the Act, simply put , is to engage with the phenomenon of
behaviour which constitutes what is , in common parlance , called “stalking” .

[40] The nature of the conduct which the Act seeks to address is such that applicants
for relief would generally be in fear for their safety or even their lives. Such a
predicament as of necessity would generally be characterized by factors which
require the urgent imposition of a restraining mechanism which has a protective
efficacy and force without notice pending the version of the applicant being given
and interrogated .

[41] Section 3(2) (c) specifically provides for the issuing of a n interim protective order
without notice in instances where the court is satisfied that there is prima facie
evidence of harassment, that harm is being or may be suffered by the
complainant as a result if a protection order is not issued immediately; and “ the
protection to be accorded by the interim protection order is likely not to b e
achieved if prior notice of the application is given to the respondent, ”.

[42] An important part of the protective machinery in the Act is the mandatory issuing
of a warrant of arrest by the Magistrate granting the order . The execution of the
warrant is then suspended subject to compliance with the interim order.

[43] Section 11(4 ) provides that the complainant may simply hand the warrant of
arrest together with an affidavit wherein it is stated that the respondent has
contravened any specified prohibition, condition, obligation or order contained in
the protection order, to any member of the South African Police Service
whereupon the police must arrest the respondent if there are reasonable grounds
to suspect that the complainant is suffering harm or may suffer imminent harm .

[44] Where a complainant seeks an interim protection order in terms of sections 2
and 3 of the PHA without notice to the respondent, the duty of full disclosure must
apply.
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[45] It is universally accepted that there is the risk of a serious infringement of the
rights of the respondent if an interim protection order is unjustifiably granted1.
This stands to reason. The relief is far reaching and invasive .

[46] If the proceedings of this nature are weaponised to punish rather than to protect ,
this inevitably and axiomatically constitutes a breach of fundamental rights.

[47] The consequences of the making of an interim or final protection order involve a
substantial curtailment of the rights of the respondent. A warrant of arrest is
issued automatically, and it is open to the complainant to have the respondent
arrested by simp ly deposing to an affidavit alleging a breach. Where the
protection order proscribes one or other form of communication, that may also
bring about a significant curtailment of the respondent’s freedom of expression.

[48] In LW v KCA , the Full Bench of this court dealing with an appeal against the
granting of an interim protection order and the subsequent confirmation thereof
had the following to say:
“A party seeking relief ex parte has a duty of the utmost good faith to the court. This
requires the applicant to disclose all material facts impacting upon the court's decision,
including facts and potential defences that might favour refusal of the relief sought ...
The rationale for the rule is that ex parte proceedings depart f rom the audi alteram
partem rule. In the absence of the respondent, the applicant must step in by anticipating
and disclosing what the respondent might have raised in opposition to the relief sought .”2
(Emphasis added).

1 See L.W v K.C.A (A2023 -013223) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1154; [2023] 4 All SA 769 (GJ); 2024 (1)
SACR 626 (GJ) (13 October 2023) at para 68 .
2 Id at para 66.
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[49] The definition of harassment must be read together with section 9(5), which
reads:

“(5) For the purpose of deciding whether the conduct of a respondent is
unreasonable as referred to in paragraph (a) of the definition of 'harassment',
the court must, in addition to any other factor, take into account whether the
conduct, in the circumstances in question, was engaged in -
(a) for the purpose of detecting or preventing an offence;
(b) to reveal a threat to public safety or the environment;
(c) to reveal that an undue advantage is being or was given to a person in a
competitive bidding process; or
(d) to comply with a legal duty.”

[50] Clearly , the legislature was alive to the potential of abuse of the process and
sought to put in place limitations to its usage .

[51] It is clear from the legislative scheme enacted to afford these protections that
such scheme represents a careful balancing of rights of complainant and alleged
perpetrator. It errs , as it must, on the side of protecting the vulnerable whilst
imposing on the complainant the responsibility to use the machinery with
circumspection and only when strictly necessary.

[52] In LW v KCA3, this Court concluded that the respondent's non -disclosures, his
dishonesty and the likelihood that the magistrate would have refused relief in the
event of full disclosure, warrant ed not only the discharge of the interim protection
order, but also the denial of a final protection order .

[53] In the present case, Ms Watson seeks only th at she be relived of the burden and
indignity of the interim order including the warrant of arrest wh ich hangs over her

3 Id at para 132
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under circumstances which are fraught with uncertainty as to when she is likely
to obtain re dress in due course . She does not ask this Court to deny a final
protection order but seeks only that it set aside the interim order . This, it is
argued, she is entitled to as of right, this crucial hearing having been thus far
denied her.

Discussion

[54] The abuse of a process aimed at protecting vulnerable persons is repugnant to
the rule of law and cannot be countenanced.

The argument on urgency

[55] To add insult to what is undisputably an abuse , Ms A dams seeks to compound
the position by mounting an opposi tion to this sensible attempt by Ms Watson to
undo the ongoing result of the abuse . She thus seeks to prolong the wrong being
done to Ms Watson.

[56] Ms Adams’ glib re tort that Ms Watson should simply wait out the period until the
determination of the final inquiry in the Magistrate ’s court ignores the gravity of
the abuse and the everyday prejudice suffered by Ms Watson.

[57] It also ignores the perils of litigation which include ongoing postponements and
wrong outcomes which require appeal.

[58] The process deliberately set in motion by Ms Adams has placed Ms W atson in a
position which entails her incurring substantial expense by way of legal costs and
other wasted resources.

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[59] The further attempt of Ms Adams to downplay the significance of the order
obtained is that there is no real urgency in the warrant because Ms A dams is
unlikely to be wanting or able to make use of this arrest mechanism calls into
question why she obtained the warrant at all.

[60] Clearly there was method behind the process adopted. It was meant to have a
chilling effect on Ms Watson and perhaps to chasten her in pursuing her role as
witness . To now say that Ms Watson should content herself with the knowledge
that Ms A dams is unlikely to invoke the warrant is cold comfort indeed in all the
circumstances .

The juri sdiction argument

[61] The argument raised on jurisdiction on behalf of Ms Adams is that this court
cann ot interfere with proceedings in a lower court save on appeal .

[62] Every fibre of the respondent ’s case seems strained to maintain the abusive
order in place.

[63] Ms Adams has thus far been successful in achieving the keeping of the order in
place. This is so whilst Ms Watson has been denied the hearing to which she is
entitled. She was given no relief when she sought to anticipate the hearing date,
and neither was such a hearing granted her on the return day set. She has
simply been placed in a position where she is now expected to mount a fully-
fledged opposition – with all that this entails including costs and delay when the
ill-gotten interim order should have been dealt with weeks ago.

[64] It is sought that this court also refuse Miss Watson a hearing.

[65] I move to deal with this jurisdictional challenge .
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[66] In Maughan 14, the Pietermaritzburg High Court reiterated the principle that it
“constitutes an abuse of process to institute and pursue proceedings which are
unsustainable as a certainty”

[67] I agree with counsel for Ms Watson that such description applies to Ms Adams’
complaint against Ms Watson.

[68] The highwater mark of Ms Adams’ complaint was that she had allegedly “become
the subject of social media badgering and abuse... tarnishing [her] reputation and
character on a public forum”. The most serious part of her complaint was that
Ms Watson had allegedly “instructed” a journalist to go to her workplace to show
the assault video to her colleagues.

[69] In answer, however, it is made clear that Ms Watson had nothing to do with any
journalist’s visit to Ms Adams’ workplace, and neither was Ms Adams’ counsel
able to point me to any personal information of Ms Adams disclosed by Ms
Watson.

[70] All that was discussed on Ms W’s TikTok platform w ere the events that had
occurred in public and in general issues of road rage and victim blaming. It
appears from the transcripts of the posts the latter issue was addressed because
there were comments suggesting that Ms M bazima should have defended
herself against the assault . The platform was also used to ask for a contribution

4 Maughan v Zuma and Others [2023] ZAKZPHC 59; [2023] 3 All SA 484 (KZP); 2023 (5) SA 467
(KZP); 2023 (2) SACR 435 (KZP), para 79 .
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to Ms M bazima ’s legal fees. This kind of fundraising is not uncommon on social
media platforms where worthy causes are recognised, and donations provided.

[71] It must also be acknowledged that certain of those posting , expressed anger and
a wish to confront Ms Adams.

[72] To her credit , Ms W atson informed those commenting that the law should be
allowed to take its course .

[73] I am most concerned with the general effect of the abuse of this process. If
persons feel themselves at liberty to obtain orders on false information and
without notice this will affect the very purpose that the Act was enacted to curtail.

[74] Such conduct brings the legal system into disrepute. Any conduct which has this
effect is always to be strongly deprecated. This is more so the case when
legislation of this nature is at stake. That victims of conduct covered by the Act
maintain their confidence in legal process is paramount in a legislative scheme
such as this one.

[75] The upshot of what I have said is this. The obtaining of the order represents a
clear abuse of this court’s process which has resulted in a significant infringement
of fundamental rights. Th is judgment on jurisdiction proceeds on an acceptance
of this fact.

[76] This court’s power to set aside the abuse of its process is rooted both in section
38 of the Constitution which empowers it to grant appropriate remedial relief
when a right in the Bill of Rights is threatened or infringed and the common law
which gives it an inherent power to prevent an abuse of process .

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[77] But this power is not new. In Mineral Sands5, the Constitutional Court held:
“Our courts have over many years used their inherent powers to protect the
institution from litigious abuse ”.

[78] Some in Solomon6, this Court (per Roper J) held (in the context of a private
prosecution):

“The taking out of the summons would clearly be an abuse of the process of the Court,
in that it had been undertaken not with the object of having justice done to a wrongdoer,
but in order to enable the prosecutor to harass the accused or fraudulently to de feat his
rights ... The process of the Court, provided for a particular purpose, would be used not
for that purpose, but for the achievement of a totally different object, namely for the
oppression of an adversary. The Court has an inherent power to preve nt abuse of its
process by frivolous or vexatious proceedings ... “

[79] Almost 100 years ago, in Hudson7, the Appellate Division held:

“When ... the Court finds an attempt made to use for ulterior purposes machinery
devised for the better administration of justice, it is the duty of the Court to prevent
such abuse. But it is a power which has to be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case.”


5 Mineral Sands Resources (Pty) Ltd and Others v Reddell and Others [2022] ZACC 37; 2023 (2)
SA 68 (CC); 2023 (7) BCLR 779 (CC), para 49.
6 Solomon v Magistrate, Pretoria, and Another 1950 (3) SA 603 (T), 607E -608A (emphasis added).
7 Hudson v Hudson and Another 1927 AD 259, 268 (emphasis added).
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[80] The fact that the protections built into the machinery allowing an interim order to
be challenged without delay have failed is one of the reasons why this is, to my
mind, a clear case.

[81] A similar argument to that raised on behalf of Ms Adams was also recently
rejected in Zuma v Downer8, where the Supreme Court of Appeal said the
following:
“The authorities are long -established and clear both that a court has the power (and in
fact a duty) to prevent an abuse of its process and that this principle applies to
proceedings in a civil court in relation to a private prosecution which is irregular,
vexatious or an abuse of the process of court .”
Conclusion

[82] The abuse of process in this matter is established on both versions. I agree with
counsel for the applicant that this case represents one of those clear cases where
interference with the processes of a lower court is merited because of abuse of
such processes.

[83] Lower courts, especially those specialised courts which deal with domestic
violence and harassment are often under - resourced and inefficient. This court
must not be hamstrung by these constraints and has a duty to act when the
abuse is such that the system of justice is impaired. This is manifestly such a
case.


8 Zuma v Downer and Another [2023] ZASCA 132; [2023] 4 All SA 644 (SCA); 2024 (2) SA 356
(SCA); 2024 (1) SACR 589 (SCA), para 31.
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Costs

[84] There is no doubt that Ms Watson must be compensated for the costs that she
has had to expend in this matter to the full ex tent possible . Furthermore, this
court is bound to express its disapproval by means of an award of punitive costs.

Epilogue

[85] This case is representative of the fact that our communities are often stretched
to their limit . People are hurried. They drive inexpertly. They are often upset or
afraid or angry due to personal circumstances against which th ey feel powerless
or hopeless .

[86] Ms Adams reports , in her version of events to the Magis trate, that she was
recently involved in a motor collision that was not her fault and which traumatised
her to the point where she endured compounded distress and triggering at the
collision between herself and Ms Mbazima .

[87] Her teenage daughter was in the vehicle at the time of the incident which would
cause distress to any mother.

[88] None of this condones violence or criminal activity or abusive conduct.

[89] But here there are three women of substance . One is an educator, one a writer
and another a businesswoman. In different circumstances they would view one
another as sisters or friends.
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[90] What has occurred is deeply unfortunate. The law will take its course in the
criminal case. I have no doubt that progress will be slow and that the results will
be of little comfort to those involved.

[91] There are alternative ways to resolve disputes which steer away from retributive
justice and towards conciliation. These alternative processes allow for a measure
of understanding, compassion , and education .

[92] I do hope that these women attempt to find a space for the possibility of
conciliation in the way forward . It would , perhaps , serve as an example to others.



Order

[93] I make the following order:


1. Part A of this application is heard urgently and the applicant's departure
from the Rules is condoned.

2. The interim protection order granted against the applicant on 11 March
2025 by the Magistrates' Court for the Sub -district of Randburg under the
Protection from Harassment Act, 2011, is set aside.

3. The costs of Part A of this application on Scale C, shall be paid by the first
respondent on the scale as between attorney and client.

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________________
FISHER J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBUR G

This Judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading to the electronic
file on Case Lines. The date for hand -down is deemed to be 08 May 2025.

Heard: 22 April 2025
Delivered: 08 May 2025

APPEARANCES:
Applicant’s counsel: Adv B Winks
Applicant’s attorneys: Barter McKellar Attorneys

1st Respondent’s counsel: Adv M Y Razak
1st Respondent’s attorneys: N. Moola Inc

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