REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 2025-053282
DATE : 5 May 2025
In the matter between:
UNIPLATE INVESTMENTS HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED First A pplicant
UNIPLATE GROUP (PTY) LIMITED Second Applicant
and
DIEU CHARIS ENTERPRISES (PTY) LIMITED First R espondent
MICHAEL VAN AS N O Second Respondent
DEVANDRAN NAICKER Third Respondent
Neutral Citation : Uniplate Investments Holdings and Another v Dieu Charis
Enterprises and Others (2025-053282 ) [2025] ZAGPJHC ---
(5 May 2025)
Coram: Adams J
Heard : 30 April 2025
Delivered: 5 May 2025 – This judgment was handed down electronically by
circulation to the par ties' representatives by email , by being
uploaded to CaseLines and by release to SAFLII. The date and
time for hand -down is deemed to be 10:30 on 5 May 2025.
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Summary: Civil procedure – stay of – urgent application for stay of arbitration
proceedings , pending application in terms of section 3(2) of the Arbitration Act –
alternatively, pending judicial review of award by Arbitrator not to stay arbitration
– no urgency – application should fail – Uniform Rules of Court 6(12) – any
urgency self -created –
Urgent application struck from the roll for lack of urgency .
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ORDER
(1) The applicants ’ urgent application be and is hereby struck from the urgent
court roll for lack of urgency.
(2) The first and the second applicant s, jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be absolved, shall pay the first respondent ’s costs of this
urgent application, such costs to include Counsel’s charges on scale ‘C’ of
the tariff applicable in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court.
JUDGMENT
Adams J :
[1]. Pending the final determination of part B of this application, alternatively ,
the final determination of the pending application in terms of s 3 of the
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 ( ‘the Act ’) under case number 2024 -140326,
whichever is the earlie st, the first and the second applicants apply, on an urgent
basis, for an interim order interdicting and restraining the arbitration
proceedings between the applicants and the first respondent from proceeding
before the second respondent (‘arbitrator’). In the alternative, the applicants
apply, on an urgent basis, for an order staying the enforcement of the
arbitrat or's ruling dated 4 April 2025 and handed down on 7 April 2025 in terms
of section 33(3) of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965
[2]. In part ‘B’ the applicants seek to review and have set aside the ruling of
the arbitrator dated 4 April 2025 and to have substitute d his finding that the
arbitration proceedings should not be stayed pending the outcome of the
pending s 3 application with a finding that the arbitration proceedings should be
stayed pending the final determination of the section 3(2) application and the
action.
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[3]. In the s 3(2) application dated 29 November 2024, the applicants apply
for an order t hat the dispute resolution agreement in the sh are sale agreement
between the parties be set aside and/or for an order that the said agreement
shall cease to have effect with reference to the disputes between the applicants
and respondents arising from the share sale agreement . In that application the
applicants also apply for an order directing them to institute an action with a
view to resolving the dispute between them ar ising from the share sale
agreement, by no later than 31 March 2025 .
[4]. The arbitration arises from a Sale of Shares Agreement dated
3 November 2023 between the first respondent and the first applicant for the
sale of shares in the second applicant and another company by the name of
IPlate (Pty) Limited. The first respondent sold shares to the first applicant for the
purchase price of R1 800 000, and in the arbitration proceedings before the
second respondent it claims from the first applicant the balance of the purchase
price of R1 500 000.
[5]. The first respondent opposes the application and seeks that the matter
be struck from the roll for lack of urgency, alternatively , dismissed with costs.
[6]. There are two difficulties which the applicants face relative to the issue of
urgency.
[7]. The first relates to the fact that the first respondent as far back as
10 September 2024 invoke d the arbitration clause in the share sale agreement.
On 12 September 2024, the parties agreed on the appointment of the second
respondent, Advocate Mike Van As SC, as the arbitrator . On 10 October 2024,
the attorneys for the applicants and the first respondent met for a pre -arbitration
meeting. The applicants did not object to the arbitration proceedings.
[8]. On 18 October 2024 (more than a month after the first respondent
invoked the arbitration clause), the applicants then did an about turn and
refuse d to participate in the proceedings unless other third parties consent ed to
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being part ies in the arbitration . The applicants refused to sign a formal
arbitration agreement unless these third parties consented to be ing a part of the
arbitration. The applicants also threatened to file an application to stay the
arbitration proceeding unless those third parties consented to be a part of the
arbitration.
[9]. On 08 November 2024, the third respondent served and filed its
statement of claim. The applicants were afforded twenty -one days to oppose
the claim , which they elected not to do. On 15 November 2024, the applicants
again threatened to launch an application for a stay, and that the applicants
would seek an interdict to prevent the continuation of the arbitration
proceedings pending the hearing of the application.
[10]. The applicants only filed their section 3(2) application on 29 November
2024 and did not seek relief on an urgent basis. And the foreshadowed action
was only instituted on 31 March 2025 .
[11]. The point is that the applicants became aware of the arbitration
proceedings during September 2024. During October 2024, they seemingly
adopted the position that they do not want the arbitration proceedings to
proceed. Yet they did nothing until April 2025. T here is , in my view, no
explanation, let alone an acceptable one, why the applicant did nothing in
support of their cause from October 2024 to April 2025.
[12]. The second difficulty relates to the fact that even after the applicant s
resolved during November 2024 to have set aside the arbitration agreement,
they still did nothing to put a halt to the arbitration, which the first respondent
was clearly determined to prosecute to finality. The rhetorical question to be
asked is why they did not at that stage launch the application to stay the
arbitration.
[13]. It is the first respondent ’s contention that the alleged urgency of the
matter is self -created and that there was non -compliance with the provisions of
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Uniform Rule of Court 6(12). It was submitted on behalf of the first respondent
that despite the fact that the applicant was aware as far back as at least
October 2024 that the first respondent was proceeding with the arbitration to
finality , the applicant s failed to issue their application soon thereafter.
[14]. Rule 6(12)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court reads as follows that:
‘(b) In every affidavit or petition filed in support of the application under para (a) of
this sub -rule, the applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which he
avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that he would not
be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.’
[15]. On behalf of the applicant s, it was submitted that the application is urgent
because it was only when the third respondent issued his award on 7 April 2025
that the exigency of the matter dawned on them . There is no merit in this
contention.
[16]. I am of the view that the urgency of this application is self -created. The
applicant s should have launched this application as soon as the respondents
made it clear to him that they do not intend staying the arbitration proceedings.
If they did so, urgency would not have been an issue now. I am not convinced
that the applicant s have passed the threshold prescribed in Rule 6(12)(b) and I
am of the view that the application ought to be struck from the roll for reasons
given above.
[17]. In Dynamic Sisters Trading (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank
Limited1, this court held as follows : -
‘This Court has consistently refused urgent applications in cases when the urgency
relied -upon was clearly self -created. Consistency is important in this context as it
informs the public and legal practitioners that Rules of Court and Practice Directives
can only be ignored at a litigant's peril. Legal certainty is one of the cornerstones of a
legal system based on the Rule of Law. ’
1 Dynamic Sisters Trading (Pty) Limited and Another v Nedbank Limited 2023 JDR 3204 (GP) .
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[18]. Accordingly, the application should be struck from the roll with costs.
Order
[19]. In the result, I make the following order:
(1) The applicants ’ urgent application be and is hereby struck from the urgent
court roll for lack of urgency.
(2) The first and the second applicant s, jointly and severally, the one paying
the other to be absolved, shall pay the first respondent ’s costs of this
urgent application, such costs to include Counsel’s charges on scale ‘C’ of
the tariff applicable in terms of the Uniform Rules of Court.
_________________________ ___
L R ADAMS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Johannesburg
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HEARD ON: 30 April 2025
JUDGMENT DATE: 5 May 2025 – Judgment handed down
electronically
FOR THE FIRST AND THE
SECOND APPLICANT S: I Miltz SC
INSTRUCTED BY: Fluxmans Incorporated ,
Illovo , Johannesburg
FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT : A Cook
INSTRUCTED BY: Wilken Attorneys ,
Hulringham Manor, Randburg
FOR THE SECOND RESPONDENT: No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY: No appearance
FOR THE THIRS RESPONDENT: No appearance
INSTRUCTED BY: No appearance