2
2 I refused default judgment because the second respondent, Ms. Macquest,
who had been joined as the putative guarantor of Regenergy’s obligations
under the loan agreement, had filed a plea setting out a defence which, if
accepted, would have absolved Regenergy from liability as well. At paragraphs 20 and 21 of her plea, Ms. Macquest pleaded that the terms of the loan agreement had been novated, and that Regenergy had complied with the varied terms. So, while Regenergy was technically in default, there was a defence apparent on the papers that would have been a complete answer to Standard Bank’s claim against Regenergy.
3 On these facts, I took the view that default judgment could not be granted, and
that the claim against Regenergy would have to dealt with together with the claim against Ms. Macquest. I explained my view to Standard Bank’s counsel, Ms. Mashishi, and invited her to make submissions to the contrary, She declined to do so. Accordingly, I exercised my well-known discretion to refuse judgment by default (on which see, for example, Mbonambi v Road Accident
Fund [2024] ZAGPPHC 455 (21 May 2024), paragraph 18).
4 I explained my view to Ms. Mashishi in some detail, so as to enable her to
convey my reasons for refusing default judgment to her attorney. I also said that I was happy to provide my reasons in writing if they were applied for.
5 On 14 April 2025, well over a year after I refused default judgment, Standard
Bank’s attorney applied for my reasons in writing. The year-long delay was neither alluded to nor explained. Strictly speaking, reasons, if required, should have been requested within 10 days of my order (Rule 49 (1) (c)). Standard Bank’s attorney appeared neither to appreciate that this was required nor