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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG)
CASE NO: 2020/38012
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED. NO
DATE : 04/03/2025
SIGNATURE :
In the matter between:
LIZETTE CONAMIE VAN ROSS Plaintiff
and
MINISTER OF POLICE Defendant
DELIVERED : This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e -mail and publication on CaseLines. The date and
time for hand -down is deemed to be 10h00 on 28 February 2025.
JUDGMENT
VELE AJ
2
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff has issued summons against the Defendant f or the recovery of the
sum of R 200 000.00, being damages that she suffered as a result of the
unlawful arrest and detention she encountered at the instance of the members
of the South African Police Services (SAPS) , who were at the time acting within
the cause and scope o f their employment with the defendant. The Plaintiff was
arrested on 30 August 2020 and released from custody on 31 August 2020,
without appearing in court. The defendant entered an appearance to defendant
and pleaded that the arrest and detention w ere lawful.
[2] As the defendant alleged that the arrest and detention were lawful , he attracted
the duty to begin and the burden of proof in terms of Rule 39 (9) of the Uniform
Rules.
Factual background
[3] The following aspects were common cause between the parties. The plaintiff
complied with section 3 of Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain
Organs of the State Act 40 of 2002 and State Liability Act 20 of 1957 . The
citation and locus standi of the parties is not in dispute .
[4] The plaintiff handed herself over at Randfontein Police Station on 30 August
2020 at around 13H00, after the police did not find her at home during their
visit. The plaintiff was arrested without a warra nt of arrest. The police officer
who arrested her acted within cause and scope of his employment with the
defendant. The p laintiff was detained until 31 August 2020, when she was
released at the court cells without appearing before a magistrate.
Issue s
[5] In dispute is the unlawfulness of the arrest and detention, as well as the
quantum. The times of arrest and release are also in dispute.
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Defendant’s Evidence
[6] Since the defendant is alleging that the arrest and detention were lawful, he
attracted the onus and the duty to begin. The defendant led the evidence of
Sergeant Samuel Sekhosana (Sgt Sekhosana) who testified that he is a police
officer in the employ of the SAPS , holding the rank of a Sergeant , with 22 years
working experience and stationed at Randfontein police station. His duties
entail ed investigating case dockets and attending crime scenes, in and around
Randfontein. On 30 August 2020 at around 13H00 , he was on duty and
deployed to the Crime Office, when the plaintiff arriv ed and introduced herself
as Ms Lizette Van Ross and informed him that police were looking for her at her
home on 28 August 2020, whilst at work in connection with a docket that was
opened against her.
[7] Sgt Sekhosana perused the docket and found that statement A1 implicated her
in an assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm (GBH) , wherein Ms Zhan
Erasmus was the complaint. He further perused the form J88 which reflected
the injuries sustained by the complainant. He arrested her after satisfying
himself that she indeed was the person mentioned in the docket. He informed
her of her rights before detaining her , without any injuries . Whilst inside the
cells, he read her of her rights as set out in SAP 14 Rights Form and she
confirmed she understood before signing and handing her a copy Exhibit “A”.
His reason for detaining her was for her to be taken to court.
[8] Sgt Sekhosana was cross examined and confirmed that the plaintiff did not
inform him that she committed the offence, but stated she came in as police
were looking for her. He further stated that she told him she was present at the
scene. He further stated that the plaintiff elected to exercise her right to remain
silent, as she indicated she was going to giv e her version in court. He did not
include the fact that, she said she was present , as it was his arrest statement
not the suspect statement. He confirmed that he perused the form J88 and
confirmed that the clinical findings were that the victim suffered minor bruises
on the eye. He further stated that he considered two J88 forms, the other being
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that of Ms Phillips. He confirmed that the offence she was suspected of having
committed was a Schedule 1 offence. Since it was assault GBH and not
common assault, he had no discretion to release her on warning, but to arrest
and detain pending the decision.
[9] Sgt Sekhosana testified that he was not aware of the Instructions relating to
Arrest an d detention of suspects issued and signed by the National
Commissioner of SAPS , Commissioner Sithole , on 19 November 20191 which
provides guidelines to be followed in arresting and detention of suspects. He
was presented with a copy. Instruction AG 1( b) of the Instructions, is directing
the Commanders to refrain from instructing members to arrest people for minor
offences, in instances wher e the police officers have no jurisdiction, like
common assault, in following instances :
“(i) where there no warrant of arrest issued,
(ii) assaults not committed in the presence of the arresting officer,
(iii) assault that did not take place in the cause of domestic violence
incident, and the member has no reasonable belief that the victim is in
danger of imminent harm if the perpetrator is not arrested .”
[10] Sgt Sekhosana further testified that he had a reasonable suspicion that a
Schedule 1 offenc e in the form of assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm
was committed and relied on section 40 of the C riminal Procedure Act 51 of
1977 (Criminal Procedure Act) . He had no discretion as this was an assault
GHB matter, which he could not issue a wri tten notice to appear in court for. He
did not consider releasing her on bail or warning as he merely arrested her not
charged her. As to what transpired after handing her over to the cells for
detention is in the domain of the Cells Commander , Sgt Sekhosa na could not
testify as to the condition of the cells, but gave a brief description thereof.
[11] Sgt Sekhosana denied that notice of right was not read to the plaintiff, stating
that he initially verbally explained and then read them in the cells area from the
1 Dated 2019/11/19 under Reference no 1/1/4/1 .
5
Notice of Rights in terms of the Constitution,2 that she signed after indicating
she understood and was given a copy. He further stated that he had no
comment regarding the fact that she was given dry bread and black tea for both
supper and breakfast the following morning , as his duties were discharged
when he handed her over at the cells .
[12] Sgt Sekhosana was re -examined and stated tha t his decision to arrest was the
correct one in the circumstances, as the charge of assault GHB may be
converted into attempted m urder. He further stated his duties seized after he
detain ed the plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s Evidence
[13] The plaintiff gave evidence that she is currently 32 years old, residing at house
number 1 […] M[...] Street, Toekomsrus, in Randfontein and employed by Stock
Counter since 2013 . On 30 August 2020, she visited the local police station,
after receiv ing a message from her grandfather that police officers were looking
for her. She heard that someone open ed a case against her, though she was
not involved. She denied informing Sgt Sekhosana that she assaulted
someone, saying she informed him she was ther e for the case of Erasmus and
the Steyn family . Sgt Sekhosana confirmed that her name appeared on the
statement inside the docket.
[14] the plaintiff further denied that the Notice of Rights was read to her, stating she
was just handed the copy and then d etained. She confirmed that she informed
the police officer that she would make a statement in court. She was never
informed that she could apply for bail. She was detained in appalling conditions,
as the cell was dirty and overcrowded, as they were seven in a small cell. She
was provided with one dirty blanket and a very thin mattress. The toilet facility
was without a door, had no toilet paper and filthy . The shower only had cold
water, so she did not bath before going to court the following morning . She
further stated that once at court, she was not provided with food, though
2 Section 35 of Constitution of Republic of South Africa .
6
released at 16H30. She was released without appearing in court. She was
aggrieved by the arrest , as she did not appear in court. She also felt
embarrassed as she had to inform her supervisor (at work) that she was
arrested.
[15] During cross examination, the plaintiff denied assaulting the complainant . She
testified that her reason for handing herself in at the police station was to clear
her name but not admission of guilt. She confirmed that the other two suspects
were her aunt and grandmother. She denied being present when the assault
took place . She was referred to paragraph two of the complainant statement to
the police which reads : “On Wednesday 20 -08-2020 at about 21H30, I was at
my residential place with my friend Larich, she had an argument with Lizette
and her family intervened. They insulted my friend and the assaulted her with
kicking in the face and one was hitting her with a cell -phone.” She had no reply
thereto , as s he merely said she was not present.
[16] The plaintiff confirmed that she informed the police that she was going to give
her evidence in court, as she elected to remain silent. She had no answer to
the statement that she went to the police to clear her name but elected to
exercise her right to remain silent. She denied that rights document was read to
her and stated that she could not read and understand English very well. She
was further not being truthful when she stated that bail rights were not
explained to her, as the “Bail Information ” form that she was referred to had
information that could only have been provided by her, like her marital status
and children for examp le. She was referred to paragraph 7.2 of the amended
particulars of claim, which reflects that she was released from court at 15H30,
not 16H30 as per her evidence, to this she had no clear answer.
[17] The plaintiff was re -examined and denied that Sgt Sekhosana spoke to her in
Afrikaan s. This was not canvassed with him to get his response. She repeated
that she went to the police station in order to prove her innocence.
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[18] In reply to the court’s question about the COVID 19 Regulations lockdown and
court hours regulations, she changed her tune and stated she was not sure of
the time she was released as she did not have a watch.
Analysis of Evidence
[19] The Court is faced with two mutually destructive versions of which if it accepts
the one it should dismiss the other as false. In this regard the Court refers to
the following cases:
a. Selamolela v. Makhado ,3
b. Mabona and another v. Minister of Law and order and others4
c. Ramakulukusha v. The Commander Venda National Force5
[20] The defendant’s witness , Sgt Sekhosana, gave his evidence in a cool , calm
and collected fashion. He did not contradict himself on material aspects , though
he was evasive at times. His evidence was not much of assistance, as he
indicated that he merely arrested her and the decision to detain was taken by
Warrant Officer Mat habathe, who took the warning statement and charged her.
The defendant made an election to close the defence case without calling
Warrant Officer Mathabathe, the officer who decided to charge the plaintiff to
come and state as to what factors he took into consideration when he decided
to detain her .
[21] The defendant was fully aware of the fact that , the plaintiff in para graph 7 of her
particulars of claim, alleged that she was subject to inhumane treatment in the
cells, as cell was filthy, overcrowded, with no privacy when inside the toilet. The
Cell Commander on the shift was not called to t estify on the condition of the
cells. As for Sgt Sekhosana, he was very evasive in this regard referring
everything to the Cell Commander.
3 1988 (2) SA 372 (VSC)
4 1988 (2) SA 654 (SECLD)
5 1989 (2) SA 813 (VSC).
8
[22] The plaintiff was a very evasive witness, who failed to answer simple questions.
Her demeanour was that of someone who had something to hide. She was hell
bound in trying to deceive the court , as t hough she could read English fluently ,
she wanted to create an impression that she was unable to follow the
proceedings. In m any instances, s he wa s ready to answer as soo n as th e
question was put to her , without waiting for it to be interpreted, an indication
that she was following. She tried to deny being informed about the option to
make a statement to the police officer or the make one in court. She indicated
that she was not familiar with the process, yet her option to give evidence in
court, was exercised, an indication that the rights were explained.
[23] The time of her release from custody, kept on changing from 15H30, 16H30 to
not sure. When asked by the court as to why she was kept at court until 16H30,
as it was during lockdown and the court operating under COVID 19 Regulations
with no trial matters proceeding . She had no answer , she later conced ed she
was not sure of the time of release, as she had no means to check the time. If
so, why choose 16H30 of all the times?
[24] The plaintiff’s personal information, s he is 32 years old , and reside d with the
Steyn family, her maternal family members at the time of the incident . All we
know from her evidence is, she was employed by Stock Counters at time of
incident, which is contradicted by the pleadings . There is no information about
her highest academic achievement, whether she is married or not, a nd if she
has children. She is not claiming for loss of income as a result of being
incarcerated. She did not give any explanation why she allege d that she was
humiliated as she did not say how many people saw her being arrested and
how far was this spread . Interesting enough is that the plaintiff stated that she
informed the police officer the name of the complainant but failed to explain
how did she get hold of this information , as she denied being present , though
when Sergeant Sekhosana testified that she told him she was present but did
not take part in the assault was never challenged . She was referred to the
complainant’s statement and had no clear answer to the fact that she was the
centr al figure of the commotion .
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[25] She indicated that she was subjected to inhumane treatment whilst in custody
as she was placed in a cell with six other persons, given a thin mattress and a
dirty blanket. She was given dry slices of bread and black tea for both supper
and breakfast. The cell had no privacy as the toilet had no door . Though the
defendant was aware that it is her case that she was ill-treated , which is
disputed, no witness to testify about the condition of the cells was called and no
reason whatsoever was advanced in this regard.
[26] The defendant did not call the person who took the decision to charge the
plaintiff, to give reasons as why less stringent measures to ensure her
attendance in court were not followed as per the directions of the National
Commissioner that were already almost a year in operation at the time. Since
the police officer was not present when the offence was committed , and that
she voluntarily came to the police station, why not issue her with the notice to
appear, or at least fix her either police or prosecutor’s bail? When one
considers the fact that the only injuries sustained by the complaint, a s reflected
on the J 88 was a small bruise above the eye of 2 Centimetres by 2 centimetres
and no other injuries recorded. Clearly Sergeant Sekhosana did not apply his
mind, when he decided to detain the plaintiff, as he disregarded the provisions
of both section 40 of the CPA and the standing Instructions of the National
Commissioner.
[27] Sgt Sekhosana acted against the Instruction AG8 which provides a ny arrest
without a warrant in instances that are outside sections 40 and 42(1) of the
Criminal Procedure Act, will be unlawful. If indeed correct that he perused the
docket and the Form J88, it would be clear that the injuries were so minor not to
warrant the arrest of the plaintiff, more especially under the circumstances
where the plaintiff brought herself in. He acted in contrast to the provisions of
Instruction AG 10, which provide that where a suspect’s attendance to court
can be secured by way of referring the matter to public prosecutor to issue the
summons to appear in terms section 54 of the C riminal Procedure Act, such
less stringent method should be applied. The charging officer was not called, so
we do not know what he considered before deciding to detain her. The
plaintiff’s arrest and detention could not be justified in the circumstances.
10
[28] Rabie CJ placed the onus to prove that the arrest was lawful on the members
of the SAPS in Minister of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another6
where the following appears:
“An arrest constitutes an interference with the liberty of the individual
concerned, and it therefore seems to be fair and just to require that the
person who arrested or caused the arrest of another should bear the onus
of proving that his action was justified in law.”
[29] Bosielo JA in Minister of Safety and Security and Another v Swart7, held the
following:
“It is rite that the reasonable ness of the suspicion of any arresting officer
acting under section 40(1)(b) must be approached objectively . The
question is whether any reasonable person confronted with the same set
of facts, would form a suspicion that the person has committed a
Schedule 1 offence. M v Minister of Safety and Security 2009 (2) SACR
291 (GSJ)”
[30] The current legal position is that an arrest or detention is prima facie unlawful
and the onus is on the defendant to prove its lawfulness. Since the defendant
are relying on the provisions of Section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which
reads as follows:
“Arrest by a peace –officer without a warrant
40 (1) A peace Officer may without a warrant arrest any person –
(a) … …. ;
(b) “whom he reasonably suspects of having committed a Schedule 1
offence, other than the offence of escaping from lawful cu stody; …”
6 1986 (3) SA 568 (A) at 589 E –F
7 2012 (2) SACR 226 (SCA) at para 20.
11
(2) If a person may be arrested under any law without a warrant and
subject to conditions or existence of circumstances set out in that law, any
peace officer may without a warrant arrest such a person subject to such
conditions or circumstanc es.”
[31] Section 40 of the C riminal Procedure Act empower s a peace officer to arrest a
person who commits an offence in his presence or a person , whom he has a
reasonable suspicion that has committed an offence that is set out in Schedule
1 thereof . In this regard the plaintiff was arrested for alleged ly assaulting two
complainants, which occurred in the absence of the arresting officer.
[32] The cumulative effect of the evidence before court , it is clear that though Sgt
Sekhosana acted without malice as he indicated that he arrested the plaintiff
based on the evidence contained in the case docket , his decision to arrest was
ill informed in the c ircumstances, as he acted contrary to the Instruction s
Relating to Arrest and Detention of Suspects,8 issued by then National
Commissioner of Police of the SAPS which was enacted following the
Constitutional Court decision in De Klerk v Minister of Police .9 Under Instruction
5(b), officer s are instructed to arrest with out a warrant for assault with intent to
do grievous bodily harm only in instances where a dangerous woun d has been
inflicted or an attempt to inflicted a dangerous wound on the victim. It is clear
from his arrest statement that he did not comply with Instruction 5(b) as it did
not contain all elements of the offence, extent of the wound and any other
factor he based his belief that the wound was dangerous.
[33] To say that the provisions of section 50(1)(b) of the C riminal Procedure Act
were followed, would be to strain the language and intention of the Legislature,
as it is clear that the police officer who arrest a suspect without a warrant will be
applying his/her discretion and must comply with the requirements as set out in
Duncan v Minister of Law and Order10, especially the fourth aspect that require
that suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
8 Dated 2019/11/19 under Reference no 1/1/4/1
9 2021 (4) SA 585 (CC)
10 1986 (2) SA 805 (A) at 818
12
[34] Sgt Sekhosana perused the docket and saw the J88 , and if he merely applied
his mind, he could have concluded that less evasive method like warning her
for cou rt the following day would have sufficed. He did not follow the
Instructions of the National Commissioner that were aimed at addressing this
very aspect, as the assault was not committed in his presence and the injuries
were so minor to qualify for assault GBH. The above was reinforced by Harms
DP in Minister of Safety and Security v Sekhoto and Another11 wherein the
following appears:
“While the purpose of arrest is to bring the suspect to trial, the arrestor
has a limited role in that process. Her or she is not called upon to
determine whether the suspect ought to be detained pending a trial. That
is the role of the court. The purpose of the arrest is no more that to bring
the suspect before the court . … Whether his decision on that question is
rational naturally depends upon the particular facts, but it is clear that in
cases of serious crimes – and those listed in Schedule 1 are serious. …
On the other hand, there will be cases, particularly where th e suspected
offense is relatively trivial, where the circumstances are such that it would
clearly be irrational to arrest …”
[35] The current case is the classic example, as the injuries were so trivial that
common assault should have been the charge . In terms of Instruction 5(f),
since she had a fixed address, easily traceable, and responded to the police
visit to her home (by coming in on her own ), Sgt Sekhosana could have
ensured that the investigations were completed and the docket handed over to
the p ublic prosecutor to make decision and issue the summons to appear in
terms of section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Act .
[36] It is clear that the defendant is wrongly relying on section 40(1)( b) which reads
as follows:
11 2011 (1) SACR 315 (SCA) at para 44
13
“whom he reasonably suspects of having c ommitted a Schedule 1
offence, other than the offence of escaping from lawful custody ; … .”
[37] Section 12 of the Constitution provides as follows:
“Freedom and Security of the person
12.(1) everyone has the right to freedom and secu rity of the person, which
includes the right – (a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without
just cause;
(b) not to be detained without trial;
(c) free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; …”
[38] The plaintiff herein was guaranteed th e right in section 12 of the Constitu tion,
which was without just any cause curtailed and needs to be appropriately
compensated and looks upon the court to do right in this regard. The court
should , however in its endeavour to achieve this , not lose sight of the other
aspects of compensation and introduce a wholesale change. It is true that this
was a serious infringement as a result of th e arrest the plaintiff spent a night in
custody and further endured some hours in c ourt before she was released
without appearing, rendered the defendant liable for her claim.
Quantum
[39] In as far as the quantum is concerned; the court will take into consideration the
fact that there is no evidence that the plaintiff was subjected to inhumane
treatment, though evidence is the cell condition was sub -standard, and she was
released without appearing before the court . In line with recent cases of the
similar nature, the court agrees that unlawful arrest and detention were serious
violations of the individual’s right s, subject to compensation being awarded .
[40] The court refers to May v Union Government12 where the court emphasised the
seriousness of the conduct that is unlawful on the part of the police officers .
12 1954 (3) SA 120 (N).
14
The court further refers to the case of Minister Safety and Security v Seymour13
where an amount of R500 000.00 was reduced to R90 000. 00 as an award for
unlawful arrest and detention .
[41] In Minister of Safety and Security v Tyulu 14 the respondent , a Magistrate , had
his award reduced to the sum of R15 000.00 by the Supreme Court of Appeal,
compensatin g him for unlawful arrest and detention on the basis that the
duration was for a short period, despite his social standing and the manner in
which the arrest took place.
[42] In Olivier v Minister of Safety and Security and Another15 the plaintiff was a
senior police officer who was arrested by the police in full view of his colleagues
then detain ed at the same police station where he was employed. He claimed
the sum of R150 000.00 and was awarded R50 000.00 to the satisfaction of all
involved.
[43] It is clear that in as far the general damages are concerned; the court should
treat each case on its own merits taking into consideration the general trend of
similar cases. In this regard the court will echo the words of Bosielo JA in
Tyulu16; where in the following was stated:
“In the assessment of damages for unlawful arrest and detention, it is
important to bear in mind that the primary purpose is not to enrich the
aggrieved party but to offer him or her some much – needed solatium for
his or her injured feelings. It is therefore crucial that serious attempts be
made to ensure that the damages awarded are commensurate with the
injury inflicted. However , our courts should be astute to ensure that the
awards they make for such infractions reflect the importance of the right to
personal liberty and the seriousness with which any arbitrary deprivation
of personal liberty is viewed in our law. I readily concede that it is
impossible to determine an award of damages for this kind of
13 2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA)
14 [2009] ZASCA 55
15 2009 (3) SA 434 (W)
16 Tyulu at para 26
15
mathematical accuracy. Although it is always helpful to have regard to
awards made in previous cases to serve as a guide, such an approach if
slavishly followed can prove to be treacherous. The correct approach is to
have regard to all the facts of the particular case and to de termine the
quantum of damages on such facts.”
[44] The court further refers to the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Minister of Police v Dlwathi17 wherein the court held that the object of
compensation of the victims was more in solace for the wrong they have
suffered than to enrich them.
[45] The court further refers to the decision of this court per Wepenaar, J in Sondlo
v Minister of Police18 wherein the court raised its concern about the high
awards granted against minister of police , as this was paid out of public funds,
stating the awards should compensate for the wrong ful action than enrich ment
of victims.
[46] In this regard the court re fers to the work of the learned writers, Neethling,
Potgieter and Visser19 where the following was said regarding the factors that
the court has to consider when assess ing the amounts that can be paid as
compensation for damages as follows:
“factors which play a role in the assessment of the amount of damages
are the following : the circumstances under which the deprivation of the
liberty occurred, the presence or absence of malice or an improper motive
on the part of the defendant, the harsh conduct of the defendant, the
duration of the deprivation of liberty, the social status and age of the
plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff was the author of his own misfortune, the
degree of publicity afforded to the deprivation of liberty; and whether the
defendant has apologised or provides a reasonable explanation for what
17 [2016 ] ZASCA 6
18 [2012] ZAGPJHC 14 .
19 Neethling’s Law of personality, Second Edition, Lexis Nexis, Butterworth, Durban , 2005 at p 121.
16
happened. In addition, awards in previous comparable judgments,
following the inflation, may be taken into ac count.”
[47] The social standing as well as family life of the plaintiff was not canvassed. The
plaintiff’s highest educational level is not canvassed.
[48] The court has tak en into consideration , all the factors as set out by the authors
Neethling et al above and the recent trends in case law, the court finds that the
compensation befitting to the plaintiff herein is the sum of R 75 000.00, as it was
clear that she was not ill -treated in anyway .
Costs
[49] In as far as costs are concerned, the court will follow the decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in De Klerk v Minister of Police ,20 where the following
appears:
“With regard to costs, although the total quantum awarded is far below the
jurisdiction of the high court, the matter concerned the unlawful
deprivation of the appellant’s liberty and he was justified in approaching
the high court ...”
[50] The court is inclined to award plaintiff costs on high court scale A, as in the
circumsta nces the lower court s, could have granted her the relief sought with
less costs. The plaintiff’s claim was within district court’s jurisdiction as claim
was for R 200 000.00.
Order
[51] In the result, I make the following order:
20 2018 (2) SACR 28 (SCA) at para 18 .
17
1. The Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff damages in the sum of
R75 000, 00 (Seventy -Five Thousand Rand only)
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay interest at the prescribed rate of
10.25% per annum on the aforesaid sum from the date of summons.
3. Costs of suit on High Court scale A, including counsel’s fees .
_________________________
SO VELE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
Counsel for Plaintiff : Advocate L Swart
Instructed by: JJ Geldenhuys Attorneys
Counsel for Defendant : Advocate MM Maphutha
Instructed by: State Attorney, Johannesburg
Date of Hearing: 28 January 2025
Date of Judgement: 04 March 2025