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SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted
from this document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION HELD AT JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO : 005318/2025
DATE : 2025- 01-30
10
In the matter between
C[…] J[…] V[…] C[…] Applicant
and
20
M[…] V[…] Respondent
JUDGMENT
ABRO, AJ :
[1] This application came before me on the urgent family court 30
roll. The applicant and the respondent were both represented by DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE : NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED : YES
SIGNATURE : .........................................
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2
attorneys and counsel. Ms Lipshitz appeared for the applicant and
Ms Naidoo for the respondent.
[2] I informed the parties at the outset that I consider ed the
matter, which concerned the best interests and safety of a three-year -old child, a girl, to be urgent.
[3] The applicant is the biological father of the minor born on 29
November 2021 and currently three years old. The respondent is
her mother. The parties were never married to one another. 10
[4] It is common cause on the papers that the parties were in a
relationship with one another from abo ut 2017 until during or
about July 2024, when the relationship came to an end as a consequence of the respondent’s severe abuse of alcohol and
alcoholism. This is admitted by the respondent in her answering
affidavit, where she refers to herself as a ‘ recovering addict ’.
[5] As such, I did not require submission on urgency from Ms
Lipshitz but invited Ms Naidoo to make submissions on her two 20
points in limine , being urgency and lis pendens.
[6] Ms Naidoo submitted that the matter is not urgent, as the
parties are to appear in Children’s Court on 10 February 2025.
Having heard Ms Naidoo’s submissions on urgency and having
had regard to her submissions made in the practice note filed this
morning, it appears that these were, inter alia , the respondent’s
grounds for her objection to the urgency of the matter :
6.1 The respondent contended that she is the biological 30
mother of the minor child, and that whilst the first applicant is
the biological father, they are unmarried;
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6.2 Further that the applicant has failed to show imminent or
potential risk of harm to the minor child;
6.3 Further that the matter is pending in the Children’s Court
at Randburg and enrolled on 10 February where the
respondent will seek an interim order regarding primary care and residenc e, pending the outcome of the investigations and
finalisation of the parenting plan; and that
6.4 The respondent was informed that the minor child remains 10
with her, pending the finalisation of her application in the Children’s Court.
[7] The respondent sought an order that the application be
dismissed with punitive costs.
[8] The lack of urgency as submitted by Ms Naidoo leads into the
lis pendens point, which was the respondent’s second point in
limine .
20
[9] Having regard to the annexures attached to the respondent’s
answering affidavit in respect of the Children’s Court proceedings
(“MV6”), the following the following is clear:
9.1 The respondent approached the Children’s Court on the
19
th of December 2024 in terms of section 53 of the
Children’s Act, which is the section which talks to bringing a matter before a Children’s Court ;
9.2 The form 2 refers to an affidavit with the words: ‘See 30
attached affidavit. ’ However, none was provided to this court
and was not attached to the answering affidavit. It is thus
impossible for this court to see what is in fact before the
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Children’s Court ;
9.3 There is a note is made therein which reads - , ‘Interim
regarding primary residence until or pending finalisation of outcome, or parental plan. ’
9.4 The next document that was provided in respect of the
Children’s Court, is a Form 9 to carry out an investigation in terms of section 50 of the Children’s Act. This is directed to
the Department of Social Development in Johannesburg, who 10
are to carry out an investigation, and submit a report on or
before the 10
th of February 2025. From the face of this
document, it is clear that this was only submitted to DSD
Johannesburg on the 23rd of January 2025. I was informed by
both Ms Lipshitz and Ms Naidoo that neither party had been
contacted by a social worker ;
9.5 The next document that was provided which emanated
from the Children’s Court is a Form 5, which is a referral of
the matter to the office of the Family Advocate, 20
Johannesburg. This document similarly seems to have only
been received by the O ffice of the Family Advocate on the
23
rd of January 2025. The reasons for the referral as evident
from this document are recorded as being to ‘assist the
parties with a parenting plan, or any other investigations you may deem fit’. It is recorded that the matter is postponed for
the 10
th of February 2025 .
[10] On or about 30/31 December 2024, t he applicant received
service of a notice to attend the Children’s Court for the district of 30
Randburg on 10 February 2025.
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[11] I was again informed by both counsel that neither party had
been contacted by anyone from the Office of the Family Advocate
as of 30 January 2025.
[12] As indicated above, the affidavit deposed to by the
respondent in the Children’s Court was not provided to this court.
It is thus unclear as what relief the respondent is seeking in that court, why she had approached the court or what the respondent had advised the clerk of the court the position was.
10
[13] What is however clear from the respondent’s affidavit in this
court is that the respondent would have advised that in her
opinion, the applicant has no parental responsibilities and rights and she and the applicant were never married.
[14] Ms Naidoo conceded that the matter in the Children’s Court
on 10 February 2025 would in all likelihood simply be postponed.
[15] It was also confirmed that neither party had appeared
before a Magistrate in the Children’s Court and further that no 20
order had been made in the Children’s Court. This is contrary to
the respondent’s assertions in her answering affidavit, particularly at paragraph 142 thereof, at page 26, where she alleges:
“That the applicant was also aware that the matter is
pending in the Children’s Court, and that B was authori zed
to be with me until at least the next court date, which is 10 February 2025. ”
[16] The respondent reiterates this at paragraph 292 of the at 30
page 53, alleging that she was informed by the Children’s Court that the matter is enrolled for 10 February 2025 and that B will remain with her until then.
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[17] It is unclear who at the court informed the respondent of
this. Possibly a clerk of the court. There is, however, no order
placing B in the respondent’s care.
[18] I am in the circumstances, satisfied that nothing has yet
transpired in the Children’s Court. No substantive orders have
been made. The parties have in fact not yet appeared before a
Magistrate. It is also unclear as to what is in fact before the
Children’s Court. 10
[19] The Form 2 attached to the answering affidavit is simply
to bring a matter to court in terms of section 53 of the Children’s Court which section sets out who may approach a Children’s Court by bringing a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of a Children’s Court to a clerk of the court. It would seem that that is
all that has occurred.
[20] As such, I am satisfied that, as the minor child’s upper
guardian, I must, in the circumstances before me, deal with this 20
matter in order to protect the minor child and ensure her best interest remain paramount.
[21] The Constitutional Court in H v Fetal Assessment Centre
2015 (2) SA 193 (CC) confirmed the position at paragraph 64
thus:
“The High Court sits as upper guardian in matters involving
the best interest s of the child (be it custody matters or
otherwise) , and it has extremely wide powers in establishing 30
what such best interests are. It is not bound by procedural
strictures or by the limitation of evidence presented, or contentions advanced or not advanced, by respective
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parties.”
[22] Notably, the respondent who is adamant throughout her
answering affidavit that the applicant is not vested with parental
responsibilit ies and rights, approached the Children’s Court to
enter into a parenting plan with the applicant, who she contends
in the same breath has no parental responsibilities and rights.
[23] Section 33(1) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 specifically
provides in respect of parenting plans that it is co- holders of 10
parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child, who enter into a parenting plan in order to determine the exercise by them of
their respective responsibilities and rights in respect of the child.
[24] The respondent ’s persistent allegations in this regard ,
coupled with Ms Naidoo’s submissions , are thus baseless and
without merit.
[25] The applicant seeks to confirm his parental
responsibilities and rights. S ection 21 of the Children’s Act, which 20
section deals with the parental responsibilities and rights of
unmarried fathers, provides as follows, 21(1):
“The biological father of a child who does not have parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child in terms of
section 20, acquires full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child-
a) If at the time of the child’s birth he is living with the
mother in a permanent life partnershi p; or
b) If he, regardless of whether he has lived or is living with 30
the mother –
i) consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms
of section 26 to be identified as the child’s father …
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ii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to
the upbringing for a reasonable period; and
iii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute
towards expenses in connect ions with the child’s
maintenance for a reasonable period.”
[26] It is common cause that the parties were living together
at the time of B’s birth. It is further common cause that the
applicant is listed as the minor child’s father on the birth certificate. It is further common cause that the relationship 10
between the parties only broke down finally in July of 2024. The
parties thus resided with one another, both prior to the birth, at the time of conception, and after the birth until B was almost three
years old.
[27] I invited Ms Naidoo to address me on this issue and make
submissions as to why in the circumstances, the respondent
contends the applicant is not vested with parental responsibilities
and rights . The submissions made included that the parties were
not in a permanent life partnership at the time of B’s birth in 20
November 2021, as the relationship was constantly in turmoil and the applicant ended the relationship. The applicant did not care and was not present as he worked three jobs and was not as involved in her upbringing. He was as such an absent father for
the first two years of her life, and he was not instrumental in her upbringing.
[28] On a reading of the affidavits, it is clear that the applicant
has contributed in good faith to B’s upbringing since birth, and that include s contributing to her maintenance. He was the only 30
employed parent in the relationship. It is also clear that the
parties were living in a permanent life partnership, albeit that same was tumultuous as a consequence of the respondent’s
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alcohol abuse and persistent admission into hospital and/or
rehabilitation clinics.
[29] The minor child, B , had been in the applicant’s
uninterrupted care from at least June/July 2024 during which
period the respondent was twice admitted into an ICU and twice
into rehabilitation centres.
[30] As such, B wa s in the applicant’s primary care at the very
least from the beginning of June 2024 until 27 December 2024, 10
when the respondent , without his knowledge or consent, removed
her.
[31] In the premises, I am satisfied that the applicant is in fact
vested with full parental responsibilities and rights is respect of B and as such same will be recorded in my order. [32] As indicated above, the respondent’s alcohol abuse,
which is extreme, has persisted for some years. It flared up again
on the 7
th of June 2024, which resulted in the respondent being 20
admitted to the ICU at the Sandton Medi clinic . On this occasion
her blood alcohol level was 0.4, which a Dr Williamson informed
the applicant, was the highest she had ever seen in the
emergency room. The respondent was literally clinging to life and
fighting for her life at that stage. After a brief stay in hospital, the
respondent was then admitted to Crossroads Recovery Centre, an
alcoholic and drug rehabilitation centre where she spent a month.
On being discharged in July, it appeared that she began drinking again.
30
[33] Things came to an end at the beginning of August 2024.
The respondent was again admitted into a rehabilitation centre on
the 16
th of August, the Sana Recovery Centre, where she
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remained until mid- November of 2024.
[34] B remain ed in the applicant’s care during this period and
had contact visits with her mother, the respondent, at the rehabilitation centre.
[35] The applicant , during October 2024 and prior to the
respondent’s discharge from Sana, through his attorneys,
addressed correspondence and provided the respondent with a
proposed parenting plan/plans in order to ensure the safety and 10
protection of B, and to regulate what the position would be subsequent to the respondent’s discharge from the rehabilitation centre.
[36] This appears to have angered the respondent, who
alleged that the parenting plan was draconian in nature, and
further that she had been bullied and forced into sign the
parenting plan, which in any event she did not sign.
[37] The respondent was discharged during the middle of 20
November 2024, and it would appear that the applicant permitted
contact between the respondent and B, albeit supervised and
whil st monitoring the respondent ’s sobriety with the use of
breathalysers and/or urine tests in order to ensure that when she exercised contact with B and visited B, she was indeed sober.
[38] In response to the proposed parenting plan/ s and on the
10
th of December 2024, the respondent provided the applicant
with a document dated the 10th of December 2024, which she
called a ‘ vital legal declaration’. The respondent did not attach 30
this document to her answering affidavit, which was curious to say
the least. She personally addressed the document to the
applicant, and I was advised that she was not legally represented
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at the time. To my mind that is irrelevant. She had just come out
of a three month stay in rehabilitation and was clearly well aware
of her vulnerabilities and her propensity to relapse at the time and
which she has unfortunately done many times over the years. She
was also clearly well aware for the need for B to be protected.
[39] Briefly, the respondent , in this document agreed that the
applicant and herself w ere to share joint custody of B . She also
refer red therein to the iSober device which she contends she had
no objection to utilis ing, as long as the first applicant purchased 10
it, as she d id not have the funds to do so. She says she did so as
she felt that it would provide a safe environment for B. She also
refers therein to exercising supervised contact in order to
facilitate her rehabilitation process and for B’s protection, and
lists numerous individuals who she contended could supervise the
contact between her and B. She recorded further, that the
appointment of supervisors would ensure that her contact with B
was not only monitored and safe, but it would also facilitate her
rehabilitation process. She set out a schedule of supervised
contact for the first three months following her rehabilitation, and 20
she recorded that this structured visitation plan provides
consistency for B and would support her reintegration into B’s life.
[40] The inclusion of supervised overnight visits would allow
for progressive bonding whilst maintaining safeguards to supervision and iS ober monitoring. She went as far as setting out
supervised contact on Mother’s Day, her birthdays, school holidays, so, she in fact went further than the three months.
[41] I referred Ms Naidoo to this document and more 30
particularly the contents thereof and queried whether the contents
of this document p enned by the respondent negated t he
allegations that she now made in her answering affidavit . Ms
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Naidoo repeatedly submitted that I must take into account that the
respondent was not legally represented at the time. A s indicated ,
that is of no import.
[42] The respondent was clearly well aware of the fact that
she had just come out of rehabilitation and that B needed to be protected because she could relapse at any time. This was then confirmed, interestingly enough, by the respondent in a WhatsApp marriage , which she forwarded to the applicant on Sunday the
26
th of January, being the same day that she deposed to her 10
answering affidavit and being but four days before the parties
were to appear before me in court.
[43] This WhatsApp message is attached as annexure ‘ RA2 ’ to
the replying affidavit and essentially what is contained therein is
that the respondent, who has made spurious allegations against
the applicant in her answering affidavit and who has only allowed
two visits between the applicant and B on the 11
th of January for
two hours and on the 26th of January for two hours . This further
negated the allegations made by the respondent in her answering 20
affidavit.
[44] The WhatsApp referred to also contained the respondent
requesting the applicant to settle. She recorded that t his
application was going to cost a fortune, and they could withdraw
the proceedings or stop the proceedings instead of going from court to court. The most disturbing part of this WhatsApp is where
she tells him that he must not worry, because should she relapse,
B would go back to him .
30
[45] I asked Ms Naidoo what B, in the event that she was in
the respondent ’s care and needed assistance, if the respondent
had become intoxicated and passed out, who is a three- year -old
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little girl, was supposed to do then? How was she supposed to get
help? Who would know? Who would find her? Ms Naidoo could
obviously not answer the question.
[46] Ms Naidoo submitted that perhaps the best thing w ould be
to place B in foster care and remove her from both parents. I
found that submission to be untenable, in that I find there is no
reason for B not to reside with the applicant , primarily in his care ,
as she had done for at the very least the entire half of 2024,
keeping in mind that she had also lived with the applicant since 10
birth.
[47] Notably, subsequent to coming out of rehabilitation and
on the 10
th of December was the respondent approached the
Children’s Court with the district of Randburg, as I have already
indicated.
[48] At the time, t he applicant afforded the respondent
supervised contact during November and December 2024. The
respondent was further afforded contact on the 27th of December 20
in order that she could celebrate Christmas with B and open
present s and what not . Thereafter, the respondent refused to
return B to the first applicant and drove with her to Klerksdorp to
her mother. The respondent indicated to the first respondent on
31 December that she would return B to him on the 8th of January
2025.
[49] The applicant approached the Children’s Court for
assistance. He was advised by a clerk that he would not be
assisted unless B was in imminent danger. 30
[50] The respondent returned B to the applicant’s care at two
o’clock on the 8
th of January 2025 , whereafter , at about quarter to
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six that very same evening she returned to the applicant’s home
accompanied by an armed member of the South African Police
Services (‘SAPS) and the respondent’s attorney . The respondent
demanded that the minor child be handed over to her .
[51] As indicated during the hearing, I take a dim view of this
conduct in involving members of SAPS to remove a three- year -old
child . The respondent’s attorney’s conduct in aiding and abetting
her in such conduct was similarly not appropriate. The applicant
handed B over. Whilst he was criticised by Ms Naidoo for doing 10
so, I disagree. The applicant acted as a parent, confronted by a member of SAPS standing in front of him whilst he is holding his three- year -old, should act. He handed the child over and avoided
any confrontation with an armed member of SAPS.
[52] I take a very dim view of this whole incident. I was not
provided with the statement that the respondent made to SAPS,
but reading between the lines in the respondent’s affidavit, it is
clear that she would have told them that she is the mother and that s he is the primary caregiver. That the applicant is abusive 20
and had committed some sort of gender -based violence. That he
had abused the minor child, and that he w ould not give the child
back to her. That they were never married and further such
allegations. Members of SAPS will obviously react which is
precisely why their services were utilised by the respondent and
her attorney. [53] Thereafter, correspondence was exchanged between the
applicant and the respondent’s attorneys. A round table was
proposed. The applicant asked for contact. He was informed that 30
he would be permitted supervised contact . As indicated he was
afforded limited contact for two hours on the 11
th of January, and
for two hours on the 26th of January.
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[54] In the circumstances, the applicant approached this
Honourable Court for interim relief in order to ensure B’s safety
and security . To my mind the respondent does not appreciate the
effect of her conduct and alcohol abuse on B. This is apparent
when has regard to paragraph 139 of her answering affidavit at
page 26 where she states:
“B was in my total care 24 hours a day, drunk or sober.”
[55] The allegation is jarring. The submission that the 10
applicant knew about this and was in her presence in light of the facts of this matter , is simply nonsensical. It is clear that the
respondent does not appreciate that she has a long road to go. In
this regard, her answering affidavit is silent as to what she is
doing to ensure her sobriety. There is no mention of Alcoholic s
Anonymous or any other programs which she attends to maintain
her sobriety.
[56] The applicant, in his replying affidavit, states that the
respondent appears to be white knuckling her recovery namely 20
when a recovering alcoholic thinks they can do it alone, without any assistance.
[57] Whilst it is not for this court to advise the respondent as
to what she ought to do or ought not to, it can protect and ensure
that the minor child is not placed in any danger were she to be placed in the respondent’s care and the respondent were to
relapse and bec ome intoxicated.
[58] In this regard I refer to the judgment of Bezuidenhout AJ 30
in JVS v LVS
1:
1 JVS v LVS (29720/2020) [2021] ZAGPJHC 458 3 September 2021 [61] – [63]
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“In my view it is a misconception harboured by many parents
who misuse alcohol that their drinking is not affecting anyone else. In fact, children of parents who misuse alcohol,
can be among those most impacted. Parents struggling with
alcoholism or the misuse of alcohol for whatever reason, may be surprised to learn how their addiction can impact on their children now and throughout their adulthood.
“The effects of growing up around the misuse of alcohol are sometimes so profound that they last a lifetime, affecting the 10
way children see themselves and others and interact in relationships. Because they may not have a good example to
follow from their childhood and potentially never experienced traditional or harmonious family relationships, adult children of alcoholics or parents who misuse alcohol may have to ultimately guess what a normal relationship looks like. Most
of the time these children will end up feeling conflicted, confused and self -conscious when they realise that
continuous drinking (or even periodic binge drinking as is the case in this matter) is not consi dered normal in other 20
families.
Although it is comforting to observe the efforts that have been made by the applicant to address his drinking problem, I am not entirely convinced that he has completely come to terms with the impact that his drinking may have had on the well -being of his children.”
[59] Similarly in this matter, and where one has regard to the
respondent’s conduct, since the end of December 2024 to date, I 30
am also not entirely convinced that the respondent has come to terms with her addiction, her recovery, or the effect that her conduct of the past month, which is unacceptable and untenable,
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has had on her minor daughter. Removing B from her father shows
a complete disregard for B’s rights to family.
[60] Insofar as the issue of costs is concerned, the
respondent ’s conduct was clearly contrived. She approached the
Children’s Court on the 19th of December whereafter she removed
B from the applicant’s care from the 27th of December to the 8th of
January. Then later and on the very same day, removed B from his
care with the assistance of a member SAPS and her attorney in a
very threatening manner . Her conduct is not in B’s best interest s 10
and is not in accordance with the spirit of co -parenting or in the
spirit of protecting and ensuring that children’s best interest s,
especially one so small , and especially in such circumstances
which the respondent knows she finds herself in.
[61] Ms Lipshitz f or the applicant argued that the respondent
had not conducted herself in B’s best interest s in taking matters
into her own hands in the manner that she had , and further that
she had made matters worse by then imposing a self -imposed
supervised contact regime upon the applicant whereby she seeks 20
to isolate him as the parent and the person that B had been living
with for the past six months.
[62] The applicant thus sought cost s of the urgent application
on a party -and- party scale at scale B.
[63] Ms Naidoo submitted that both parties did what they believed
to be in B’s best interests. She further submitted that the
respondent is in a vulnerable position right now.
30
[64] It is unclear as to exactly what that means. The
respondent was in a vulnerable position when she came out of
rehabilitation and removed B from the applicant’s care. She
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further submitted that the respondent has been amenable to
finalising a parenting plan and that one could have been finalised,
but that it was in fact the applicant who had prevented this from happening.
[65] This argument holds no water. As I indicated previously,
the respondent was adamant in her contention that the applicant does not have parental responsibilities and rights and in the circumstances, it is curious that she is insistent on entering a parenting plan with him. 10
[66] Ms Naidoo submitted that it is in the interests of B that I
make an order that each party pay their own costs. The
respondent however sought the dismissal of the application with
punitive costs. She did not seek an order that each party pay their
own costs. Costs is a discretion, and in exercising my discretion, I
am of the view that costs should follow the result.
[67] I am in agreement with Ms Lipshitz that but for the
respondent’s conduct, which conduct was unilateral and contrary 20
to B’s best interest , the applicant would not have found himself in
a position where he had no choice but to approach an urgent court in order to ensure B’s safety, protection, and best interests.
[68] In the circumstances, I will include in the order that the
respondent is to pay the costs of the application on a party -and-
party scale, on scale B .
The order is as follows:
30
ORDER
[1] The applicant’s failure to comply with the U niform Rules of
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Court is condoned.
[2] The applicant and the respondent are vested with full
parental responsibilities and rights as provided in sections 18(2)(a) to (d) and section 18(3) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.
[3] Pending the outcome of the application launched by the
respondent against the first applicant out of the Randburg Children’s Court, under case number 14/1/4/2– 753/2024:
10
3.1Th e minor child, B, is to be returned to the applicant’s
care forthwith, and by way of the applicant collecting the
minor child from her school today, being Thursday, 30 January 2025, at 16:00. The minor child shall remain
primarily resident with the applicant and in his care.
3.2The respondent shall exercise the following contact with
the minor child under the supervision of either party’s family member and/or Bridget Matebele, which contact will take place at the respondent’s home, or a place within a ten- 20
kilometre radius from the respondent’s home - as follows:
3.2.1 Every Monday and Wednesday from 15:30 to
18:30 at the respondent’s home;
3.2.2 Every alternative weekend, Saturday and Sunday,
from 09:00 to 17:00 ; and
3.2.3 Every intervening weekend, Saturday from 09:00
to 17:00. 30
[4] In order to ensure that the respondent has not consumed any
alcohol prior to or during her contact with the minor child, the
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20
parties shall procure, at a shared cost, a device described as an
iSoberS Pro BLE Premium Breathalyser, which operates in
conjunction with an iSober application (hereinafter “the Device”)
which allows random alcohol testing at all times and the
publication of the results of such testing by WhatsApp message in real time.
[5] On such days when the respondent has contact with the
minor child, as inter alia referred to in 3.2 and the subparagraphs
above, she shall transmit by way of data message (WhatsApp) the 10
test results of the alcohol test by means of the device at a minimum of 20 (twenty) minutes before the minor child being in
her care.
[6] The respondent shall also be required to transmit , by way of
data message (WhatsApp) , to the applicant the test results of the
alcohol test through the device at two- hour intervals during her
contact with the minor child, which must be done in the presence of the party supervising the contact sessions.
[7] In the event that the test result as published and sent to the 20
applicant indicates that the respondent has consumed any alcohol whatsoever, the applicant shall be entitled to withhold her from exercising contact with the minor child until such time as she has presented him with a negative breathalyser test.
[8] In the event that the applicant takes the minor child away for
a weekend, then the contact as set out in paragraphs 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 above, shall not apply. The applicant shall arrange for the
respondent to make up her contact time.
30
[9] The respondent shall be sober when exercising contact with
the minor child as envisaged in paragraph 3.2 ( and
subparagraphs ) above, and should she arrive intoxicated, she will
005318/2025 /hvr JUDGMENT
2025 -01-30
21
not be permitted to have contact with the minor child
[10] The respondent will be subjected to random alcohol tests,
including but not limited to urine, blood, and/or hair follicle tests
at the applicant’s instance and demand if she presents with a
positive breathalyser test.
[11] The respondent is to pay the applicant’s costs on S cale B.
ABRO , AJ 10
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
DATE :
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
For the Applicant: T Lipshitz
Instructed by:
Chiba Attorneys
For the Respondent: 20
N Naidoo
Instructed by:
Otrebski Attorneys