IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE CASE NO: 019721/2025
( l) REPORT ABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED:
26 March 2025
DATE SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
and
COMMISSIONER FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE SERVICE
MINISTER OF FINANCE
ESKOM
JUDGMENT
TOLMAY J Applicant
First Responden t
Second Responden t
Intervening Party
2
INTRODUCTION
[1] The Road Accident Fund ( “the RAF”) is funded by the Road Accident Fund levies
(“RAF levies”), which is levied in terms of the Customs and Excise Act, 1964 ( “the CEA”)
on diesel purchases . Taxpayers may claim “diesel refunds” if they comply with the
requirements of the CEA. This entails that a taxpayer is refunded the RAF levy and the
fuel levy.
[2] The dispute between the RAF and the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) is
about “diesel refunds” claimed by Eskom, in terms of the CEA. SARS has the authority to
decide whether diesel refunds (which include the RAF levies) claimed by taxpayers, suc h
as Eskom, should be paid to taxpayers. SARS decided that Eskom is not entitled to the
diesel refunds for a period of approximately 30 months (2019 to 2021). A dispute arose
between SARS and Eskom. SARS and Eskom then entered into a settlement agreement
in terms of which SARS contends it is obliged to pay Eskom an amount of approximately
R5.1 billion (five point one billion rand) .
[3] SARS and Eskom entered into a settlement agreement on 17 Octo ber 2024. SARS
informed the RAF about this settlement agreeme nt on 12 November 2024. SARS
informed the RAF that it will recoup /deduct the R5.1 billion from the RAF levies over a 2 -
month period. This period was then extended to five months.
[4] On 14 March 2025, Eskom filed an application to intervene, this applicat ion was
not opposed by any of the parties and was granted.
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URGENCY
[5] The matter was set down for 24 February 2025, but on that day the parties agreed
that the matter should proceed for facilitation i n terms of the Inter -Governmental
Relationship Framework Act, 13 of 2005 (“IRF Act”). During December of 2024 , the RAF
declared a dispute in terms of the IRF Act. This was acknowledged in SARS’ email of 31
January 2025. The matter stood down until 28 February 2025 for purposes of facilitation
before re tired Justices Ngcobo and Nugent. The process started on 28 February 2025.I
was requested to avail myself to hear the application on 14 March 2025 if the dispute was
not resolved.
[6] On 14 March 2025 Eskom filed the application for intervention and the a ffidavit and
the settlement concluded between Eskom and SARS attached thereto impacted the
approach of the parties significantly. The RAF and Eskom agreed to a time restricted
interim interdict, but SARS was not amenable to the proposal.
[7] It also transpired that despite the declaration of the dispute, the ongoing dispute
resolution process in terms of the IRF Act, SARS has recouped /deducted the f irst tranche
of approximately R1 .2 billion (one point two billion rand) . The RAF became aware of this
on 26 February 2025. To add insult to injury , I was inform ed by counsel representing
SARS that the certificate to Treasury regarding the second tranc he will be issued on the
same day that I was hearing the matter. This led to me granting an interim order pen ding
the judgment which I undertook to deliver on or before 28 March 2025. The attitude of
SARS, which I find rather difficult to comprehend, created even more reason to hear this
matter on an urgent basis.
4
[8] SARS submitted that it had no choice but to proceed deducting/ recouping the
money because if it did not , Treasury’s records will not be accurate. It must be noted that
the Minister of Finance is the second respondent in this application but chose not to
partake in these proceedings. At this sta ge, I was informed that neither Treasury nor the
Minister of Finance have joined the proceedings in terms of the IRF Act.
[9] The RAF says that if the application for the interim relief is not granted on an urgent
basis, the RAF will not receive adequate redress in the normal course. The intended
deductions will render the RAF unable to perform its core statutory duty. The operations
of the RAF nationwide will also be severely prejudiced. The intended deductions of R5,1
billion constitute approximately 10% of the RAF’s annual income. The RAF says that the
intended deductions will render the RAF unable to perform its core statutory duty. The
operations of the RAF nationwide will also be severely prejudiced. The intended
deductions of R5,1 billion (five point one billion rand) constitute approximately 10% of the
RAF’s annual income.
[10] SARS says that the application is not urgent and that the RAF failed to take the
necessary steps since 12 November 2024 to protect its interests, if any urgency exists , it
is self-created. SARS, however, does not elaborate on which steps the RAF were
supposed to take.
[11] The chronology of events leading up to the launching of the application is
important. On 13 January 2025 , SARS acknowledged the declaration of a dispute under
the IRF Act. On 31 January 2025 , a meeting was held between the RAF and SARS. On
5
3 February 2025 the RAF sent an email to SARS proposing the names of three retired
judges to act as faci litator in terms of the IRF Act . On 7 February 2025 , the RAF requ ested
a response to the email. On the same day the RAF requested an undertaking from SARS
that it would not proceed with the intended deductions until the dispute declared in terms
of the IRF Act has been finalised. On 10 February 2025 , the RAF delivered a notice in
terms of s 96 of the IRF Act, because of SARS’ failure to respond to the request to give
the aforementioned undertaking. The undertaking was not given and RAF filed the urgent
application.
[12] The matter is urgent not only based on the reasons initially provided by the RAF,
but also due to SARS’ conduct by deducting/recouping the first tranc he and insisting that
it will proceed doing so despite the pending processes before court and the ongoing
processes in terms of the IRF Act.
THE ARGUMENTS
[13] In the initial affidavit filed by the RAF the position was taken that it should have
been part of the settlement negotiations between SARS and Eskom. In the supplementary
affidavit and heads of argument filed on 10 March 2025, the RAF correctly disav owed
that proposition. No such right exist s, but SARS could have and should have informed
the RAF well in advance of the potential financial consequences, especially seeing that
the papers revealed that the dispute between SARS and Eskom is for the period between
2019 up to 2021.
6
[14] When Eskom’s application for intervention was filed , the settlement agreement
between Eskom and SARS was attached. This change d the whole approach by the RAF .
Counsel representing SARS was highly critical of the new arguments raised on behalf of
the RAF and insisted that the RAF should stand or fall based on what was raised in the
founding papers. However, the RAF was unaware of the facts until Eskom filed their
papers. It needs mentioning that SARS on the other hand was aware of these facts and
in my view was duty -bound to reveal it to both the Court and the Justices invol ved in the
facilitation process but inexplicably failed to do so , despite the fact that SARS was
empowered by the settlement agreement to disclose it to the RAF.
[15] In this context the settlement agreement makes for interesting reading.
Clause 1.1.17 defines “’settle’ and ‘settlement’ as the meaning referred to in section 77J
of the CEA”. Section 77J of the CEA states:
“For the purposes of this part ‘settle ’ means to resolve a dispute by compromising any disputed liability,
otherwise than by way of either the Commissioner or the person concerned accepting the other party’s
interpretation of the facts or the law applicable to the facts, or of both the facts a nd the law, and ‘settlement’
shall be construed accordingly”
[16] Clauses 2.1 to 2.4 of the settlement agreement sets out the issues in dispute
between the parties and the processes followed to try and resolve the issues in dispute
which remained unresol ved.
[17] Clause 4.3 states:
“The parties agree to settle the dispute on the following basis:
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ESKOM shall be paid a final amount of 80% of the amount of the refund of levies claimed by ESKOM in
respect of all the periods from February 2019 to the latest period in which a diesel refund claim has been
filed as at the effective date of the agreement.”
[18] Clause 4.4.1 states:
“SARS and ESKOM have performed a reconciliation of the amounts ESKOM has claimed and SARS has
refunded.”
[19] Clause 5.5 of the set tlement agreement states:
“The Settlement does not in any way constitute an admission by any Party as to the true nature or the
proper interpretation of any of the issues or applicable legal principles and may not be used by the Parties
in relation to any other matter or transaction other than the Settlement of this Dispute” (own underlining).
[20] Paragraph 6.3 states:
“The Commissioner undertakes to adhere to the secrecy provision contained in the CEA with regard to
information relating to the persons co ncerned but ESKOM acknowledges that information concerning this
Settlement may be required to be disclosed to inter alia National Treasury and/or the Road Accident Fund
and consents to such reasonable disclosure in terms of section 4(3D) (b)of the CEA ” (ow n underlining).
[21] It was argued on behalf of the RAF that from the provisions of section 77J and the
settlement agreement, it is apparent that SARS and Eskom are not admitting either
party’s interpretation of the law or the facts, or both. The nature of the settlement
agreement between SARS and Eskom is one that is concluded “because the rights of the
parties are uncertain, and they choose not to resolve that uncertainty”, as sta ted in Wilson
Bayly Holmes (Pty) Ltd v Maeyane and Others1.
1 1995 (4) SA 340 (T) at 345E.
8
[22] It was h eld in Wilson Bayly Holmes that “ By the very nature of such a contract,
there can be little room for finding that the parties must have intended their contract to
depend upon the existence of one or other of the factors relevant to their respective
rights.2”
[23] The above principles were confirmed by the Constitutional Court in inter alia Mafisa
v RAF where the Constitutional Court held:
“[33] A compromise is an agreement between the parties to prevent or terminate a
dispute by adjudicating their differ ences by mutual consent. It is trite that the comprise
gives rise to new contractual rights and obligations which exist independently of the
original cause of action. Once a compromise is reached, the parties are precluded from
proceeding on the original cause of action (unless, of course, the compromise provides
otherwise)3.”
[24] In paragraph [42] of the Mafisa judgment, the Court held:
“… In its judgment the Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated the principles outlined in Eke
and confirmed that a compromise extinguishes disputed rights and obligations, puts an
end to the litigation and has the effect of res judicata .4”
2 Ibid.
3 2024 (4) SA 426 (CC) at paras [33] .
4 Ibid at para 42. See also Road Accident Fund v Ngobane 2008 (1) SA 432 (SCA) at para [12] and Eke v Parsons
2016 (3) SA 37 (CC) .
9
[25] It was argued on behalf of the RAF that the original cause of action of Eskom was
to claim diesel refunds in terms of the CEA. This original cause of action has been
extinguished by the compromise agreement as stated in paragraph [42] of the Mafisa
judgment.
[26] It was argued that in these circumstances SARS cannot contend that it entered
into the settlement agreement b ecause it had a liability to refund Eskom the RAF levies.
The settlement agreement was entered into to avoid having the issue being resolved by
a Court of law. Furthermore, the settlement agreement gives rise to new contractual rights
and obligations and the parties are precluded from proceeding on the original cause of
action. The original cause of action of Eskom was to claim diesel refunds in terms of the
CEA This original cause of action has been extinguished by the compromise agreement
as stated in pa ragraph [42] of the Mafisa judgment.
[27] SARS, so says the RAF, is therefore not entitled to deduct the settlement amount
from the RAF levies, as the settlement amount does not constitute a diesel refund of the
RAF levies as envisaged in the CEA. Cons equen tly, SARS’ s decision to deduct/ recoup
the amount it undertook to pay Eskom in terms of the settlement agreement, cannot be
in terms of the provisions of the CEA as the settlement agreement extinguished the
original cause of action.
[28] It was argue d on behalf of the RAF that the dispute between the R AF and SARS
about the deduction/ recoupment of the amount of R5.1 billion does not affect Eskom’s
right to receive payment in terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement
between Eskom and the RAF created new rights and obligations which are totally
10
independent from the previous cause of action (the claim in terms of the CEA), which was
extinguished by the settlement agreement.
[29] The RAF was also, and rightly so, aggrieved by the non-disclosure of the taxpayer
and the content of the settlement agreement. SARS refused to provide the agreement to
the RAF and contended that the secrecy provision applies to the settlement agreement
and that SARS is not entitled to disclose it to the RA F. This is directly contrary to clause
6.3 that makes specific provision therefor e that the contents of the settlement agreement
may be disclosed to the RAF.
[30] This conduct by SARS must have had an effect on the dispute resolution pro cess
followed in t erms of the I RF Act, as the settlement agreement could not be made available
to the parties during that process. The fact that the settlement agreement is now available
to all the parties, will in the applicant’s view make a significant difference in the continuing
negotiations to follow in terms of the dispute resolution process under the IRF Act.
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN INTERIM INTERDICT
[31] The requirements for an interim interdict are trite, they are the existence of a prima
facie right, a reasonable ap prehension of irreparable harm, that the balance of
convenience favours the applicant and the absence of an appropriate alternative remedy.
[32] The pr esence of a prima facie right was hotly contested by SARS . Eskom initially
also had reservations about i t, based on the fact that the inter -governmental dispute
would remain pending for an indefinite period of time, or until a prescribed result or final
11
resolution has been reached. Considering the time -restricted interim order agreed on
between the RAF and Eskom, the objection by Eskom fell away and during argument
Eskom supported the existence of a prima facie right as formulated in the proposed order.
[33] SARS strongly objected to the RAF’s developed argument because of the new
facts that belatedly became known and insisted that the RAF must stand or fall by the
facts set out in the founding affidavit. Ironically, SARS was fully aware of the true
circumstances, and despite being empowered to reveal it to the RAF , chose not to do so.
The facilitators in terms of the IRF Act was apparently also kept in the dark and so was
the Court until 14 March 2025 , the day of the hearing. It will be to put form over substance
and would be manifestly unjust not to allow the RAF to rely on these new facts.
[34] This is an application for an interim interdict. In Webster v Mitchell5 it was held that:
“The right to be set up by an applicant for a temporary interdict need not be shown by a
balance of probabilities. If it is ''prima facie established though open to some doubt'' that
is enough .6”
[35] In Gool v Minister of Justice7 some qualification was se emingly applied to the
principle set out in Webster when the following statement was made:
“With the greatest respect, I am of the opinion that the criterion prescribed in this
statement for the first branch of the enquiry thus far outlined is somewhat too favourably
expressed towards the applicant for an interdict. In my view the criterion on the applicant's
own averred or admitted facts is: should (not could) the applicant on those facts obtain
5 1948(1) SA 1186 (W).
6 Ibid at 1189 .
7 1955 (2) SA 6829(C).
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final relief at the trial. Subject to that qualification, I respectfully agree that the approach
outlined in Webster v Mitchell . . . is the correct approach for ordinary interdict
applications .8”
[36] In Zulu v Minister of Defence and Others9 the Court however quoted Tony Rahme
Marketing Agencies10 with approval as it held as follows:
“The correct test was, however, correctly and hopefully now finally expressed even more
correctly by Goldstein J in Tony Rahme Marketing Agencies SA (Pty) Ltd and Another v
Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1997 (4) SA 213 ( W) D at 215C
- 216C, where he writes:
'The applicants seek two interim interdicts pending the determination of review
proceedings they intend ins tituting against the respondent. No answering affidavit has
been filed, the respondent arguing that the applicat ion ought to be dismissed for reasons
of fact and law. Before I address the issues I have to decide, it is necessary to refer to the
difference of approach in our case law regarding the test I have to apply to disputes of
law. Of course, the principles to be applied to disputes regarding interim interdicts have
long ago been authoritatively laid down in such cases as Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA
1186 (W); Ndauti v Kgami and Others 1948 (3) SA 27 (W) at 36 - 7 and Olympic
Passenger Service (Pty) Ltd v Ramlagan 1957 (2) SA 382 (D). Are s uch principles to
apply only in respect of factual and not in respect of legal disputes? In Mariam v Minister
of Interior and Another 1959 (1) SA 213 (T) Roper JA (as he then was) simply applied
Webster to a matter involving disputed legal issues. Viljoen J (as he then was) criticised
8 Ibid at 668E .
9 2005(6) SA 446 (T) .
10 Tony Rahme Marketing Agencies SA Pty Ltd and Another v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council 1997 (4) SA 213(W) .
13
this approach in Fourie v Olivier en 'n Ander 1971 (3) SA 274 (T). The decision in Webster
was intended, he said at 285, to apply to factual disputes and not legal ones. In the case
of the former a final decision would be premature but not in the case of the latter. In such
a case the court was obliged to give a decision and conclude th e matter finally. Viljoen J
went to say the following at 285F - :
''Die Regter wat 'n aansoek om 'n interdik pedente lite verhoor wat afgemaak kan word deur
'n regsbeslissing is myns insiens nie geregtig om te sê dat hy die regsvraag halfhartig gaan
benader en dit aan sy ampsbroer wat die verhoor waarneem gaan oorlaat H om die saak
behoorlik te oorweeg en finaal te beslis nie. Dit sou strydig wees met die beginsels in ons reg ten
aansien van res juidicata, dit sou onnodige koste veroorsaak en dit sou die onsuksesvolle party
in die pedente lite -aansoek die reg van appèl ontsê terwyl die uitleg van die Regter op daardie
stadium aan die regsvraag heg, hoewel dit miskien nie bedoel is om die Verhoorregter te bind
nie, hom in 'n groot verleentheid kan stel as hy voel dat hy met die eersgenoemde Regter wil
verskil. In die hiëragie I van Howe staan die Verhoorhof nie hoër as die Kamerhof waar die
aansoek van die interdik aanhangig gemaak word nie. Dit is albei een -Regter -Howe wat oor dieselfde
aangeleentheid moet beslis.''
With respect I differ from the learned Judge. Whilst there may be situations where a Court
having to decide an interim interdict, has sufficient time and assistance to arrive at a final
view on a disputed legal point - in which event it pro bably has to express a strong view in
order to save costs - situations of urgency arise when decisions on legal issues have to
be made without the judicial officer concerned having had the time to arrive at a final
considered view. In such a situation he i s surely forced to express only a prima facie view.
I cannot see how the expression of such a view and the grant of interim relief would
conflict with principles of res judicata. I also see no embarrassment in an urgent Court
Judge being overridden by a tr ial Judge. Each of us, privileged to hold this high and
responsible office, owe, in the wielding of our considerable power, a duty only to truth and
14
justice. The interlocutory decisions of Colleagues, and indeed of our own, are not binding
at later stages of proceedings and should, and I trust, do yield easily to persuasive
arguments indicating error or oversight.11”
[37] SARS insisted that I was duty bound to not only determine the matter based on the
case made out in the founding affidavit, but also to ma ke a final determination on the
rights of SARS and the obligations of the RAF in relation to the recoupment/deduction of
the levies in terms of the CEA. This is not what the law requires .
[38] I agree with the approach set out in Zulu above. This matter and how it was
conducted illustrates in what an unenviable and difficult situation Judges often are in the
urgent court. There is simply no way that this Court can arrive at a final view on what
exactly the par ties’ rights are. SARS insisted th at I should do just that. The best a court
can do in these circumstances is to express a prima facie view .
[39] This matter was enrolled for 14 March 2025 as set out above on the insistence of
the parties. Eskom filed their heads of argument late in the afternoon of 13 March 2025
and the application for intervention on 14 March 2025 . SARS filed further heads of
argument during the evening of 13 March 2025 and in response to this application the
RAF filed a third set of heads of argument on 14 March 2025 . This judgment must be
delivered as quickly as possible. The situation her e is exactly what was envisaged in Tony
Ram he Agencies . The court is duty bound to act within the constraints of the urgent court
and is ill -equipped to come to any final decision.
11 Supra note 9 at para 41 .
15
[40] This matter does not only involve the interpretation of complex legal issues but
also will have far reaching consequences not only for the RAF, but mor e importantly for
motor vehicle accident victims. In my view this Court is obliged, especially in
circumstances where it is only called upon to grant an interim interdict, to express only a
prima facie view and on this basis, I am persuaded that the RAF es tablished the existence
of such a right.
[41] As far as the argument is that the RAF is limited to what was stated in the founding
affidavit there simply is no merit in that argument. SARS withheld crucial information from
the RAF and the Court, and it would make a mockery of justice and fair play to uphold
this argument.
[42] As far as the requirements of balance of convenience and irreparable harm is
concerned, the RAF’s precarious financial position is undeniable. The consequences
thereof are ill ustrated in several matters before our courts where the courts have granted
inter alia moratoriums on writs of execution and warrants of attachments against the
RAF12. SARS submitted that these moratoriums would assist the RAF and, if I understand
the argum ent correctly, will alleviate the financial position of the RAF. This argument does
not consider the history and the financial position that the RAF is in and which is public
knowledge. The reduction/recoupment of R1,2 billion (one point two billion rand) per
month for the next remaining four months may indeed lead to the financial collapse of the
RAF. SARS on the other hand will not suffer any irreparable harm, as the amounts may
12 The latest of these is The Road Accident Fund v The Legal Practice Council and Others (21 February 2025)
Caseno.134420 (Gauteng Division, Pretoria ).
16
still be recouped/deducted when the matter is resolved or the time limit set by this Court
comes to an end. If that happens , the RAF will have to approach the courts again for
assistance as provided for in the order.
[43] As far as an alternative remedy is concerned , SARS s ays that the RAF should
rather have approached Treasury for assistance. The RAF says that the process will take
too long and will not prevent the immediate problems that the RAF faces. In any event , it
was pointed out that the RAF did declare a disp ute in terms of s 96 and therefor e
exhausted any other availabl e remedy . S 96 of the CEA provides as follows:
(1)(a) No legal proceedings shall be instituted against the State, the Minister, the
Commissioner or an officer for anything done in pursuance of this Act until one month
after delivery of a notice in writing setting forth clearly and explicitly the cause of action,
the name and place of abode of the person who is to institute such proceedings this
section referred to as (in “litigant”) and the name and address of his attorney or agent, if
any.
(ii) such notice shall be in such form and shall be delivered in such a manner and at
such places as may be prescribed by rule.
(iii) no such notice shall be valid unless it complies with the requirements prescribed
in this section and such rules
(b) Subject to the provisions… ’
17
[44] SARS complained that the notice is defective and the notice should be disreg arded
on that basis. In Mohlomi13 the purpose for notification was explained and the following
was said in relation to prior notice to state organs:
“The conventional explanation for demanding prior notification of any intention to sue an
organ of government is that, with its extensive activities and large staff which tends to
shift, it needs the opportunity to investigate claims laid against it to consider them
responsibly and to decide, before getting embroiled in litigation at public expense,
whether it ought to accept, reje ct or endeavour to settle them .14”
[45] In Dragon Freight15 the Court held:
“The Supreme Court of Appeal has been critical of the state and organs of state raising
technical hurdles instead of facilitating the expeditious finalisation of cases. In Safcor
Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v NTC 1982 930 SA (A) at 672H to 673A (judgment of Corbett JA
as he then was) the Court relying on the judgmen t of Shreiner JA in Trans – African
Insurance Co. Ltd v Maluleka 1956 (2) SA 273 at 278 F –G held as follows:
“there is no indication that the Commissioner was in anyway prejudiced by the alleged
non-joinder of its Chairman. In the circumstances it is to m e, a matter of some surprise
that a public body like the Commission should raise such a technical procedural hurdle to
the expeditious despatch of what appears to have been an urgent review application.”
Although the Court found that the appellant should have cited the Chairman, the point
was dismissed, for “technical objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not
13 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997(1) SA 124 (CC).
14 Ibid at para 9.
15 Dragon Freight (Pty) Ltd and Others v CSARS and Others [2021] 1 ALL SA 553(GP).
18
be permitted, in the absence of prejudice, to interfere with the expeditious and, if possible,
inexpensive decision of cases on the ir real merits .16”
[46] In the context of this matter , the same should apply and SARS should not be
allowed to rely on a technical hurdle. SARS was at all times aware of the RAF’s dispute
and it did not suffer any prejudice as a result of any deficiency in the notice. The RAF met
all the requirements for an interim interdict as set out above.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE JUDGMENT WAS RESERVE D.
[47] On 24 March 2025, my Registrar informed me that SARS emailed an application
to file a fu rther supplementary affidavit. They were informed that this will not be allowed.
On the same day , a letter by the RAF was emailed to my Registrar by the attorneys of the
RAF. I then perused the affidavit and the letter. The essence of SARS’ affidavit is that the
facilitation process has been terminated and my order will be rendered moot as a result.
New factual issues were also raised. The letter filed on behalf of the RAF indicated that
the RAF does not agree that the facilitation process should be terminated . The goal posts
in this matter is constantly being shifted. I have heard the matter and I make an order
based on what wa s argued before me . On 25 March 2025 Eskom withdrew from the
application. I granted the intervention application during the hearing, bu t considering the
withdrawal , I’ve remove d that from my order as well as any reference to the status of the
settlement between SARS and Eskom.
16 Ibid at para 64.
19
The following order is made:
1. Condonation is granted to the applicant for its non -compliance of the Rules of
Court relating to forms and service and the matter is enrolled and heard as one
of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. The statutory one month notice period provided for in section 9 6(1) (c) (ii) of
the CEA is reduced to 13 February 2025 .
3. An interim interdict is granted against the first respondent in the following terms:
3.1 The first respondent is interdicted and prohibited from deducting
the amount of R5.1 billion or any part thereof which the first respondent
is obliged to pay to the third resp ondent (Eskom) in terms of the
settlement agreement between Eskom and SARS of 18 October 2024,
from the monthly Road Accident Fund levies collected by it.
3.1. SARS will still be entitled to make such statutory monthly deductions as
provided for in section 5(2 ) of the Road Accident Fund Act, 56 of 1996
read with section 75(1) of the Customs and Excise Act, 91 of 1964,
which are not related to the R5.1 billion which is in dispute.
4. The interim interdict set out in paragraph 4 hereof will remain operative until
such time as the dispute that was declared between the applicant and the first
respondent in terms of section 41 of the Intergovernmental Relations
Framework Act, 13 of 2005, has been resolved or the process has been
terminated.
5. The process to be followed in terms of the Intergovernmen tal Relations
Framework Act, referred to above, must be finalised within 45 business days
from the date of this judgment.
6. If the dispute is not resolved between the applicant and the first responden t
within the 45-business day period referred to above, or the process is
terminated, then the applicant will be entitled to institute proceedings against
SARS to prohibit it from deducting /recouping the R5.1 billion from the
applicant, along with any other legal proceedings to recover from SARS any
deductions /recoupments already made.
7. The First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the Applicant, including
costs of two counsel on scale C. 20
RTOLMAY
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION , PRETORIA
21
Appearances
Counsel fo r applicant: Adv C Louw SC and Adv AJ Wessels instructed by Mpoyana
Ledwaba Inc.
Counsel for first respondents: Adv J Peter SC and Adv B Ramela instructed by VDT
Attorneys.
Counsel for In tervening party: Adv AP Joubert SC and Adv LJ Du Bruyn instructed by
Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs .
Date heard: 14 March 2025
Date of Judgment: 26 March 2025