IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: CC10/2024
(1)Reportable: No.
(2) Of interest to other judges: No
(3) Revised.
Date 17 March 2025
Signature
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
PAUL PHILIPPUS PRINSLOO ACCUSED
JUDGMENT ON MERITS
Munzhelele J
[1] Mr. Pri nsloo was charged with two counts of murder, read with the provisions of
section 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, in that the State alleges
that the murders were committed with premeditation. The accused understood the
charges against him and the sentences applicable thereto. He further understood the
competent verdicts applicable to the charge of murder, as explained to him by his
counsel.
On these two charges, the accused pleaded not guilty to premeditated murder but guilty
to murder, read with the provisions of section 51(2) of Act 105 of 1997. A statement in
terms of section 115 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was handed in as Exhibit
A. Admissions were also read into the record, and the accused confirmed that these
were his admissions, which could be recorded in terms of section 220 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
[2] The accused admitted to the following:
1. That Dr. Olifemi Adegboyega Omotobra conducted a post-mortem examination
on the deceased, Heideman Ruzanne, and compiled a report marked as Exhibit
C, which concluded that the cause of death was perforating gunshot injuries to
the abdomen.
2. That a second post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Olifemi Omotobra
on the body of Prinsloo Catharina Magdalena, with the findings recorded in
Exhibit D, indicating that the cause of death was perforating gunshot injuries to
the trunk.
3. That photographs of the crime scene were taken by Warrant Officer Sidney
Motau and submitted as Exhibit E.
4. That a ballistic analysis was conducted by Captain Retha Grobler, with the
findings submitted as Exhibit F .
[3] The State called Nicolas Pienaar as a witness , to establish that the accused acted
with premeditation before committing the murders. Pienaar testified that he had known
the accused for four years prior to the incident. On the day in question, the accused
invited him to his house for drinks. He arrived at approximately 12:15 PM and joined the
accused.
While they were seated, the accused’s wife approached them, handed the accused his
phone, and accused him of still being in love with his ex -girlfriend. She then left, only to
return moments later, informing the accused that he needed to vacate the house before
December 2023 , because Alfie would be moving in with her. In response, the accused
stated that he was tired of the situation and declared that he would kill three people:
Ruzzane, Magdalene, and Alfie.
Following this exchange, the accused went inside the house to his upstairs room.
Shortly thereafter, he returned but proceeded directly to the flat where his daughter and
her mother were seated. An argument ensued, during which the witness heard screams
and the sound of slapping. He then heard the accused’s daughter exclaim, "You can
shoot me if you want!" —immediately followed by the sound of a gunshot.
At that moment, Magdalene, the accused’s wife, ran past the witness and told him to
call the police, as the accused had shot Ruzzane. By that time, the accused had already
moved from the flat to the upstairs area of the main house. Once inside, he shot
Magdalene. A young girl who had been swimming at the time then stated, "Oupa has
shot Ma and Grandma." She then asked the witness to take her to his home, after which
they left the scene. The witness further testified that Magdalene’s demeanour that day
was aggressive.
[4] In response, the Defens e called the accused, Phillip pus Paul Prinsloo, as the
sole witness to refute the allegation of premeditation. The accused denied having told
Mr. Pienaar that he intended to kill three people.
He testified that his wife had approached him while he was sitting outside and thrown a
beer on him. Shortly thereafter, his daughter, Ruzzane, also confronted him, and both
Ruzzane and Magdalene began arguing with him.
Following this altercation, the accused went inside the house and retrieved his firearm.
He testified that he took the firearm to assert dominance and to show them "who was in
charge." With the firearm loaded, he then proceeded to the flat where Magdalene and
Ruzzane were located.
Upon his arrival, both women allegedly attacked him, kicking him and demanding that
he leave the house. During the altercation, Ruzzane reportedly taunted him, saying,
"Shoot me!" . The accused then fired a shot at her. He subsequently shot Magdalene,
who had not provoked him with similar words.
Following the shootings, the accused walked into the main house, sat down on a chair
in the sitting room, and remained there. He testified that he did not understand why he
had committed the act, insisting that everything happened so fast.
Analysis of the facts
[5] Premeditation is a crucial factor in distinguishing between murder as
contemplated under section 51(2) and premeditated murder under section 51(1) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, which carries a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment.
The determination of premeditation must be based on the evidence presented on the
merits, and it is for the court to decide whether the accused acted with premeditation.
The state and defense as seen above each called one witness to prove or disprove
premeditation. This principle was articulated in S v Legoa (33/2002) [2002] ZASCA 122;
[2002] 4 All SA 373 (SCA); 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA) (26 September 2002), where
Cameron JA stated in paragraphs 13 -14:
“The 1997 minimum sentencing legislation requires for its application that an
accused must have been ‘convicted of an offence referred to’ in the Schedule. In
this case the offence ‘referred to’ in the Schedule is that of dealing in a
dangerous dependence -producing substance ‘ if it is proved that – (a) the value of
the dependence -producing substance in question is more than R50 000,00 ’. The
question is whether the High Court’s conclusion that the value of the substance
in question relates solely to the question of sentence and is irrelevant before
conviction, is correct.
In my view , for three principal reasons it is not. First, the High Court’s conclusion
flies in the face of the wording of the 1997 statute. That wording in my view
clearly indicates that for the minimum sentencing jurisdiction to exist in respect of
an offence, the accused’s conviction must encompass all the elements of the
offence set out in the Schedule. (This does not apply when the Schedule
specifies an attribute not of the offence, but of the accused, such as rape when
committed ‘by a person who has been convicted of two or more offences of rape,
but has not yet been sentenced in respect of such convictions’ ). Second, even if
the wording of the statute was open to more than one interpretation (which in my
view it is not) , the grave injustice that the contrary interpretation can cause ,
compels the conclusion that the elements of the offence must be established
before conviction. Third, the High Court’s conclusion is contrary to established
principle s and practice in our criminal trial courts.
[6] In Benedict Moagi Peloeole v The Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng
(740/2022) [2022] ZASCA 117 (16 August 2022), a case with facts closely resembling
the present matter, the court found that the murder was premeditated . It was held that
the determination of whether a crime was premeditated requires a consideration of the
factual matrix of each case to ascertain the state of mind of the perpetrator prior to the
commission of the offence. See also S v Raath 2009 (2) SACR 46 (C), where the court
emphasized that when assessing the accused’s state of mind at the time of the killings ,
a subjective test is applied. This approach necessitates that the decision -maker
considers the accused's personal feelings, experiences, and perceptions , rather than
applying a wholly neutral or objective standard . In this regard, Williamson JA in S v Mini
1963 (3) SA 188 (A) at 196E stated :
‘In attempting to decide by inferential reasoning the state of mind of a particular
accused at a particular time, it seems to me that a trier of fact should try mentally to
project himself into the positio n of that accused at that time’. S ee also S v Ferreira and
Others [2004] ZASCA 29 ; [2004] 4 All SA 373 (SCA) para 33.
[7] The court must consider the totality of the evidence in determining whether the
murders were premeditated. It is incumbent upon the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused premeditated the murder of his wife and daughter.
Conversely, the accused bears the responsibility of presenting facts to demonstrate that
the murders were not planned in advance. See Kekana [2018] ZASCA 148; 2019 (1)
SACR 1 (SCA), where the court held that:
“In summary therefore, it was for the appellant to lay a factual foundation for a
conclusion that the murders were not premeditated, and the issue was one for the trial
court to decide. In coming to a decision, the court would have had regard to all the
circumstances of the murders, including the appellant’s actions during the relevant
period” . A mere assertion by the accused that he does not know what overcame him,
how the incident transpired, or that it happened too quickly, is insufficient. Ultimately, it
is the trial court's prerogative to decide whether the murders were premeditated. In
making this determination, the court will consider all relevant circumstances , including
the accused’s conduct before, during, and after the commission of the offence.
[8] The State and the Defenc e had two mutually destructive versions. From the
State’s evidence, particularly the testimony of Nicolas Pienaar, the accused expressed
clear intent before the killings, stating that he was “tired of this” and explicitly declaring
his intention to kill Ruzzane, Magdalene, and Alfie. This statement suggests pre -existing
contemplation and resolution, indicating premeditation rather than a spontaneous
emotional reaction. Additionally, his actions —leaving the scene of the argument, going
upstairs, returning with a firearm, and deliberately targeting the victims —suggest a
degree of planning rather than an impulsive act driven by provocation.
However, from the defence’s perspective, the accused portrays a different subjective
experience —one of escalating tension, perceived loss of control, and an emotional
response to provocation. He claimed he took the firearm not with an immediate intent to
kill, but rather to assert dominance, suggesting an internal struggle rather than a fully
formed plan. His testimony that everything happened “so fast” implies a lack of
premeditation in his perception, portraying the killings as reactionary rather than pre -
planned. Furthermore, the accused’s passivity after the killings —walking into the house,
sitting down, and making no attempt to flee —could be interpreted as evidence of shock,
remorse, or emotional detachment following the event. This could suggest that, in his
mind, the act was not premeditated but rather the culmination of overwhelming
emotions and provocation. But what bothers me with the version of the accused is that ,
if the inten tion was just to scare them or show them who is the boss; why then, did he
want to scare them with a loaded gun? Secondly , if the accused acted out of
provocation , his wife went away and retreated from assaulting him ; why then, did he
follow her upstairs and shoot her?
[9] Key Issues Undermining the Defense's Perspective:
The Use of a Loaded Firearm to "Scare" the Victims: The accused stated that he
retrieved the firearm to assert dominance or “show them who was in charge.” However,
his choice to use a loaded firearm instead of any other means of intimidation suggests
an intent to use lethal force rather than merely to instil fear. If his only intention was to
scare them, why not retrieve an unloaded firearm or use another non -lethal means of
asserting control? The presence of ammunition demonstrates a readiness to kill rather
than a spontaneous emotional response.
The Pur suit and Execution of Magdalene: The sequence of events contradicts an
impulsive reaction to provocation . Even if the accused was momentarily provoked by
Ruzzane’s words (“shoot me”), that does not explain his subsequent actions .
Magdalene had already retreated from the altercation after witnessing her daughter
being shot. Instead of de -escalating, the accused actively pursued her upstairs and shot
her, reinforcing the notion that he was carrying out a premeditated plan rather than
reacting emotionally in the heat of the moment . If he had truly been overwhelmed by
emotion and acting impulsively, one would expect his actions to cease after the initial
gunshot —not to continue methodically.
Fulfilling His Expressed Intentions: Earlier in the day, the accused explicitly stated his
intent to kill Ruzzane, Magdalene, and Alfie . His subsequent actions mirror his prior
threats —he killed Ruzzane, then pursued and killed Magdalene, suggesting he was
executing a plan rather than reacting spontaneously . The consistency between his prior
declarations and his actions further undermines his claim of an unplanned, emotionally -
driven act.
[10] In the case of S v Raath 2009 (2) SACR 46 (C) , the court held that premeditation
does not require long -term planning but requires some measure of prior thought or
consideration before the act is committed . Accused testified that after the altercation
with his wife and daughter , he left the drinking area where he was seated with his friend,
went inside the house, took beer from the fridge and put it on top of the table at the
sitting room , went upstairs to his room and open ed the wardrobe , took a gun from his
wardrobe, and then went downstairs to confront his wife and daughter . This sequence
suggests that he had time to reflect, which supports premeditation. In Raath ’s case
paragraph 13, the court explains that premeditation can happen within minutes if the
suspect forms a firm intent before committing the act.
[11] In S v Kekana 2014 (2) SACR 240 (SCA) , the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
premeditation involves consideration of the act before committing it, regardless of
whether the actual killing happens shortly after the decision is made . In this case, after
an argument, the accused armed himself and then went to confront the victims . The
suspect retrieved a gun from a different location (upstairs) before returning to the crime
scene , which strongly indicates that he had time to consider his actions. But , because
he had already concluded in his heart , that he wants to kill his wife and daughter, he
conti nued to fulfil what he premedita ted. In the case of kekana paragraph 12-14, the
court explains that a cooling -off period does not necessarily remove premeditation if the
accused had formed a clear intent before acting. At paras 12 and 13 of the judgment,
this Court stated as follows:
‘It was also submitted that the appellant’s conduct occurred on the spur of the moment,
and that his actions were not premeditated. I disagree. The appellant’s overall conduct
puts paid to that suggestion. It all began with the argument he had with his wife, after
which he decided to commit suicide. He rationalised to himself that his children would
suffer in his absence. He killed the first child, after which he instructed one of the
children to call his wife. He called his wife to listen to the horror of the killing.
This conduct, to my mind, points to pre -planning or premeditation. In this regard, one
must bear in mind what this court said in S v Kekana [2014] ZASCA 158 at para 13, that
premeditation does not necessarily entail that the accused should have thought or
planned his or her action for a long period of time in advance before carrying out his or
her plan. This is because ‘even a few minutes are enough to c arry out a premeditated
action’.
[12] Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng v Pistorius [2016] ZASCA 150 , The
Supreme Court of Appeal clarified that even a short period between forming the intent
and carrying out the act can amount to premeditation . Here, the suspect had time to
reflect while retrieving the firearm , supporting the argument that he acted with prior
consideration rather than spontaneous rage. Paragraph 55 of the case of Director of
Public Prosecutions, Gauteng , the court emphasizes that retrieving a weapon from
another room before committing the crime can demonstrate premeditation. The accused
in this case “weighed – up” his proposed conduct on a thought -out basis.
[13] The process of inferential reasoning must be consistent with all proved facts.
The evidence needs to be considered in its totality. It is only then that , one can apply
the oft -quoted dictum in R v Blom 1939 AD 188 at 202 -203, where reference is made to
two cardinal rules of logic which cannot be ignored. These are, first, that the inference
sought to be drawn must be consistent with all the proved facts and, second, the proved
facts should be such “that they exclude every reasonable inference from them, save the
one sought to be drawn. I n S v Mtsweni 1985 (1) SA 590 (A) at 593F -G, the Court, in
emphasizing that only proven facts can form the basis for legitimate inferences, said:
‘Inference must be carefully distinguished from conjecture or speculation. There
can be no inference unless there are objective facts from which to infer the other
facts which it is sought to establish …if there are no positive proved facts from
which the inference can be made, the method of inference fails , and what is left,
is mere speculation or conjecture ’.
[14] The question remains whether the inferences in the case are the only ones to be
drawn. Consistency with the Proved Facts: The inference that the accused acted with
premeditation must align with all established evidence . The accused’s prior statement
that he would kill Ruzzane, Magdalene, and Alfie , followed by his retrieval of a loaded
firearm and his deliberate pursuit of his wife after already shooting his daughter , fits
perfectly within a premeditated framework. The accused did not merely react in the heat
of the moment —his actions systematically followed the intent he expressed earlier .
Exclusion of Other Reasonable Inferences: The defense argues that the killings were
spontaneous and a result of provocation . However: If the intent was only to intimidate,
why retrieve a loaded firearm? If the accused lost control in a moment of anger, why did
he then follow Magdalene and kill her upstairs after Ruzzane had already been shot?
Why did his actions align so precisely with his earlier threat to kill three people? A truly
impulsive act would be erratic and unstructured , whereas the accused’s actions reflect a
controlled execution of prior intent . The only reasonable inference that excludes
speculation or doubt , is that the accused acted in accordance with a premeditated plan
rather than an emotional outburst. Based on inferential reasoning under R v Blom , the
conclusion that the accused premeditated the murders is the only reasonable inference
consistent with all the proved facts. Any alternative explanation —such as acting
impulsively under provocation —is not supported by the totality of evidence and fails to
exclude the deliberate execution of a preconceived plan .
[15] The accused’s state of mind at the time of the killings, viewed through a
subjective test , strongly supports premeditation rather than an impulsive act driven by
provocation . His retrieval of a loaded firearm , rather than an unloaded one, indicates an
intention to use deadly force rather than merely to scare or assert control. His pursuit
and execution of his wife, even after she had retreated, negates any claim of immediate
provocation and instead suggests deliberation and follow -through on a prior de cision .
His actions align precisely with his earlier threats , further demonstrating that he was
carrying out a preconceived intention rather than reacting in the heat of the moment .
The defence’s version lacks credibility in light of the accused’s own pre-incident
statements, his methodical execution of the killings, and his conscious choice of a
loaded firearm . The totality of the evidence supports the conclusion that , the accused
acted with premeditation and that the murders were not the product of temporary
provocation or loss of control .
[16] Considering Exhibit A and the plea explanation of the accused, I find that the
accused has admitted to the elements of the offence. In respect of Count 1, the accused
alleges that he shot Magdalene inside the house while she was no longer fighting him.
In respect of Count 2, he shot at Ruzzane while she was already four meters away from
him. I find that the murder was premeditated.
[17] Therefore, the following verdict is made :
Accused is found guilty as charged on both counts.
M. Munzhelele
Judge of the High Court Pretoria
Heard: 10 March 2025
Delivered: 17 March 2025
Counse l for the S tate: Adv. Khosa
Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Moldenhauer