CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA


Case CCT 300/24

In the matter between:


BLIND SA Applicant

and

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA First Respondent

SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Second Respondent

CHAIRPERSON OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF PROVINCES Third Respondent

MINISTER OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND
COMPETITION Fourth Respondent

MINISTER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
AND COOPERATION Fifth Respondent

and

MEDIA MONITORING AFRICA TRUST Amicus Curiae



Neutral citation: Blind SA v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
[2025 ] ZACC 9

Coram: Madlanga ADCJ, Kollapen J, Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Rogers J,
Seegobin AJ, Theron J, Tolmay AJ and Tshiqi J


Judgment: Mhlantla J (unanimous )

Heard on: 28 November 2024

Interim order : 13 December 2024

Decided on: 7 May 2025

Summary: Copyright Act 98 of 1978 — direct access — urgen t relief after
lapse of section 13A reading -in order — interim order to protect
rights of persons with visual and print disabilities — section 19D
reading -in order




ORDER



On application for direct access :
1. Direct access is granted.
2. Pending the coming into force of legislation remedying the constitutional
defects in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as identified by this Court’s
judgment and order of 21 September 2022 , the Copyright Act 98 of 1978
shall be deemed to include a section 19D reading as follows :
“Section 19D.
(1) An authori sed entity, or any person as may be prescribed and who
serves persons with disabilities may, without the authori sation of
the copyright owner, make an accessible format copy for the
benefit of a person with a disability, supply that accessible format
copy to a person with a disability by any means, including by non -
commercial lending or by digital communication by wire or
wireless means, and undertake any intermediate steps to achieve
these objectives, if the following conditions are met:
(a) The person wishing to undertake any activity under this
subsection must have lawful access to the copyrig ht work or
a copy of that work;
(b) in converting the copyright work to an accessible format
copy, the integrity of the original work must be respected,
taking due consideration of the changes needed t o make the
work accessible in that alternative format and of the
accessibility needs of the persons with a disability; and
(c) the activity under this subsection must be undertaken on a
non-profit basis .
(2) (a) A person to whom the work is communicated by wire or
wireless means as a result of an activity under subsection (1)
may, without the authori sation of the owner of the copyright
work, reproduce the work, where that person is a person —
(i) with a disabil ity, for their personal use; or
(ii) who serves persons with disabilities, including an
authori sed entity, for personal use by a person with
a disability.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) are without prejudice to any
other limitations or exceptions that the person referred to in
that paragraph may en joy.
(3) A person with a disability, or someone acting on their behalf,
including an authori sed entity, may make an accessible format
copy of a work for the personal use of the person with a disability
or otherwise may assist the person with a disability t o make and
use accessible format copies where the person with a disability has
lawful access to th at work or a copy of that work.
(4) (a) A person with a disability or a person who serves persons
with disabilities, including an authoris ed entity, may,
without the authoris ation of the copyright owner export to,
or import from, another country any legal copy of an
accessible format copy of a work for distribution, or to make
it available to persons with a disability, as long as such
activity is undertaken on a non-profit basis by that person.
(b) A person contemplated in paragraph (a) may not export or
import an accessible format copy where such person knows,
or has reason to know, that the accessible format copy will
be used for purposes other than to aid persons with a
disability.
(5) The exception created by this section is subject to the obligation of
indicating the source and the name of the author, if it appears on
the work, on any accessible format copy.
(6) For the purposes of this section 19D—
(a) ‘accessible format copy’ means a copy of a work in an
alternative manner or form, which gives a person with a
disability access to the work, including to permit the person
to have access as feasibly and comfortably as a person
without a disability;
(b) ‘authoris ed entity’ means —
(i) an entity that is authoris ed or recognised by the
government to provide education, instructional
training, adaptive reading or information access to
persons with a disability on a non -profit basis; or
(ii) an entity, includi ng a government institution or non -
profit organis ation that provides education,
instructional training, adaptive reading or
information access to persons with a disability on a
non-profit basis as one of its primary activities or
institutional obligations .
(c) ‘person with a disability’ means a person who has a
physical, intellectual, neurological, or sensory impairment
and who requires the work to be in a format that enables that
person to access and use the work in the same manner as a
person without a di sability; and
(d) ‘commercial’ means the obtaining of economic advantage
or financial gain in connection with a business or trade.”
3. The reading -in of section 19D shall remain in effect until the remedial
legislation contemplated in paragraph 2 comes into f orce.
4. The President of the Republic of South Africa must pay the costs of this
application including the costs of two counsel .


JUDGMENT




MHLANTLA J (Madlanga ADCJ, Kollapen J, Mathopo J, Rogers J, Seegobin AJ,
Theron J, Tolmay AJ and Tshiqi J concurring ):


Introduction
[1] On 13 December 2024, this Court issued an interim order pending the final
determination of the matter. The terms of the order were as follows:

“1. The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 shall be deemed to in clude the following
provisions:
‘Section 13A Exceptions applicable to beneficiary persons
(1) For the purposes of section 13A —
MHLANTLA J
6 (a) ‘accessible format copy ’ means a copy of a work in an alternative
manner or form which gives a beneficiary person access to the work,
including to permit the person to have access as feasibly and
comfortably as a person without visual impairment or other print
disability. The ac cessible format copy must be used exclusively by
beneficiary persons, and it must respect the integrity of the original
work, taking due consideration of the changes needed to make the
work accessible in the alternative format and of the accessibility
need s of the beneficiary persons;
(b) ‘beneficiary person ’ means a person who —
(i) is blind;
(ii) has a visual impairment or a perceptual or reading
disability which cannot be improved to give visual
function substantially equivalent to that of a person who
has no such imp airment or disability and so is unable to
read printed works to substantially the same degree as a
person without an impairment or disability; or
(iii) is otherwise unable, through physical disability, to hold or
manipulate a book or to focus or move the eyes to the
extent that would normally be acceptable for reading
regardless of any other disabilities;
(c) ‘literary works ’ means literary works as defined in section 1 of this
Act, and shall be taken to include artistic works forming part of a
literary work;
(d) ‘permit ted entity ’ means an entity, including a government
institution or non -profit organisation, that provides education,
instructional training, adaptive reading or information access to
beneficiary persons on a non -profit basis, and has the provision of
such services as one of its primary activities or institutional
obligations.
(2) A permitted entity may, without the authorisation of the owner of copyright
in a literary work, make an accessible format copy of the literary work; obtain
from another permitted entit y, an accessible format copy, and supply those
copies to beneficiary persons by any means, including non -commercial
lending or by electronic communication by wire or wireless means, and
undertake any intermediate steps to achieve those objectives, provided that
all of the following conditions are met —
MHLANTLA J
7 (a) the permitted entity wishing to undertake said activity has lawful
access to that work or a copy of that work;
(b) the work is converted to an accessible format copy, which may
include any means needed to navigate information in the accessible
format, but does not introduce changes other than those needed to
make the work accessible to the beneficiary person;
(c) such accessible format copies are supplied exclusively to be used by
beneficiary persons; and
(d) the activity is undertaken on a non -profit basis.
(3) A beneficiary person, or someone acting on their behalf, including a primary
caretaker or caregiver, may make an accessible format copy of a work for the
personal use of the beneficiary person or otherwise may assist th e beneficiary
person to make and use accessible format copies where the beneficiary person
has lawful access to that work or a copy of that work. ’
2. Costs are reserved.
3. Reasons for this order shall be given at a later date. ”

This Court has now considered the matter and made a final determination in respect of
the relief sought . Our reasons for the final order are set out below .

[2] On 8 October 2024, Blind SA, an organisation which advocates for the rights
and empowerment of visually impaired persons in South Africa , filed an urgent
application in this Court for direct access in terms of section 167(4)(e) of the
Constitution read with rules 11 and 12 of this Court’s Rules. The application was
against the President of the Republic of South Afri ca (President), the Speaker of the
National Assembly (Speaker) , the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces
(NCOP) , the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition (Minister) and the Minister
of International Relations and Coop eration. T he Speake r and Chairperson of the NCOP
have filed notic es to abide .

[3] Blind SA sought the following orders —
MHLANTLA J
8 (a) declaring the failure of the President to make a timeous decision on
whether to sign the revised version of the Copyright Amendment Bill1
(CAB) inconsistent with the President’s obligations in terms of
section 79(4) read with section 237 of the Constitution ;2
(b) directing the President to assent to and sign the CAB within 10 days of
the order of this Court ;
(c) in the alternative, directing that from the date of the order, pending
legislation coming into force that would cure the constitutional defect in
the Copyright Act,3 the Act will be dee med to include a new provision,
namely, section 13A; and
(d) ordering the President to pay the costs of this application, includ ing the
costs of two counsel, on an attorney and own client scale, alternatively
jointly by the President and all other respondents who oppose the relief
sought.

[4] It is apposite at this stage to set ou t the circumstances that led to this application .

Backgro und
[5] The legislat ive context began in 2015, when Parliament commenced the process
to amend the Copyright Act. The CAB was originally introduced in the
National Assembly on 10 May 2017. Parliament p assed the CAB on 28 March 2019
and forwarded it to the President for his assent. O n 16 June 2020, the President referred
that version of the CAB a nd the Performers Protection Amendment Bill (PP AB)

1 [B 13B —2017].
2 Section 79(4) of the Constitution provides:
“If, after reconsideration, a Bill fully accommodates the President’s reservations, the President
must assent to and sign the Bill; if not, the President must either
(a) assent to or sign the Bill; or
(b) refer it to the Constitutional Court for a decision on its constitutionality.”
Section 237 of the Constitution states that all constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without
delay.
3 98 of 1978.
MHLANTLA J
9 (originally introduced in the National Assembly on 27 November 2016 ) back to
Parliament for reconsideration as he had reservations about certain p rovisions .

[6] As there was no legislative provision to assist persons with visual and print
disabilities to legally access literary material in accessible formats, clause 19D of the
CAB sought to facilitate such access by providing an exception to copyright for such
persons and those assisting them on a non -profit basis.4 However, this was not possible
as the Bill wa s not signed by the President. As the re was a delay in finalisi ng the
legislative process of amending the Act, Blind SA launched an application in the
High Court in 2021 and challenged the constitutionality of sections 6 and 7 of the
Copyright Act. On 7 December 2021, t he High Court5 granted the application in favour
of Blind SA and made a declaration of invalidity.

[7] On 21 September 2022, the Constitutional Court in Blind SA I6 confirmed the
declaration of invalidity granted by the High Court that sections 6 and 7, read with
section 23 of the Copyright Act, were unconstitutional. This Court held that these
provisions were inconsistent with constitutional rights enumerated in
sections 9(3), 10, 16(1)(b), 29(1) and 30, specifically regarding access rights of persons
with visual and print disabilities. The Court held that requiring copyright owners ’
permission to create accessible formats amounted to a discriminatory barrier that
unfairly prevented people with visual and print disabilities from accessing copyrighted
materials.

[8] The Court , when considering an appropriate remedy, declined to incorporate
clause 19D7 of the CAB , stating that it was excessively broad and lacked the precision

4 This was a provision from an earlier version of the CAB. Clause 19D remains in the present version of the CAB
although it is slightly revised.
5 Blind SA v Minist er of Trade, Industry and Competition [2021 ZAGPPHC 871 (GP).
6 Blind SA v Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition [2022] ZACC 33; 2023 (2) BCLR 117 (CC ).
7 Clause 19D is the National Assembly’s attempt to allow authorised entities or prescribed persons to create,
supply and distribute accessible format copies of copyrig ht works to persons with disabilities without copyright
owner permission, provided they have lawful access to the work, maintain it s integrity, operate non -profit and
properly attribute the source and author.
MHLANTLA J
10 necessary for the spec ific case under consideration. As an interim measu re, the Court
read in “section 13A” into the Act, w hich was based on but not identical to clause 19D
of the CAB,8 as well as definitions necessary for the operation of section 13A. The
declaration of invalidity was suspended for a period of 24 months to afford Parliament
an opportunity to cure the legislative defect.

[9] Section 13A established exceptions for persons with visual and print disabilities
by introducing four definitions: “accessible format copy ”, “beneficiary person ”,
“literary works” and “permitted entity ”. These definitions formed the b asis for
conditions permitting the creation of accessible format copies without re quiring
copyright owner s’ authoris ation.

[10] On 29 February 2024, Parliament passed the revised versions of the CAB and
PPAB and, on or about 2 March 2024 , resubmitted the Bill s to the President for his
assent and signature.

[11] On 23 April 2024, Blind SA sent a letter to the President requesting him to sign
the CAB. Between 10 May 2024 and 3 0 June 2024, the national elections were held,
the incumbent President was re-elected and a new cabinet formed. On 7 August 2024,
Blind SA sent another letter to the President imploring him to sign the CAB. In that
letter, Blind SA indicated that it would launch an urgent application in the event the
President failed to sign the CAB before the expiry of the suspension period. On
12 September 2024, Blind SA sent a letter to the Presidency to enquire about progress ,
adding that it would have to proceed with litigation if the President failed to act.
Blind SA received a response to the effect that the President was attending to the matter.
It was advised that the deadline for the expiry of the suspension of the declaration of
invalidity did not apply to the President . Notwithstanding the requests from Blind SA
for the Pre sident to sign the Bi ll, he did not do so.


8 It was also formulated through reference to t he Marrakesh VIP Treaty , see n 10 below. See Blind SA I above
n 6 at paras 105‑8.
MHLANTLA J
11 [12] On 21 September 2024, the suspension period expired without the promulgation
of legislation curi ng the defect . This resulted in the lapse of the interim provisions that
had permitted entities to create accessible format copies under conditions of lawful
access an d non -profit status. Therefore, the declaration of invalidity took effect and
persons who previously had the benefit of the reading -in, no longer did .

Application for direct access
[13] On 8 October 2024, Blind SA, clearly troubled by this state of affairs, launched
this application for direct access. The main reason for the application was that the lapse
of the suspension period without any enabling legislation in place left a lacuna (gap) in
the Copyright Act, resulting in the violation of the rights of persons with visual and
print disabilities. Therefore, in the application Blind SA sought an order granting just
and equitable relief and that section 13A should be kept in place until legislation is
passed to cu re the constitutional defect. It state d that if the Marrakesh VIP Treaty9 had
been signed and ratified by South Africa , persons with blindness and other visual
impairments in South Africa would be able to access hundreds of thousands of
accessible format copies of literary works from international libraries. According to
Blind SA, facilitating South Africa’s accession to the Marrakesh VIP Treaty is one goal
of this litigation.

[14] Blind SA recognise d that this Court does not have the power to extend the period
of suspension of the declaration of invalidity and the reading -in once that period has
expired, but contend ed that this Court has the power to grant just and equitable relief in
terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution . It also sought an order di recting that
costs be paid by the President , or jointly by him and those respondents who elect to
oppose the relief sought . It contend ed that the request for costs aligns with the urgency
of bringing this application due to the President ’s failure to make a timeous decision on
the CAB by the deadli ne.

9 Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or
Otherwise Print Disabled (2013) 52 ILM 1309 administered by the World Intellectual Property Organis ation
(Marrakesh VIP Treaty) .
MHLANTLA J
12
[15] On 14 October 2024, the Presi dent ref erred the CAB and the PP AB to this Court
in terms of sections 79(4)(b) and 84(2)(c) of the Constitution for a determination of
constitutional validity. These reservations concerned provisions unrelated to the
updated version of clause 19D of the CAB. The President ’s referral confirmed that
Parliament had address ed some of his previous concerns but it stated that he still had
reservations about certain pr ovisions.

[16] On 2 2 October 2024, the Court issued directions consolidating both matters for
an urgent hearing scheduled for 28 November 2024. The Court also directed the
respondents to file their opposing papers and written submissions within prescribed
timelines.

[17] In light of the referral matter, on 18 October 2024 Blind SA filed a
supplementary affidavit stating that it no longer sought the relief in prayers 2 and 3.
Blind SA stated that the matter was urgent ; litigating the present application and the
President’s referral10 on a non -urgent basis would delay the finalisation of its case by
more than a year.

[18] On 29 October 2024 , the President filed his answering affidavit in which he
submitted th at the matter was not urgent, this Court’s jurisdiction was not engaged and
that the matter was moot. The President state d that he had given due attention to the
CAB and the PP AB. He refute d the allegation that he had failed to act within a
reasonable time. He explained that the referral of the CAB and PP AB to this Court after
the expiry of the suspension period was due to the national elections and formati on of
a new government, which resulted in his team requir ing time to prepare a memorandum
on the Bills and parliamentary submissions and to obtain legal opin ion fr om the
state attorney. He submitte d that he was not in a position to sign the Bill when the

10 Blind SA argues that this referral will likely take longer than the referral in Ex parte President of the Republic
of South Africa: In re Constitutionality of the Liquo r Bill [1999] ZACC 15; 2000 (1) SA 732 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR
1 (CC) , which was a less complex matter and yet still took eight months and resulted in the Liquor Bill being
found unconstitutional.
MHLANTLA J
13 suspension period of the declaration of invalidity expired and t hat he was not reacting
to Blind SA’s application when he filed the referral application . The President did not
oppose the relief sought in prayer 4 of Blind SA’s notice of motion but sought a costs
order against it .11

[19] On 31 October 2024, Blind SA filed its amended notice of motio n, in which it
stated that the only relief that was sought related to prayers 1, 4 and 5 (these are now
prayers 1, 2 and 3 of the amended notic e of motion).12 On the same day, Blind SA, in
its replying affidavit , challenged the President’s repeated assertions that this Court’s
order in Blind SA I is not relevant to him, even though he was the only person in a
position to assent to the Bill following the passing of the CAB by Parliament . On
6 November 2024 , Media Monitoring Africa Trust (MMA) filed an application for
admission as amicus curiae .

[20] On 11 November 2024, the Minister filed a condonation application, a notice to
abide and an explanatory affidavit regarding the stance of the Department of Trade,
Industry and Competition (Department) on the reading -in of section 13A. The Minister
provided an explanation for the delay and stated that this was due to communication,
procedural and logistical factors. Th e explanatory affidavit provides the history of the
CAB and documents some initial concerns raised in 2018 to 2019 by a technical team
appointed by Parliament a bout clause 19D. These concerns did not relate to the
constitutionality of clause 19D, but rather the alignment of clause 19D with the
Marrakesh VIP Treaty and whether it would meet the three -step test. The Minister
supported an order that would read in section 13A.


11 Seeking interim amendment of the Copyright Act by the inclusi on of section 13A, pending the coming into
force of the CAB.
12 In restating the relief sought, prayer 1 pertains to the applicant ’s request for an urgent hearing pursuant to rule 12
of the Constitutional Court Rules; prayer 2 (formerly prayer 4) is for interim relief in the form of an inclusion of
section 13A in the Copyright Act, pending the enactment of appropriate legislation; and prayer 3 (formerly
prayer 5) is for a costs order on an attorney and client scale, including costs of two counsel, against th e President
or, in the alternative, jointly against the President and all opposing respondents.
MHLANTLA J
14 [21] On 18 November 2024 , Blind SA filed its replying affidavit in response to the
Minister . This was to dispute the Minister’s contention that South Africa has signed
the Marrakesh VIP Treaty . First, Blind SA state d that South Africa has not acceded to
the Marrakesh VIP Treaty. It also highlight ed that since this Court’s order in 2022,
South Africa has still not acceded to the Treaty and despite numerou s requests for the
Department to initiate the processes to do so , it is not clear whether it has taken any
such steps . Blind SA point ed to the fact that nowhere in the Minister’s papers does he
confirm that the Department will regard section 13A as providing a sufficient basis for
the country’s accession to the Marrakesh VIP Treaty.

[22] On 20 November 2024, the Court separated this matter from the President’s
referral and admitted MMA as amicus curiae . The separation was on the basis that
Blind SA’s application would be adjudicated urge ntly while the President’s referral
would be decided in the ordinary course.

Submissions by the parties
[23] Blind SA submitted that t his Court’s jurisdiction is engag ed because the relief
sought is an order that would effectively vary or supplement this Court’s order in
Blind SA I. It relied on Ex Parte Home Affairs13 for the proposition that “the variation
of orders is a constitutional matter , within this Court’s jurisdiction ”14 and that only this
Court has the power to vary its own orders .15 Furthermore, i f direct access is refused ,
persons w ith visual and print disabilities would have to wait for the enactment of the
CAB and this could tak e years depending on the outcome of the referral case. During
that time, the rights of persons with visual and print disabi lities would be unrealised.
Therefore , it is in the interests of justice for this Court to grant direct access.


13 Ex parte Minister of Home Affairs : In re Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs [2023] ZACC
34; 2024 (1) BCLR 70 (CC); 2024 (2) SA 58 (CC) .
14 Id at para 29.
15 Id at para 10.
MHLANTLA J
15 [24] Initially, the President , in his answering affidavit, submitted that no case had
been made out for direct access. However, in the written submissions , the President
appears to accept that this Court’s jurisdiction is engaged and that the matter is urgent.
He has no objection to the updated relief sought by Blind SA save for the costs order
against him, which he opposes.

[25] On urgency, Blind SA recognises that the majority of case law about urgency in
relation to app lications for extensions of declarations of invalidity concern applications
made close to the expiry of the suspen sion period . It submits that appropriate r elief is
urgently required to clarify the pos ition of persons with visual and print disabilities and
those they rely on to make or obtain these accessible format copies. Another potentially
indefinite delay to th e amendment of the Copyright Act is not justified considering the
length of time the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities have been violated.
This was recognised by this Court in Blind SA I, in terms of which this Court held that
persons w ith visual and print disabilities needed to be provided with immediate relief
to address the continuing infringement of their rights.16 Despite Parliament having
fulfilled it s obligation to pass legislation to cure the constitutional defect, clause 19D
has not been promulgated and the Court’s reading -in of section 13A is no longer
operative.

[26] Blind SA asks this Court to grant just and equitable relief and that section 13A
should be kept in place until legislation is passed to cure the constitutional defe ct. This
would remove the uncertainty that exists regarding the current pos ition of persons with
visual and print disabilities and wo uld facilitate South Africa’s acces sion to the
Marrakesh VIP Treaty, which has been put on hold indefinitely .17


16 Blind SA I above n 6 at para 102.
17 South Africa had previously indicated that it would not sign the Marrakesh VIP Treaty until its laws were
aligned with it. Despite this, even when this Court read section 13A into the Copyright Act, which supposedly
aligned South Africa’s copyright regime with the Marrak esh VIP Treaty, South Africa still did not sign or ratify
the treaty.
MHLANTLA J
16 [27] Blind SA argues that this Court is able to vary or supplement its order in the
manner sought . It relies on LAMOSA ,18 in which this Court confirmed the principle that
it has the power to vary its orders, although this power must be sparingly exercised.19

[28] Blind SA submits that the Court is not obliged to read in section 13A as an
interim measure but could read in the current version of clause 19D of the CAB and the
definitions it relies upon ( the current version is slightly different from the previous
version of clause 19D considered by the C ourt in Blind SA I) as Parliament has chosen
this provision to cure the constitutional defect in the Copyright Act. Alternatively, this
option is made possible by this Court’s judgment in EFF II,20 in which this Court held
that t he power to grant just and equitable relief is “so wide and flexible that it allows
courts to formulate an order that does not follow prayers in the notice of motion or some
other pleading”.21 Blind SA argues that the current clause 19D is “more user friendly
and better advances the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities”. Therefore,
it would be just and equitable for this Court to revive section 13A or to read in the
current clause 19D in the CAB as the Legislature’s chosen solution, wh ich is also not a
subject of the President’s referral.

[29] On costs, Blind SA argues that if it is successful in relation to its substantive
relief, the President should pay the costs of the application, including the costs of two
counsel and that this should be on a punitive scale . This is due to the delay on the part
of the President to make a decision on the CAB before the expiry of the suspension
period and the declara tion of invalidity taking effect . Secondly, the President failed to

18 Speaker of the National Assembly v Land Access Movement of South Africa [2019] ZACC 10; 2019 (5) BCLR
619 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 568 (CC) .
19 Id at para 15. In its written submissions, Bli nd SA gives several examples of where this Court has exercised
this discretion , see Acting Speaker of the National Assembly v Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Childr en [2015]
ZACC 16; 2015 (10) BCLR 1129 (CC) ( Teddy Bear Clinic ) at para 12; Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services v Ramuhovhi [2019] ZACC 44; 2020 (3) BCLR 300 (CC) ( Ramuhovhi II) at para 9 ; and Electoral
Commission of South Africa v Speaker of the National Assembly [2018] ZACC 46; 2019 (3) BCLR 289 (CC)
(Electoral Commission of South Africa ) at paras 69-70.
20 Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly [2017] ZACC 47; 2018 (2) SA 571 (CC );
2018 (3) BCLR 259 (CC) .
21 Id at para 211.
MHLANTLA J
17 inform the parties that he would not be able to make a decision in time, forcing Blind SA
to approach the Court after the declaration of invalidity had expired and thus
jeopardising the rights of persons with print and visual disabilities. The President did
not make it clea r to the parties that he would not be able to decide on time. If he had
informed the parties, Parliament, the Minister or Blind SA could have approached this
Court before the expiry of the suspension of invalidity. Blind SA contends that it was
compelled to approach the Court on an urgent basis because those who should have
ensured the implementation of the order were absent. The President, on his side, rushed
his referral of the CAB to this Court, which strongly suggests he did so in response to
the ini tiation of this case and indicat es that without such pressure, the referral would
have taken longer.

[30] The President has abandoned his initial stance that Blind SA should pay costs
and submits that the Biowatch22 principle applies. Regarding the costs order sought
against the Pr esident, the President submit s that he was not a party to the order in
Blind SA I and, thus, his failure to decide on the CAB before the end of the suspension
of the declaration of invalidity did not contraven e this Court’s order or his constitutional
obligations. He further argues that there is no assertion in Blind SA’s founding affidavit
that the CAB was not prioritised, nor any mention of facts that might support such a
view . Blind SA had thus made out a new case in its replying affidavit – that the
President ought to have prioritised the processing of the CAB , which was not
foreshadowed in its founding affidavit. The Pre sident was not afforded an opportunity
to respond to these averments.

[31] The President argues that there is no basis for a punitive cos ts order against him.
He submits that t he scale of attorney and client costs is extraordinary and should only
be granted in cases where a litigant has acted in “a clear and indubitably vexatious and
reprehen sible manner” to indicate the extreme disapproval of the Court.


22 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources [2009 ] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) ; 2009 (10) BCLR 1014
(CC) .
MHLANTLA J
18 [32] The Minister submits that while the Court has broad and flexible power s to grant
just and equitable relief under section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution to address the
current dispute and ensure constitutional compliance , any reading -in should respect the
legislative process and concerns raised by the President. A just an d equitable remedy
would be one that maintain s section 13A while respecting the separation of powers. In
this regard, t he Minister argues that this Court should be guided by
Ex Parte Home Affairs .

[33] The Minister thus supports the temporary inclusion of section 13A into the
Copyright Act pending legislation curing the defect. He argues that this is necessary to
preserve the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities and align South Africa
with the Marrakesh VIP Treaty, which the Minister believes has been ratified.

[34] Media Monitoring Africa provide d submissions on remedy. It notes that all
parties rely on Ex Parte Home Affairs to justify the view that this Court has the power
to grant supplementary relief . However, it argues that this Court is in a somewhat
unique position in this case : Parliament technically complied with this Court’s order in
Blind SA I but, due to the delay in sign ing the CAB , the intention of the order is
unrealised and as a result the legislative defect is not cured. The Court did not anticipate
that the President’s process in deciding whether to sign the CAB would hinder or delay
the enactmen t of the remedial legislation. This has effectively resulted in the rights of
persons with visual and print disabilities being violated once again .

[35] The amicus refers to the Firestone23 principle that a court has no power to change
or supplement a final ju dgment, unless such change or supplementation relates to
accessory or consequential matters that the court overlooked or accidentally omitted.24
It submits that this Court has developed a “precautionary measures approach” in that,
because of the repeated a pplications for extensions of declarations of invalidity, this

23 Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG 1977 (4) SA 298 (A); [1977] 4 All SA 600 (A) .
24 Id at 306F -H.
MHLANTLA J
19 Court provides an interim reading -in that becomes final if the suspension of the
declaration of invalidity expires. The Court express ed this approach in Levenstein ,25
Centre for Child Law ,26 Women’s Legal Centre Trust27 and Ramuhovhi II.28 The
combination of the precautionary measures approach and the power of courts to
supplement orders culminated in Ex Parte Home Affairs , which MMA submits allows
this C ourt to remedy the lacuna in the current law through granting the just and equitable
relief sought by Blind SA. This Court actually has a constitutional responsibility to
grant supplementary relief because it is clear that , without such relief, the rights of
persons with visual and print disabi lities will be violated again . This Court should also
infuse precautionary measures into its order.29 MMA submits that this Court may grant
the relief proposed by Blind SA or any other relief on an urgent basis and provide
reasons for granting this relief later.

Issues
[36] The central issues for determination by this Court are as follows:
(a) Firstly, whether this Court retains jurisdiction to hear the present
application and whether the application satisfies the requisites of urgency.
(b) Secondly, what form of remedy constitutes just and equitable relief,
considering the lapsed suspension period of the prior declaration of
constitutional invalidity in relation to the Copyright Act.
(c) Thirdly, whether an order for costs against the President and/or the
Minister is warranted in these circumstances.


25 Levenstein v Estate of the Late Sidney Lewis Frankel [2018] ZACC 16; 2018 (2) SACR 283 (CC) ; 2018 (8)
BCLR 921 (CC) at paras 76 and 89 .
26 Centre for Child Law v Media 24 Limited [2019] ZACC 46; 2020 (3) BCLR 245 (CC); 2020 (4) SA 319 (CC)
at para 128(7).
27 Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa [2022] ZACC 23; 2022 (5) SA 323
(CC); 2023 (1) BCLR 80 (CC) at para s 86(1.7)-(1.9).
28 Ramuhovhi II above n 20 at para 12.
29 Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa [2017] ZACC 41; 2018 (2) BCLR 217 (C C); 2018 (2)
SA 1 (CC) at paras 50 and 71.
MHLANTLA J
20 Analysis
[37] During the hearing of the matter, there was no dispute between the parties that
this matter was urgent and that the Court’s jurisdi ction is engaged. I agree , this Court
is the only court w ith the competency to supplement its orders. This matter is also about
the protection of the constitutional rights of the visually and print -disabled persons
pending the coming into force of remedial legislation. Therefore, this Court’s
jurisdiction is e ngaged.

[38] The matter is urgent as the persons represented by Blind SA find themselves in
a precarious position because they no longer enjoy the protection of this Court’s order
and are now without an effective remedy. The urgency here stems from the lacuna
created by the lapsed suspension period of the declaration of constitutional invalidity
and the resultant lapsing of section 13A’s reading -in provisions. This gap creates an
immediate breach of the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities – rights that
section 13A previously safeguarded. Similarly, Blind SA approached this Court
approximately ten days after the expiry of the suspension period, notwithstanding the
fact that it did not have any res ponsibility to cure the defects . In my view, questioning
whether they could have acted sooner would misplace the constitutional burden. No
party contests the pressing nature of this application and that the potential violation of
rights demands immediate attention.

[39] The remaining issues that req uire the Court’s attention relate to the determination
of just, supplementary and equ itable relief and whether the President and /or the Minister
should pay the costs of the application .

[40] During the hearing , Blind SA submitted that , at a minimum, a just and eq uitable
solution would be to effectively reinstate section 13A until it is no longer required.
Alternatively, Parliament ’s chosen solution of clause 19D, which has been delayed only
by the referral matter and which may provide a more comprehensive remedy , should be
read in. Counsel for the President and the Minister supported Blind SA’s position and
MHLANTLA J
21 urged us to read in the current version of clause 19D until legislation to cure the defect
in the Copyright Act comes into force .

[41] In Hoërskool Ermelo ,30 this Court held that in deciding on a remedy in a
constitutional matter within this Court’s power, the “litmus test will be whether
considerations of justice and equity in a particular case dictate that the order be made”.31
The Court further held that the powe r to order just and equitable relief is available even
though the case is not one in which a court makes a declaration of invalidity nor one in
which the outcome hinge s on constitutional invalidity. T o do this, the Court reasoned,
places substance over form.32

[42] In LAMOSA , this Court confirmed “that courts do have the discretion to vary
their orders, albeit that this discretion must be exercised sparingly ”.33 This Court has
exercised such discretion to extend suspension periods where Parliament failed to cure
constitutional defects timeously .34

[43] This Court in Blind SA I declared that the provisions of the Copyright Act were
constitutionally invalid and provided interim relief it considered just and equitable at
the time.35 The circumstances have since evolved: after two years, the interim reading -
in remedy has lapsed without the defect having been cured, creating uncertainty and
postponing access ion to the Marrakesh VIP Treaty. Indeed, the failure to promulgate
the CAB within 24 months has created a le gislative gap, reverting to the position before
this Court ’s original order. This situation requires balancing the immediate need for
protection against the necessity of ensuring constitutionally compliant legislation

30 Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo [2009] ZACC 32 ; 2010 (2)
SA 415 (CC); 2010 (3) BCLR 177 (CC).
31 Id at para 96.
32 Id at para 97.
33 LAMOSA above n 18 at para 25.
34 Teddy Bear Clinic above n 20, considering factors in Ramuhovhi II above n 20 at para 9 and
Electoral Commission above n 20 at paras 69-70.
35 See Blind SA I above n 6.
MHLANTLA J
22 satisfactory to both the President an d Parliament. The retention of section 13A is
proposed as an appropriate solution, as it would continue to protect visually and print -
impaired persons ’ constitutional rights to equality, dignity and education under
sections 9, 10, and 29 of the Constituti on.

[44] As the suspension period has lapsed, no exten sion may be granted. However,
this Court has the power to order just and equitable relief if justice so demands and as
long as that does not revive statutory provisions that have been declared invalid and
where such de claration has taken effect. T herefore , this Court has to determine a just
and equitable remedy rather than an extension of a suspension of an order of
constitutional invalidity. The parties are not arguing otherwise, correctly so.

[45] As to whe n such a just and equitable order may be sought, this Court in
Ex Parte Home Affairs considered whether it could vary an order where the suspension
period had expired, leaving an uncert ain legal framework. It recognis ed its power under
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution “to order supplementary just and equitable relief
to provide [legal] certainty ”,36 explaining :

“The legal question is what, under the circumstances, would qualify as a just and
equitable order? To determine this, we must adopt the appr oach set out in Ntuli , Zondi ,
Minister of Social Development and Cross -Border Roads Transport Agency , where this
Court considered:
(a) the nature of the constitutional defects;
(b) the harm caused by the failure to pass remedial legislation; and
(c) the remedies proposed by the parties.
. . .
As stated, this C ourt cannot revive statutory provisions after . . . suspension. But there
is nothing in our law that precludes us from ordering amplified just and equitable relief
to supplement the [original] order. An amp lification . . . by adding a modified version
of the invalid [provisions ] is not a reading -in . . . following upon a declaration of . . .

36 Ex Parte Home Affair s above n 13 at para 40.
MHLANTLA J
23 invalidity. Instead, it is a free -standin g judicial remedy in terms of
section 172(1)(b). ”37

[46] In the above case, t he Court granted the order three years after the expiry of the
suspension period of a declaration of invalidity and six years since the original order of
constitutional invalidity was made. In the present case, the applicant approached us
around ten days after the suspension p eriod ended.

[47] Important ly, in granting a supplementary just and equitable order, one must be
mindful of the legal framework at play. Section 13A was read into the Copyright Act
as a whole and functioned as a standalone provision. The constitutional defect that
necessitated this Court ’s intervention did not lie in any specific provision of the
Copyright Act that needed to be struck down, but rather in the absence of necessary
provisions to protect the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities. Section 13A
was designed to function as an interim measure to fill this gap. The President ’s current
referral of the CAB raises distinct constitutional questions about that Bill ’s provisions,
which cannot affect the existing Copyrigh t Act as the CAB has not yet been enacted
into law. Therefore, our task is to craft an appropriate interim remedy that addresses
the lapsed suspension period while the legislative process takes its course.

[48] The factors outlined in this Court’s judgments require a careful balancing to
determine whether justice demands reading in section 13A or clause 19D along with
necessary ancillary provisions. The traditional considerations from Zondi II38 and
LAMOSA , inclu ding explanations for failing to remedy the defects timeously, the
adequacy of proposed extensions and comparative prejudice,39 do not align precisely
with the circumstances of the current matter . Unlike typical cases, there is no proposed
timeline for a parliamentary remedy, as the CAB remain s before this Court for

37 Id at paras 30 and 40.
38 Zondi v Member of the Executive Council for Traditional and Local Government Affairs [2005] ZACC 18; 2006
(3) SA 1 (CC) ; 2006 (3) BCLR 423 (CC) .
39 Id at para 46 and LAMOSA above n 18 at paras 32-6.
MHLANTLA J
24 determination as to whether certain provisions pass constitutional muster . Therefore,
any relief granted must operate pending the coming into force of the legislation .

[49] The potential violation of fundamental rights emerges as the decisive
consideration, particularly given the absence of certainty regarding the Bill ’s eventual
assent. The interests of justice therefore compel the provision of remedial relief. This
approach is aligned with the a pproach in Ex Parte Home Affairs where this Court
focused on three main factors, namely, the natu re of the constitutional defect, the harm
ensuing due to the lacuna and the suggested remedies for consideration in determining
a supplementary just and equita ble order .40 I proceed to deal with that question.

Should this Court grant section 13A or clause 19D relief?
[50] As indicated in this judgment, after the hearing this Court issued an interim order
in the form of section 13A to ensure that the persons with visual and print disabilities
had some form of relief whi lst we were considering the matter. The question wheth er
this Court should grant an order reading in section 13A or the current version of
clause 19D pending the com ing into force of remedial legislation warrants detailed
examination.

[51] There have been concer ns raised about the proposal of reading -in clause 19D and
these relate to piecemeal legislation through judicial intervention, with the provision ’s
perceived ambig uity pre senting significant obstacles . The view was that the reading -in
of clause 19D risked undue intrusion into legislative domain, particularly given its
status within a Bill that has not yet been assented to and signed. The uncertainty
surrounding th e provision ’s final legislative form amplified these concerns about
encroaching on parliamentary prerogatives. Another factor was this Court’s decision
in Blind SA I when it declined to incorporate the previous version of clause 19D on the
basis that it went beyond Blind SA’s constitutional challenge .41

40 Ex Parte Home Affairs above n 13 at para 30.
41 See Blind SA I above n 6 at para 105.
MHLANTLA J
25
[52] While the concerns about judicial overreach are valid, the changed
circumstances , the intention of the Legislature, urgent righ ts protection and the
temporary nature of the remedy , warra nt the reading -in of clause 19D instead of
section 13A. Furthermore, t he convergence of all respondents ’ positions supporting
clause 19D as the just and equitable remedy, coupled with their comprehensive legal
arguments, provide compelling grounds th at a reading -in of clause 19D is an
appropriate order for the reasons set out below.

[53] First, u nlike in Blind SA I, clause 19D has undergone substantial revision and
notably is not one of the provisions in the President ’s referral matter where he has
constitutional reservatio ns. The previous barriers that prevented its incorporation have
been resolved through proper constitutional tagg ing and parliamentary scrutiny . The
provision previously fell short due to specific deficiencies: its narrow scope, critical
dependence on sub ordinate legislation, procedural flaws in legislative tagging and
incomplete drafting. These fundamental limitations necessitated this Court ’s crafting
of section 13A as a temporary relief which, while embodying clause 19D’s core
principles, addressed imm ediate needs. Section 13A was explicitly designed as an
interim measure and has since lapsed, requiring fresh consideration of relief
mechanisms within the current constitutional framework.

[54] Second, clause 19D represents Parliament ’s chosen solution, havi ng already
passed through the legislative process. Reading it in as an interim measure respects
rather than undermines legislative prerogatives, as it implements Parliament ’s
considered remedy while tec hnical processes are completed . The 2024 iteration o f
clause 19D demonstrates a marked evolution through proper constitutional tagging and
rigorous parliamentary scrutiny. It has developed into a broader provision
encompassing artistic works and multiple formats, reflecting both procedural
improvements and substantive enhancement of its legal architecture.

MHLANTLA J
26 [55] Third, the laps ing of section 13A has created an immediate rights vacuum
affecting the constitutional rights of visually and print -impaired persons, therefore, it is
imperative that these rights are prot ected. Clause 19D provides a more comprehensive
framework aligned with both constitutional imperatives and international obligations,
particularly the Marrakesh VIP Treaty. A detailed comparative analysis between
section 13A and clause 19D reveals fundamental distinctions. Where section 13A
provided restricted relief focused solely on visual or print disabilities, clause 19D
establishes a comprehensive scheme aligned with contemporary disability rights
jurisprudence. Clause 19D incorpo rates essential cross -border provisions mandated by
the Marrakesh VIP Treaty, enabling international exchange of accessible ‑format
copies – a vital element entirely absent from section 13A. The provision carefully
balances accessibility requirements with copyright protections through specific
attribution requirements and detailed safeguards against misuse, particularly in
international transfers.

[56] These substantive improvements render clause 19D a more robust and legally
sustainable framework. Its structu re harmoni ses with both evolving disability rights ’
principles and South Africa ’s international obligations, providing essential flexibility,
durability and clarity for meaningful relief. Reading in clause 19D as interim relief
achieves an appropriate bal ance between constitutional imperatives, legislative intent
and pressing accessibility needs in a manner that section 13A, with its inherent
limitations, could not accomplish.

[57] The international dimension merits consideration, though requires careful
articulation. While South Africa played a significant r ole in negotiating the
Marrakesh VIP Treaty in 2013, it has not yet acceded to the treaty. Thus, South Africa
does not currently bear binding international obligations under this instrument.
Nevertheless , clause 19D’s framework represents an advancement over section 13A’s
limited scope, particularly in its provision for cross -border exchange of accessible -
format copies. This alignment with international best practices in disability rights
protectio n, as embodied in the Marrakesh VIP Treaty, would place South Africa in an
MHLANTLA J
27 advantageous position should it choose to accede to the treaty in future. Furthermore ,
clause 19D’s comprehensive approach to accessibility rights better serves the
constitutional imperatives of equality and dignity for persons with disabilities. The
provision maintains its constitutional integrity and remains separate from the concerns
raised in the President ’s referral.

[58] Lastly, the separation of powers concerns that initially weighed against
clause 19D can now be resolved through established constitutional principles with
minimal procedural complexity. Framing the relief as temporary and interim in nature –
pending p residential assent – avoids judicial overreach into legislative or executive
domains . The Court, which is not bound by the previous relief due to its expiry,
possesses the constitutional authority to formulate the most appropriate solut ion. As
counsel persuasively argued during the hearing, while nomenclature may vary, the
substantive constitutional effect remains constant. The reading -in would be temporary
in nature, serving as an interim bridge ensuring that the CAB ’s stated objectiv es persist
despite procedural delays, particularly given the uncertain trajectory of the referral
matter , and will remain until the formal legislative process is finalised. This approach
balances the need to protect constitutional rights with respect for the separation of
powers. This solution represents a pragmatic response to an urgent constitutional need
while maintaining appropriate deference to legislative and executive functions .

[59] The reading -in of clause 19D as an interim measure would neither impe de
Parliament ’s ongoing legislative functions nor compromise its broader constitutional
objectives. Parliament ’s permanent legislative remedy, though delayed by the referral
process, would remain intact and preserved for implementation upon the CAB ’s
eventual assent. The fact that the order will be an interim one should allay any fears
regarding the legislative process that will follow, including the signing of the
Marrakesh VIP Treaty . It must be borne in mind that the clause 19D relief is not merel y
a question of the p arties agreeing to it, but Parliament has already passed this provis ion
and the President did not raise any issue with it.

MHLANTLA J
28 [60] In the result , it would be just and equitable for this Court to make an order that
would essentially supplement its 2022 order, to ensure its effectiveness. It would be
unacceptable for this Court to permit a delay of more than a year in the realisation of
the rights of persons with visual and print disabilities in light of the President’s referral.
It follows that an orde r must be issued to protect their constitutional rights. For this
purpose, clause 19D and the relevant definitions contained in the current version of the
CAB as passed by Parliament will be in operation until the coming into force of the
CAB.

Costs
[61] Initially, Blind SA sought a punitive costs order against the President. During
the hearing, counsel for Blind SA indicated that it no longer seeks a punitive costs order .

[62] While many respondents participated in these proceedings, the President ’s
unique constitutional position and responsibilities distinguish his role. The President
alone possessed both the authority and knowledge to prevent this litigation. His failure
to act timeously regarding the CAB , or at minimum alert other parties to pote ntial
delays, effectively necessitated these proceedings. The President failed to communicate
with any of the parties that he would not be able to make a decision on the CAB before
the expiry of the declaration of invalidity. In my view, his lack of comm unication
resulted in the suspension period of the declaration of invalidity expiring without any
party b eing able to launch proceedings in advance, to extend the suspension of
invalidity. Blind SA’s a pplication cannot be characteris ed as frivolous or vexatious. It
was caused by the President ’s delay in addressing the CAB some seven months after
parliamentary passage. Blind SA demonstrated procedural diligence by its enquiries
and prompt filing of supplementary documentation.

[63] The p osition of other respondents – including the Chairperson of the NCOP and
the Minister – differs materially, as they had fulfilled their duties and lacked the
knowledge that the relief would expire due to the President ’s decision not to sign the
CAB . Had t he President exercised appropriate diligence in either making a timely
MHLANTLA J
29 decision or seeking an extension, rather than maintaining prolonged silence after
parliamentary passage of the CAB , Blind SA’s approach to this Court might have been
avoided entirely . The dilatory approach to this matter is not acceptable and this Court
cannot condone it. Therefore, the President must pay Blind SA’s costs.

[64] During the hearing, Blind SA sought an order that the Minister should pay its
costs for the filing of the replyin g affidavit. Blind SA submitted that it was compell ed
to file a reply due to the error in t he Minister’s affidavit. I am not persuaded by this
argument as the Minister was an abiding party and merely filed an explanatory affidavit .

Order
[65] In the result, the following order is made:
1. Direct access is granted.
2. Pending the coming into force of legislation remedying the constitutional
defects in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as identified by this Court’s
judgment and order of 21 September 2022 , the Copyright Act 98 of 1978
shall be deemed to include a section 19D reading as follows :
“Section 19D.
(1) An authoris ed entity, or any person as may be prescribed and who
serves persons with disabilities may, without the authoris ation of
the copyright owner, make an accessible format copy for the
benefit of a person with a disability, supply that accessible format
copy to a person with a disability by any means, including by non -
commercial lending or by digital communication by wire or
wireless means, and und ertake any intermediate steps to achieve
these objectives, if the following conditions are met :
(a) The person wishing to undertake any activity under this
subsection must have lawful access to the copyright work or
a copy of that work;
MHLANTLA J
30 (b) in converting t he copyright work to an accessible format
copy, the integrity of the original work must be respected,
taking due consideration of the changes needed to make the
work accessible in that alternative format and of the
accessibility needs of the persons with a disability; and
(c) the activity under this subsection must be undertaken on a
non-profit basis .
(2) (a) A person to whom the work is communicated by wire or
wireless means as a result of an activity under subsection (1)
may, without the authoris ation of the owner of the copyright
work, reproduce the work, where that person is a person —
(i) with a disability, for their personal use; or
(ii) who serves persons with disabilities, including an
authoris ed entity, for personal use by a person with
a disability.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) are without prejudice to any
other limitations or exceptions that the person referred to in
that paragraph may enjoy.
(3) A person with a disability, or someone acting on their behalf,
including an authoris ed entity, may make an accessible format
copy of a work for the personal use of the person with a disability
or otherwise may assist the person with a disability to make and
use accessible format copies where the person with a disability has
lawful access to that wor k or a copy of that work.
(4) (a) A person with a disability or a person who serves persons
with disabilities, including an authoris ed entity, may,
without the authoris ation of the copyright owner export to,
or import from, another country any legal copy o f an
accessible format copy of a work for distribution, or to make
MHLANTLA J
31 it available to persons with a disability, as long as such
activity is undertaken on a non -profit basis by that person.
(b) A person contemplated in paragraph (a) may not export or
import a n accessible format copy where such person knows,
or has reason to know, that the accessible format copy will
be used for purposes other than to aid persons with a
disability.
(5) The exception created by this section is subject to the obligation of
indica ting the source and the name of the author, if it appears on
the work, on any accessible format copy.
(6) For the purposes of this section 19D—
(a) ‘accessible format copy’ means a copy of a work in an
alternative manner or form, which gives a person with a
disability access to the work, including to permit the person
to have access as feasibly and comfortably as a person
without a disability;
(b) ‘authoris ed entity’ means —
(i) an entity that is authoris ed or recognised by the
government to provide education, instructional
training, adaptive reading or information access to
persons with a disability on a non -profit basis; or
(ii) an entity, including a government institution or non -
profit organis ation that provides education,
instructional training, adaptive reading or
information access to persons with a disability on a
non-profit basis as one of its primary activities or
institutional obligations.
(c) ‘person with a disability’ means a person who has a
physical, intellectual, neurological, or sensor y impairment
MHLANTLA J
32 and who requires the work to be in a format that enables that
person to access and use the work in the same manner as a
person without a disability;
(d) ‘commercial’ means the obtaining of economic advantage
or financial gain in connection wit h a business or trade.”
3. The reading -in of section 19D, shall remain in effect until the remedial
legislation contemplated in paragraph 2 comes into force .
4. The President of the Republic of South Africa must pay the costs of this
application including the costs of two counsel .


For the Applicant :


For the First Respondent :



For the Fourth Respondent:


For the Amicus Curiae:

J Berger and M Rasivhetshele instructed
by Section 27

N Bawa SC, R Tulk and S Kazee
instructed by Office of the State
Attorney , Pretoria

S Baloyi SC and L Phasha instructed by
Office of the State Attorney, Pretoria

M Power and T Power instruc ted by
Power and Associates Incorporated