SN obo ON v MEC for Health: Eastern Cape (277/2023) [2025] ZASCA 36 (2 April 2025)

80 Reportability
Personal Injury Law - Medical Negligence

Brief Summary

Delict — Medical negligence — Failure to monitor during labour — Appellant claimed damages for brain injury to child due to alleged negligence of hospital staff — Hospital staff failed to adequately monitor foetal heart rate and respond to signs of distress — High Court dismissed claim, finding no negligence — Appeal upheld, finding negligence established and causation linked to child’s brain damage — MEC ordered to pay damages.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa arising from a medical negligence delictual claim (Lex Aquilia) for damages allegedly caused during labour and delivery at a public hospital.


The appellant was SN, acting on behalf of her minor child, ON. The respondent was the Member of the Executive Council for Health: Eastern Cape, cited on the basis that the MEC would be vicariously liable for the conduct of hospital staff at Madzikane KaZulu Memorial Hospital.


The matter originated in the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Mthatha, where the parties separated merits (liability) and quantum. The issues for determination were negligence and causation. After trial, the high court dismissed the claim with costs, having found that the nursing staff’s monitoring was not substandard and that the “loose” nuchal cord did not cause the injury. The appeal was brought with the leave of the high court.


The general subject-matter was whether inadequate intrapartum monitoring (particularly foetal heart rate monitoring) and management during labour caused ON to suffer hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy resulting in cerebral palsy, and whether such harm was preventable with reasonable care.


2. Material Facts


SN, aged 34, was pregnant with her first child. On 14 February 2013, she experienced labour pains and was admitted to Madzikane KaZulu Memorial Hospital at about 07h30. On admission, her pregnancy was estimated at 36/40 weeks. She was assessed as being in the latent phase of labour. Her foetal heart rate (FHR) at that time was recorded as 142 bpm, the foetus was in a cephalic presentation, and SN’s cervix was 3 cm dilated. Her maternal condition was recorded as good, with normal uterine contractions.


At 10h00, a partogram was commenced. The assessment at that time recorded that labour was progressing, maternal condition remained good, the FHR was 138 bpm, SN was 4 cm dilated, membranes were intact, and there was no caput or moulding. Pethidine was administered for pain.


After 10h00, the documentation showed no further assessment recorded in the Maternity Case Record. The partogram reflected a further assessment at 12h00, although the attending nurse, Sister Bonga, said this assessment occurred between 11h30 and 12h00. At that later assessment, the FHR was recorded as 136 bpm, with no decelerations noted. The liquor was recorded as “broken” with a tinge of meconium, but it was not recorded whether it was thin or thick. The baby’s head was recorded as down completely, with caput and no moulding.


The summary of labour form recorded that SN was fully dilated at 11h15, began bearing down at 11h30, and a male child was born at 12h00. A complication was recorded: the umbilical cord was wrapped three times around the baby’s neck. The records did not state whether the cord was tight or loose.


The neonatal records recorded a live birth with Apgar scores of 7/10 at 1 minute and 8/10 at 5 minutes. ON was described as a “floppy baby”, with a weak Moro reflex and an absent cry, requiring resuscitation. At about 12h30, ON was recorded as lethargic, hypotonic, tachypnoeic with costal recession, with an absent cry. Nursing notes later recorded him as critically ill, cyanosed, requiring supplementary oxygen, nasogastric feeding, and head cooling. ON was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy (HIE). An MRI scan (22 August 2014) was considered diagnostic of hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy, and it was common cause that ON later presented as a child with cerebral palsy.


The judgment distinguished between what was in dispute and what was not. It was common cause that ON suffered harm and that the cord was wrapped around his neck. The high court had accepted that monitoring was adequate and that the cord was loose, but the Supreme Court of Appeal treated the monitoring as substandard, noting formal admissions made by the respondent in relation to the applicable monitoring guidelines and the fact that monitoring did not occur at required intervals.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the hospital staff were negligent in monitoring and managing SN’s labour and the foetus, and whether such negligence was causally connected to ON’s hypoxic-ischaemic injury and subsequent cerebral palsy.


The negligence dispute concerned the application of the legal test for negligence to the facts, including a factual evaluation of what monitoring occurred, what a reasonable nurse would have done, and whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable and preventable.


Causation required determination of whether the established injury was caused by an intrapartum hypoxic-ischaemic event and, more specifically, whether the failure to monitor foetal distress and intervene timeously was a factual cause of the brain injury. The court further had to consider the effect of the respondent’s formal admissions arising from the experts’ joint minute, and whether those admissions narrowed or removed causation as a live issue.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Supreme Court of Appeal approached the matter as a delictual claim under the Lex Aquilia, requiring a wrongful act (here, negligent conduct) that causes damage. It held that damage was not in dispute: it was common cause that ON suffered injury and that he was a child with cerebral palsy, supported by the joint minutes of the obstetricians and radiologists.


Evaluation of expert evidence


The court applied the principles on expert evidence articulated in AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape and reiterated the caution from Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another. It emphasised that experts may testify to observed facts, general professional knowledge, and opinions with reasons, and that courts should not too readily reject genuinely held expert views as unreasonable. Equally, a court is not bound to absolve a defendant merely because evidence suggests conduct was in accordance with “sound medical practice”.


Within this framework, the court assessed the competing versions, including the expert opinion of Dr Ebrahim and the nursing evidence of Sister Bonga, who had no independent recollection and largely relied on the records and her usual practice.


Causation and admissions


On causation, the court accepted that the records showed a cord wrapped three times around ON’s neck and that this was recorded as a complication. Dr Ebrahim’s opinion attributed the injury, in the absence of an observable alternative sentinel event, to the cord around the neck as the sentinel event causing hypoxic-ischaemic compromise.


The court placed decisive weight on the respondent’s formal admissions made at trial commencement, referencing the joint minute of the obstetricians (Dr Ebrahim and Dr Frank). It treated the admissions as extending beyond merely acknowledging an expert opinion: it characterised them as free-standing admissions. On this basis, the court held that causation was no longer in dispute, and that it was accepted that a hypoxic-ischaemic event involving reduction or blockage of blood flow caused ON’s injury. With causation effectively settled in this manner, the remaining substantial inquiry was whether the event could have been detected and avoided through reasonable monitoring and intervention.


Negligence (foreseeability, preventability, and standard of care)


The court applied the settled negligence test from Kruger v Coetzee, framed in terms of reasonable foreseeability, reasonable preventability, and failure to take reasonable steps. It noted that foreseeability is a fact-bound enquiry, citing Pitzer v Eskom.


The court identified the applicable standard of care in district hospitals as reflected in the Guidelines for Maternity Care in South Africa (2007). These guidelines required that once a patient is in the active phase (cervix 4 cm dilated), the FHR should be checked every half hour, before, during, and after contractions, and at higher frequency in the second stage.


Applying the guidelines to the established record, the court highlighted substantial gaps: SN was assessed at 10h00 when she was at 4 cm dilation, but there was no recorded monitoring at 10h30 or 11h00, and no recorded monitoring at 11h15 when SN was fully dilated, nor at 11h30 when she began bearing down. The court treated this interval as a critical period during which foetal distress would need to be detected.


The court accepted Dr Ebrahim’s explanation of the physiological mechanism: when foetal oxygen drops substantially, the foetus may exhibit bradycardia and other FHR abnormalities, initially as a defensive response. If the oxygen deficit persists, bradycardia persists and oxygen delivery to vital organs, including the brain, becomes compromised, producing acute injury. The court noted that, on the uncontested evidence, such an episode would ordinarily manifest as FHR decelerations, and that adequate monitoring would typically detect this. In the court’s view, had foetal distress been identified, the maternity guidelines contemplated timeous intervention to expedite delivery, thereby avoiding the injury.


The court found that the nursing evidence did not withstand scrutiny on probabilities. It regarded the recorded FHR of 136 bpm shortly before birth as improbable given the baby’s condition at birth (“floppy”, lethargic, absent cry, needing resuscitation). It further criticised the record-keeping: the nurse recorded the nuchal cord as a complication but did not record whether it was tight or loose; similarly, meconium was recorded without specifying thickness, despite meconium being indicative of foetal stress. The court also regarded as suspicious the nurse’s claim to recall details (such as inserting a finger under the cord to cut it) that were not recorded and contrasted with her general lack of recollection.


On credibility and reliability, the court rejected Sister Bonga as not honest and trustworthy and considered her evidence unreliable. It found Dr Ebrahim’s opinion more probable because it aligned with the probabilities of the overall record and provided reasoned inferences consistent with the established medical mechanism.


Finally, the court observed that nuchal cords are relatively common and do not usually result in cerebral palsy, suggesting that adverse outcomes tend to be avoided where foetal distress is detected early by proper monitoring and addressed with timeous intervention. It held that this was what reasonable nursing staff would have done, and that the respondent’s employees failed to meet this standard.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal with costs. It set aside the high court’s order dismissing the claim and substituted it with an order that the defendant (the MEC) must pay the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damages with costs.


Cases Cited


AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape [2020] ZASCA 89; 2021 (3) SA 337 (SCA)


Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); [1966] 2 All SA 490 (A)


Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another [2001] ZASCA 12; 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA); 2002 1 All SA 384 (SCA)


Pitzer v Eskom [2012] ZASCA 44; 2012 JDR 0507 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that ON suffered hypoxic-ischaemic injury resulting in cerebral palsy and that the injury was most probably caused by a hypoxic-ischaemic event associated with the umbilical cord being wrapped around the neck. It further held that the hospital staff’s monitoring of foetal heart rate during labour was substandard when measured against the applicable national maternity care guidelines and that proper monitoring would likely have detected foetal distress and enabled timeous intervention to prevent the brain injury. The court rejected the attending nurse’s evidence as unreliable, preferred the expert obstetric evidence, and concluded that negligence and causation were established. The appeal succeeded and the MEC was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s damages (agreed or proven) with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A delictual claim under the Lex Aquilia requires proof of a wrongful act (including negligent conduct) causing damage; where damage is common cause, the inquiry focuses on causation and negligence as elements of liability.


The test for negligence is whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have foreseen the reasonable possibility of harm and would have taken reasonable steps to prevent it, and whether the defendant failed to take such steps, as articulated in Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); [1966] 2 All SA 490 (A).


What is reasonably foreseeable is a fact-bound inquiry, as recognised in Pitzer v Eskom [2012] ZASCA 44; 2012 JDR 0507 (SCA).


In evaluating expert evidence, courts consider experts’ roles in providing observed facts, general professional knowledge, and reasoned opinions. Courts should be slow to conclude that genuinely held expert views are unreasonable, but are not bound to accept expert evidence as dispositive of whether conduct was negligent, consistent with AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape [2020] ZASCA 89; 2021 (3) SA 337 (SCA) and Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another [2001] ZASCA 12; 2001 (3) SA 1188 (SCA); 2002 1 All SA 384 (SCA).


Where a party makes formal admissions concerning key aspects of the case (including admissions arising from joint expert minutes as treated in this judgment), such admissions may narrow the issues for determination, including potentially removing causation as a live dispute, leaving the court to determine the remaining elements of negligence and liability on the admitted basis.





THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case no: 277/2023

In the matter between:

SN […] obo ON […] APPELLANT

and

MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
FOR HEALTH: EASTERN CAPE RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: SN obo ON v MEC for Health: Eastern Cape (Case no
277/2023) [202 5] ZASCA 36 (2 April 2025 )
Coram: MOKGOHLOA ADP, WEINER, KATHREE -SETILOANE and
KOEN JJA and MOLITSOANE A JA
Heard : 17 February 2025
Delivered : This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal
website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down is deemed to
be 11h00 on Wednesday the 2 April 2025.
Summary: Delict - Medical negligence - failure to monitor the appellant and
foetus during labour - whether hospital staff was negligent - whether negligence
causally connected to the child’s brain damage - negligence and causation
established.

2



ORDER
__ ___
On appeal from: Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Mthatha
(Nhlangulela DJP sitting as court of first instance):
1 The appeal is upheld with costs.
2 The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s agreed or proven damage s
with costs ’


JUDGMENT
__ ___
Mokgohloa ADP (Weiner, Kathree -Setiloane a nd Koen JJA and Molitsoane
AJA concurring):

Introduction
[1] The appeal concerns a medical negligence claim in terms of which the
appellant (SN), acting on behalf of her minor child (O N), claimed damages in the
Eastern Cape Division of the High Court, Mthatha (the high court) arising from
the brain injury which O N suffered during the birth process at Madzikane KaZulu
Memorial Hospital (the hospital) in the Eastern Cape Province . The claim was
lodged against the Member of the Executive C ouncil for Health, Eastern Cape
Province (the MEC), who would be vicariously liable for damages caused by the
negligent conduct of the hospital staff.


3

The f acts
[2] During 2013 , SN was pregnant with her first child. She was 34 years old.
She experienced labour pains in the morning of 14 February 2013 and was taken
to the hospital where she was admitted at around 07h30 . On examination in the
labour ward at 07h30, her pregnancy was estimated at 36 out of 4 0 weeks and her
uterine contra ctions were normal. There are two phases of labour: the latent phase
progressing to the active phase. The active phase in turn has two stages, with the
first stage beginning when the cervix of a woman in labour reaches a dilation of
4cm and the second stage starting when the cervical dilation is 10cm. The
examination revealed further that SM was in the latent phase of labour. The
membrane had not yet r uptured . She had a good temperature and pulse. The foetal
heart rate (FHR ) was 142 beats per minute (bpm) . The f oetus was in a cephalic
presentation and the cervix was 3cm dilated.

[3] The partogram began at 10h00. The examination revealed tha t labour was
progressing well and t he maternal condition was good. The FHR was stable at
138 bpm. SN was 4cm dilated and t he membrane was intact with no c aput nor
moulding. A peth idine drug was administered to calm down her labour pains. The
Maternity Case Record (MCR) d id not show any further assessment after 10h00.
However, the partogram form show ed that SN was again assessed at 12h00 ,
though Sister Bonga , the nurse that attended to SN, stated that it was between
11h30 and 12h00. I will return to this issue later in my judgment. At this stage,
the assessment show ed the FHR at 136 bpm; that there were no dec eleration s; the
liquor was broken and there was a tinge of meconium although not reco rded
whether thick or thin ; the head of t he baby was down completely; 2 caput and no
moulding.

4

[4] The summary of labour form in the MCR show ed that SN was fully dilated
at 11h15 and began bearing down at 11h30 . A male child was born at 12h00 . As
regards complications, the summa ry of labour form reveal ed that there was a cord
which was wrapped thr ice around the baby’s neck. It was not recorded whether
the cord was tight or loose. The neonatal detail show ed that a male child was born
alive . It is further recorded that his 1 -minute Apgar score was 7/10 .1 His score for
the heart rate was 2, while he scored 1 for respiration, muscle tone and response
to stimulation respectively . He scored 2 for colour. A second Apgar assess ment
was done 5 minutes after O N’s birth; he scored 8/10, again the score for heart rate
was 2. There was no improvement on his respiration and muscle tone. His
response to stimulation had improved and scored 2. The neonat al assessment
describe d ON as a ‘floppy baby ’ with a weak Moro reflex,2 and a n abs ent ‘cry’.
He had to be resuscit ated.

[5] Later observations noted that O N was resuscitated with an oxygen mask.
The first examination on the neonat al page was completed at 12h30 . It record ed
that O N was lethargic, hypotonic, tachypnoeic with costal recession and his cry
was abse nt. The nursing notes record ed ON as being critically ill, cyanosed and
requir ing supplementary oxygen, nostalgic feeding and head cooling. O N was
diagnosed with a hypoxic -ischaemic encephalopathy (HIE).3 Ischaemia is defined

1 APGAR stands for Appearances, Pulse, Grimace, Activity and Respiration. In the Apgar test, five factors are
used to check a newborn baby’s health. Each is scored on a scale of 0 to 2, with 2 being the best score. For
Appearance the skin colour is checked; for pulse, heart rate; fo r Grimace, reflexes; for Activity, muscle tone; and
for Respiration, breathing rate and effort. The individual scores for the five factors are added up to obtain a score
out of ten. The highest score t o be achieved is 10 and scores of 7, 8, or 9 out of 10 are normal or good scores.
Source: kidshealth.org.
2 The Moro reflex is an infantile reflex that, inter alia, entails the infant’s spreading of the arms in response t o a
sudden loss of support. In W B Saunders Co’s Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 25 ed (1974), Moro reflex
is described as follows: ‘[O]n placing an infant on a table and then forcibly striking the table on either side of the
child, the arms are suddenly thrown out in an embrace attitude; called also startle r[eflex]’. W B Saunders Co ’s
Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 25 ed (1974) defines ‘hypertonia’ as ‘increased resistance of muscle to
passive stretching’.
3 The American College of Obstetrics and Gynaecology (ACOG) defines neonatal encephalopathy as a clinically
defined syndrome of disturbed neurological function in the earliest days of life of an infant born after 35 weeks
of gestation manifest by a subnorma l level of consciousness or seizures and often accompanied by difficulty with
initiating and maintaining respiration and depression of tone and reflexes.
5

as a deficiency of blood in a b ody part due t o functional construction or actual
obstruction of a blood vessel. Hypoxia results from a sustained reduction in the
supply of oxygen to the brain.

In the high court
[6] It was on that basis that the appellant claimed damages from the MEC. In
her particulars of claim, SN asserted, inter alia, that the MEC’s employee s, ie
hospital staff , had failed to initiate regular blood sugar or blood pressure
monitoring of SN after she was admitted at the hospital ; failed to take required
steps to ensure proper, timeous and professional assessment, monitoring and
management of SN, and failed to take steps to prevent the occurrence of
complications when this could have been done by e xercising reasonable care and
diligence. Furthermore, it was averred, inter alia, that the hospital staff had failed
to perform accurate and proper monitoring of the foetal heart rate; failed to record
an accurate partogram; failed to monitor the FHR with sufficient frequency, and
failed to detect that ON was in foetal distress.

[7] The MEC’s plea amounted to a bare denial, denying every aspect of
negligence which the appellant had alleged in the particulars of claim. She
pleaded , in the alternative , that in the event that the court finds that her nursing
staff’s monitoring of the labour was substandard, the n the baby’s brain damage
was not caused by such lack of monitoring, but was the result of an acute profound
hypoxic ischemic injury caused by an unknown sentinel event. The pre -trial
minutes identified the issues for determinat ion as negligence and causation and
indicated that the parties agreed to separate the issues of liability and quantum.
The trial commenced on 17 February 2020.

6

[8] At the commencement of the trial, Counsel for the MEC in his opening
address referred to the formal admissions that the MEC made in respect of the
joint minute of the obstetricians, Dr Ebrahim and Dr Frank dated 29 August 2019.
Of relevance at this stage is the admission in paragraphs 6 to 8 of the join t minute
which reads:
‘6. The Department of Health’s guidelines for Maternity care in South Africa (2007) state that
the FHR should be checked at half hourly intervals in the first stage of labour, before during
and after a contraction. It is also a standard of care to check the FHR after every five minutes
or after second push in the second stage of labour.
7. FHR monitoring was sub -standard as it was not checked in accordance with these guidelines.
8. It is therefore unknown whether FHR abnormalities were present or not in the first and
second stages of labour.’
In effect, the MEC admitted that the hospital staff were negligent in monitoring
SN’s labour progress.

[9] The evidence adduced before the high court was that of the appellant, the
nursing sister who attended to her ( Sister Bonga) and two experts. Sister Bonga
had no recollection of SN’s labour process and the birth of ON. She testified as
to what is recorded in the MCR and what her usual practice was in dealing with
a patient in labo ur. The expert witnesses who testified formulated their opinions
based on the appellant’s medical records, her antenatal card, the partogram, the
neonatal records as well as the MRI scan performed by Dr Twetwa on 22 August
2014. The MRI features were considered by the radiologists as diagnostic of
hypoxic ischaemic encephalopathy.

[10] The appellant testified and adduced the evidence of two experts, namely
Dr Ebrahim, an obstetrician and gynaecologist, and Dr Kara, a p aediatrician. The
MEC adduced the evidence of Sister Bonga. The MEC’s gynaecologist and
7

obstetrician , Dr Frank, signed a joint minute of experts with Dr Ebrahim, but did
not testify during the trial.

[11] In its judgment, the high court outlined the issue for determination as
follows :
‘[7] As agreed in the pre -trial minute, and repeated during the trial on 18 February 2020, t he
following issues were identified by the parties as being critical for the determination of this
matter. Those are: (1) whether the acute profound hypoxic ischaemic injury that occurred
intrapartum was preventable or foreseeable to the nursing staff of the hospit al (the negligence
issue); and ( 2) if so, whether the conduct of the nursing staff was the cause of the cerebral palsy
(the causation issue). ’

[12] Having analysed the evidence of all the witnesses, the high court found that
the monitoring of the appellant by Sister Bonga was not substandard. The high
court accepted Sister Bonga’s evidence that the assessment and examination of
the appellant was done at the correct intervals; the foetal heart rate was always
normal, the existence of Grade 1 meconium was not an indication of foetal
distress, and Sister Bonga did not observe any warning si gn which was
threatening to the well-being of the foetus. The high court also accepted Sister
Bonga’s evidence that the cord that was wrapped thri ce around the baby’s neck
was not tight as she managed to put her finger between the cord and his neck to
clamp and cut the cord. The evidence of Dr Ebrahim was rejected by the court as
being e xtremely confusing and not fact based. The high c ourt concluded that ‘the
loose n uchal cord did not cause acute profound hypoxic is chaemic brain injury in
this case’. Consequently, the appellant’s claims were dismissed with costs. Thi s
appeal is with the leave of the high court.



8

In this Court
Evaluation of expert evidence
[13] The legal principles applicable to the evaluation of expert evide nce was
outlined by this Court i n AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape ,4 as
follows:
‘. . . The function s of an expert witness are threefold. First, where they have themselves
observed relevant facts that evidence will be evidence of fact and [be] admissible as s uch.
Second, they provide the court with abstract or general knowledge concerning their discipline
that is necessary to enable the court to understand the issue arising in litigation. This includes
evidence of the current state of knowledge and generally accepted practice in the field in
question. Although such evidence can only be given by an expert qualified in the relevant field,
it remains, at the end of the day, essential ly evidence of fact on which the court will have to
make factual findings. It is ne cessary to enable the court to assess the validity of opinions that
they express. Third, they give evidence concerning their own inferences and opinions on the
issues in the case and the grounds for dra wing those inferences and expressing those
conclusions.’5

[14] That being so , this Court had earlier on in Michael and Another v Linksfield
Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another6 cautioned that courts should be slow to
conclude that the views genuinely held by compete nt expert are unreasonable.
The Court further warned that a court is not bound to absolve a defendant from
liability for allegedly negligen t medical treatment or diagnosis just because expert
opinion evidence is that treatment or diagnosis was in accordance with sound
medical practice.


4 AM and another v MEC Health, Western Cape [2020] ZASCA 89; 2021 (3) SA 337 (SCA)
5 Ibid para 17
6 Michael and Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd and Another [2001] ZASCA 12, 2001 (3) SA 1188
(SCA); 2002 1 All SA 384 (SCA) para s 36 and 39.
9

[15] Having stated the above. I turn to the claim itself. I t is clear that SN’s claim
is based on the Lex Aqu ilia. The requirements of Lex Aqu ilia are a wrongful act
which caus ed injury or damage .

Damage
[16] As regards injury , it is common cause that ON suffered damage. He is a
cerebral palsy (CP) baby . This is confirmed in the joint minute report of both the
obstetrician s, Dr Ebrahim and Dr Frank and that of the radiologists , Dr Kar a and
Dr Lewis .

Causation
[17] The question is what caused ON to be a CP baby. There is uncontested
evidence that there was a cord around ON’s neck. This cord was wrapped thrice
around his neck . The MCR recorded the cord around the neck as a complication.
Dr Ebrahim opined that ‘in the absence of an observable sentinel event, the cord
was clearly tightly around the neonate’s neck giving signs of near strangulation
and WAS the sentinel event.’ He concluded that the cord that was wrapped around
ON’s neck was the more probable cause of the injury as opposed to the cord
compression. His reason was that ‘tight nuchal cords are more commonly
associated with cerebral palsy as opposed to a terminal bradycardia causing
sentinel brain damage.’

[18] The above obstetricians’ opinion was admitted by the MEC in her formal
admissions. The admission was also confirmed by Counsel for the MEC at the
commencement of the trial. The admission that there was an occlusion caused by
the cord was therefore not simply an admission of the opinion of an expert or the
joint opinion of experts ; it is free standing and meant that causation was no longer
an issue in dispute. Therefore, i t was a hypoxic ischaemic event (a reduction or
10

blockage of blood flow to a specific area of the body, leading to a shortage of
oxygen and nutrients) that caused ON’s injury.

[19] This brings me to the next issue , namely negligence : whether the cord
occlusion could have been detected and steps taken to avoid an ischaemic hypoxic
injury timeously.

Negligence
[20] The test as for negligence, is trite,7 it rests on two bases, namely, reasonable
foreseeability and the reasonable preventability of damage and failure to act
accordingly. What is or is not reasonably foreseeable in a particular case is a fact-
bound enquiry.8

[21] The standards that were applicable in clinics and district hospitals in South
Africa at the time of ON’s birth were those specified in the Guidelines for
Maternity Care in South Africa 2007 , which emphasise the necessity to monitor
a woman in labour. They set out the standard of monitoring that is considered
appropriate. The guidelines state that when the patient is in the active phase of
labour ie when the cer vix is 4cm dilated, the FHR should be checked every half
an hour - before, during and after every contraction . However, in this case, SN
was assessed at 10h00 and there is no record of any monitoring at 10h30 or 11h00,
or when NS was fully dilated at 11h15. There is only one period of monitoring
recorded which , on the mental recollection of Sister Bonga , is alleged to have
been somewhere between 11h30 and 12h00.


7 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 (2) SA 428 (A); [1966] 2 All SA 490 (A) at 430E -F
8 Pitzer v Eskom [2012] ZASCA 44 ; 2012 JDR 0507 (SCA) para 24.
11

[22] Dr Ebrahim explained how the injury normally occurs: According to him,
the injury to the brain is caused by an acute drop in oxygen levels in the foetus.
He went on to explain what happens in the circulation of the foetus when it is
deprived of oxygen . During labour , the foetus is naturally exposed t o slight drops
of oxygen levels. But a healthy foetus is able to handle that without any changes
in its heartbeat. However, w hen t he oxygen levels of the foe tus drop to below 50
percent of norm, it affects the cardiovascular response of the foetus. What
happens is that the foetus ’ heart rate slows down in the face of this reduced
oxygen supply from the maternal circulation, and this is mainly a defence
mechanism for the heart to reduce its oxygen consumption so that the heart does
not fail. The foetus slows down the heart , so it works less and therefore consumes
less oxygen in the environment of reduced oxygen. As a result, the heart does not
function at its normal rate above 110 b pm but rather does so at a reduced level
because the normal level requires that it must use up more oxy gen.

[23] According to Dr Ebrahim, there is an additional mechanism in the
circulation that prevent s the vital organs , other than the heart , from being
compromised by the reduced oxygen output . This mechanism , preferentially
distributes whatever oxygen there is to the vital organ s, that is, the brain, the
kidneys, and the adrenal glands . The initial response is a drop in the heartbeat,
which is called a bradycardia. This bradycardia will last for the duration of the
contraction, because the contraction is t he cause of the reduced oxygen - transient
reduction in oxygen. And when the contraction is over , the heartbeat returns to
normal, because it is again getting a normal supply of oxygen. But , if a drop in
oxygen does not recover , the bradycardia will remain because the heart is being
deprived of oxygen for a prolonged period of time. As a result of that prolonged
bradycardia, the eventual supply of oxygen to the brain is also compromised to
the extent that the brain suffers acute damage.
12

[24] The uncontested evidence of Dr Ebrahim was that the injury or the hypoxic
ischaemic episode would have manifested itself in deceleration s of the FHR
which would normally be noted with adequate monitoring. He opined that foetal
distress is unpredictable and can occur even in low -risk pregnancies. However,
he was of the opinion that FHR abnormalities are the first sign s of such foetal
distress. Therefore, FHR monitoring is a universal requirement in labour cases.
According to Dr Ebrahim, in the face of t he foetal distress, the desired preventive
action indicated in the maternity guidelines would have been sufficient to
expedite ON’s delivery and would have prevented his brain injury .

[25] It is clear on the probabilities in this matter that the injury was caused by
the cord around the neck of ON. Such injury , according to Dr Ebrahim, could
have been prevented by proper monitoring by the nursing staff to determine
whether there were FHR dec elerations. There was however no monitoring at
10h30 up to 11h00 . There was also no monitoring at 11h15 when SN was fully
dilated , and none at 11h30 when SN started bearing down and the cord probably
tightened . This was a serious and critical period to determine any dec eleration in
the FHR , yet it is clear from Sister Bonga’s evidence that the nursing staff did not
take reasonable and necessary steps to monitor the FHR of ON . Sister Bonga ’s
evidence points to clear substandard monitoring that did not accord with the
standards set out in the guidelines. According to her evidence, the FHR was 138
bpm at around 10h00 and 136 bpm somewh ere around 11h30 and 12h00. On the
probabilities, that reading c annot be correct because shortly thereafter ON was
born floppy and lethargic.

[26] Of much concern i n the evidence of Sister B onga is that she recorded in
the MCR that the cord around the neck was a complication yet she did not indicate
whether the cord was tight or loose. She did not indicate whether the meconium,
13

which is indicative of foetal stress, was thin or thick. She had no recollection of
what happened to the patient except for what she recorded in the MCR and what
she would normally do in the circumstance. Curiously, she could recall that she
got her finger under the cord and cut it yet this was never recorded in any of the
hospital records . How she remembered this, remains a mystery .

[27] In my view, Sister Bonga was not an honest and trustworthy witness. Her
evidence should have been rejected as being unreliable and not credible. On the
contrary , I find the evidence of Dr Ebrahim to be more probable as it is consistent
with the probabilities on the evidence viewed as a whole. He gave evidence
concerning his ‘own inferences and opinions on the issues in the case and the
grounds for drawing those inferences and expressing those conclusions.’9 His
conclusions were not unreasonably arrived at. They were based on genuine views
and logical reasoning .

[28] In conclusion, nuchal cords wrapped around the neck of foetuses occur
frequently10 but they do not all result in CP births. Few do. This is because they
are generally, on probabilities, identified early enough by proper or standard
monitoring, picking up the foetal distress shown by decelerations or otherwise,
and are the n dealt with by timeous interventions. That is what a reasonable
member of the nursing staff would have done. The MEC ’s employees failed to
do so.





9 Op cit fn 4
10 Peesay, M ‘Nuchal Cord and Its Implications ’ Maternal Health, Neonatology, and Perinatology (2017).
14

[29] In the result, the following order is made :
1 The appeal is upheld with costs.
2 The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the
following:
‘The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s agreed or proven
damage s with costs’

____________________
F E M okgohlo a
Judge of Appeal

















15

Appearances

For the appellant: V Kunju SC
L Brauns
C Gqetywa
Instructed by: Mjulelwa Incorporated Attorneys, Mthatha
Webbers Attorneys, Bloemfontein

For the respondent: P J de Bruyn SC
T Rossi
Instructed by: Norton Rose Fulbright South Africa Inc , Johannesburg
Phatshoane Hen ney Inc, Bloemfontein .