REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE)
REPORTAB LE: YES/NO CASE N2: HCAA 24/2023 (1)
(2)
(3) OF INTERES T TO THE JUDGES : YES/NO
REVISED: YES/NO Court a quo CASE N2: 215/2023
K.L. PILLAY AJ
.,.
In the matter between:
TSUNDZUKA KEVIN MALULEKE
and
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE N RANCHOD
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE B MASHILE
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE EM MAKGOBA
MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
CHIEF REGISTRAR OF THE LIMPOPO DIVISION
OF THE HIGH COURT: POLOKWANE
LIMPOPO PROVINCIAL COUNCIL APPELLANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
THIRD RESPONDENT
FOURTH RESPONDENT
FIFTH RESPONDENT
SIXTH RESPONDENT
CORAM NAUDE-ODENDAAL J MAKOTI AJ, et PILLAY AJ.
1
HEARD
DELIVERED
PILLAY AJ:
INTRODUCTION: 25 OCTOBER 2024
20 MARCH 2025
JUDGMENT
[1] The matter that serves before us is an appeal being sought by the appellant,
against the dismissal by Mthimkulu AJ of the appellant's application for contempt
of court, delivered on 24 May 2023. The appellant's leave to appeal was granted
by Mthimkulu AJ on 21 June 2023. The contempt of court application was only
opposed by the sixth respondent in the court a quo and before this court.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
[2] The appellant raised various grounds of appeal as contained in the notice of appeal
dated the 18 July 20231 in respect of the judgment and order of Mthimkulu AJ
delivered on 24 May 20232.
BRIEF BACKGROUND:
[3] The appellant launched an ex parte application 3 in the High Court of South Africa
Limpopo Division Polokwane seeking:
1 See Notice of appeal record page 270 to 277of volume E.
2 See judgment pages 281 to 287 of volume E
3 See pages 5 to 18 of volume A.
2
[3.1] Consent to institute proceedings against the first three respondents who
were all judges.
[3.2] Seeking a postponement in respect of the striking off the roll as legal
practitioner proceedings against him, which was set down for hearing
on 17 January 2023.
[3.3] An interdict preventing the judges from hearing the matter.
[3.4] A review of the appointment of the first and second respondents
scheduled to hear the matter with the third respondent.
[4] This application served before Acting Judge President Semenya who granted the
following order4:
[4.1] The matter is to be heard in camera, due to the parties involved and the
nature of the application.
[4.2] The application is postponed sine die.
[4.3] The applicant is ordered to serve the papers on the respondents by the 17
February 2023.
[4.4] The respondents are to file their opposing papers on or before the 8 March
2023.
[4.5] The application for postponement is to be heard by the judges seized with
the matter as set down today the 17 February 2023.
[4.6] Costs are to be cost in the application .
4 See pages 175 to 176 of volume C.
3
[5] The appellant sought the postponement in the main striking off proceedings and
same was refused. It is worth mentioning that the appellant had elected not to file
any answering affidavit, to the allegations in that court. The matter was finalised
on 17 January 2023, with the appellant being struck off the roll of legal
practitioners. The appellant served the interlocutory application via email on the
respondents on 10 February 2023. This was not in compliance with the provisions
of Rule 4(1)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court in respect of service and in contrast
to the undertaking as contained in the interlocutory application, that service would
be by Sheriff and in respect of the Judges in compliance with the rules.
[6] None of the respondents filed opposing papers in respect of the said application.
The appellant, thereafter , launched an urgent contempt of court application 5 due
to the respondents failing to file the opposing papers by 8 March 2023 deadline.
This application was opposed by the sixth respondent 6 and ultimately resulted in
the judgement and order delivered by Acting Judge Mthimkulu 7. This decision is
before us for adjudication , consequent to the leave to appeal 8, granted to the
appellant.
ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THIS COURT:
[7] The appellant indicated that the court a qua erred in dismissing the contempt of
court application . The appellant argued that all the legal requirements for civil
5 See pages 145 to 152 of volume C.
6 See pages 188 to 191 of volume C
7 See judgment pages 281 to 287 of volume E
8 See page 290 of volume E
4
contempt had been satisfied and that the respondents offered no valid explanation
for not complying with the court order dated 17 January 2023.
[8] The appellant highlighted that the court a quo wrongly found that the respondents
chose not to file opposing papers by 8 March 2023. The appellant argued that this
conclusion could not be reached, as the respondents had not submitted any
version to the court a quo, explaining their failure to comply, with the court order.
[9] That the court a quo erred by concluding that the first and second respondents,
who had proceeded with the main application on 17 January 2023, made it
unnecessary for them, to oppose the interlocutory application. This finding,
according to the appellant was not supported by any evidence provided by the
respondents .
[10] The appellant maintained that there was a binding directive to the respondents to
file opposing papers by 8 March 2023 and same must be complied with unless and
until, set aside by the court. Therefore, the court a quo erred by misinterpreting the
order and treating it as non-peremptory and discretionary .
(11] The appellant contended that the court a quo erred in failing to consider that the
responde nts had not formally placed on record, any decision not to file opposing
papers, which according to the appellant was necessary . Moreover , the appellant
5
claimed that the court a quo erred, by implying that the respondents had the option,
to not file opposing papers, arguing that the court order did not provide for such a
discretion to be afforded the respondents.
[12] The appellant noted that the version before the court a quo in respect of the civil
contempt application was unchallenged , as no answering affidavits were filed by
the respondents, to rebut the appellant's claims, and the court a quo erred by not
giving sufficient weight, to this uncontested evidence. That the court order was
binding on the respondents requiring an answer and regardless of being correct or
incorrect, same was to be complied with by the respondents.
The appellant indicated that the court a quo erred in both the interpretation of the
court order, and the legal principles regarding contempt proceedings , and
therefore erred in dismissing the application for contempt of court against the
respondents. The appellant sought that the appeal succeeds with a punitive cost
order to be granted against the respondents .
[13] The sixth respondent in answer, argued that the appellant misunderstood and
misconstrued the contents of the court order. The sixth respondent maintained that
the court a quo was correct in its interpretation , that the court order provided
timelines in which the respondents were to file their answering affidavits, if they
sought to oppose the application .
6
[14] The sixth respondent indicated that once the main proceedings continued , on the
17 January 2023 and the appellant was struck off the roll of legal practitioners , this
application and court order became moot, thus not requiring any response from
the respondents , in respect of the interlocutory application .
[15] The sixth respondent argued that the court a qua correctly applied the principles
in respect of civil contempt of court and found no basis to find the respondents in
contempt of court. The sixth respondent sought that the appeal be dismissed with
costs.
THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ANALYSIS
[16] Section 47 of the Superior Courts Act9 indicates as follows:
(1) Except for an application made in terms of the Domestic Violence Act, 1998
(Act 116 of 1998), no civil proceedings by way of summons or notice of motion
may be instituted against any judge of a Superior Court, and no subpoena in
respect of civil proceedings may be served on any judge of a Superior Court,
except with the consent of the head of that court or, in the case of a head of court
or the Chief Justice, with the consent of the Chief Justice or the President of the
Supreme Court of Appeal, as the case may be.
[S 47(1) substituted bys 20 of Act 116 of 1998 with effect from 14 April 2023.J
9 Act 10 of 2013
7
(2) Where the issuing of a summons or subpoena against a judge to appear in a
civil action has been consented to, the date upon which such judge must attend
court must be determined in consultation with the relevant head of court.
[17] In N v Lukoto 10 Ngoepe JP dealt with an application brought in terms of
section 25(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1959, which is the precursor to section
47(1) and noted the following:
"[4] It is necessary to explain how such applications are traditionally dealt with
and the reasons therefor. Normally, it is the Judge President who would
receive such an application and consider it in Chambers . This mechanism would
quietly dispose of patently frivolous claims which might unjustifiably damage the
reputation of a Judge. Where there appears to be at least an arguable case, the
Judge President would approach the Judge concerned. In appropriate
circumstances , the Judge President might even urge the Judge to oblige; for
example, where there is a clear debt against the Judge. The Judge President
would impress on the Judge concerned that those who are the ultimate enforcers
of the law must themselves make every endeavour to observe it; also of
importance is to avoid the appearance of a Judge as litigant in court, particularly
in the lower courts. Where there seems to be an arguable case against the
Judge, but the latter remains recalcitrant , the Judge President would give the
Judge the opportunity to oppose the application for leave to sue him/her. The
io N v Lukoto 2007 (3) SA 569 (TPD) at 5728-E par 4
8
matter may then be disposed of in Chambers or in an open court, depending on
the intensity of the opposition. Once an applicant shows good cause, leave would
be granted. "
[18] In the Lukoto matter, the intended action related to a maintenance inquiry, and the
proceedings were initiated by a letter from the Public Prosecutor . The request
was granted as it was not opposed by the Respondent. There were delays in the
finalization of the proceedings requiring the Public Prosecutor to submit a further
request in writing seeking consent. The Judge President on determining that leave
to institute proceedings was opposed, directed that a formal affidavit be filed, a
case number be allocated, and the respondent be given an opportunity to file an
opposing affidavit. The matter was heard in open court.
[19] The procedure to be followed in the institution of legal proceedings against a
Judge, were endorsed by Mlambo JP in Engelbrecht v Khumalo 11 as follows:
"In essence the person seeking consent writes to the head of the court
concerned. On receipt of the request the head of court discusses the matter with
the judge concerned and may thereafter either grant the consent requested or
direct that a formal process be followed involving the filing and service of an
11 2016 (4) SA 564 (GP) at 566H-567C
9
application accompanied by the necessary affidavits. The head of court will then
hear argument and thereafter dispose of the matter as he deems fit."
"I followed a similar approach in this matter. I considered the correspondence from
Engelbrecht and from the judge and advised Engelbrecht 's attorneys that I was
disinclined to grant consent based on the correspondence at my disposal. I
advised that should Engelbrecht be so inclined he was at liberty to pursue the
matter formally through a court process where both parties would be afforded the
opportunity to file affidavits and advance submissions. "
[20] In the case of Mthenjwa v Steyn and Another 12 the court highlighted the
following:
"[12] I now revert to the question whether this application should have been
preceded by a request for leave to the Head of Court. In my view, the words
employed by the legislature in s 47(1) are couched in peremptory terms. The
legislature 's intention is to prohibit the institution of any civil proceedings , be it by
way of summons or by Notice of Motion, against a Judge without the consent of
the Head of that Court in which the Judge serves. The question to be asked is
whether the proceedings under consideration constitute civil proceedings by way
of Notice of Motion referred to ins 47(1). These proceedings were initiated in the
form of a formal application issued by the Registrar of the Court without the
knowledge and involvement of the Head of Court. The application was served on
12 (9028/17) [2017] ZAWCHC 161 (30 November 2017)
10
the first respondent placing her on terms to respond to the substantive
allegations made in the founding affidavit and annexures thereto. She was
required to respond within a time frame as prescribed by the Uniform Rules of
Court. The proceedings were not specifically directed at the Head of Court. The
Head of Court only came into the equation right at the end of the spectrum, after
pleadings have closed and the matter was ripe to be heard. Once the application
was issued by the Registrar it became a public document to which any member
of the public had access. It follows that the present proceedings constitute
proceedings referred to ins 47(1) and therefore, leave of the Head of Court was
necessary before they could be instituted.
[13) There are good reasons why a form of 'informal' notice or communication to
the Head of Court is necessary before formal legal proceedings to obtain consent
are instituted. This is the substantive aspect of the requirement. The Head of
Court must first determine whether the claim, to which the request for consent
relates, would have merit if instituted. He/she would also take the matter up with
the Judge concerned and where appropriate, impress upon the Judge to satisfy
the claim/demand or accede to the consent. Where the Judge unreasonably
refuses to satisfy the claim or accede to the request, a party seeking consent
would be granted consent to bring a formal application. In such event the Judge
would be exposed to filing papers in response to the application which may
ultimately be adjudicated either in chambers or in open court.
[14] The requirement to bring a request before issuing a formal application to
seek consent serves as a screening process for the Head of Court. It contributes
11
to the need to insulate Judges against ill-conceived and unwarranted legal
proceedings. This statutory requirement for the insulation of Judges should
therefore start at the very beginning when legal proceedings are contemplated
and not only when substantive proceedings are instituted. The requirement for an
informal request to institute proceedings is not intended to be a mere courtesy,
but an opportunity for the Head of Court not to allow baseless, unwarranted and
ill-conceived litigation against the Judge 13. The Judge who refused to heed the
advice of the Head of Court to settle the dispute or agree to the consent exposes
himself/herself to a formal application for consent to the Head of the Court.
[15] In conclusion I find that the application brought by the applicant is fatally
defective on two fronts. Firstly, it is not directed at the Head of the Court. It is
issued through the Registrar's Office and directed at the Court. Secondly, the
application is issued without the consent of the Head of the Court. For these
reasons the application falls to be dismissed. "
[21] It is apparent that there was no preceding informal notice, by letter or otherwise
requesting authorization to institute proceedings against the three Judges, prior to
the urgent ex-parte application before the Acting Judge President Semenya in
terms of Section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act. The various case law as
highlighted above is prescriptive of how such proceedings , are to be litigated and
cannot be ignored. The appellant in compliance with the provisions as highlighted
13 Soller v President of the Republic of South Africa [2005] ZAGPHC 13; 2005 (3) SA 567 (T) at para 14.
12
above, was bound to provide the Head of Court Acting Judge President Semenya,
some form of notice by letter or otherwise seeking authorisation to institute
proceedings against the Judiciary. This court is alive to the fact that urgency, would
not supersede compliance with the provisions of Section 47(1 ).
[22] In terms of the court order the applicatio n was postponed sine die. The court order
in total is silent in respect of the authorisation , required to institute proceedings
against the three Judges. It cannot be inferred that the appellant had received the
relevant permission to institute proceedings in terms of Section 47(1 ), against the
three Judges and unless or until the said permission was granted, the application
was premature , as highlighted above in the Mthenjwa matter that the need for
authorization was necessary prior to any litigation.
[23] It is not disputed that the interlocutory application sought to halt the finalization of
the striking off proceedings. The appellant was struck from the roll of advocates ,
on the same date, after the postponement , which was sought, was refused. It is
not in dispute that the appellant emailed the respondents the application and court
order and the contempt of court application was based on the respondent's failure
to file answering papers, which was dismissed .
[24] The court order in issue, firstly ordered, the interlocutory proceedings be
postponed sine die, for the purposes of service of this application on the
respondents. This court accepts that this application was not served by way of
13
sheriff on the respondents. Regard was had to Rule 4(1) of the Uniform Rules of
Court14wherein provision is made concerning service of the application and court
order. The appellant argued that the manner of service was irrelevant, provided
that the court order came to the knowledge of the respondents . This argument is
untenable, especially where there was no proper service of this application and
court order on the respondents. Service by email on the personal email addresses
of the Judges, cannot be motivated, as being compliant with the rules as well as
Section 47(1 ). This court aligns itself with the argument raised by the sixth
respondent, that this was not proper service, for the application to have been
entertained . The issue of service was not ventilated in the court a qua, and at face
value, the fact that the first to the fifth respondents were not before the court, proper
service on them was required, before the court could proceed with the application.
This court noted that based on the presence of the sixth respondent , in the court
a quo, that the appellant relied on the allegation that the respondents had
knowledge of the court order and is in contempt of same.
14 Rule 4(1) (a) Service of any process of the court directed to the sheriff and subject to the provisions of paragraph
(aA) any document initiating application proceedings shall be effected by the sheriff in one or other of the following
manners- (i) by delivering a copy thereof to the said person personally : ...... ;(ii) by delivering a copy thereof at the
place of residence or business of the said person, guardian, tutor, curator or the like to the person apparently in charge
of the premises at the time of delivery, being a person apparently not less than sixteen years of age. For the purposes
of this paragraph when a building, other than an hotel, boarding-house, hostel or similar residential building, is occupied
by more than one person or family, 'residence' or 'place of business' means that portion of the building occupied by the
person upon whom service is to be effected; (iii) by delivering a copy thereof at the place of employment of the said
person, guardian, tutor, curator or the like to some person apparently not less than 16 years of age and apparently in
authority over such person; if the person so to be served has chosen a domicilium citandi, by delivering a copy thereof
to a person apparently not less than sixteen years of age at the domicilium so chosen; ...... .Rule 4(1) (d) It shall be the
duty of the sheriff or other person serving the process or documents to explain the nature and contents thereof to the
person upon whom service is being effected and to state in a return or affidavit or on the signed receipt that the person
serving the process or document has done so.
14
[25] The Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie NO v Systems (PTY) L TD15dealt with the
prerequisite for the committal in respect of contempt of court and held,
"{9] The test for when disobedience of a civil order constitutes contempt has come
to be stated as whether the breach was committed 'deliberately and ma/a fide'. A
deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non-complier may genuinely , albeit
mistakenly, believe him or herself entitled to act in the way claimed to constitute
the contempt. In such a case, good faith avoids the infraction. Even a refusal to
comply that is objectively unreasonable may be bona fide (though
unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).
[1 OJ These requirements -that the refusal to obey should be both wilful and ma/a
fide, and that unreasonable non-compliance , provided it is bona fide, does not
constitute contempt -accord with the broader definition of the crime, of which non
compliance with civil orders is a manifestation. They show that the offence is
committed not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the deliberate and
intentional violation of the court's dignity, repute or authority that this evinces.
Honest belief that non-compliance is justified or proper is incompatible with that
intent."
In Matjhabeng Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings LTD and Others 16,
15 2006 (4) SA 326 (SCA),at paragraph 9 and 10
16 2018 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 61
15
The Constitutional Court held that the standard of proof to be applied in contempt
cases varied in accordance with the consequences of the remedy. If the sanction
involved committal, the standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) was always
required. But if it involved civil remedies, the civil standard of proof (on a balance
of probabilities) sufficed.
[26] The Constitutional Court noted in the matter of Secretary of the Judicial
Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture, Corruption and
Fraud in the Public Sector including Organs of State v Zuma and Others 17:
[37] '~s set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Fakie, and approved by
this Court in Pheko II, it is trite that an applicant who alleges contempt of court
must establish that (a) an order was granted against the alleged contemnor.
(b) the alleged contemnor was served with the order or had knowledge of it; and
(c) the alleged contemnor failed to comply with the order. 18Once these
elements are established, wilfulness and ma/a tides are presumed and the
respondent bears an evidentiary burden to establish a reasonable doubt. 19
Should the respondent fail to discharge this burden, contempt will have been
established ."
17 [2021] ZACC 18
18 See Pheko If above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 32; Fakie above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at
para 22; and Consolidated Fish above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at 522E-H, which affirms Southey v Southey
1907 EDC 133 at 137.
19 Fakie id at paras 41-2 and endorsed by this Court in Pheko If id at para 36. Additionally, in Uncedo Taxi Service
Association v Maninjwa 1998 (3) SA 417 (E) (Maninjwa) at 425C-G and 428A-C, it was held that the fundamental
right to a fair criminal trial guaranteed by section 35(3) of the Constitution requires that, in order for an applicant
in contempt proceedings to succeed, he or she must prove the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt.
This principle was cited in Victoria Park Ratepayers' Association above n Error! Bookmark not defined. at para 17.
16
[27] Based on the aforesaid , it would be prudent to first establish the contents of the
court order, its literal meaning, the phrase on which the appellant relies in respect
of the contempt of court proceedings , and finally in the context of the proceedings
whether the respondents, were in contempt, in not complying with the court order.
[28] The appellant relies on paragraph 4 as motivation for seeking the respondents to
be held in contempt of court. This court notes that it has been held by various
courts and on numerous occasions, that the provision sought to be relied upon
must be read in context and in its entirety and not in isolation of the other
provisions. Paragraph 4 of the court order reads, "the respondents are to file their
opposing papers on or before 8 March 2023. "The sixth respondent disagreed with
this contention relying on the aspect that paragraph 4 refers to time periods and
argued that the entire interlocutory application became moot, once the main
striking off application , was finalised on 17 January 2023.
[29] This court had regard to paragraph 5 of the court order which read, "The application
for postponement is to be heard by the judges seized with the matter as set down
today the 17 February 2023." The appellant was obliged to seek a postponement
of the main striking off application. This was dismissed and the main striking off
application was finalized. Furthermore , based on the refusal of this postponement
application , the prayers sought in the interlocutory application , concerning the
interdict and review pertaining to the Judges, and in respect of the main striking off
application , was rendered moot already on the 17 February 2023, with specific
17
reference to paragraph 5 of the court order. The need to respond to this
interlocutory application and file opposing papers, in respect of paragraph 4 of the
court order, was no longer relevant. The court a quo took cognisance of this fact,
when considering the entire court order, and adopted the approach of considering
paragraph 4, in context with all the other paragraphs of the court order, which was
the proper approach , as paragraph 4 could not be read in isolation.
[30] The court a quo was correct in its appreciation of the fact that the wording of
paragraph 4 made specific reference to timelines as this paragraph flows from
paragraph 3 which speaks to the timeframe in which this interlocutory application
was to be served on the respondents and the date by which the respondents were
to respond.
[31) Rule 6 of the uniform rules of court provide for the procedure of how applications
are to be ventilated. Timeframes are dictated by the rules and if the respondent
did not comply, the applicant would be entitled to set the matter down on the
unopposed court roll, for the court order to be granted, due to the default of the
respondent. This was exactly what transpired in the main striking off application ,
where the appellant failed to file any answering papers, to the allegations and the
matter proceeded on an unopposed basis.
[32) The appellant in this matter was ordered to serve the application and court order
on the respondents, this was not done in compliance with the rules. The appellant
18
sought to proceed with contempt of paragraph 4 of the court order only, instead of
setting the matter down on the unopposed court roll for the ventilation of this
interlocutory application. Had this interlocutory application been entertained , the
relief sought was destained for failure due to the noncompliance of Section 47(1)
in respect of the Judges and the main application being granted against the
appellant , rendering the court order moot. This court is satisfied that the court a
qua was correct in its findings that paragraph 4 of the court order pertained to
timeframes to which the respondents were to answer this interlocutory application .
Once the appellant was struck from the roll of advocates on the 17 February 2023
this interlocutory court order was rendered moot.
[33) The court a quo was correct in its finding that paragraph 4 was not prescriptive
requiring the respondents to answer to the application , instead it set the period in
which this answer was to be served and filed. The appellant's assertion that the
court order did not provide for the discretion, to be afforded the respondents
whether to answer or not, but rather that the respondents were ordered to respond
is not a sustainable argument , considering the court order, being read in its entirety
and in context.
[34) As indicated earlier, before the principles relevant for contempt of court was
applicable , it was necessary to ventilate whether there was a court order placing
an onus on the respondents to comply. In this matter the appellant failed to prove
that there was a court order which was prescriptive to the respondents to respond.
19
The appellant was selective in only relying on paragraph 4 in motivation for the
contempt of court instead of considering the entire court order and as such the
court a quo was correct in the conclusion reached that the application for contempt
of court be dismissed. The appellant failed to convince this court to find differently
and as such the appeal must fail.
[35] This court was at pains to reiterate the principles relevant for proceedings to be
instituted against Judges, this was the starting point. From the content of the ex
parte application , the language , tone and manner revealed that the appellant
showed a lack of respect for the Judges, who were cited as respondents and a
disdain of the process to be followed, when seeking authorizat ion from the Acting
Judge President Semenya. Instituting proceedings against the Judges, before
obtaining permission to do so, does not bode well with this court and must be
censored . What is apparent is that the appellant, amidst not having received
authorisation to institute proceedings against the Judges, proceeded to institute
the contempt of court application . The appellant thereafter , in non-compliance of
the rules in respect of service, sought that the respondents be found in contempt
of the court order. Clearly the appellant has a double standard in respect of failing
to comply with the rules, but quick to seek orders for contempt of court, in respect
of the respondents , amidst the fact that they were not properly before the court a
quo, for the order to be granted. This style of litigation harms our Judicial system
and must be avoided at all costs.
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CONCLUSION:
[36] Based on all that has been said above and the reasons given, it is just and
equitable that this appeal be dismissed .
COSTS:
(37] The ordinary rule is that costs should follow the result, and the successful party is
awarded costs on the scale as between party and party. The appellant sought cost
if successful, on a punitive scale as between attorney and own client, motivating
that contempt of court is so egregious, worthy of a higher cost order. The sixth
respondent sought costs of the appeal. It is unnecessary to ventilate the cost order
sought by the appellant, except to note that based on how this matter unfolded,
had the sixth Respondent sought such order it would not have been difficult to
grant.
ORDER:
(38] In the circumstances the following order is made:
(38.1] The Appeal is dismissed .
[38.2] The Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal in respect of the
Sixth Respondent.
PI LAY AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT. LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
21
I, concur, and it is so ordered.
I, concur.
Counsel for the Appellants
Instructed by
Counsel for the Respondent
Instructed by
Date of the hearing
Date of delivery of Judgment ENDAALJ
G OF THE HIGH COURT,
OPO DIVISION , POLOKWANE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT,
LIMPOPO DIVISION , POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
Tsundzuka K Maluleke
In Person
J F Moolman
Prat Luyt &De Lange Attorneys
: 25 October 2024
: 20 March 2025
This judgment was circulated electronically to the parties' legal representatives by email.
The date and time for delivery of this judgment is deemed to be 20 March 2025 at
13h00PM.
22