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[2024] ZAECMKHC 126
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Madyibi and Another v Minister of Water and Sanitation and Others (939/2020) [2024] ZAECMKHC 126 (19 November 2024)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
Reportable
Case No.: 939/2020
Matters
heard on: 10 October 2024
Judgment
delivered on: 19 November 2024
In the matter between:
NTOMBIZINE
MADYIBI
First Applicant
MAUDLINE
MABI
Second Applicant
And
MINISTER
OF WATER AND SANITATION
First Respondent
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
IN THE DEPARTMENT
Second Respondent
OF WATER AND
SANITATION
AMATOLA
WATER
Third Respondent
THE
BOARD OF AMATOLA WATER LISTED
Fourth to Fourteenth Respondent
IN ANNEXURE “A”
JUDGMENT
Zono
A J
Introduction
[1]
The applicants are former members of Amatola Water Board who were
appointed as such by
the former Minister of Water and Sanitation, Ms
Lindiwe Sisulu on 5 August 2021. Applicants contend that they
received letters
of termination penned and signed by the Minister of
Water and Sanitation, Mr Senzo Mchunu on 18 January 2022, terminating
their
respective memberships to the Amatola Water Board. Letters of
termination are annexed to the applicants’ papers.
[2]
The applicants contend that the
termination of their respective memberships was unlawful
as it
breached the principle of legality. It is further submitted that the
applicants did not know that their appointments as Board
members did
not comply with the requirements for such appointments. As private
parties they were not privy to the internal protocols,
processes,
decisions and arrangements of the Ministry that preceded their
appointments by the Minister.
[3]
Underpinned by the aforesaid
brief factual scenario, the relief sought was to the effect
that the
Minister’s decision to terminate applicants’ membership
of the Amatola Water Board be declared as unlawful
and accordingly
set aside. The applicants, as a consequence of that sought to be
reinstated as Board members of the Amatola Water
Board. The
applicants seek damages they might have suffered as a result of
termination of their membership aforesaid, and an order
of costs.
[4]
The applicants contend that
prior their appointments as Board members there was a long
recruitment process which started in 2020 which was the following:
advertisements, submissions of application documents, establishment
of interview panel by the Minister, interviews on Microsoft Teams.
The interview for the first applicant was conducted on 21 November
2020 and for the second applicant was conducted on 13 March 2021. As
a result of these processes the applicants were appointed
and assumed
their duties.
[5]
On 15 October 2021, prior to the
termination of the applicants’ membership, the Minister
served
a notice in terms of which the applicants were called upon to show
cause why their membership cannot be terminated. They
were invited to
furnish their written reasons within seven days of receipt of the
letter/notice. It does not appear that the notice
was heeded. No
response or reasons had been forthcoming. On 18 January 2022 the
Minister terminated applicants’ membership
aforesaid in terms
of the letter or notice. In what follows I deal with the contents of
the letter.
[6]
The material and relevant parts
of the Minister’s letter dated 18 January 2022 to
the first
applicant reads as follows:
‘
4….
However, considering that the seven (7) days provided has lapsed and
I remain uninformed of your views. Therefore, I
am taking advantage
of this opportunity to terminate your membership of the Amatola Water
Board for the following reasons:
(i)
That your appointment was flawed in that it did not follow the
process prescribed by the Water Services Act 1997 (Act No 108 of
1987), in that you were not nominated and seconded as required in
terms of item 3 of Schedule 1of the Act. There are stringent
procedures for nomination up until to the final stage of appointment
to a Water Board. For example, in terms of item 3 of Schedule
1 (5)
of the
Water Services Act, the
following is provided:
(5)
Every
nomination of a person for appointment of a Water Board must be
signed by a proposer and a seconder, none of whom may be a
nominee
and must contain the nominee’s signed acceptance. No person may
nominate or second more than one person.
It is clear from the
above that appointing a candidate to a Water Board which he/she has
never been nominated and seconded for negates
the object of item 3 of
Schedule 1 of the Water Service Act in particular item 3(5).
(ii)
There is an institutionalised cabinet policy which requires
that once the Minister approves the recommended candidate for
appointment
following compliance with Section 35 read with Schedule 1
procedure of the Water Service Act; and
(iii)
That you were never interviewed for the position as it is
required in terms of the WSA.
(5)
Section 35(5) of the WSA empowers me to terminate membership
of board members. It is on the basis of the aforesaid reason and the
power bestowed on me that I take this opportunity to terminate your
membership of the Board. I have therefore, based on the above,
painstakingly taken a decision to terminate your board membership in
terms of Section 35(5) of Water Service Act 108 of 1997.
(6)
I
take this opportunity to thank you for serving the Amatola Water
Board albeit for a short period of time and wish you the best
in your
future endeavour.’
Second applicants’
letter is, to a large extent, to the same effect
[7]
The contents of the termination
letter quoted above bring into sharp focus the provisions
of Water
Services Act 108 of 1997 (the Act). It appears that the Minister,
when terminating applicants’ membership was invoking
the
provisions of the Act.
[8]
The Minister deposed to an
answering affidavit. The essence of his submission is that the
appointment of the applicant was irregular and/or unlawful for it did
not comply with the imperative provisions of the Act. He
further
submits that he acted in terms of the Act when terminating the
applicants’ membership, he acted and exercised the
power he has
in terms of the Act and related enactments. Accordingly, he submits
that his action was lawful.
Discussion/analysis
and legal framework
[9]
There are instances where a
member of Water Board can cease to be a member. Those instances
are
set out in
Water Services Act
[1]
.
The relevant subsection is worded as follows:
‘
(1) A member of
a Water Board ceases to hold office‒
(a) . . . . .
(b) . . . . .
(c) . . . . .
(d) . . . . .
(e) if his or her
appointment has been terminated in terms of Section 35(5) of the
Act.’
This
is a general provision applicable to all members of the Board. Item 4
of Schedule 1 of the Act deals with the termination of
term of office
of board members as the heading suggests.
[10]
The Minister is invariably empowered to remove the
Board members in terms of Section 35(5) of the Act, which
provides as
follows:
‘
(5) The
Minister may terminate the appointment of any or all the members of a
Water Board.’
In
what follows I aptly deal with the provisions of Interpretation
Act
[2]
.
[11]
Section 10 of the Interpretation Act provides:
‘
(1) When a law
confers a power or imposes a duty then, unless the contrary intention
appears, the power may be exercised and the
duty shall be performed
from time to time as occasion requires.
(2) Where a law
confers a power, jurisdiction or right, or imposes a duty or the
holder of an office as such, then, unless the contrary
intention
appears, the power, jurisdiction or right may be exercised and the
duty shall be performed from time to time by the holder
for the time
being of the office or by the person lawfully acting in the capacity
of such holder.
(3) Where a law
confers a power to make rules, regulations or by-law, the power
shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be
construed as
including a power exercisable to like manner and subject to the like
consent and conditions (if any) to rescind, revoke,
amend or vary the
rules, regulations or by-law.’
[12]
Even prior to the advent of the Constitutional
dispensation, powers conferred on the administrators were
inevitably
accompanied by an implied duty to exercise power
[3]
.
Placket J in
Vumazonke
[4]
appositely observed as follows:
‘
35 Public
powers and functions . . .. are given to administrative official for
a purpose: they are intended to be exercised in the
furtherance of
the of the public interest.’
[13]
The aforesaid statement of law is internationally
acclaimed. In
Julius
v Lord Bishop of Oxford
[5]
where it was held that:
‘
Where a power
is deposited with a public officer for the purpose of being used for
the benefits of persons who are specifically
pointed out, and with
regard to whom a definition is supplied by the Legislature of the
conditions upon which they are entitled
to call for its exercise,
that power ought to be exercised, and the court shall require it to
be exercised.’
[14]
It is without a doubt that the resolution of the
dispute between the parties herein inevitably engages the
interpretation of the provisions of
Water Services Act 108 of 1997
.
As Wallis JA in Natal Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endimeni
Municipality
[6]
observed:
‘
18 . . ..
Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words
used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory
instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by
reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of
the
document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming
into existence. Whatever the nature of the document, consideration
must be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary rule
of grammar and syntax, the context in
which the provision
appears the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material
known to those responsible for its production
. . ..’
[15]
One of the reasons for the termination of
applicants’ membership to the Water Board is non-compliance
with item 3(5) of Schedule 1 of the
Water Services Act 108 of 1997
.
That reason is set out in paragraph 4 of the letter or notice of
termination dated 18 October 2022. The item requires that “
every
nomination of a person for appointment to a Water Board must be
signed by a proposer and a seconder. None of whom may be the
nominee,
and must contain the nominee’s signed acceptance. No person may
nominate or second more than one person
”.
[16]
Applicants’ papers are silent about the
manner in which they were nominated, or whether there was
any
nomination process taken place which was seconded. Because there was
no mention of the nomination, as a corollary applicants’
papers
are devoid of the identity of persons nominating them. This failure
is fatal to applicants’ application. The applicants
content
themselves in stating that they were appointed as members of Amatola
Board pursuant to a long recruitment process. That
does not address
the requirements of item 3(5) of Schedule 1 of the
Water Services
Act.
[17]
The provisions of item 3(5) of Schedule 1 of
Water
Services Act are
couched in peremptory terms. That is so because of a
mere use of the word “
must
”
in the text. A statutory requirement construed as peremptory needs
exact compliance for it to have the stipulated legal
consequences.
[7]
As a general rule, non-compliance with peremptory provision results
in nullity.
[8]
Any purported
compliance falling short of that is a nullity.
[9]
I reiterate that the use of the word “
must
”
in the text is a strong indication that the provision is peremptory
and it consequently requires exact compliance.
[10]
[18]
I am constrained to mention that applicants’
letter of termination was referred to in the applicants’
founding affidavit papers and annexed thereto as annexure E1 and E2,
respectively. The applicants had ample opportunity to deal
with the
reasons set out in the letters in their founding affidavit but failed
to do so. It is therefore justifiable to infer from
that failure that
the applicants were never nominated in writing as envisaged in item
3(5) of Schedule 1 of
Water Services Act. A
strong indication that
the nomination must be in writing is borne out by the facts that the
proposer and the seconder are required
to sign the nomination.
Requirement of signature denotes that nomination must be in writing.
Applicants’ papers are devoid
of an allegation that they were
nominated in writing.
[19]
The applicants confine themselves in the following
allegations in the founding affidavit:
‘
20 The
applicants did not know that the Board appointments did not comply
with the requirement for such appointments. The applicants
aver that
the appointments by the Minister were in order.
21 The appointments of
the applicants did not breach the Act.
22 The first
respondent effected the termination of the Board memberships of the
applicants before they received the letters of
termination that were
dated 18 January 2022.
23 The applicants as
private parties were not privy to the internal protocols, processes,
decisions and arrangements of the ministry
that preceded the
appointment by the Minister.’
[20]
Save for the bare allegation that applicants’
appointments were in order, the applicants deal with
the pertinent
allegation that their appointments did not comply with the provisions
of
Water Services Act by
saying that they were not aware of
respondents’ internal protocols and processes for proper
appointment as Board members.
That does not make their appointments
lawful. On this basis, I find that applicants’ appointments
were unlawful. The provisions
of
Section 35(5)
of
Water Services Act
were
properly invoked in the circumstances.
[21]
The second reason cited in the letter of
termination is that the applicants were not interviewed for the
position as it is required in terms of
Water Services Act. In
the
answering affidavit the Minister expatiate on this ground and states
as follows:
’
17.1 The
applicants should not have been appointed as Board members at Amatola
Water Board. They were nominated for Lepelle Water
Board and not for
Amatola Water Board. Furthermore, they attended interviews only for
Lepelle Water Board and not for Amatola Water
Board.
17.2 Accordingly their
appointment was not in compliance with the provision of
Section 35
read with Schedule 1 of the Act. On this ground alone, the review
application should be dismissed with costs order.’
[22]
In paragraph 11 of the founding affidavit the
applicants assert as follows:
‘
11 The
appointments on 5 August 2021 were a sequel to a long recruitment
process which was started in 2020 with responses to advertisements,
submissions of all application documents by the applicants,
establishment of interview panels by the Ministry, virtual interview
which were conducted via Microsoft Teams. The interview for the first
applicant was held on 21 November 2020 and for the second
applicant
on 13 March 2021.’
[23]
Whilst it is admitted in reply that second
applicant was nominated for and interviewed for Lepelle Northern
Water Board, the first applicant states that she was nominated for
Amatola Water Board on 10 March 2020 and was interviewed for
Amatola
Water Board on 21 November 2020. The replying affidavit raises a
number of issues that deserve serious attention.
[24]
I have stated above that no case made out in the
founding affidavit that the applicants were nominated.
A case about
nomination is built only in the replying affidavit, which is
impermissible. The second applicant was not nominated
for Amatola
Water Board, but for Lepelle Water Board and was further interviewed
for Lepelle Northern Water Board. It would be
absurd that a nominee
can be nominated for one Water Board and be taken to serve in another
Board for which he or she was not nominated.
Equally, an interview
for one Water Board cannot conceivably be taken to be an interview
for another and different Water Board.
Nominations and interviews for
appointment to a specific Water Board depend on the needs of that
specific Water Board. Nominations,
interviews and nominees cannot
validly be transferred to a Water Board which was not involved in
them. This is the second reason
for rejection of applicants’
version emerging from reply.
[25]
With regard to the first applicant, there is a
massive dispute of fact as to whether her nomination and
interview
was for Amatola Water Board or Lepelle Water Board. The dispute is
irresoluble on these papers. In that case respondents’
version
must prevail.
[11]
[26]
Harms DP observed:
‘
Motion
proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the
resolution of legal issues based on common cause facts.
Unless the
circumstances are special, they cannot be used to resolve factual
issues because they are not designed to determine
probabilities. It
is well established under the Plascon-Evans rule that where the
motion proceedings disputes of fact arise on
the affidavits, a final
order can be granted only if the facts averred in the applicant’s
(Mr Zuma’s) affidavit, which
have been admitted by the
respondent (the NDPP), together with the facts alleged by the latter
justify such order
[12]
.’
[27]
Even if one may wish to take a benevolent stance
to consider a case made out in the replying affidavit
[13]
,
that there was a nomination of the first applicant
[14]
for Amatola Water Board, such nomination is without a seconder as
contemplated by item 3(5) of Schedule 1 of the
Water Services Act.
That
is not compliant with the imperative statutory provisions
relating to nomination.
[28]
Diemont JA in the matter of Mistry
[15]
aptly observed as follows:
‘
When as in this
case, the proceedings are launched by way of notice of motion, it is
to the founding affidavit which a judge will
look to determine what
the complaint is. As was pointed out by Krause J in
Pountes’
Trustee v Lahenas
1924 WLD 67
at 68
and has been said in
many other cases “. . .. An applicant must stand or fall by his
petition and the facts alleged therein
and that, although sometimes
it is permissible to supplement the allegations contained in the
petition, still the main foundation
of the application is the
allegation of facts stated therein, because those are the facts which
the respondent is called upon either
to affirm or deny.
’
[29]
This trite principle was quoted by Dukada J in
Nkume
v TransUnion Credit Burear (Pty) Ltd and Another
[16]
in this division. The applicants are not legally permitted to build a
case in reply. That has serious repercussions on the common
law
principle or “
Audi
Alteram Partem Rule
”
as the respondent would not have an opportunity to deal with those
new allegations. That would result in the unfairness
in the
proceedings.
Conclusion
[30]
Judicial review is concerned with determining
whether the impugned acts were made within the ambit of the
empowering legislation, and in accordance with the precepts of such
law, in particular, and the Constitution in general
[17]
.
Public or state functionaries must confine themselves within the
limits of the empowering provisions when performing public function
or exercising power. The primary function of the court is to ensure
that those who are charged with the duty to perform public
functions
in terms of the legislation act within the parameters of the law
[18]
.
Courts have a duty to ensure that the limits to the exercise of
public power are not transgressed.
[19]
[31]
In this case, when the applicants were appointed
to be the Board members of Amatola Water Board, the erstwhile
Minister did not act within the parameters of the law. The erstwhile
Minister failed to confine herself within the limits of the
empowering provision when appointing the applicants. The empowering
provision requires that a nomination must be signed by the
proposer
and also by the seconder, which did not happen as I have adumbrated
above. Mandatory provisions were transgressed by the
then Minister.
[32]
Under Common Law, necessary preconditions that
must exist before an administrative power can be exercised
are
referred to as “
jurisdictional
facts
”.
In the absence of such preconditions or jurisdictional facts, so it
is said, the administrative authority effectively has
no power to act
at all.
[20]
The decision maker
is dependent on the existence of the necessary preconditions or
jurisdictional facts for a proper and valid
exercise of power.
[33]
The erstwhile Minister, when exercising a power to
appoint the applicants lacked the necessary precondition
or
jurisdictional fact relating to the written nomination and a seconder
thereto. The erstwhile Minister should not have exercised
a power to
appoint the applicants as she did not have such a power in the
absence of the necessary preconditions.
[21]
[34]
“
Jurisdictional
facts
”
refer broadly to preconditions or conditions precedent
[22]
that must exist prior to the exercise of the power and procedures to
be followed, or formalities to be observed, when exercising
the
power: Subjective jurisdictional facts in the case of preconditions
and procedural jurisdictional facts in the case of procedural
requirements and formalities. These facts are jurisdictional because
the exercise of power depends on their existence or observance,
as
the case may be. See
Cora
Hoexter: Administrative Law in South Africa, Second edition paragraph
290
.
The erstwhile Minister lacked substantive jurisdictional fact
relating to the necessary precondition of a valid written nomination
signed by a proposer and a seconder.
[35]
There are two categories of jurisdictional facts
that can be encountered in the empowering legislation.
The first
category is described as objective jurisdictional facts, and the
second one is described as subjective jurisdictional
facts. This case
is less about subjective jurisdictional facts. It is more about
objective jurisdictional facts. Objective jurisdictional
facts
include the type of fact or state of affairs that must exist in an
objective sense before the power can validly be exercised.
If it is
found that the objective jurisdictional fact did not exist, equally
it must be found that the exercise of the power was
invalid.
[23]
[36]
Section 165(2) of the Constitution provides:
‘
2 The courts
are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the Law,
which they must apply impartially and without fear,
favour or
prejudice.’
In
our democratic order, it is the duty of courts to apply and enforce
legislation. If the validity of legislation is not impugned,
there
can be no justification for not enforcing it. Courts are themselves
subject to the fundamental principle of legality as they
are bound to
uphold the Constitution. It is a basic principle of our law that a
court can never lend its aid to the enforcement
of an illegal
act.
[24]
The court has a duty
to uphold the doctrine of legality, by refusing to countenance an
ongoing statutory contravention
[25]
.
In the final analysis applicant’s appointment was contrary to
the doctrine of legality and therefore cannot be countenanced.
[37]
Applicants’ counsel strongly contended that
if the Minister was of the view that the appointment of
the
applicants was unlawful, he should have approached this court for a
review of the erstwhile Minister’s decision appointing
the
applicants. He further stated that the conduct of the Minister
amounted to self-help. I do not agree.
[38]
The legislature expressly empowers the Minister to
remove Board members. The Minister may terminate the
appointment of
any or all the members of a Water Board
[26]
.
Equally, a member of a Water Board ceases to hold office if his or
her appointment has been terminated in terms of Section 35(5)
of the
Act
[27]
.
[39]
In
casu
,
applicants’ appointments contravened the provisions of item 3
(5) of Schedule 1 of the
Water Services Act of 1997
. It is that
contravention that triggered the operation of
Section 35(5)
of the
Water Services Act. Accordingly
, I find that the Minister is
statutorily empowered to terminate membership of the Board members
should a reason to do so arise.
The court, as it is always warned,
cannot usurp that power. Baxter
[28]
aptly puts it:
‘
Without
statutory authority, the court may not venture to question the merits
or wisdom of any administrative decision that may
be in dispute. If
the courts were to do this, it would be usurping the authority that
has been entrusted to the administrative
body by the empowering
legislation
[29]
.’
[40]
I am alive that this was said in administrative decision context, but
it applies in equal or
more force on the facts of this case or on the
decision statutorily taken by the Executive Authority. It does not
matter that the
power is administrative or executive, what is
important is that “
All
public power must be sourced in Law
”
[30]
.
I therefore find that the termination of applicants’ membership
was effected by the Minister in terms of the empowering
provision and
was therefore lawful.
Costs
[41]
The general rule is that costs must follow the
result. I see no reason why costs should not follow the event.
In the
light of the fact that the applicants failed in their application, I
find that they are liable to pay costs of this application,
jointly
and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved.
Order
[42]
In the result, I make the following order:
[42.1] The application is
dismissed.
[42.2] The applicants are
ordered to pay costs of this application jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved.
A S ZONO
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel for the
applicant
:
Adv. Mnyondo
Instructed by
: Sithembele
Zibi Attorneys Inc.
c/o Mgangatho Attorneys
100 High Street
MAKHANDA
Counsel for the first
respondent :
Adv. Vimbi
Instructed
by
: State
Attorneys
c/o Lulama Prince Inc.
87 High Street
MAKHANDA
[1]
Item
4 of Schedule 1 of Water Service Act 108 of 1997.
[2]
Interpretation
Act 33 of 1957.
[3]
Chatabac
v Union Government (Minister of Justice) and Registrar of Ascatics
1911 AD 13
at 13; Luynch v Union Government (Minister of Justice)
1929 AD 281
at 285; also Baxter L Administrative Law (1984) at 414.
[4]
Vumazonke
and others v MEC for Social Development and Welfare for Eastern Cape
2005 (6) SA 229
(SE) paragraph 35.
[5]
Julius
v Lord Bishop of Oxford
[1880] 5 AC 214
at 225.
[6]
Natal
Joint Municipality Pension Fund v Endimeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA
593
at 603 paragraph 18.
[7]
GM
Cockram: Interpretation of Statutes, Third Edition, page 163.
[8]
LAWSA:
Volume 25 Part 1 page 399 paragraph 366.
[9]
Shalala
v Klerksdorp Town Council and Another
1969 (1) SA 582
(T) at 587
A-C.
[10]
Maguma
v Station Commander, Fleet Street Police Station and Others (EL
683/2023) [2024] ZAECELLC 8 (19 March 2024) paragraph 51.
[11]
Palscon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
A at 634-5.
[12]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009 (2) SA 277
(SCA)
paragraph 26.
[13]
Which
has not been made out in the founding affidavit.
[14]
Annexure
H1-6.
[15]
Director
of Hospital Services v Mistry
1979 (1) SA 626
(A) at 635 H –
636 A.
[16]
Nkume v TransUnion Credit Burear (Pty) Ltd and Another
2014
(1) SA 134
(ECM) paragraph 7.
[17]
MEC
for Environmental Affairs and Developmental Planning v Clarrison’s
CC
2013 (6) SA 235
SCA paragraph 18; Magqazana v Buffalo City
Metropolitan Municipality and Another (EL 1386/2023) [2024] ZAECELLC
7 (5 March 2024)
paragraph 19.
[18]
Mwelase
v Minister of Social Development and Others (CA74/16) [2018] ZAECMHC
16 (22 March 2018) paragraph 25; Baxter: Administrative
Law page
305.
[19]
Minister of Social Development and Another v Mpayipheli
(CA
135/16) [2018] ZAECMHC 31 (26 June 2018) paragraph 18.
[20]
Kimberly Junior School and Another v Head of the Northern Cape
Education and Others
2010(1)
SA 217 (SCA);
2009 (4) All SA 135
(SCA) paragraph 11.
[21]
Paola v Jeeva N.O.
[2003] ZASCA 100
;
2004
(1) SA 396
(SCA) paragraphs 11, 14 and 16.
[22]
Union
of Refugee Women v Director: Awate Security Industry Regulatory
Authority
2007 (4) SA 395
(CC) paragraph 78.
[23]
South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice
1967
(1) SA 31
(C) at 34-35; President of RSA v South African Football
Union
2000 (1) SA 1
(CC) paragraph 168.
[24]
Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard and Another
2014
(4) SA 474
paragraphs 58, 77 and 99.
[25]
Lester
v Ndlambe Municipality
2015 (6) SA 283
(SCA) paragraphs 26, 27 and
28.
[26]
Section
35(5) of
Water Services Act 108 of 1997
.
[27]
Schedule
1 (4)(e) of
Water Services Act 108 of 1997
.
[28]
Administrative
Law page 305.
[29]
National
Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
2012 (6) SA 223
(CC)
paragraph 44.
[30]
AAA
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council
[2006] ZACC 9
;
2007 (1) SA
343
(CC) paragraph 68.