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[2024] ZAECQBHC 64
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Greeff v Road Accident Fund (1476/2021) [2024] ZAECQBHC 64 (31 October 2024)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, GQEBERHA)
NOT
REPORTABLE
CASE
NO. 1476/2021
In
the matter between:
GAWIE
GERT
GREEFF
PLAINTIFF
and
ROAD
ACCIDENT
FUND
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
NONCEMBU
J
[1]
This is a claim for damages arising from a motor vehicle collision
which
occurred on 4 July 2019 at the intersection of John and Caledon
streets in Kariega, Uitenhage. The plaintiff’s vehicle collided
with an Atlas security vehicle which was driven by a one Farrel du
Toit (the insured driver) who was employed as a reaction officer
at
Atlas security.
[2]
It is alleged in the particulars of claim, that the insured driver
was
the sole cause of the collision, as he was negligent in one or
more of the following ways:
(a) He failed to
keep a proper lookout;
(b) He drove the
insured vehicle at an excessive speed in the circumstances;
(c) He failed to
apply breaks of the insured vehicle timeously or at all;
(d) He failed to
avoid a collision by the exercise of reasonable care and skill he
could and should have done so;
(e) He entered an
intersection:
(i)
In a dangerous manner;
(ii)
At an inopportune time;
(iii)
Against a red traffic light.
[3]
It is further alleged that as a result of the aforesaid collision,
the
plaintiff sustained serious bodily injuries.
[4]
In its amended plea the defendant alleges that it is the plaintiff
who
was the sole cause of the collision as he was negligent by
inter
alia
, entering an intersection against a red traffic light.
[5]
The matter proceeded on the issue of liability only as per court
order
dated 17 October 2022. Two witnesses tendered evidence in the
plaintiff’s case, and three witnesses testified for the
defendant.
Summery
of evidence
[6]
The plaintiff testified in support of his claim, and led the evidence
of a person who witnessed the collision. The defendant led the
evidence of three witnesses: the insured driver, his colleague at
the
time of the accident and a police officer.
[7]
Briefly, the evidence of the plaintiff can be summarised as follows.
On
the day of the incident, he was on his way to Engen garage to buy
pies as he was hungry. It was during the night, but he could not
recall the exact time. He was driving along John Street, approaching
a robot-controlled intersection where he was to turn right
onto
Caledon Street. John street, where he was travelling has two lanes
and he was travelling on the right lane which allows him
to turn to
the right. He was travelling at a speed of between 55 and 60 km per
hour.
[8]
As he was approaching the intersection the traffic light was red on
his
side, but when he was about 30m away from it, it changed to
green, thus allowing him to proceed. He had his right indicator on.
He proceeded to enter the intersection after making the necessary
observations. He could not see properly on his right-hand side
because there was a big building at the corner which was obscuring
his view. He looked on his left, and when he looked on his right
again the insured vehicle was already at the intersection, and he
could not avoid the collision.
[9]
His vehicle was bumped on the right-hand side, and it spun around. He
sustained bodily injuries which included his ribs, lung, chest bones,
and a permanent concussion which resulted in him getting spells
of
dizziness from time to time.
[10]
He confirmed that the photos in exhibit “A” depict the
damage to the right
side of his vehicle which was sustained during
the collision, as well as the intersection where the accident
happened.
[11]
He had consumed one beer around four o clock on the afternoon in
question but he was sober
at the time of the accident. He could not
recall whether or not he was working night shift on the day of the
accident as he has
been suffering from short term memory loss since
the accident.
[12]
Peter Isaac Sutch was the second witness for the plaintiff. He
testified that he was working
for Certus Security as a security
guard, posted at Algoa Toyota, which is situated at the corner of
Bishop and Caledon streets,
at the time of the accident. He
explained that on the other side of the intersection John Street
becomes Bishop Street.
[13]
On the night in question he was standing by the robot smoking, when
he noticed two Atlas
vehicles on Caledon Street, speeding towards the
robot-controlled intersection. The traffic lights were red on their
side. He also
saw a white Nissan that was driving towards the
intersection on John Street. The traffic lights were green on its
side, and therefore
it had a right of way. The Nissan entered the
intersection, passed the first traffic light and the first lane of
Caledon Street.
When it was on the second lane, one of the Atlas
vehicles jumped a red traffic light, rammed onto the body of the
Nissan on the
right hand side it in the middle, whilst the second
vehicle passed it from behind. The doors on the right side was
damaged.
[14]
He explained further that Caledon Street has two lanes which split
into three towards the
intersection. According to him the Nissan was
driving at a normal speed. Some time after the incident, he was
approached by some
Atlas employees who promised to pay him cash if he
did not give a statement about what he saw regarding the accident.
[15]
During cross-examination, he was questioned extensively about his
initial evidence that
he was standing by a tree on Bishop Street when
he witnessed the accident. On this point, the argument was that
Caledon Street
is not visible from the aforementioned position. In
clarifying this, he stated that he was standing next to the robot (at
the corner
of the intersection), and hence he was able to see both
sides of the intersection when the accident happened. He denied that
there
was a police vehicle travelling together with the Atlas
vehicles at the time of the accident. Two days later he made a
statement
to the police regarding the accident. This was after he was
asked by the plaintiff’s wife to give a statement and after he
had seen the plaintiff and the terrible condition he was in, as his
initial stance was not to get involved in the matter.
[16]
Photos depicting the scene of the accident as well as damages to the
respective vehicles,
were admitted as exhibits “A”, “B”
and “C” respectively.
[17]
The first witness for the defendant was Farell Christian du Toit, the
insured driver. His
evidence was that at the time of the incident he
was employed as an Armed Response Reaction Officer by Atlas Security.
He was responding
to a report of a breaking in that was in progress
at business premises in Kruisrivier at the time of the accident. He
was driving
an Atlas vehicle which had a light beam that was flashing
on top, and his emergency lights were also on.
[18]
He was driving along Church Street, and he joined Caledon Street at a
T-junction intersection.
His colleagues, Gradwell Booysen and Gaylar
Tosan were driving in another Atlas vehicle, also with emergency
lights on and the
light beam on top flashing.
[19]
At the intersection of Church and Caledon Streets, they were joined
by an unmarked police
vehicle, which was also responding to the
aforementioned break-in. The three vehicles proceeded along Caledon
Street, with his
colleagues’ vehicle driving behind him and the
police vehicle traveling alongside him on the left lane. He was
driving
at a speed of around 80km per hour, having informed his
control room that he was going to exceed the speed limit, which, for
that
area was 60 km per hour. The police vehicle was therefore left
behind, and it drove behind his colleagues’ vehicle, who were
about 10 meters behind him.
[20]
When he was about 20 meters from the Caledon and John Streets
intersection, he noticed
that the traffic light was green on his
side. He had not seen the traffic light before the said distance, but
he could not give
an explanation as to why. He reduced his speed when
he was about 10 meters from the intersection, looked to his left and
when he
looked to his right the Nissan vehicle (plaintiff’s
vehicle) was already there. Everything happened very fast, he did not
see the Nissan coming and as such he was not able to avoid the
collision. He collided onto its right side.
[21]
He maintained that the traffic light was green on his side when the
collision happened,
and that it was red on the plaintiff’s
side. On his estimation, the plaintiff’s vehicle was travelling
at a speed of
between 40km and 60 km per hour.
[22]
The second witness for the defendant was Gradwell Booysen who was the
driver of the second
Atlas vehicle. His evidence was that he was
employed by Atlas as a trainee on the day in question, and he was
travelling with a
partner who was permanently employed.
[23]
They were responding to a call of a break-in, which was in progress
at Kuilsrivier. There
was a second Atlas vehicle travelling with them
also responding to the said call. The two vehicles proceeded down
Church Street
and turned right at a robot-controlled intersection in
Keller Road. They met a marked police vehicle that was going in the
opposite
direction at the corner of Burt Street, which made a U-turn
and followed them. The three vehicles followed each other and turned
right onto Caledon Street at the Church Street intersection. The
police vehicle was driving behind him and he was driving behind
the
insured driver.
[24]
According to this witness, he could see the traffic light at the John
Street intersection
when he joined Caledon Street from Church Street
as the road was clear. He could not recall what speed he was
travelling at, nor
the speed limit on the said road, but reckoned
that the insured driver was travelling faster than him.
[25]
The traffic light at the intersection of Caledon and John Street was
green on their side.
When the insured driver was approaching the
intersection, a vehicle came from John Street and jumped a red
traffic light. The insured
driver applied brakes, but it was too
late. His vehicle collided with the said vehicle. The police came and
said they saw everything,
and that this vehicle had jumped a red
traffic light.
[26]
The third and last witness for the defendant was Elroy George
Bullegalo who holds the rank
of a Sergeant in the South African
Police Services (Sgt Bullegalo). His evidence was that he was coming
from the police station
with his colleague when they received
information of a break-in that was in progress in Kuilsrivier. They
proceeded to the said
premisses. As they were driving down Caledon
Street there was an Atlas vehicle which was driving next to them. The
Atlas vehicle
had its roof lights on; hence they knew that they were
also responding to the same call. As this was not a serious call,
they did
not put the siren or blue lights on in their vehicle.
[27]
On approaching the John Street intersection, the traffic light was
red on their side, and
it turned green when they were about 17- 20
meters away. The Atlas vehicle accelerated and passed them,
immediately thereafter
a collision happened. He could not say how the
accident happened, nor state where the point of impact was on the
road, except to
say that it was on the second lane of Caledon Street.
He was also not sure what the speed limit on that road was; whether
it was
60 or 80 km per hour.
[28]
That concluded the evidence at the trial.
The
issue
[29]
The triable issues for determination before
this Court are: whether the insured driver was negligent and
therefore the sole cause
of the accident; and whether the plaintiff’s
negligence contributed to the cause of the collision.
The legal principles
applicable
[30]
The
legal framework upon which the claim is predicated is set in the
provisions of the Road Accident Fund Act (RAF Act).
[1]
[31]
Section
17(1) of the RAF Act stipulates that the defendant is obliged to
compensate a person (third party) for loss or damage suffered
because
of a bodily injury caused by or arising from the driving of a motor
vehicle. The defendant’s liability is conditional
upon the
injury having resulted from the negligence or wrongful act of the
driver.
[2]
An evidentiary onus rests on the plaintiff to prove such negligence
on a balance of probabilities.
[32]
Contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff can reduce such loss or
damage in accordance with the provisions of section
1 of the
Apportionment of Damages Act
[3]
,
which states –
‘
(1)(a) Where
any person suffers damage which is caused partly by his own fault and
partly by the fault of any other person,
a claim in respect of that
damage shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the claimant
but the damages recoverable in respect
thereof shall be reduced by
the court to such extent as the court may deem just and equitable
having regard to the degree in which
the claimant was at fault in
relation to the damage.
(b) Damage shall for the
purpose of paragraph (a) be regarded as having been caused by a
person’s fault notwithstanding the
fact that another person had
an opportunity of avoiding the consequences thereof and negligently
failed to do so.’
[33]
It
is a trite principle of evidence that in civil matters the plaintiff
bears the onus of proving his or her case on a balance of
probabilities. In the book titled
Principles
of Evidence
,
[4]
this principle is formulated as follows:
‘
In
civil cases the burden of proof is discharged as a matter of
probability. The standard is often expressed as requiring proof
on a
“balance of probabilities” but that should not be
understood as requiring that the probabilities should do no
more than
favour one party in preference to the other. What is required is that
the probabilities in the case be such that, on
a preponderance, it is
probable that the particular state of affairs existed.’
[34]
In
Miller
v Minister of Pension (Miller)s
[5]
Lord Denning expressed the civil standard of proof as follows:
‘
It
must carry a reasonable degree of probability but not so high as is
required in a criminal case. If the evidence is such that
the
tribunal can say “we think it more probable than not”,
the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal
it is
not.’
[35]
The Court in the present matter is faced
with two mutually destructive versions. Essentially, the case turns
on whether the insured
driver entered an intersection against a red
traffic light; or as it is alleged by the defendant, the plaintiff is
the one who
entered an intersection against a red traffic light and
therefore was the cause of the collision
.
[36]
Under
these circumstances, the plaintiff can only succeed if he satisfies
the Court on a preponderance of probabilities that his
version is
true and accurate and therefore acceptable, and that the defendant’s
version is false or mistaken and falls to
be rejected.
[6]
[37]
The
locus
classicus
authority in dealing with irreconcilable versions when evaluating
factual disputes is
Stellenbosch
Farmer’s
Winery
Group Ltd v Martell et Cie and others,
[7]
where
Nienaber JA stated the following:
‘
To come to a
conclusion on the disputed issues a court must make findings on (a)
the credibility of the various factual witnesses;
(b) their
reliability; and (c) the probabilities. As to (a), the court's
finding on the credibility of a particular witness will
depend on its
impression about the veracity of the witness. That in turn will
depend on a variety of subsidiary factors, not necessarily
in order
of importance, such as (i) the witness' candour and demeanour in the
witness-box, (ii) his bias, latent and blatant, (iii)
internal
contradictions in his evidence, (iv) external contradictions with
what was pleaded or put on his behalf, or with established
fact or
with his own extracurial statements or actions, (v) the probability
or improbability of particular aspects of his version,
(vi) the
calibre and cogency of his performance compared to that of other
witnesses testifying about the same incident or
events. As to
(b), a witness' reliability will depend, apart from the factors
mentioned under (a)(ii), (iv) and (v) above, on (i)
the opportunities
he had to experience or observe the event in question and (ii) the
quality, integrity and independence of his
recall thereof. As to (c),
this necessitates an analysis and evaluation of the probability or
improbability of each party's version
on each of the disputed issues.
In the light of its assessment of (a), (b) and (c), the court will
then, as a final step, determine
whether the party burdened with the
onus of proof has succeeded in discharging it. The hard case, which
will doubtless be the rare
one, occurs when a court's credibility
findings compel it in one direction and its evaluation of the general
probabilities in another.
The more convincing the former, the less
convincing will be the latter. But when all factors are equipoised
probabilities prevail.’
Evaluation
[38]
The crux of the matter is whether the
plaintiff has established on a preponderance of probabilities, that
his version is true and
accurate, and therefore acceptable, and that
the defendant’s version is false or mistaken and falls to be
rejected.
[39]
In establishing this onus, the plaintiff
relied on his own testimony; that of an eyewitness (who, for reasons
that follow, I consider
to be an independent witness for purposes of
this matter); as well as documentary evidence in the form of photos
depicting the
accident scene and damages to the vehicles involved in
the collision.
[40]
I cannot level any criticism on the calibre
and cogency of the plaintiff’s performance as a witness in the
matter. His evidence
was corroborated in material aspects, by that of
Mr Sutch, and supported by the documentary evidence presented to
Court. He had
mentioned that he suffers from short term memory loss
which is sequelae to the accident, and that certain minor
details which
he could not recall were due to this predicament. This
evidence was not disputed.
[41]
He conceded that he had consumed some
alcohol earlier on the day in question, but that this was a small
amount (only a glass) and
much earlier in the day (the common cause
evidence was that the accident happened around 10 in the evening).
Overall, his evidence
was clear, straightforward and remained
consistent and steadfast even under strenuous cross-examination. I
found him to be a credible
witness. I therefore have no reason not to
accept his evidence.
[42]
Ms Naidoo, for the defendant argued that Mr
Sutch was not a reliable witness and therefore his evidence ought to
be rejected. This
was based on the fact that his initial evidence was
that he was standing next to a tree (which on the undisputed evidence
is much
further and out of the view of Caledon Street) when he
witnessed the accident, and later stated that he was standing next to
the
robot at the corner.
[43]
This aspect, in my view, was resolved
already under his examination in chief. Granted, Mr Sutch’s
powers of narration are
a tad short of one who can be characterised
as a good storyteller. At best, it was difficult to follow his
testimony at times.
This however, by no means qualify him as an
unreliable witness.
[44]
When the issue of where he was standing when he
witnessed the accident came up, he was referred to photo 2 in exhibit
“A”,
where he had to point out where he was standing. The
dialogue in this regard went as follows:
‘
Mr
Schubart: At the time the collision occurred where were you situated
if one has a look at this photograph? Can you tell us?
Mr Sutch: I was standing
here by the tree
and the
robot pole is there
. I was
standing
there
. (emphasis intended) I was on my way to the
workshop.
Mr
Schubart:
what were you doing?
Mr Sutch: I must go to
clock.
Mr Schubart: And were you
standing or walking?
Mr Sutch: no, I was
standing there because I was smoking.
Mr Schubart: If we can
also just get photograph 2, the route that we see in the foreground,
is that John Steet?
Mr Sutch: that is
positive, ja. Here where that white bakkie stand, John's Steet, yes.
Mr Schubart: and then the
intersection itself is that the intersection of it is John Street on
this side, I think the other side
of the intersection it has another
name. Is that right?
Mr Sutch: Bishop Street.
Positive, ja.
Mr Schubart: And then the
road that would go to the left and to the right from this
intersection, which one is that?
Mr Sutch: It is Caledon
Street.
Mr Schubart: Now this
collision do you know what time this collision occurred?
Mr Sutch: I will be
honest, I cannot remember.
Mr Schubart: It was night
time, it was dark.
Mr Sutch: Yes, it was.
Mr Schubart: Now can you
tell us what did you see that particular night with regard to the
collision?
Mr Sutch: At that night
I
was standing at the robot
. (emphasis intended) Before I see the
white Nissan car coming up John straat, I was see two Atlas vehicles.
They was racing from
my left towards the location or something.’
[45]
Clearly from the above, Mr Sutch was very
precise when he stated that he was standing at the robot when he
witnessed the accident
(first stating that ‘the robot is
there
,
I was standing
there’
,
after pointing out the tree as ‘
here’
).
The confusion regarding the tree can only be attributed to the fact
that on the picture itself, which he was pointing to at the
time, it
appears to be right next to the robot. On further examination
however, as demonstrated above, this issue was clarified.
The
argument that his evidence is unreliable therefore, is unsustainable.
[46]
The same, however, cannot be said of the
defence witnesses. The material contradictions in their evidence make
one wonder if they
were at all at the same accident scene. Firstly,
there are conflicting versions on where the Atlas vehicles met up
with the police
vehicle before the accident. According to the insured
driver, he met up with the police from the intersection of Church and
Caledon
streets, and from there the police drove on the left lane
next to him, as he was driving on the right lane, and they only
lagged
behind as he was approaching the John Street intersection.
Contrary to this evidence, on Mr Booysen’s version the police
vehicle was driving behind his as he was following the insured
driver.
[47]
According to Mr Booysen (the second Atlas
driver), the police vehicle was driving in the opposite direction
when they first met
it, and it made a U-turn and followed them. This,
however, was explicitly denied by Sgt Bullegalo (the police officer
who was the
driver of this vehicle).
[48]
Secondly, Sgt Bullegalo, throughout his
testimony, only referred to one Atlas vehicle, notwithstanding that
according to all the
other witnesses there were two Atlas vehicles
involved in the matter.
[49]
I also find it quite telling that Sgt Bullegalo’s memory
regarding the entire incident
was very vague, except for the aspect
that the robot was green for the Atlas vehicle. In this regard, his
evidence was that the
robot turned green when they were about 17-20
meters away from it, and that the Atlas vehicle just passed him
immediately before
the collision happened. This is in clear
contradiction to the evidence of both the Atlas drivers. He could not
recall whether he
was driving a marked vehicle or not, at what speed
he was driving at or the speed limit on that road, despite the fact
that he
had been working as a policeman in that area for a very long
time.
[50]
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly in this regard, is the
defendant’s version
with regards to the traffic light at the
John Street intersection. The insured driver’s evidence was
that he only saw that
the traffic light was green when he was 20
meters away from it and could give no explanation of why he did not
see it earlier.
He applied breaks to see if it would not change and
to ensure that it was clear for him to go through.
[51]
On the other hand, Mr Booysen who was driving behind him told the
court that the road was
clear and that he could see the traffic light
from the time he joined Caledon Street from Church Street. Further,
according to
him the insured driver only applied his brakes when he
was trying to avoid colliding with the plaintiff’s vehicle, and
not
before. This begs the question of why the insured driver, who was
driving in front with no obstruction before him, did not see the
traffic light sooner; and why the two have conflicting versions on
when he applied his brakes. The inescapable conclusion
that one
can come to is that the insured driver was not maintaining a proper
look-out.
[52]
To further compound this situation, according to Sgt Bullegalo, the
traffic light on their
side was red the whole time, and only turned
green in favour of the insured driver when he was about 20 meters
away from it.
[53]
Considered cumulatively, these challenges, if anything, render the
plaintiff’s version
more probable than not. Overall, the
defendant’s version is so fraught with contradictions and
inconsistencies that it makes
one wonder if these witnesses were all
at the same scene, thus solidifying Mr Such’s testimony that
the police were not at
the scene in question. I am fortified in my
view that the defence witnesses did not present an accurate account
of the events of
the day in question, and that their evidence was
deliberately crafted to mislead the Court In the circumstances,
I find that
the defendant’s version is false and falls to
be rejected.
[54]
The plaintiff gave a clear account of how the collision occurred,
which was supported by
the evidence of an independent witness. The
common cause evidence was that the collision occurred on the second
lane of Caledon
Street, indicating that the plaintiff had already
passed the first lane, and as such should have been clearly visible
to any vehicle
approaching from Caledon Street. The damage to the two
vehicles also indicates that the Atlas vehicle rammed into the
plaintiff’s
vehicle, which was already in the middle of the
intersection. Damages to the plaintiff’s vehicle are on the
right in the
middle, while those of the Atlas vehicle are in front.
[55]
Further, common cause evidence is that the plaintiff’s
vehicle was travelling
at a normal speed, thus indicating that it did
not suddenly jump into the intersection. Therefore, a reasonable
driver maintaining
a proper look-out should have been able to take
evasive measures to avoid colliding into it. This, the insured driver
failed to
do.
[56]
Therefore, I am satisfied that the plaintiff has established, on a
preponderance of probabilities
that his version is true and accurate.
I have no reason not to accept it as such.
Whether
contributory negligence is applicable
[57]
The only question that remains, is whether the plaintiff ‘s
negligence contributed
to the cause of the accident, thus warranting
a reduction on the damages he suffered as a result thereof, and if
so, the extent
of such reduction.
[58]
It is the
duty of every driver to keep a proper lookout at all material times,
i.e.
a continuous scanning of the road ahead, from side to side for
obstruction or potential obstruction.
[8]
A driver of an emergency vehicle, in this case the insured driver, is
not entitled to proceed against a red traffic light unless
and until
he/she has satisfied him/herself that it is safe.
[9]
This, the insured driver failed to do.
[59]
Furthermore, the undisputed evidence of the plaintiff was that his
view on the right was
partially obstructed by the big building at the
corner, making it difficult for him to see vehicles coming from
Caledon Street
at a distance.
[60]
The evidence of the Atlas drivers was that they did not have any
sirens on, other than
the beam on top and the emergency lights. There
was therefore nothing to alert the plaintiff that there were
emergency vehicles
approaching the intersection which would warrant
that he gives them a right of way. Even the police officer who allege
to have
been at the scene stated that they did not have their sirens
on in their vehicle as this was not a serious call, whatever that
means.
[61]
The evidence before me is that the plaintiff was driving at a normal
speed as he was about
to turn at the intersection. Whether or not his
indicators were on does not take the matter any further in my view,
because on
the objective evidence, he had already entered the
intersection, having already passed the first lane, when the
collision occurred.
Whether he was turning right or not, does not
take away the duty of the insured driver of ensuring that it was safe
for him to
enter the intersection.
[62]
The issue of intoxication does not arise before me. The only evidence
before me pertaining
to alcohol consumption is that of the plaintiff,
which evidence remains undisputed. I therefore cannot find that
the glass
of alcohol he took hours before the accident may have
affected his mental faculties and thus impacted his driving
capabilities.
There is, in any even no evidence to support such a
proposition before me.
[63]
I therefore cannot find that the plaintiff contributed to the
cause of the collision.
In my view the insured driver was the
negligent party, having entered an intersection against a red traffic
light without first
ensuring that it was safe to do so. He was
therefore the sole cause of the accident.
Order
[64]
In the result, the following order is made:
(a)
The
defendant is liable for 100% of such damages as plaintiff is able to
prove, arising out of injuries he sustained in the collision
he was
involved in on 4 July 2019.
(b)
The
defendant shall pay plaintiff’s costs of suit as taxed, to date
in respect of the merits portion of the action. Such costs
shall
include:
(i)
Costs of photographs.
(ii)
Plaintiff’s costs for attendance of a pre-trial
inspection in loco; and
(iii)
Costs of Plaintiff’s counsel including trial fees.
(c)
Interest on the costs shall accrue at the legal rate of 7.75%
per annum payable as from 14 days from the dated of taxation, until
date of payment.
(d)
Payment of any amounts in terms of paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)
shall be paid into the bank account of the plaintiff’s
attorneys,
the details of which are as follows:
Johan Cronje Attorneys
Nedbank Uitenhage
Bank Code: 198765
Trust Cheque Account
No.: 1[…]
V
P NONCEMBU
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel
For the plaintiff:
Schubart SC
Instructed
by:
Johan Cronje Attorneys
C/O
Heine Ungerer Attorneys
Gqeberha
For
the defendant:
Ms Naidoo
Instructed
by:
Office of the State Attorney
Gqeberha
Dates
of hearing:
22 February 2024; 20 and 22 March 2024
Date
of judgment:
31 October 2024
[1]
Act
56 of 1996.
[2]
MP
Olivier, ‘
Social
Security: Core Elements’: LAWSA (LexisNexis, Vol 13(3), 2ed,
July 2013),
para 163.
[3]
Act 34 of 1956.
[4]
PJ Schwikkard (et al),
Principles
of Evidence
(Jutastat e-publications,
5
th
Ed, 2023), at ch32-p 666.
[5]
[1947]
2 All E.R. 372
(25 July 1947) at 374. (
Miller
was
referred to with approval by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Ocean
Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd v Koch
1963
(4) SA 147
(A) p 157).
[6]
National
Employer’s General Insurance Co Ltd v Jagers
1984 (4) SA 437 (E).
[7]
2003 (1) SA 11
[SCA] at 14J – 15E.
[8]
See
Jenneker
v Marine and Trade
1978 (2) SA 145
(SE) at 149H.
[9]
R
v Marais
1946
CPD
261.