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[2024] ZAFSHC 376
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De Bruin v S (Director of Public Prosecutions) and Another (6359/2024) [2024] ZAFSHC 376; 2025 (1) SACR 231 (FB) (25 November 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
NO
Of
interest to other Judges: NO
Circulate
to Magistrates:
YES
Case
no:
6359/2024
In
the matter between:
PETRUS
JACOBUS HENDRIK DE BRUIN
Applicant
And
THE
STATE (DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)
1
st
Respondent
THE
MAGISTRATE OF THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT
FOR
THE FEZILE DABI DISTRICT HELD AT KOPPIES
2
nd
Respondent
Coram:
DAFFUE J
Heard
:
09 NOVEMBER
2024
Judgment
:
09 NOVEMBER 2024
Reasons
delivered:
25 NOVEMBER 2024
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email and release to SAFLII.
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 12H00 on 25 NOVEMBER
2024.
Summary:
A Magistrates’ Court
postponed a bail application at the request of the prosecutor
notwithstanding information that the Investigation
Officer did not
object to bail. The accused person was well-known in the district
where he was born. He owns several farms and
has been farming for his
own account for the last seventeen years. He is married with minor
children. He approached the High Court
on an urgent basis to be
granted bail. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Director of Public
Prosecutions agreed with the applicant’s
counsel that bail be
granted in the amount of R5 000, subject to certain conditions.
The court considered the circumstances
to be exceptional and granted
bail, but warned that the judgment should not be seen as
carte
blanche
to all accused persons to approach the High Court
as a court of first instance whilst proceedings are pending in the
lower
courts.
REASONS
Daffue
J
[1]
On Saturday morning, 9 November 2024, I was on urgent
court duty. I
attended chambers, preparing the matters allocated to me for the
upcoming week. I received notification of an urgent
bail application
and soon thereafter the application papers were filed. On the time
set down for the hearing the legal representatives
of the applicant
and the Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein (the DPP)
approached me in chambers, confirming that they
had reached an
agreement for the release of the applicant on bail, subject to
certain conditions.
[2]
I granted the following order:
‘
BY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
the
following order is
made:
1.
Bail is set at R 5 000.00 (five thousand rand) and on further
condition that
the accused shall not interfere with, or intimidate
the complainant and/or any other potential state witnesses and/or
contact or
discuss the complaint against him with any state witnesses
or potential state witnesses, a list of state witnesses to be
provided
to the accused by the investigating officer forthwith.
2.
The accused shall report to the Koppies police station every Friday
between 06H00
and 18H00 until the conclusion of this matter.
3.
The accused shall appear in the Koppies Magistrates Court on 15
November 2024
and all other dates to which the case may be postponed.
4.
This order shall be sent by the registrar of this court
electronically to the
Magistrate of Koppies as well as the head of
the Correctional Centre in Kroonstad in order for the applicant to be
released on
bail on receipt of the bail amount.
THE FOLLOWING ORDER IS
NOT BY AGREEMENT:
5.
The above order which is made by agreement is exceptional and
therefore, reasons
shall be provided electronically to the parties in
due course.’
[3]
When I was informed that the applicant would seek to
be released on
bail, my initial inclination was that such application should not be
granted. The High Court is ordinarily not the
court to consider bail
applications. However, as I was awaiting the matter to be heard, I
did some research on receipt of the application
papers. More about
this later.
[4]
The previous day, to wit Friday 8 November 2024, the
applicant
appeared for the first time in the Magistrates’ Court, Koppies.
His application for bail was postponed to 15 November
2024 at the
request of the prosecutor. The applicant was not impressed with the
decision and decided to approach the High Court
on an urgent basis.
[5]
The following material facts appear from the applicant’s
founding affidavit:
a.
he is a 38-year-old married farmer with minor
children who has grown
up in the district of Koppies where his family has been farming since
his birth;
b.
he owns several farms in the districts of
Koppies and Heilbron and he
personally has been farming in the Koppies district for the last 17
years, employing 35 employees at
this stage;
c.
on 4 November 2024 he was informed by the
Local Detective Commander
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) that he was a suspect in a
case docket opened on 2 November
2024;
d.
he, through his attorney, arranged with the
commander to meet at the
police station the next day where they met her as well as the
Investigating Officer (IO), Constable Lerato
Moloi;
e.
the IO informed them of the charges of attempted
murder and crimen
iniuria that occurred during the morning of 2 November 2024, the
complainant being one of the applicant’s
employees;
f.
the Magistrates’ Court in
Koppies sits on Mondays and Fridays
only and it was agreed with the two police officers that the
applicant and his attorney would
meet them the next Friday, 8
November 2024 at 07:30 at court;
g.
the IO confirmed at the initial meeting that
she needed to verify the
applicant’s criminal profile on the SAPS system;
h.
the IO also indicated that a medical report,
a J88 was obtained in
respect of the complainant, that the doctor merely noted marks which
he indicated as bruises and consequently,
the IO confirmed on request
of the applicant’s attorney that it was apparent that no
serious bodily harm was inflicted and
therefore s 60(11) read with
Schedule 5 of the CPA was not applicable;
i.
although the applicant and his
attorney consulted for the first time
with the police officers on 5 November 2024, which was a Tuesday, the
applicant was not arrested
then, but only on Friday the 8
th
when all the necessary paperwork had been completed;
j.
by Friday, 8 November 2024, the
IO had verified the applicant’s
address and his criminal profile and he was placed in the holding
cells as she believed that
she could not grant police bail, but
confirmed that she did not oppose bail and would recommend that bail
be set in the amount
of R 2 000;
k.
the IO also requested a commitment from the
applicant that he would
not interfere with any witnesses or potential witnesses which he gave
to her apparent satisfaction;
l.
when the applicant appeared before
the magistrate at 11h50 on Friday,
8 November 2024, the prosecutor opposed bail in the absence of the IO
and requested a remand
for a formal bail application to be held on
the next Friday, 15 November 2024;
m.
applicant’s attorney objected to the request and
indicated on
record – as is also evident from the transcribed record
attached to the founding affidavit - that the IO was
not opposed to
the applicant’s release on bail and urged the magistrate to
stand the matter down for the IO to testify;
n.
upon a query by the magistrate in this regard,
the prosecutor
pertinently avoided answering the magistrate’s question,
implying that the applicant was interfering with
state witnesses as
she was not sure from where he got his information, as is evident
from her version which I quote
verbatim
:
‘
Number one, this
is interfering with state witnesses, I am not sure where he got that
information from, this is state’s case
Your Worship, I am
saying that I am opposed to bail at this point in time…’;
o.
the prosecutor continued to say that there
were two other bail
applications on the roll that day which should get priority as they
had been postponed from the previous week,
also insisting as follows:
‘
this is a first
appearance, the
arrangement
that was made
between the
accused person and the police
and what, has nothing to do with
me
at this stage, as
I am now in possession of the docket and it is
now my case
as the
dominus litus
Your Worship, as it
pleases the Court.’ (emphasis added)
p.
when the applicant’s attorney
asked that the matter not
be postponed to the next Friday the 15
th
, but the next
Monday, the prosecutor insisted that s 50(6) of the Criminal
Procedure Act allows this, the SAP69s would not be obtained
by then
and again reiterated that ‘this is the state’s case at
this stage… I do not even believe that the IO
will be on
duty.’
[6]
Section 60(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(the CPA)
reads as follows:
‘
(1)
(a)
An
accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall, subject to
the provisions of section 50(6), be entitled to be
released on bail
at any stage preceding his or her conviction in respect of such
offence,
if the court is satisfied that
the interests of justice so permit
.
(b)
Subject
to the provisions of section 50(6)
(c),
the
court
referring an accused to any other
court for trial or sentencing
retains
jurisdiction relating to the powers, functions and duties in respect
of bail
in terms of this Act until the
accused appears in such other court for the first time.
(c)
If
the question of the possible release of the accused on bail is not
raised by the accused or the prosecutor, the court shall ascertain
from the accused whether he or she wishes that question to be
considered by the court.’
(emphasis
added)
[7]
Whilst
waiting for the application to be heard, I had time to consider the
following two judgments, to wit
Majali
v S (Majali)
[1]
and
Magistrate,
Stutterheim v Mashiya (Magistrate Stutterheim).
[2]
In
Magistrate
Stutterheim
a single judge of the High Court directed the magistrate adjudicating
a bail application to hear the addresses of the prosecutor
and
defence attorney within a few hours from making the order and further
directed the magistrate to give judgment that same day.
The Supreme
Court of Appeal held as follows:
[3]
‘
To
summarise: even if the magistrate’s postponement of the bail
proceedings was unjustified and unreasonable, and the respondent
was
therefore entitled to a prompt decision on bail, no case was made out
before Pillay J for subjecting the magistrate’s
conduct of the
proceedings to the time specifications the order contained. These
were in the circumstances unwarrantably constricting
and demeaning to
the magistrate, and the order must therefore be set aside.’
[8]
The following is however important from the facts contained
in
Magistrate Stutterheim.
After the magistrate heard the
arguments of both parties, he declined to grant judgment that same
day as directed by the High Court
and reserved his judgment.
Thereafter, the accused’s counsel applied to the full bench of
the High Court for his release
on bail. Kroon and Leach JJ heard
argument on a Saturday evening. The DPP representative submitted
that, based on the record provided,
he was unable to submit that bail
should have been refused. The full bench accepted that there were
grounds to exercise the High
Court’s inherent jurisdiction to
intervene in the uncompleted proceedings and granted bail subject to
certain conditions.
I pertinently wish to point out that, although
the Supreme Court of Appeal referred to the proceedings before the
full court and
its decision to grant bail, those proceedings,
although not the subject of an appeal to the SCA, were not criticised
at all.
[9]
In
Majali
the bail application in the Magistrates’ Court was postponed
whereupon the applicant launched an urgent bail application
to the
High Court who released him on bail, subject to certain conditions. I
agree in principle with the reasons advanced in
Majali
,
without having to repeat all these. Firstly, although it is apparent
that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction in matters
of this
nature, the power to intervene shall be exercised in exceptional
circumstances only, for example when there is ‘no
lawfully
justifiable reason to detain an arrested person.’
[4]
[10]
Section 50(6)(d) provides that a lower court may postpone bail
proceedings
for a period not exceeding seven days at a time if it is
of the opinion that it has insufficient information to its disposal
to
reach a decision on the bail application, or if it appears to the
court to be necessary in the interest of justice to do so. It
reads
as follows:
‘
(d)
The
lower court before which a person is brought in terms of this
subsection, may postpone any bail proceedings or bail application
to
any date or court, for a period not exceeding seven days at a time,
on the terms which the court may deem proper and which are
not
inconsistent with any provision of this Act, if-
(i) the
court is of the opinion that it has insufficient information or
evidence at its disposal to reach a decision
on the bail application;
(ii) the
prosecutor informs the court that the matter has been or is going to
be referred to an attorney-general
for the issuing of a written
confirmation referred to in section 60 (11A);
(iii) ......
(iv) it
appears to the court that it is necessary to provide the State with a
reasonable opportunity to-
(aa)
procure
material evidence that may be lost if bail is granted;
or
(bb)
perform
the functions referred to in section 37; or
(v) it
appears to the court that it is necessary in the interests of justice
to do so.’
[11]
Unlike
popular belief amongst some, perhaps certain prosecutors, it is not
the prosecutor’s function to ensure that the accused
person
remains in custody at all costs. I do not suggest that the facts
in
casu
are on par with the facts in
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Swarts
[5]
(Swarts)
,
but it is important to note that the trial court held the NDPP liable
for the unlawful detention of the bail applicant. The decision
was
confirmed on appeal. In that case the bail applicant handed himself
over to the police who had no objection to his release
on bail or
warning. The court
inter
alia
stated the following:
‘
The
case was simply as a matter of routine postponed for further
investigation, in circumstances where further investigation was
clearly not required. This reflects very poorly on the
prosecutors and, indeed, the Magistrate. What occurred in the
court was a mechanical process with no consideration whatsoever being
given to the right of the respondent to have been released
on bail or
warning.’
[12]
In
Swarts
the prosecutor who had access to the police docket
simply failed to bring the bail court’s attention to the fact
that the
investigating officer stated in his affidavit facts that
would have entitled the accused to bail at his first appearance. It
was
confirmed in
Swarts
that applications for postponement
cannot be granted mechanically, or as of right, or for the mere
asking. The prosecutor seeking
an indulgence must present
satisfactory reasons justifying the granting of a postponement.
[13]
In casu
, the prosecutor acted without the intervention of the
IO. There was nothing substantial to support her version. The SAP69s
are
not required during bail proceedings. The applicant’s
criminal profile on the SAPS system has been obtained, indicating no
previous convictions. Furthermore, the prosecutor submitted that she
had not obtained statements of all witnesses and that these
possible
witnesses were staying on the applicant’s farm. I would have
expected the IO to inform the prosecutor that statements
of eye
witnesses were still outstanding and that she feared that the
applicant might interfere with, or intimidate them. There
is
absolutely nothing on record in this regard. In any event, bail
conditions can always be set to prevent interference or intimidation.
The alleged incident occurred in the morning of 2 November 2024. It
would have given ample time to the IO to obtain all necessary
statements, but if that was impossible, the IO might have alerted the
prosecutor that the applicant might interfere with the investigation
and that bail should be refused. There is not an iota of evidence in
this regard.
[14]
Although I might not be prepared to grant bail if it was opposed on
proper
grounds, it is not necessary to dwell onto this aspect any
further. However, a warning should be sounded. This matter was based
on exceptional circumstances
in casu
and in particular the
agreement reached between the legal representatives of the applicant
and the DPP, as well as the prosecutor’s
failure to consult the
IO. Bail applicants do not have
carte blanche
to approach the
High Court as a court of first instance in each and every case where
they are dissatisfied with bail processes
in the lower courts. The
floodgates are not open. Every application will still have to be
considered on its merits, bearing in
mind that exceptional
circumstances should be present.
[15]
It is apposite to refer to the charge of
attempted murder. Section 60(11) stipulates as follows:
‘
Notwithstanding
any provision of this Act, where an accused is charged with an
offence-
(a)
…..;
(b)
referred
to in Schedule 5, but not in Schedule 6, the court shall order that
the accused be detained in custody until he or she
is dealt with in
accordance with the law, unless the accused, having been given a
reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces evidence
which satisfies the
court that the interests of justice permit his or her release; or
(c)
contemplated
in section 59 (1)
(a)
(ii)
or (iii), the court shall order that the accused be detained in
custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with
the law,
unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do
so, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that
the interests of
justice permit his or her release.’
An onus is cast on an
accused person if Schedule 5 applies. The Schedule is clear and
unambiguous. The crime of attempted murder
is qualified: it must
involve the infliction of grievous bodily harm. If this is not the
case, the onus does not shift to the accused
person in terms of s
60(11)(b).
[16]
The court
considered the right to freedom in
S
v Bennett
[6]
and
concluded:
‘
Section
12(1) of our Constitution confers on everyone the right to freedom
which includes the right not to be detained without trial.
That is
the fundamental premise in a case such as this. It has long been the
fundamental premise of our common law. See
Minister
van Wet en Orde en Andere v
Dipper
1993
(2) SACR 221 (A)
and
[1993] ZASCA 78
;
1993
(3) SA 591
(A) at 224g and 595G and
S
v Du Plessis en 'n Ander
1993
(2) SACR 379 (T)
at
386b; see also
S
v Petersen and Another
1992
(2) SACR 52
(C)
and
S
v Acheson
1991
(2) SA 805
(Nm). The constitutional rights to freedom have, of
course, to be limited in terms of s 36 thereof but only to the extent
that
it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic
society. The presumption of innocence operates in favour of
an applicant
even where there is a strong prima facie case
against him. See S v Essack
1965 (2) SA 161
(D) at 162C and S v
Thornhill
(2)
1998
(1) SACR 177 (C)
at
181D - H.
The
presumption of innocence, according to Du Toit and others
in
Commentary
on the
Criminal Procedure Act
at
9-2 remains a cornerstone of bail and this explains why the
courts should in principle lean in favour of the liberty of the
bail
applicant. Sections 2 and 3 of the Prevention of Family Violence Act
provide for drastic and unusual measures infringing upon
a person's
liberty. They must accordingly be applied with due caution.’
[17]
I decided to put my reasons for granting bail on record in the hope
that the
prosecutor that appeared in this case, and perhaps all other
prosecutors across the country, take note of their responsibilities
as is apparent from legislation, authorities and the Prosecution
Policy issued by the NDPP in terms of s 12(1)(a) of Act 32 of
1998.
[18]
The Prosecution Policy is a public document and should surely be
well-known
to all prosecutors. Unfortunately, only the 2013 edition
is available on the internet. I am fully aware that the NDPP has
issued
various policy directives and circulars since then, but these
are apparently confidential. I shall quote some of the provisions
from the 2013 edition that apply in this particular case. The first
two paragraphs under the heading, Purpose of Policy Provisions,
read
as follows:
‘
The aim of this
Prosecution Policy is to set out, with due regard to the law, the way
in which the NPA and individual prosecutors
should exercise their
discretion.
The purpose of this
Prosecution Policy is, therefore, to guide prosecutors in the way
they should exercise their powers, carry out
their duties and perform
their functions. This will serve to make the prosecution process more
fair, transparent, consistent and
predictable.’
[19]
The
discretion to be exercised by a prosecutor relates also to the
decision whether or not to oppose an application for bail or
to
release an accused person who is in custody following arrest. The
process of establishing whether or not to prosecute usually
starts
when the police present a docket to the prosecutor. Prosecutors must
present the facts of a case to a court fairly and they
must disclose
information favourable to the defence even though it may be adverse
to the prosecution case. This notion also applies
to bail
proceedings. On the one hand, prosecutors should aim to ensure that
persons accused of serious crimes are kept in custody
in order to
protect the community and to uphold the interests of justice. But,
‘prosecutors should not oppose the release
from custody of an
accused person if the interests of justice permit.’
[7]
[20]
In Item 7 of the Prosecution Policy the ‘[
E]ffective
co-operation with the police
and other investigating agencies
from the outset is
essential
to the efficacy of the
prosecution process’ and ‘[W]ith regard to the
investigation and prosecution of crime,
the relationship
between prosecutors and police officials
should be one of
efficient and close cooperation
, with mutual respect for the
distinct functions and operational independence of each profession.’
(emphasis added)
[21]
It is
therefore clear that the prosecutor has a duty to place before the
court all relevant information which the court needs to
exercise its
discretion with regard to the grant, or refusal of bail, or even the
postponement of the bail application. The authorities
do not have to
be quoted in much detail, but it is clear that the NDPP has been held
liable for the neglect of prosecutors to bring
critical information
to the attention of the court. Tshiki J stated the following in
Botha
v Minister of Safety and Security and Others; January v Minister of
Safety and Security and Other
[8]
’
33.
Prosecutors also have a duty to
establish facts which justify the further incarceration
of a detained person before he or she can apply to the court for the
detainee’s further incarceration. One of the methods
expected
to be used by the
prosecutor is to
establish from the police official investigating the case, all the
facts
which would justify the
further detention of the arrested person. He or she has to protect
the public interest, act with objectivity,
take proper account of the
position of the suspect and the victim and pay attention to all
relevant circumstances, irrespective
of
whether
they are to the advantage or disadvantage of the suspect
.’
(emphasis added)
[22]
Tshiki J
emphasised the need for proper cooperation between the police and
prosecution regarding decisions concerning the liberty
of an arrested
person during the pre-trial stage in the following words:
[9]
‘
Relative
to the prosecutors, they owe a duty to carry out their public
functions independently and in the interests of the public.
In doing
so he or she is obliged to act in accordance with the requirements of
the Constitution and has to have regard to the rights
of the accused
person. Such rights include the accused’s rights to bail and
not to be detained arbitrarily and without just
cause. Although the
question of bail consideration is pre-eminently a matter for the
judicial officer, the information furnished
to the judicial officer
can but come from
the prosecutor. The
latter has a duty to place before court any information relevant to
the exercise of the discretion with regard
to the granting or refusal
of bail.
’
(emphasis
added)
[23]
Investigating
officers are supposed to be present during criminal trials or at
least readily available and this surely applies to
bail proceedings
as well. In
Director
of Public Prosecutions, Northern Cape v Brooks and Others
[10]
the court described the
investigating officer as a ‘key member of the prosecution
team’. Surely this apply to bail
matters as well. It is obvious
that an investigating officer should in the course of the
investigation of the case also gather
evidence that might be relevant
in the event of a bail application. The importance of this aspect
cannot be over-emphasised, bearing
in mind that too many bail
applications are postponed for further investigation when bail should
have been granted during the initial
process of investigation.
[11]
[24]
In
Links
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
[12]
the investigating officer did not oppose bail. There was also a
failure to conduct an identification parade as instructed by a
senior
prosecutor. The court concluded that the continued incarceration of
the plaintiff (the former accused) for more than two
months after his
arrest was unlawful. In
S
v Ntozini
[13]
the court dealt with criminal trials in general, but warned against
the making of unsustainable submissions, the reason being that
the
overriding duty of the prosecutor is not to win cases, but to ensure
that justice is done. It is expected of a prosecutor to
act in a
responsible and fair manner and to be candid and open to the court at
all times.
[25]
Although
relevant to criminal proceedings in general, it is necessary to refer
to the
locus
classicus
,
Solomon
v Magistrate, Pretoria (Solomon)
[14]
which was recently referred to with approval in
Zuma
v Downer and Another.
[15]
In
Solomon
the court held that the prosecutor had undertaken a prosecution with
an ulterior purpose, ‘not with the object of having
justice
done to a wrongdoer, but in order to enable the prosecutor to harass
the accused or fraudulently to defeat his rights’.
[26]
In
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police
[16]
the Constitutional Court disagreed with the judgment of the Supreme
Court of Appeal and held as follows:
‘
The
Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision to relieve the Minister from
liability for damages suffered by the applicants after
a further
remand order was made on 14 June 2005, implies that the
obligation on members of the police to make proper
and complete
disclosure to the prosecutor of the facts relevant to the further
detention of the applicants did not exist on the
second court
appearance. The obligation on the police to disclose all
relevant facts to the prosecutor is to be regarded
as a duty that
remains for as long as the information withheld is relevant to the
detention.’
Obviously,
Mahlangu
dealt with the liability of the Minister of Police for the neglect of
one its employees.
In casu
, the opposite is true. The IO was
prepared to grant bail as put on record by the applicant’s
attorney. The prosecutor, either
did not contact the IO to establish
the correctness thereof, or without reason disregarded the IO’s
disclosure that further
detention was not required.
[27]
In conclusion, Koppies is a small town in the Free State Province.
The court
and police station are probably within walking distance
from each other. The IO was present at court before the applicant’s
case was called. There should have been communication between the IO
and the prosecutor about the case and the intended application
for
bail. In any event, nowadays everybody is in possession of a cell
phone and there is just no acceptable excuse for the prosecutor’s
failure to have contact with the IO. She neglected her duties and
deprived the applicant of his freedom in employing an egregious
stratagem. The DPP is not requested to hold a formal enquiry, but the
prosecutor should be reminded that she is expected to carry
out her
functions without fear, favour or prejudice, but overall in good
faith.
DAFFUE
J
Appearances
For
Applicant:
Adv
J Potgieter
Instructed
by:
ADRIAAN
JANSE VAN RENSBURG INC
BLOEMFONTEIN
For
the 1
st
respondent:
Adv
M Strauss
Instructed
by:
DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
BLOEMFONTEIN.
[1]
(41210/2010) [2011] ZAGPJHC 74 (19 July 2011).
[2]
2004 (5) SA 209 (SCA).
[3]
Ibid
para 27.
[4]
Majali
loc cit
para 14 with reference to the authorities quoted.
[5]
(CA 164/2019) [2020] ZAECGHC 64 (17 June 2020) para 20.
[6]
2000
(1) SACR 406
(W) at 408e-f;
see
also
S
v Mabapa
2003 (2) SACR 579
(TPD) para 8.
[7]
Prosecution Policy: Item 6; See in general: Du Toit
et
al, Commentary on the
Criminal Procedure Act
vol
1, p 1-40P – 1-40W;
S
v Makayi
2021 (2) SACR 197
(ECB) paras 70&71.
[8]
2012 (1) SACR 305
(ECP) at para 33.
[9]
Ibid
para 32.
[10]
(509/19)
[2020] ZASCA 80
(2 July 2020) at para 86.
[11]
Joubert
Applied
Law for Police Officials
5
th
ed (2018) at p 23.
[12]
(2271/10) [2015] ZAECPECH 18 (30 March 2015).
[13]
2009 (1) SACR 42
(E) 49d-h.
[14]
1950 (3) SA 603 (T)
[15]
2024 (2) SA 356
(SCA) para 26.
[16]
2021 (2) SACR 595
(CC) para 37.