About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAFSHC 375
|
|
Joubert Kramer Weihmann Inc - Review of Taxation (3645/2022) [2024] ZAFSHC 375 (20 November 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
NO
Of
interest to other Judges: NO
Circulate
to Magistrates:
NO
Case
no:
3645/2022
In
the review of taxation between:
PJ
JOUBERT
Applicant
And
KRAMER
WEIHMANN INC
Respondent
Coram:
JP DAFFUE J
Judgment
delivered
:
20 NOVEMBER 2024
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email and release to SAFLII.
The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14H30 on 20 NOVEMBER
2024.
Summary:
Rule 48 of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that any party
dissatisfied with the ruling of the taxing master in respect of a
bill of costs presented to them for taxation may request the taxing
master to state a case for decision of a judge on review. The
plaintiff instituted action against the first defendant and four
other defendants. The first defendant filed a composite application
which included an exception to the particulars of claim, as well as
an application in terms of rule 23(2) for the striking out
of certain
paragraphs in the particulars of claim and a further application in
terms of rule 30 read with rule 30A for the striking
out of the
plaintiff’s claim. The exception succeeded, but the two
applications for striking out were dismissed. Thereupon
the first
defendant’s bill of costs was presented for taxation. Numerous
disputes were raised by the plaintiff. The taxing
master taxed the
bill of costs whereupon the dissatisfied plaintiff instituted
proceedings in accordance with rule 48 for review
of taxation.
Held
that the taxing master was clearly wrong in considering that the
successful party in the exception was entitled to fees and
expenses
relating to about 7 000 pages which did not form part of the
particulars of claim, but was discovered in accordance
with rule 35
procedure. Consequently, the review court interfered with some of the
rulings.
ORDER
1.
Items 5 to 14 of the bill of costs are disallowed
and shall be taxed
off.
2.
Joubert, cited as the applicant in the papers
(the respondent in the
review application), shall pay the costs of Kramer Weihmann cited as
the respondent (the applicant in the
review application) in the
amount of R1 000.
REVIEW
OF TAXATION
Daffue
J
Introduction
[1]
This is a
review of taxation contemplated in rule 48(1) of the Uniform Rules of
Court. Having been dissatisfied with the ruling
of the taxing master
for allowing several items on the taxed bill of costs presented by Mr
PJ Joubert (Joubert), Kramer Weihmann
Inc (Kramer Weihmann) initiated
proceedings in accordance with the aforesaid rule. Its notice was
filed on 14 November 2023.
[1]
[2]
On 22
January 2024 and in response to the taxing master’s stated
case, Kramer Weihmann filed its submissions in terms of rule
48(5)(a).
[2]
Joubert did
likewise.
[3]
The taxing master
filed the required report in accordance with the provisions of rule
48(5)(b), whereupon the parties filed their
further submissions in
terms of rule 48(5)(c). The court is now called upon to adjudicate
the review in accordance with rule 48(6)(a).
The
parties and the relevant background to the litigation
[3]
Kramer Weihmann is a personal liability company, conducting
its
practice of attorneys, notaries and conveyancers in Bloemfontein. It
instituted action as plaintiff against Joubert as first
defendant and
four other defendants. The claim against Joubert is for alleged
misappropriation of trust monies entrusted to Kramer
Weihmann, but
nothing more needs to be said in this regard.
[4]
Joubert, an admitted attorney, notary and conveyancer,
served as
director of Kramer Weihmann until 3 March 2020. Bearing in mind the
present dispute between Kramer Weihmann and Joubert,
it is
unnecessary to deal any further with the claims against second to
fifth defendants and/or processes embarked upon by them
in the
litigation under case number 3645/2022.
[5]
Joubert filed a notice of intention to defend the main
action
whereupon he filed a composite application which included an
exception to the particulars of claim, as well as an application
in
terms of rule 23(2) for the striking out of certain paragraphs in the
particulars of claim and a further application in terms
of rule 30
read with rule 30A for the striking out of the plaintiff’s
claim. I shall herein later deal again with this composite
document,
encapsulating the exception and the two applications for striking
out. Kramer Weihmann opposed the composite application.
Rantho AJ
heard this opposed application on 27 January 2023 and handed down
judgment on 13 June 2023.
[6]
In order to
put the matter in perspective, I quote the order of 13 June 2023
verbatim:
[4]
‘
1.
The applicant’s first ground of exception against respondent’s
particulars
of claim is dismissed.
2.
The applicant’s second to seventh grounds
of exception against
respondent’s particulars of claim are upheld.
3.
The applicant’s application for strike-out
is refused.
4.
The respondent is afforded leave to amend
its particulars of claim
within 10 (ten) days from the date of judgment.
5.
The respondent is to pay the costs of this
application on party and
party scale.’
[7]
The review application consists of 316 pages. It includes
the
documents referred to above as well as the parties’ heads of
argument presented to Rantho AJ, as well as the learned
judge’s
judgment. Throughout the exception process Joubert is referred as the
applicant and not as the excipient. Kramer
Weihmann is referred to as
the respondent. Kramer Weihmann is the applicant in this review
application and Joubert the respondent
as correctly indicated by the
taxing master, but the parties are incorrectly cited as in the
composite application. In order to
avoid confusion, I shall refer to
them as Joubert and Kramer Weihmann respectively.
Relevant
authorities pertaining to review of taxation
[8]
It is trite
that the taxing master has a discretion to allow, reduce or reject
items in a bill of costs, which discretion must be
exercised
judicially. Courts are reluctant to interfere with the decisions of
the taxing master. I dealt with this issue in
Osho
Agri Investments (Pty) Ltd v Honey Attorneys and Another (Osho
Agri).
[5]
I quote
paragraph 13 of that judgment:
‘
[13]
The taxing master has specialised knowledge of the technical details
of taxation and a court should
be reluctant to interfere with his/her
discretion. This will only be done when compelling grounds have
been proven. A full
bench of the Cape Provincial Division consisting
of eminent judges, such as, Herbstein, Van Winsen and Beyers, stated
that a court
cannot substitute its opinion for that of the taxing
master and that it “will not interfere merely where it
concludes that
had it been seized of the enquiry to determine the
amount to be allowed it would have been allowed more or less than
that did the
Taxing Officer.”’
[9]
The trite
principles pertaining to review of taxation are also encapsulated in
the following
dictum
of the court in
Visser
v Gubb:
[6]
‘
The Court will not
interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it appears that
the Taxing Master has not exercised his
discretion judicially and has
exercised it improperly, for example, by disregarding factors which
he should properly have considered,
or considering matters which it
was improper for him to have considered; or he has failed to bring
his mind to bear on the question
in issue; or he has acted on a wrong
principle. The Court will also interfere where it is of opinion that
the Taxing Master
was clearly wrong but it will only do so if it is
in the same position as, or a better position than, the Taxing Master
to determine
the point in issue. The Court must be of the view that
the Taxing Master was clearly wrong, ie its conviction on a review
that
he was wrong must be considerably more pronounced than would
have sufficed had there been an ordinary right of appeal.’ (the
judgments relied upon by the court were omitted)
[10]
In
Legal
General Assurance Society Ltd v Lieberum NO and Another
[7]
the court confirmed that the powers of the review court are wider
than the recognised common law review powers in the following
words:
‘
With these remarks
I find myself in full agreement and I consider that the review
referred to in Appellate Division Rule 9 (1) confers
upon this Court
the wider exercise of supervision envisaged by INNES, C.J., in this
decision. The Court, therefore, has the power
to correct the Taxing
Master's ruling not only on the grounds stated in
Shidiack's
case
but also when it
is clearly satisfied that he was wrong
. Of
course,
the Court will interfere on this ground only when it is in
the same or in a better position than the Taxing Master to determine
the point in issue
.’ (emphasis added)
[11]
Gorven J
observed as follows in
Lander
v O’Meara and Another:
[8]
‘
There
is a so-called graft on the main principle relating to judicial
interference with the decision of the taxing master.
The
court will substitute its own opinion for that of the taxing master
when the matter is one in which the court is as well able
to judge as
the taxing master is
.’
(emphasis
added)
I dealt with the same
issue in
Osho
Agri
[9]
in the following words:
‘
According to
Kruger and Mostert
courts defer to specialised officials like
taxing masters, but they are able to consider the reasons for
decisions. The authors
continued as follows: “Judges can assess
whether the bill and supporting documents and the facts were properly
weighed by
the taxing master. They can also check the process
of justification. In doing so judges do not reconsider the
substantive
question but assess the decision-making process.
They will ask whether the taxing master’s decision is
reasonably supportable
on the facts.” In the same vein,
the quantum of fees is a matter primarily for the discretion of the
taxing master
and a judge will interfere only in extreme cases and
then reluctantly too. The experience of the co–author,
Justice
Kruger, a former judge and before that an advocate at the bar
for many years, cannot be doubted. With reference to
Aloes
Executive Cars (Pty) Ltd v Motorland (Pty) Ltd and another
the
authors proceeded: “However, a judge who worked as counsel for
many years may be in a better position than the taxing
master to
assess the need for and reasonableness of counsel’s
consultations and drafting or settling of affidavits.
Similarly, a judge who worked as an attorney for many years may be in
a better position than the taxing master to assess the reasonableness
or necessity of work done.”’
[12]
I shall deal with the taxing master’s stated case, amplified by
his report,
and the parties’ submissions under the next
heading. Suffice to say that the greatest dispute between the parties
centred
around allowance of fees and expenses close to R500 000
relating to additional documents of about 7 000 pages not
attached
to the particulars of claim, but discovered in rule 35
proceedings.
Evaluation
of the parties’ contentions
[13]
I reiterate
that in addition to the exception, Joubert also applied for striking
out of certain paragraphs of the particulars of
claim in accordance
with the provisions of rule 23(2) and for the striking out of Kramer
Weihmann’s claim as an irregular
proceeding in accordance with
rule 30 read with rule 30A. The first striking out application was
aimed at alleged scandalous, vexatious
or irrelevant allegations
contained in the particulars of claim. In the second striking out
application, Joubert alleged that Kramer
Weihmann had failed to
comply with rules 18(4) and 18(10). Rule 18(4) stipulates that every
pleading shall contain a clear and
concise statement of the material
facts relied upon with sufficient particularity to enable the other
party to respond meaningfully.
Rule 18(10) stipulates that a party
suing for damages must set out the claim in detail to enable the
defendant reasonably to assess
the quantum of the claim. In my view,
none of the additional documents discovered could assist Joubert or
the court to consider
any non-compliance with the rules. Although the
exception succeeded, Joubert’s two applications for striking
out have been
considered and refused without granting a costs order
in favour of Kramer Weihmann, the successful party. In fact, costs
associated
with those two applications were not pertinently and
separately dealt with.
[10]
[14]
Rantho AJ
made a costs order in favour of Joubert after having considered
Joubert’s contention that attorney and client costs
should be
awarded. The learned judge awarded ‘the costs of
this
application
on party and party scale’ to Joubert. I emphasise the words
‘this application’. It is possible that the learned
judge
did not appreciate the consequences of her award. As things turned
out, the taxing master allowed costs in favour of Joubert
which have
a direct bearing on the two striking out applications because of the
nature of the procedure undertaken. Initially,
I held the view, as
contended for by Kramer Weihmann, that the order should have been
interpreted on the basis that Joubert was
not entitled to all his
costs,
ie
of the
successful exception as well as the two unsuccessful two
applications. Having reconsidered this aspect, I am not convinced
that the taxing master is clearly wrong. If the order is properly
interpreted in line with the conclusion pertaining to costs,
there
can be little doubt that insofar as Joubert succeeded on most of the
grounds of exception, the learned judge concluded that
he was
entitled to the costs of the application and not only those costs
relating to the exception. Put differently, if the learned
judge
intended to award costs in favour of Kramer Weihmann who achieved
partial success, she could have structured her order appropriately
to
give effect to such intention.
[11]
[15]
I must admit that I have never come across the
procedure adopted by Joubert
in casu
.
An exception is a pleading and subject to the rules relating to
pleadings. Kramer Weihmann did not object to the procedure as
far as
I could ascertain and it is not my prerogative to criticize the
procedure.
Joubert’s verbosity has not escaped my
attention, but it is not necessary to say anything more in this
regard, save to make
it clear that the grounds on which an exception
is founded must be stated clearly and concisely as particularly set
out in Uniform
Rule of Court 23(3). In this case the court was
confronted with a composite application which included the exception,
consisting
of 60 pages, together with annexure 1 thereto, being the
notice to remove the cause of complaint and of the intended
applications
to strike out. This notice consisted of a further 57
pages. Most of the allegations were duplicated. Such paper war really
deserves
some censure, but it is not the right forum to say anything
more in this regard.
[16]
Although
not on all fours with the facts
in
casu
,
Heher J dealt with the procedure as follows in
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and Others
[12]
:
‘
Seen in that
light, the filing of a notice of exception, which contains as an
alternative an application to set pleadings aside
under the
provisions of Rule 18(2) read with Rule 30, does not constitute the
taking of a further step within the meaning of Rule
30(2). Such an
excipient is concerned merely to make full use of the remedies which
the Rules provide for an attack on a defective
pleading. The
inclusion of the alternative is quite opposed to an inference that
the excipient intends to pursue the cause despite
the irregularity.
In my opinion, therefore, the procedure adopted by the fourth
defendant did not preclude reliance upon Rule
30(1).’
[17]
In
order to consider an exception, the court must accept all allegations
of fact pleaded by the party as true and correct. It may
not have
regard to any other extraneous facts or documents as clearly
pronounced in
Pretorius
and Another v Transport Pension Fund and Another (Pretorius).
[13]
The Constitutional Court also made the same point in
Baliso
v Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank,
[14]
stating the following:
‘
Where
an exception is taken a court looks only to the pleading excepted to
as it stands, not to facts outside those stated in it.’
More recently, in
Naidoo
and Another v Dube Tradeport Corporation and Others (Dube)
[15]
the Supreme Court of Appeal dealt with the issue as follows:
‘
With
respect, the High Court erred. This being an exception stage, the
factual averments by Sagadava must have been accepted as
correct,
unless they are manifestly false, which fact is not apparent
from the pleadings. The High Court should not have gone
beyond the
allegations. It could well be that, at the trial, the allegations
turn out to be false. But for the purposes of the
exception, their
truthfulness should have been accepted.’
[18]
Prior to embarking on a process of considering the specific items in
dispute
in the bill of costs, the following remarks are apposite. The
first and most crucial aspect to be considered in this review
application
is the taxing master’s interpretation of Rantho
AJ’s judgment, his conclusion that the additional 7 000
pages
of documents were relevant in the exception proceedings and
that all fees and expenses relating thereto should be allowed on
taxation.
An excipient who alleges that the plaintiff’s
particulars of claim does not disclose a cause of action must
establish that
upon any construction of the particulars of claim no
cause of action is disclosed. No further documents, not attached to
the particulars
of claim and no extraneous facts, should be
considered.
[19]
The taxing master emphasised paragraph 55 of Rantho AJ’s
judgment in
support of his allowance of numerous items in the bill of
costs. I quote this paragraph:
‘
[55]
In response to the applicant’s [
Joubert
] contentions as
set out above,
the respondent’s [Kramer Weihmann] view
is that the allegations of misconduct and culpable omissions on the
applicant should be read together with what annexure “POC1”
to its particulars of claim reveals,
together with the 7,000 pages
that have been provided to him
.’ (emphasis added)
[20]
It must be
borne in mind that the reference to 7000 pages came from Kramer
Weihmann’s legal team who contended that these
documents should
have been read with POC1, attached to the particulars of claim.
Rantho AJ specifically did not accept this contention.
I quote the
next two paragraphs of her judgment:
[16]
‘
[56]
The court held in
First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd
v Perry NO and others
that an exception sets out why
the excipient says that the facts pleaded by a respondent
are insufficient.
Only if the facts pleaded by a respondent could
not, on any basis, as a matter of law, result in a judgment being
granted against
the cited defendant, can an exception succeed.
Only
those facts alleged in the particulars of claim and any other facts
agreed to by the parties can be taken into account
.
[57]
I am in agreement with the applicant that paragraphs 17 and 18 of the
respondent’s particulars
of claim lack the necessary averments
to sustain a cause of action. In the circumstances, the sixth ground
of exception should
also succeed.’
(emphasis
added)
[21]
The learned
judge’s conclusion in paragraph 56 and 57 followed upon her
earlier
dicta
in paragraphs 24 and 25 which read as follows:
[17]
‘
[24]
The respondent also submitted that the report and the documents
provided under
Rule
35(12)
and
(14)) to the applicant dealt with very specific instances in
clarification of the period in question. I do not agree with the
respondent on this point because the particulars of claim should be a
starting point to enable the applicant to reply thereto.
Where
a pleading does not comply with the provisions of
Rule
18
,
the other party is entitled to either invoke
Rule
23
or
30
and/or
30A to address the cause(s) of
complaint
against offending allegations
.
[25]
The principle that a court is obliged to take pleadings as they stand
for the purpose of determining
whether an exception to them should be
upheld is limited in operation to allegations of fact, and cannot be
extended to inferences
and conclusions not warranted by the
allegations of fact. This principle does not oblige a court to
satisfy itself by accepting
facts which are manifestly and so
divorced from reality that they cannot possibly be proved. If the
facts pleaded by a respondent
could not, on any basis, as a matter of
law, result in a judgment being granted against the cited defendant,
an exception should
succeed.’
(footnotes
omitted)
The learned judge’s
dicta
in the aforesaid four paragraphs dispel the taxing
master’s contention contained in the stated case and his report
which
found favour with Joubert.
[22]
It is
apposite to quote the dictum in
First
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO
[18]
relied upon by Rantho AJ:
‘
[6]
The matter was decided as on exception. This has two relevant
consequences. The excipients have to show that the pleading is
excipiable on every interpretation that can reasonably be attached to
it:
Theunissen
en Andere v Transvaalse Lewendehawe Koöp Bpk
1988(2)
SA 493(A) at 500 E-F. Then, the plaintiff, FNB, is confined to the
facts alleged in the particulars of claim, apart
from any further
facts which the parties agreed at the trial might be taken into
account.’
[23]
It should immediately be clear that items 5 to 14 of the bill of
costs deal
exclusively with discovery which has absolutely nothing to
do with the exception process. In order to decide whether any of the
exceptions should succeed, the learned judge was bound to accept the
allegations of fact pleaded by Kramer Weihmann as true and
correct
and could not have regard to any other extraneous facts or documents.
She complied with the trite principles.
[24]
I intend to refer to the specific items in the bill of costs objected
to and
the contentions in respect thereof in the sequence presented
by Kramer Weihmann and shall adjudicate the parties’
contentions
pertaining to the relevant issues in dispute.
Items
5 to 14 of the bill of costs
[25]
These fees
and expenses relate to rule 35 procedure, the costs in obtaining
copies of the discovered documents as well as the perusal
of these
documents. Kramer Weihmann is of the view that these items should
have been disallowed as it had nothing to do with either
the
exception, or the applications to strike out. The taxing master
recorded Joubert’s submission that on receipt of the
7 292
pages, including 1 436 pages of statements, ‘the exception
was filed and that forms a very significant part of
[the] matter’.
Also, ‘it was absolutely necessary to have produced that in
order to see whether the particulars of
claim is not excipiable or
not’.
[19]
This
contention is totally wrong, bearing in mind the authorities referred
to above and Kramer Weihmann’s contention in this
review that
the only document that should have been considered during exception
was the specific pleading against which the exception
was filed. I
perused Joubert’s heads of argument presented to Rantho AJ and
could not find any reference to any of the 7 000
pages
discovered. Even if that was the case, the learned judge would be
fully entitled to ignore contentions in that regard.
[26]
The taxing
master made a material mistake in submitting that Rantho AJ stated,
with reference to paragraph 55 of the judgment, that
a reading of
these extra papers were necessary.
[20]
The learned judge did not state that it was necessary to obtain the
further documents, ie the additional 7 000 pages. The
reliance
on paragraph 55 of the judgment is totally wrong. Unfortunately, the
taxing master did not properly consider the judgment
in context and
the aforesaid four paragraphs in particular. No doubt, the learned
judge considered adjudication of the exception
in line with the
authorities quoted above. In any event, the additional 7 000
pages were not required in order to consider
and/or adjudicate the
applications for striking out.
[27]
I am
satisfied that the fees and expenses referred to in the aforesaid
items were not reasonably incurred by Joubert in relation
to the
specific matter. Although the taxing master’s discretion is
wide, it is not unfettered. The taxing master must properly
consider
and assess all relevant facts and circumstances relating to a
particular item in the bill of costs. Furthermore, a court
on review
will
be entitled to interfere where the decision is based on the
application of a wrong principle or where a material error of law
was
committed a
s
again recently confirmed in the full Court in the Eastern Cape in
Trollip
v Taxing Mistress of the High Court and Others
.
[21]
In conclusion, I am satisfied that the taxing master was clearly
wrong. Interference is therefore required in respect of items
5 to
14.
Items
19 to 24 of the bill of costs.
[28]
Kramer Weihmann contended that these fees and expenses relate to
Joubert’s
application for condonation and that the court did
not make any order in this regard. It was submitted on behalf of
Joubert that
the application for condonation was not opposed and that
the notice clearly stated that it would be costs in the exception if
unopposed.
I cannot find that the taxing master was clearly wrong in
concluding that these costs should be costs in the exception.
Items
18, 30, 44, 47 and 65 of the bill of costs
[29]
Kramer
Weihmann submitted that Joubert’s counsel did not need to
concern himself with the extra 7 000 pages of documents in
order to
consider whether an exception should be taken and/or applications to
strike out be filed. Joubert obviously held a different
view,
submitting that these extra documents had to be perused ‘in
order to determine what to plead or whether an exception
had to be
filed …’
[22]
The
taxing master was wrong in submitting that fees should be allowed for
the perusal of the extra documents ‘in line with
para 55 of the
judgment in casu’. But this issue was not properly debated. I
am prepared to accept the taxing master’s
ruling pertaining to
the hourly rate charged by counsel notwithstanding the objections by
Kramer Weihmann. Several amounts in respect
of counsel’s fees
have been taxed off. The hours claimed by counsel appear to be
exorbitant. Although it might be a case
where I could intervene,
bearing in mind my experience as attorney and advocate and the
authorities quoted, I prefer to accept
that the taxing master duly
considered counsel’s fees and came to a just conclusion. If one
considers what the attorney claimed
for perusal of the additional
7 000 pages of documents – R432 000 – counsel’s
fees should not be reduced
any further. No interference is justified.
Item
15 of the bill of costs
[30]
I agree with the taxing master that there was no merit in Kramer
Weihmann’s
complaint in this regard and the item should have
been allowed.
Items
25, 31 and 32 of the bills of costs
[31]
I am satisfied that the taxing master considered the contentions of
the parties
appropriately and deducted an amount of R1 400.
Nothing more needs to be said in this regard, save to refer to my
criticism
about Joubert’s verbosity. Although I am not
completely satisfied with Joubert’s approach, I am prepared to
accept
that the taxing master considered the complaint appropriately.
No interference is justified.
Conclusion
[32]
Kramer Weihmann achieved substantial success in this review
application and
no reason exists why they shall not be entitled to
the costs of review. Such an order shall be made.
Order
[33]
The following order is granted:
3.
Items 5 to 14 of the bill of costs are disallowed and shall be taxed
off.
4.
Joubert, cited as the applicant in the papers (the respondent in the
review application), shall pay the
costs of Kramer Weihmann cited as
the respondent (the applicant in the review application) in the
amount of R1 000.
DAFFUE
J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
For
the applicant in the review application
(cited
as respondent in the papers):
Pieter
Skein Attorneys
c/o
Kramer Weihmann Inc
Bloemfontein.
For
the respondent in the review application
(cited
as applicant in the papers):
Peyper
Attorneys
c/o
PH Attorneys
Bloemfontein.
[1]
Review record: p 49.
[2]
Ibid
:
p 87.
[3]
Ibid
:
p 150.
[4]
Ibid
:
pp 183/4.
[5]
(3088/2021)
[2022] ZAFSHC 140
(6 June 2022); (the full bench
decision referred to is
Bertish
v Standard Bank of SA Ltd
1956 (4) SA 9 (C) 13 D-E).
[6]
1981 (3) SA 753
(C) at 754H-755C;
Ocean
Commodities Inc and Others v Standard Bank of SA Ltd and Others
1984 (3) SA 15
(A) at p18.
[7]
1968 (1) SA 473
(A) at 478G; see also
Protea
Life Co Ltd v
Mich
Quenet Financial Brokers en Andere
2001
(2) SA 636
(O) at 642C-D.
[8]
2011 (1) SA 204
(KZD) at para 17, the learned judge having relied on
Scott
& Another v Poupard & Another
1972
(1) SA 686
(A)
at 689 F-G
.
[9]
Loc cit
para 14; Kruger and Mostert, Taxation of Costs in the High and Lower
Courts: A Practical Guide at pp 109 & 110;
Aloes
Executive Cars (Pty) Ltd v Motorland (Pty) Ltd and Another
1990
(4) SA 587
(T)
at 589B-C.
[10]
Review record: pp 182-184, paras 64-71 of the judgment read with
paras 3&5 of the order.
[11]
Ibid
:
pp 183-184, paras 68-71 of the judgment read with para 5 of the
order.
[12]
1998 (1) SA 836
(W) at 904F-H.
[13]
2019 (2) SA 37 (CC) para 15.
[14]
2017
(1) SA 292
(CC) para 33.
[15]
2022 (3) SA 390 (SCA) para 18.
[16]
Review record: pp179&180.
[17]
Ibid
:
pp 167&168.
[18]
[2001] 3 All SA 331 (A) para 6; see also
Pretorius
and
Dube
quoted
supra
.
[19]
Review record: p79.
[20]
Ibid
:
p14 of the stated case on p80 of the record, a mistake which was
repeated in his report on pp 274&275 of the review record.
[21]
2018 (6) SA 292 (ECG) para 17 read with para 45.
[22]
Review record: p83.