2
TARENTAAL CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
(Registration Number: 2005/000028/07)
FLORA CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
(Registration Number: 2004/030198/07)
WATERGLEN SHOPPING CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
(Registration Number: 2005/000076/07)
CARLETONVILLE CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
(Registration Number: 2005/037661/07)
WITBANK HIGHVELD INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Sixth Respondent
(Registration Number: 2004/013979/07)
GEO SPHERE DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD Seventh Respondent
(Registration Number: 2013/126393/07)
In re: the ex parte, in camera application of:
THE VILLAGE MALL INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD First Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/030240/07)
TARENTAAL CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Second Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/000028/07)
FLORA CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Third Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/030198/07)
WATERGLEN SHOPPING CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fourth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/000076/07)
CARLETONVILLE CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fifth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/037661/07)
WITBANK HIGHVELD INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Sixth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/013979/07)
GEO SPHERE DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD Seventh Applicant
(Registration Number: 2013/126393/07)
In re: the application of:
THE VILLAGE MALL INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD First Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/030240/07)
3
TARENTAAL CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Second Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/000028/07)
FLORA CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Third Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/030198/07)
WATERGLEN SHOPPING CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fourth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/000076/07)
CARLETONVILLE CENTRE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Fifth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2005/037661/07)
WITBANK HIGHVELD INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Sixth Applicant
(Registration Number: 2004/013979/07)
GEO SPHERE DEVELOPMENTS (PTY) LTD Seventh Applicant
(Registration Number: 2013/126393/07)
and
BRIGHT LIGHT SOLAR PTA1 (PTY) LTD First Respondent
(Registration Number: 2017/444392/07)
BRIGHT LIGHT SOLAR PTA2 (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
(Registration Number: 2020/099723/07)
BRIGHT LIGHT SOLAR BLM1 (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
(Registration Number: 2017/310177/07)
BRIGHT LIGHT SOLAR JHB1 (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
(Registration Number: 2017/444357/07)
Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is h anded down electronically by circulation to the parties' legal
representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 on 19 December
2024.
4
JUDGMENT
PG LOUW, AJ
Introduction
[1] I refer to the parties as cited in the main application. The respondents seek a
reconsideration of the order granted by me on 2 December 2024 in the urgent
court. The order was sought and granted on an ex parte basis.1
The ex parte application
[2] On 2 December 2024, the applicants approached the urgent court as a result
of a threat made by the respondents on 25 November 2024 to institute
liquidation proceedings against the applicants , unless payment of certain
amounts is made to the respondents by no later than 2 December 2024. The
applicants sought interim injunctive relief against the respondents , interdicting
them from instituting liquidation proceedings against the applicants pending
finalisation of various actions which have been instituted by the applicants
against the respondents out of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, subject to the
respondents’ right to set the matter down for reconsideration of the order.
[3] It was submitted on behalf of the applicants, inter alia, that:
[3.1] The threatened liquidation proceedings constitute an abuse of
process.
[3.2] The threatened liquidation proceedings are primarily intended as an
instrument to embarrass the applicants under circumstances where
1 Although the case heading indicates that the application was made in camera, the applicants
made an election to proceed with the ex parte application – without it being heard in camera.
5
the applicants are solvent; the alleged debts relied upon by the
respondents are bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds; and
disputed questions of fact and law are involved in the pending action
proceedings instituted by the applicants.
[3.3] The threatened liquidation proceedings are designed as a tactical
device to compel payment of disputed debts.
[3.4] Relying on Soundcraft (Pty) Ltd t/a Advanced Audio v Daan Jacobs
t/a Radio Spares and TV2 and Kalley Flooring Co (Pty) Ltd v President
Carpeting Manufacturers Ltd,3 the applicants are entitled to an order
interdicting the respondents from persisting with their threatened
abuse of process.
[3.5] Because it is the launching of the threatened liquidation proceedings
which is intended by the respondents to irreparably harm the
applicants, the applicants cannot provide the respondents with notice
of the application until such time as an interim order is granted. If the
application were to be served on the respondents, t hey will simply
launch the threatened liquidation proceedings, thereby rendering the
application superfluous. Therefore, it is necessary that the application
be brought ex parte.
[3.6] The respondents will, upon the granting of the interim relief sought,
be entitled to enrol the matter for reconsideration whilst, in the interim,
the applicants’ rights will be protected.
[3.7] On 28 November 2024, the applicants wrote to the respondents,
reiterating that the alleged debts relied upon by the respondents were
disputed by the applicants on bona fide grounds, and seeking an
2 1982 (4) SA 685 (W).
3 1982 (4) SA 681 (C).
6
undertaking from the respondents that the threatened liquidation
proceedings would not be brought.
[3.8] Notwithstanding, on 29 November 2024, the respondents reiterated
their intention to bring the threatened liquidation proceedings.
[3.9] Given that the respondents are inten t to launch their threatened
liquidation proceedings if the disputed amounts are not paid in full on
or before 2 December 2024, the applicants have no alternative but to
seek relief from this court on short notice. If the applicants were to
have sought to enrol the a pplication on the ordinary roll, the
respondents’ unilateral deadline for payment of the disputed debts
would have expired by the time the application will have been heard
and the abusive proceedings will have been launched.
[3.10] The spurious debt of R95 million alleged by the respondents pales
into significance when compared to the asset value of the Nova
Group of Companies which has an asset base which is valued in the
billions of rands.
[4] I accordingly granted an order in accordance with the notice of motion,
excluding the relief sought that the proceedings are to be dealt with in camera.
[5] The respondents submit that the order is a nullity because , although it invited
the respondents to set the matter down for reconsideration, it did not allow for
a return day as prescribed in Rule 6(8) which may be anticipated on 24 hours’
notice. The respondents rely on the judgment in Knoop NO and Another v Gupta
(execution)4 for this contention.
4 2021 (3) SA 135 (SCA).
7
[6] The applicants submit that the reasons set out by the Supreme Court of Appeal
in Knoop as to why the order in that matter was invalid, 5 are distinguishable
from this matter because none of the issues in Knoop arise in this matter. The
applicants, relying on Lourenco and Others v Ferela (Pty) Ltd and Others (No
1),6 submit that the order need not contain a n express provision that the
respondents are entitled to apply on notice to discharge the order. In Lourenco,
Southwood J held that:7
“The fact that the order does not expressly provide for the respondents to
anticipate the return date or provide that they are entitled to apply on notice
to discharge the order cannot be an obstacle to the Court entertaining an
application on either basis …
In any event both rule 6(8) and rule 6(12)(c) cover the case.
In terms of rule 6(8) any person against whom an order is granted ex parte
may anticipate the return day upon delivery or on not less than 24 hours’
notice …
In terms of rule 6(12)(c) a person against whom an order was granted in his
absence in an urgent application may by notice set down the matter for
reconsideration of the order.”
[7] On this basis, the applicants submit that the order is not a nullity as contended
for on behalf of the respondents.
[8] My approach to the reconsideration application makes it unnecessary for me to
make any finding in this regard, but I find the applicants’ contention on this issue
persuasive. Even though the order does not contain a rule nisi, the order
5 Knoop at para 27.
6 1998 (3) SA 281 (T).
7 At 289J to 290A.
8
specifically stated that the respondents may by notice set the matter down for
reconsideration, which is exactly what transpired.
The reconsideration application
[9] Pursuant to obtaining knowledge of the order, the respondents delivered an
affidavit in support of the reconsideration on 4 December 2024 and set the
matter down for hearing on 6 December 2024. The applicants delivered its
replying affidavit on 6 December 2024. The reconsideration application was
heard on 9 December 2024.
[10] In The Fonarun Naree: Afgri Grain Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Trustees, Copenship
Bulkers A/S (in liquidation) and Others ,8 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
that:-
“If an affidavit is filed in support of the application for reconsideration, then the
party that obtained the order is entitled to deliver a reply thereto, subject to the
usual limitations appli cable to replying affidavits. When that is done, and the
party seeking reconsideration does not argue a preliminary point at the outset
that the founding affidavit did not make out a case for relief, the case must be
argued on all the factual material before th e judge dealing with the
reconsideration proceedings. That material may be significantly more extensive
and the nature of the issues may have changed as a result of the execution of
the original ex parte order.” [Footnotes omitted.]
[11] The applicants disputed that the reconsideration application is urgent.
Interestingly, the applicants referred the court to Faraday Taxi Association v
Director Registration and Monitoring MEC for Roads and Transport and Others9
where the court referred to the matter of LA v LW where it was held that:
8 2024 (1) SA 373 (SCA) at para 14.
9 (58879/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 213 (5 April 2022) at para 7.
9
“The circumstances of each case and considerations of convenience and
fairness are private when the court exercises its discretion to enrol a rule
6(12)(c) application.”
[12] In Faraday, Keightley J held that:10
“There may well be cases where resort to the urgent court is not justified. What
renders this case suitable for reconsideration in the urgent court is the
complaint that there were material non-disclosures by FTA when it approached
Crutchfield AJ urgently. If this averment is found to be meritorious, then there
should be no delay in the order obtained in such circumstances being set
aside”. [Emphasis added.]
[13] This court held that the Uniform Rules of Court make provision for an urgent
reconsideration of an order granted ex parte.11
[14] I accordingly find that the reconsideration application ought to be entertained
on an urgent basis.
[15] The respondents adopted a dual approach in accordance with the principles
established in MV New Endeavor and Others v Indian Cil Corporation Ltd12 and
Mazetti Management Services (Pty) Ltd and Another v Amabhungana Centre
for Investigative Journalism NPC and Others,13 namely that the founding
affidavit in the ex parte application does not justify the order granted and, having
regard to the merits of the matter with reference also to the answering and
replying affidavits, the application for interdictory relief should be dismissed.
[16] Because of the view I adopt in respect of the latter approach, it is not necessary
to deal comprehensively with the first. However, in my view , the applicants
10 At para 7.
11 Mazetti Management Services (Pty) Ltd and Another v Amabhungane Centre for Investigative
Journalism NPC and Others 2023 (6) SA 578 (GJ) at para 1.
12 2024 (6) SA 64 (SCA).
13 2023 (6) SA 578 (GJ).
10
made out a case for the interdictory relief sought in the founding affidavit
(considered in isolation). The applicants’ founding affidavit appropriately
canvasses all of the necessary elements required for the relief sought, namely:
[16.1] That various electricity services and supply agreements (ESSA
agreements) were entered into between the applicants and the
respondents.
[16.2] That in essence, the arrangement between the parties was that the
respondents would install solar and the requisite batteries at the
various shopping centres.
[16.3] That the respondents failed to perform insofar as the installation of
batteries were concerned.
[16.4] As a result of the respondents not having installed the batteries the
shopping centres ended -up consuming unnecessary electricity from
the various municipalities in large and unnecessary amounts for the
period between June 2022 to July 2024.
[16.5] As a result of the respondents’ breach of their contractual obligations,
the applicants suffered damages in the region of R84 million
collectively.
[16.6] As a result of these facts, the applicants instituted six actions against
the respondents on or about 24 October 2024.
[16.7] The inclusion of such additional battery components by further
agreement was specifically contemplated by each of the ESSA
agreements.
11
[16.8] In not installing these said batteries the respondents breached or
repudiated the agreements, thus entitling each applicant to cancel the
agreement in question.
[16.9] Upon a proper interpretation of the ESSA agreements the obligation
of the applicants to make payment to the respondents for electricity
used by them is reciprocal to the respondents’ obligation to install the
complete facility.
[16.10] Before the applicants became aware of the fact that the respondents
had not entirely installed the facility – and under the false
apprehension that the invoices that were being raised by the
respondents were bona fide, due, owing and payable – the second,
third, fourth and sixth applicants – during July 2024, entered into an
arrear payment agreement with the respondents wherein the
applicants acknowledged an indebtedness to the respondents for an
outstanding amount to the value of almost R3.7 million (arrear
payment agreement).
[16.11] Shortly after the conclusion of the arrear payment agreement the
applicants started to conduct their own investigations . Pursuant to
investigations the applicants realised that the respondents reneged
on their obligations and only partially completed the facilities.
[16.12] The arrear payment agreement is voidable at the instance of the
applicants by virtue of the respondents’ failure to disclose that they
had not installed the agreed battery components at their properties
as undertaken.
[16.13] The founding affidavit contains a succinct summary of the grounds for
disputing the respondents’ claims for payment.
12
[16.14] In light of numerous correspondence exchanged between the parties,
and having regard to the institution of the actions, a dispute between
the parties materialised. In this regard, the applicants refer specifically
to an email from Mr Myburgh, a director of all the respective
applicants, to the respondents’ attorneys on 1 October 2024. [I return
to this email hereinbelow.]
[16.15] The respondents were aware of the fact that the applicants had an
asset base which is valued in billions of rands.
[16.16] The only reasonable inference to be draw n from the respondents ’
threatened liquidation proceedings is not that the respondents
subjectively believe that they will not be able to recoup the alleged
amount of R95 million from the applicants if action proceedings are
instituted, but rather that the respondents are using the threat of
liquidation proceedings as a weapon in terrorem.
[16.17] The applicants dealt with their prima facie right, which included the
right not to face liquidation proceedings which will be launched merely
as an instrument to embarrass them and would constitute a clear and
flagrant abuse of process.
[16.18] The issue of irreparable harm is dealt with , being the harm that will
eventuate as soon as the applicants appear as respondent s in
liquidation proceedings.
[16.19] The issue of balance of convenience is addressed inter alia on the
basis that the purpose of the ex parte application is not to bar the
respondents from pursuing legitimate liquidation proceedings , but
rather to facilitate a process for determining the legitimacy of those
proceedings before any lasting harm is inflicted on the applicants
through abusive liquidation proceedings.
13
[16.20] The applicants dealt with its lack of alternative remedies to avoid the
institution of abusive liquidation proceedings.
[17] However, and even if I am wrong in respect of the respondents’ point in limine,
the reconsideration application ought to succeed on the second leg of the
respondents’ approach.
[18] It is trite that in an ex parte application, an applicant has a duty to disclose all
material facts which might influence a court in coming to a decision. The non -
disclosure or suppression of facts may be met with the penalty of rescission,
even if it is not wilful or mala fide. The court, apprised of the true facts, has a
discretion to set aside its order or to preserve it. 14 In Schlesinger, Le Roux J
held that:15
“It appears to me that unless there are very cogent practical reasons why an
order should not be rescinded, the Court will always frown on an order
obtained ex parte on incomplete information and will set it aside even if relief
could be obtained on a subsequent application by the same applicant.”
[19] In an ex parte application, the applicant is required to observe the uberrima
fides (utmost good faith) rule.16
[20] This rule requires that: –
[20.1] in ex parte applications all material facts must be disclosed which
might influence a court in coming to a decision;
14 Schlesinger v Schlesinger 1979 (4) SA 342 (W) at 349A-B.
15 Schlesinger at 350B.
16 Thint (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others ; Zuma v National Director
of Public Prosecutions and Others 2009 (1) SA 1 (CC) at para 296.
14
[20.2] the non-disclosure or suppression of facts, whether wilfully, mala fide
or negligently, may incur the penalty of the order being set aside with
costs; and
[20.3] the court, apprised of the true facts, has a discretion to set aside the
former order with costs or to preserve it.17
[21] In exercising its discretion, the court will have regard to: –
[21.1] the extent of the non-disclosure;
[21.2] the question whether the first court might have been influenced by
proper disclosure;
[21.3] the reasons for non-disclosure; and
[21.4] the consequences of setting the interim order aside.18
[22] The applicants are adamant that it made a full disclosure of all the material facts
and correspondence that transpired between the parties, the most obvious
material fact being that an arrear payment agreement was entered into.
[23] Counsel for the respondents pointed out numerous correspondence that were
not attached to the founding affidavit. According to the respondents, the history
of the debt clearly establishes that the dispute is a belated and vexatious
attempt to avoid payment and that this is apparent from the complete
correspondence between the parties. I do not intend to belabour this judgment
17 Thint at para 296; Hassan and Another v Berrange NO 2012 (6) SA 329 (SCA) at para 14;
Schlesinger at 349A-B.
18 Phillips and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2003 (6) SA 447 (SCA) at para 29.
15
with references to all of the correspondence relied upon by the respondents in
this regard, but point out a few items which are of some significance in my view.
[24] On 20 August 2024, the deponent to the applicants’ affidavits, Mr Myburgh, sent
an email to Mr Shames, the deponent to the respondents’ affidavit, in response
to emails from Mr Shames enquiring about payment from the applicants in terms
of the arrear payment agreement and the ESSA agreements. Mr Myburgh’s
response was that he was “making arrangements to pay the amounts due
towards 1 September 2024” . This email is significant because the applicants
allege that shortly after the conclusion of the arrear payment agreement (on 25
July 2024) they commenced with investigations which ultimately resulted in a
realisation that, on their version, the respondents have breached the ESSA
agreements by failing to complete the installations in that the batteries were not
installed at the applicants’ various shopping centres . Significantly, the
applicants do not say when exactly these investigations commenced, how they
were conducted, by whom they were conducted, precisely when the applicants
realised that the respondents fa iled to complete the installations, and so forth.
This aspect is not remedied in the replying affidavit where Mr Myburgh simply
states that although he had been under the impression all along that batteries
had been installed (which “formed part of the Agreement all along ”), he only
came to realise at a much later sta ge that the batteries had in fact not been
installed.
[25] The first indication of this dispute in respect of the admitted indebtedness to the
respondents came to the fore in an email from Mr Myburgh to Mr Shames on 1
October 2024, which was in response to a notice of default from the
respondents’ attorneys of record dated 17 September 2024.
[26] The applicants also failed to disclose in the founding affidavit that a judgment
for payment of an amount exceeding R31 million was obtained by a creditor,
Beneficio Developments (Pty) Ltd against one of the Nova entities (the second
16
applicant) on 23 May 2023. 19 I agree with the respondents that in an ex parte
application one would have expected the applicants to make full disclosure of
the judgment and the present status of this judgment debt.
[27] The respondents attached a copy of the audited financial statements of the
Nova Group for the year ending 28 February 2023 to its affidavit. The audited
annual financial statements for the year ended 28 February 2024 is not yet
available. It is evident fro m the financial statements that the applicants are
involved in litigation with the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission
(CIPC) pertaining to a compliance notice issued by the CIPC. In the compliance
notice, the CIPC inter alia assert that the Nova Group is unable to prove “beyond
a reasonable doubt” that it has sufficient liquidity to meet its current obligations.
This is also a fact (irrespective of whether or not there is merit in the CIPC’s
assertion) which, to my mind, ought to have been disclosed in the applicants’
founding affidavit.
[28] The applicants’ failure to disclose material evidence in its founding affidavit to
the ex parte application is fatal in this matter. Although I have a discretion in this
regard,20 I am of the view that if a full disclosure of the fa cts referred to
hereinabove was made in the founding affidavit, I would not have granted the
order.
[29] The extent of the non -disclosure is severe. As I have already stated, I would
have been influenced by proper disclosure, to the extent that the order would
not have been granted.
[30] The applicants do not set out the reasons for the non-disclosure; the applicants
are of the view that it made a full disclosure of all the material facts and
correspondence. For the reasons already mentioned, I disagree.
19 Beneficio Developments (Pty) Ltd v Tarentaal Centre Investments (Pty) Ltd and An other
(22258/20) [2023] ZAGPPHC 324 23 May 2023.
20 Schlesinger at 349B.
17
[31] Insofar as the consequences of setting aside the order is concerned, the
applicants will have an opportunity to oppose the threatened liquidation
proceedings, if they were to be instituted . If the applicants succeed in proving
that the alleged debt is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds, the
applicants will avoid liquidation.
[32] The allegation that the respondents are using the threat of liquidation
proceedings as a weapon in terrorem, the applicants’ right not to face liquidation
proceedings which will be launched merely as an instrument to embarrass them
and would constitute a clear and flagrant abuse of process , the alleged harm
that will eventuate as soon as the applicants appear as respondents in
liquidation proceedings , together with the submissions that the threatened
liquidation proceedings constitute an abuse of process , are primarily intended
as an instrument to embarrass the applicants under circumstances where the
applicants are solvent, are designed as a tactical device to compel payment of
debts bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds , and that because it is the
launching of the threatened liquidation proceedings which is intended by the
respondents to irreparably harm the applicants, were factors that persuaded me
to grant the order.
[33] Having been apprised of the true facts, and having considered the applicants’
non-disclosure together with these factors, I am of the view that the order ought
to be set aside and the interdictory relief sought by the applicants ought to be
refused.
[34] The respondents seek a punitive cost order against the applicants , which is in
my view justified as a result of the applicants’ non -disclosure. Although the
respondents initially sought a de bonis propriis cost order against the applicants’
attorneys of record, I was informed at the onset of the hearing that the cost order
against the applicants’ attorneys of record is not persisted with. Nothing more
needs to be said about it.
18
Application to strike out
[35] The applicants delivered an application to strike out. The application to strike
out is directed at two articles attached to the respondents’ affidavit and all
references made thereto in the affidavit. The first article , entitled “ 12 Nova
Companies face winding up applications”, which according to the respondents
was published last year on various online platforms , is dealt with in paragraph
16 of the respondents’ affidavit and attached as KS2. The second article, which
according to the respondents made hea dlines, is dealt with in paragraph 17 of
the answering affidavit and attached as KS3. The second article pertains to an
allegation that the Nova Group breached the Companies Act by not publishing
its annual financial statements within the prescribed six months fo llowing the
financial year end.
[36] The applicants apply for the striking out on the basis that the articles and the
references made thereto in the respondents’ affidavit is either vexatious and/or
scandalous and/or hearsay in nature.
[37] Scandalous matter include allegations which may or may not be relevant but
which are so worded as to be abusive or defamatory.21
[38] Vexatious matter includes allegations which may or may not be relevant but are
so worded as to convey an intention to harass or annoy.22
21 Helen Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2015 (2) SA 1
(CC) at para 28.
22 Ibid.
19
[39] Inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay evidence not supported by an affidavit
may also be struck out. 23 Hearsay evidence can be struck out irrespective of
whether or not there is prejudice.24
[40] The first article was, ex facie KS2, written by one Roy Cokayne on 30 June
2023. The writer did not depose to a confirmatory affidavit. The second article
was, ex facie KS3, written by one Ryk van Niekerk on 13 September 2024.
Similarly, no confirmatory affidavit was deposed to by him.
[41] The contents of both articles constitute inadmissible hearsay evidence. In light
of this finding it is not necessary for me to decide whether the articles and
references made thereto in the respondents’ affidavit are scandalous and/or
vexatious. Similarly, the second requirement of a striking -out application,
namely prejudice to the applicants if the matter concerned is not struck out, 25
need not be decided either.26
[42] The application to strike out ought to succeed.
[43] In the circumstances, I make the following order:
1. The respondents’ application for reconsideration is urgent and the respondents’
failure to comply with the ordinary rules related to time periods and service of
the application is condoned in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. Annexures “KS2” and “KS3” to the respondents’ affidavit in support of the
reconsideration and all references made to these annexures in paragraphs 16
to 18 of the respondents’ affidavit, are struck out.
23 See the authorities cited by Van Loggerenberg in Erasmus: Superior Court Practice, Volume 2,
Second Edition at D1 Rule 6-65 note 419.
24 Culturia 2000 and Another v Government of the Republic of Namibia and Others 1993 (2) SA 12
(NM) at 27H.
25 Helen Suzman Foundation at para 27.
26 Culturia at 27H.
21
Appearances
Counsel for Applicants Adv A M Heystek SC
(main application): Adv A A R Marques
Instructed by: VFV Attorneys
Counsel for Respondents Adv P Stais SC
(main application): Adv L Acker
Instructed by: Thomson Wilks Inc
Date of hearing: 9 December 2024
Date of judgment: 19 December 2024