IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
Case number: 2613 /23
In the matter between:
BREEDE VALLEY ONHAFHANKLIK
Applicant
and
SPEAKER OF THE BREEDE VALLEY
MUNICIPALITY
First Respondent
EXECUTIVE MAYOR OF THE BREEDE VALLEY
MUNICIPALITY
Second Respondent
MUNICIPAL MANAGER OF THE BREEDE VALLEY
MUNICIPALITY
Third Respondent
BREEDE VALLEY MUNICIPALITY Fourt h Respondent
Coram: Acting Justice A Montzinger
Heard: 27 January 2025
Delivered electronically: 27 January 2025
JUDGMENT
(LEAVE TO APPEAL)
Montzinger AJ
Summary introduction
1. The applicant, Breede Valley Onafhanklik ("BVO"), applies for leave to appeal
against my judgment of 1 November 2024, in which I dismissed its application
to review and set aside the decision of the Breede Valley Municipal Council (the
“Council”) to unilaterally appoint BVO’s members to serve on the Council’s
section 801 committees.
2. The application for leave to appeal was filed one day late, exceeding the time
period prescribed in Uniform Rule 49(1)(b). BVO has asked for the period to be
extended.
3. The application for leave to appeal is premis ed on the grounds that an appeal
would have a reasonable prospect of success. Additionally, BVO argue d that
the appeal holds significant importance for itself, its members, councillors, and
the public at large.
4. The application is opposed.
Extension of ti me period
5. The application for leave to appeal was due on 22 November 2024 but was
only delivered on 25 November 2024. Having considered the reasons
advanced for this delay, I am satisfied that BVO has established good cause for
the extension of the time period in which to file the application . An order
extending the prescribed 15 -day period will be granted accordingly.
Merits of the leave to appeal application
1 Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (the “Structures Act”)
6. The facts and issues pertinent to the matter are set out in the main judgment.
7. The jurisprudence by the Supreme Court of Appeal2 requires that I assess,
dispassionately and based on the facts and law, whether a court of appeal
could reasonably arrive at a different conclusion. In line with the principles
articulated in Ramakatsa , BVO must demonstrate sound and rational grounds
indicating a reasonable, non -remote prospect of success on appeal.
8. Section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Courts Act3 further provides that compelling
reasons for granting leave to appeal must be assessed in conjunction with the
merits of the appeal, which remain o ften decisive4. Compelling reasons include,
among others, the involvement of substantial public interest, an important
question of law, differing judicial interpretations, or a discrete issue of statutory
interpretation with implications for future cases5.
9. After a careful review of the grounds raised by BVO, I am satisfied that the
Supreme Court of Appeal could reasonably arrive at a different conclusion. This
establishes that the applicant has a reasonable prospect of success on appeal.
10. Furthermore, the broader public implications of the judgment justify granting
leave to appeal. The issues addressed in the judgmen t, such as the autonomy
of political parties in local governance, the rights of councillors, and the
interpretation of the Structures Act regarding unilateral appointments to section
80 committees , are of considerable public interest. These issues impact the
operation of municipal councils and necessitate authoritative clarification by the
Supreme Court of Appeal.
2 Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Southern Africa Litigation Centre
and Others [2016] ZA SCA 17 ; 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA ); Ramakatsa v African National Congress
(Case no 724/2019) (“Ramakatsa”)
3 10 of 2013
4 Caratco (Pty) Ltd v Independe nt Advisory (Pty) Ltd 2020 (5) SA 35 (SCA) at para 2
5 Van Loggerenberg: Erasmus Superior Court Practice (3rd ed) Vol 1 D106 -108
Conclusion and order
11. I am therefore satisfied that BVO has made out a case for leave to appeal to be
granted. The following order is therefore issu ed:
11.1 The time period in which the applicant was required to deliver its
application for leave to appeal is extended to Monday 25 November
2024.
11.2 Leave to appeal is granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
11.3 The costs of the leave to appeal application to be costs in the appeal.
A MONTZINGER
Acting Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
Applicants’ counsel: Adv DC Joubert SC
Applicant’s attorney: Chris Fick & Associates
Respondents ’ counsel: Adv T Sarkas
Respondent s’ Attorney: Fairbridges Wertheim Becker