IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU -NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG

Case No: 14688 /2021P
In the matter between:

BRENDAN MARK PILLAY APPLICANT

and

THE NATIONAL DIRE CTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS FIRST RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
KWAZULU -NATAL SECOND RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF POLICE THIRD RESPONDENT
THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE NATIONAL HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE OF
PRIORITY CRIMES INVESTIGATION FIFTH RESPONDENT
CAPTAIN MARK MCLEAN SIXTH RESPONDENT
WENDY O’BRIEN SEVENTH RESPONDENT
NASEEM CASSIN N.O EIGHTH RESPONDENT
NAVIND DAYANAND NINTH RESPONDENT


Coram : Nako AJ
Heard : 2 December 2024
Delivered : 24 January 202 5

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__________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

The following order is granted:
1. The late filing of the first, second and seventh respondents’ opposing affidavit
in the rule 30A application is condoned.
2. The application in terms of rule 30A is dismissed with costs on an attorney and
client scale.
3. The application in terms of rule 35(7) is dismissed with costs on an attorney
and client scale.


JUDGMENT

NAKO AJ :

Introduction
[1] There were three interlocutory applications set down for hearing before me .
The first application is brought in terms of Uniform rule 3 5(7), where in the applicant
seeks an order compelling the respondents to provide documents which had been
requested in terms of a Uniform rule 35(3) notice delivered on 12 April 2023 (‘the rule
35(7) application ’). The second application is an application in terms of Uniform rule
30A wherein the applicant seeks an order declaring that the first, second and seventh
respondents’ opposing affidavit dated 26 June 2023 is out of time and that th ose
respondents are barred from delivering their opposing a ffidavit in the absence of them
bringing a condonation application within ten days of being directed to do so (‘the rule
30A application ’). The applicant seeks costs on a punitive scale against the
respondents , alternatively costs de bonis prop riis against their legal representatives.
The third appli cation is an application for condonation for the late filing of the opposing
affidavit in the Uniform rule 30A application (‘the condonation application ’).

[2] In the main application , the applicant seeks a review, in terms of Uniform rule
53, of a warrant of arrest i ssued on 30 July 2021 (‘the review application ’). A rule nisi
was issued on 28 October 2022, with interim relief staying the execution of the warrant
of arrest , pending the final determination of the review application . The record
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envisaged in Uniform rule 53 was served on the applicant on 14 December 2022 . The
applicant is yet to file his supplementary papers , despite being directed by the court to
do so , and he alleges that the record filed by the respondents is inadequate . In
demonstration of his frustration with the record , the applicant caused correspondence
to be sent to the respondents’ representatives and thereafter issued a notice in terms
of rule 35(3) , followed by the rule 35(7) application .

[3] There ha ve been delays from the respondents in delivering the record , in
responding to the rule 35(3) notice and in opposing the rule 35(7) application .
However , there has been a response to the rule 35(3) notice and there is an
explanation on oath in the affidavits opposing the rule 35(7) application regarding the
failure to produce some of the demanded documents.

Condonation and rule 30A application
[4] The applicant , in the rule 30A application , seeks to have the first, second and
seventh respondents’ opposing affidavit in the rule 35(7) application declared to be out
of time , directing them to apply for condonation , and in the event that they fail to apply
for condonation within ten days , to be barred from delivering their opposing affidavit.
For the sake of convenience, the first, second and seventh respondents will
collectively be referred to as the NPA respondents.

[5] The rule 30A application was brought on 12 December 2023 , notwithstanding
the fact that the opposing affidavit was served by the NPA respondents by email on 13
June 2023 and that Bedderson J , at the hearing of the application to compel on 14
June 2023 , declared that the opposing affidavit was filed and directed the applicant to
deliver his replying affidavit in terms of the rules before the return date of the review
application on 27 June 2023. Bedderson J went further by finding that there was no
need for a condonation application , as same was unnecessary in circumstances
where the opposing affidavit had already been served.

[6] The applicant brings the rule 30A application on the premise that Bedderson J
was informed of only one affidavit and not t wo sets of affidavits and that the NPA
respondents delivered their opposing affidavit on 26 June 2023 , after the applicant
had filed his replying affidavit.
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[7] However , the applicant fails to address the fact that two affidavits were in fact
emailed , regardless of counsel referring to ‘an affidavit ’ in the submissions made to
Bedderson J . The applicant also fails to address the contention that the affidavits
delivered on 26 June 2023 were in fact hard copies of the affidavits already served ,
and, as such , there was no prejudice to the applicant.

[8] It is clear from the ruling of Bedderson J on 14 June 2023 that the late filing of
the opposing affidavits in respect of the rule 35(7) application was condoned and any
application to demand a condonation application in respect thereof is ill -founded.

[9] The applicant , however , brought the rule 30A application some five months ,
one week and two days after the hard copies of the affidavit he wishes to raise an
objection to were delivered , and more than four months after the expiry of the period
prescribed in rule 30A notice . The NPA respondents were late in delivering their notice
to oppose this application and their subsequent opposing affidavit and they have
brought a condonation application for their late opposition to the rule 30A application.

[10] In response to the late delivery of the opposing papers to the rule 30A
application , the applicant issued yet another notice in terms of rule 30A , demanding a
condonation application for the late filing of the papers opposing the rule 30 A
application , which prompted the NPA respondents’ condonation application.

[11] The NPA respondent s’ representative tenders an explanation for the delay . She
relates her ordeal of becoming a victim of a car hijacking , which included being
kidnapped by the hijacker s for three hours and the robbery of her cell phone, her diary
containing the relevant dates in this matter , her laptop containing documents related
to this matter , and other personal items . The representative further relates the trauma
she experienced and having to undergo therapy.

[12] The applicant rejects the explanation on the basis that the representative has
not attached proof that she laid criminal charges in the form of a CAS number related
thereto and generally claims that he has been prejudiced by the NPA respondents’
failure to comply with the rules of court.
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[13] It is trite that an applicant in a condonation application must tender a
reasonable explanation for the delay , which excludes a wilful d isregard for the rules of
court, demonstrate that they enjoy reasonable prospects of success in the application
and that it is in the interests of justice to condone the late filing.

[14] There is no dispute that the affidavits delivered by the respondents on 26 June
2023 were in fact the same affidavits served by email on 13 June 2023 . There is also
no dispute that the applicant replied to one of the affidavits on 23 June 2023 .
However , the applicant did not reply to the opposing affidavit of the NPA respondents
because the email had apparently been categorised as junk mail and was missed by
the applicant ’s representatives .

[15] Rule 30A provides that:
‘(1) Where a party fails to comply with these rules or with a request made or notice given
pursuant thereto, or with an order or direction made by a court or in a judicial case
management process referred to in rule 37A, any other party may notify the defaulting party
that he or she intends, after the lapse of 10 days from the date of delivery of such notification,
to apply for an order —
(a) that such rule, notice, request, order or direction be complied with; or
(b) that the claim or defence be struck out.
(2) Where a party fails to comply within the period of 10 days contemplated in subrule (1),
application may on notice be made to the court and the court may make such order thereon
as it deems fit. ’

[16] The relief sought by the applicant in the rule 30A application is not in alignment
with the rule in two respects . The first is that t he applicant seeks to prescribe a
remedy for the alleged failure to comply with the rules by seeking an order whereby
the NPA respondents are direct ed to apply for condonation and barring the NPA
respondents from bringing the application for condonation should it not be brought
within the ordered period.

[17] The second is that the application concerns the failure to comply with the
timelines prescribed in Uniform rule 6 , and as such, the applicant ought to have used
the procedure prescribed in rule 30 in bringing this application. This is so , as the
remedy sought by the applicant, to the extent that he requires the affidavits to be
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ignored until and/or unless they are regularised by an order condoning their late filing,
is not what rule 30A envisages and is more in line with the remedies set out in rule 30.

[18] The applicant ought to have brought his application within 15 days of the NPA
respondents failing to remedy his compla int. This is so because complaints against
the failure to comply with the Uniform rules ought to be brought timeously , as they are
intended to facilitate a speedy and proper resolution of disputes. In this regard , the
rule 30A notice is afflicted by both the delay and not being aligned with the rule.

[19] A proper consideration of the papers shows that the real difficulty was not the
late filing of the affidavit but rather the applicant’s belief that the NPA respondents only
served their affidavit on 26 June 2023 , while they , in fact , delivered on the same day
as the third, fourth, fifth and sixth respondents. Thus , the complaint is not the failure to
comply with the order granted on 14 June 2023 , but rather the applicant’s failure to
pick up the second affidavit in respect of the NPA respondent s in his emails , which he
then failed to reply to , and as such , rule 30A , or even rule 30 for that matter , does not
find application.

[20] The purpose of the rule is to ensure that the rules of court are compiled with, on
notice , in circumstances where there has been non -compliance, but not to bar a
respondent from any attempt to fall in line with the rules nor to demand an application
for condonation.

[21] Dealing with a similar objection where the court was invited to disregard
affidavits on the basis that they were out of time , Wepener J in Pangbourne Properties
Ltd v Pulse Moving CC and another1 held that :
‘There are a large number of matters that come before us in this division in which parties, for a
variety of reasons, agree to file affidavits at times suitable to them. Each case must be
decided on its own facts and it cannot be said that when affidavits are filed out of time that
these are not, without more, before the court. Without attempting to tabulate all instances
where affidavits which are filed out of time may indeed be validly before a court, I refer to two
examples only. Affidavits can validly be before the court pursuant to an agreement between
the parties — see rule 27(1) which provides for such an agreement. They can also be validly

1 Pangbourne Properties Ltd v Pulse Moving CC and another 2013 (3) SA 140 (GSJ) para 16.
7

before the court if the interests of justice require it. See the unreported judgment of In re
Application for the Issuing of a Letter of Request (GNP case No 3771/07, 14 September 2007)
where Van der Merwe J (as he then was) said: “Though the replying affidavit was well out of
time it had to be taken into account in the interests of justice.” Shongwe J (as he then was)
said in the unreported judgment of Venter v Van Wyk (GNP case No 30323/04, 27 June
2005):
“The first point in limine is, in my view, highly technical. It is correct that the replying affidavit
was filed out of time and that no formal application for condonation was filed by the
respondent. However there is a lot of mud -slinging to and fro between the parties which
situation I do not prefer to entertain. It is a waste of valuable time. I therefore rule that I will
admit all affidavits before me and deal with the important issues presented by the
application.”’

[22] There is no automatic bar to the late filing of affidavits and the aggrieved party
should demonstrate the prejudice suffered for the court to intervene . However , such
intervention should not create a circumstance where the ventilation of the real dispute
between the parties is unfulfilled . Making this point , Schreiner JA in Trans-Africa n
Insurance Co Ltd v Malule ka remarked that
‘…technical objections to less than perfect procedural steps should not be permitted, in the
absence of prejudice, to interfere with the expeditious and, if possible, inexpensive decision of
cases on their real merits. ’

[23] The only prejudice referred to by the applicant is the delay in the hearing of the
review application , as the impending arrest and prosecution have been stayed by the
interim interdict. The rule 30A application is not only incompetent in the circumstances
for the failure to align with the rule and having been launched outside the prescribed
period , but i t also serves to interrupt the 35(7) application , intended to resolve the
issue of the outstanding record and designed to move the review application forward.

[24] The court held in Federated Trust Ltd v Botha2 that:
‘The court does not encourage formalism in the application of the Rules. The rules are not an
end in themselves to be observed for their own sake. They are provided to secure the
inexpensive and expeditious completion of litigation before the courts.’


2 Federated Trust Ltd v Botha 1978 (3) SA 645 (A) at 654D -E.
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[25] The court went on to hold that:3
‘Where one or other of the parties has failed to comply with requirements of the Rules or an
order made in terms thereof and prejudice has thereby been caused to his opponent, it should
be the court's endeavour to remedy such prejudice in a manner appropriate to the
circumstances, always bearing in mind the object for which the Rules were designed. ’

[26] In Khunou and other s v M Fihrer & Son (Pty) Ltd and others4 the court held that
‘The Rules of Court are in a sense merely a refinement of the general rules of civil procedure.
They are designed not only to allow litigants to come to grips as expeditiously and as
inexpensively as possible with the real issues between them, but also to ensure that the
Courts dispense justice uniformly and fairly, and that the true issues which I have mentioned
are clarified and tried in a just manner. ’

[27] The rule 30A application in this matter offends against all the principles
enunciated in the cases set out above while also being procedurally irregular , and, as
such , should fail. The rule 30A application is not truly necessary in the circumstances
of this case , and to the extent that the applicant had not replied to the second affidavit ,
he ought to have simply sought leave to supplement the replying affidavit to
incorporate his reply to the opposing affidavit of the NPA respondents.

[28] Returning to the condonation application , it is clear that the 30A application is
without merit as it is not intended to alleviate any prejudice. The application is also ill-
founded on the bases that it was brought outside the prescribed period and that it was
not, in the true sense , brought due to the conduct of the NPA respondents ( it was due
to the applicant missing the emailed version of the affidavit as it was in the junk mail
folder) .

[29] The NPA respondents ’ representative has tendered a reasonable explanation
for the default and has prospects of success in defending the rule 30A application ,
and, as such , the condonation for the late filing of the opposing papers must be
viewed as being in the interests of justice.


3 Ibid at 654E -F.
4 Khunou and others v M Fihrer & Son (Pty) Ltd and others 1982 (3) SA 353 (W) at 355G -H.
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[30] The opposition to the condonation application , after demanding same , is yet
another demonstration of the applicant having lost sight of the purpose of the Uniform
rules of court. Having demanded that an application should be brought for the late
opposition to the rule 30A application , and after the explanation has been tendered ,
the opposition to the condonation application is not truly required for justice to be done
or for the speedy resolution of litigation between the parties . It is unavoidable to
conclude that it is designed to frustra te justice and to delay the determination of the
real issues between the parties. In the circumstances , the condonation application
should succeed to ensure that injustice does not arise.

The r ule 35 (3) notice and rule 35(7) application
[31] The parties have not provided a chronology of events leading to the issuing of
the rule 35(3) notice and the bringing of the rule 35(7) application. The applicant has
appended some of the correspondence between the parties , albeit selectively , as the
letters from the respondent s’ representative are not attached , while the applicant’s
representative’s responses are attached.

[32] The following chronology of events appears from the papers :
(a) On 28 October 2022 , the applicant brought the review application together with a rule
nisi;
(b) On 14 December 2022 , after some failed requests for the extension of time , the
respondents served a copy of the rule 53 record on the applicant;
(c) On 11 January 2023 , the applicant sent a letter to the respondent s’ representative
complaining about the inadequacy of the record and listing what documents he required ;
(d) On 8 February 2023 , the applicant’s representatives were invited to inspect the original
docket s on 21 February 2023 and responded to this invitation on 9 February 2023 by
indicating their unavailability until 20 March 2023 and other dates thereafter;
(e) On 24 March 2023 , the applicant’s representatives declined the invitation to inspect
the original dockets;
(f) On 31 March 2023 , the r espondent s’ representatives responded to the demand for
documents made in the letter dated 11 January 2023 by providing ‘A clip ’ of the dockets,
tendering an explanation for the failure to include certain dockets and the investigating
officer’s diary in the rule 53 record and requesting the applicant to deliver his supplementary
papers in the review application ;
10

(g) On 3 April 2023 , the applicant demanded the very documents the respondents said
were not included in the review record as they were not relevant for the decision which was
the subject of the review application and indicated his intention to bring an application to
compel discovery should these documents not be provided and further demanded
confirmation that the state attorney represents all the respondents;
(h) On 12 April 2023 , a notice in terms of rule 35(3) was delivered by the applicant ,
demanding the very documents referred to in the correspondence dated 11 January 2023 and
31 March 2023; and
(i) On 28 April 2023 , the applicant brought the rule 35(7) application.

[33] The record delivered by the respondents is in terms of Uniform rule 53 and
relates to the decision which is the subject -matter of the review application and it is
not per se discovery as envisaged in Uniform rule 35 .

[34] Rule 35(3) provides that
‘If any party believes that there are, in addition to documents or tape recordings disclosed as
aforesaid, other documents (including copies thereof) or tape recordings which may be
relevant to any matter in question in the possession of any party thereto, the former may give
notice to the latter requiring such party to make the same available for inspection in
accordance with subrule (6), or to state on oath within 10 days that such documents or tape
recordings are not in such party’s possession, in which event the party making the disclosure
shall state their whereabouts, if known.’

[35] This subrule permits a party to call for documents in addition to documents or
tape recordings disclosed in terms of rule 35(1) and these documents must be
relevant to the matter in question. Strictly speaking , this subrule can only be utilised
after discovery in terms of rule 35(1) and this is denoted by the use of the word
‘disclosed as aforesaid’ in the subrule . The respondents oppose the application partly
on this premise.

[36] Rule 35(7) permit s a party to bring an application to compel discovery after a
failure to discover in terms of rule 35(1) , and to comply with the subsequent rule 35(3)
and/or rule 35(6) notice /s. In Kgamanyane and another v ABSA Bank Limited ,5 the

5 Kgamanyane and another v ABSA Bank Limited [2024] ZAGPJHC 68 para 14.
11

court found that the use of the words ‘as aforesaid’ in the subrule means in terms of
the earlier provisions of rule 35.

[37] The respondents have taken the point that the provisions of rule 35(7) are not
available to the applicant in the review application and also if not preceded by the
discovery procedure envisaged in subrule 35(1). The respondents seek the dismissal
of the application on the basis that it is procedurally wrong and even if it was not , the
applicant has not demonstrated the relevance of the documents requested to the
review application. The respondents accept the general application of the discovery
procedure to applications as envisaged by rule 35(13) but dispute that the applicants
are entitled to bring this application and ought to have rather relied on rule 35(12).

[38] While I agree that the procedure followed by the applicant is incorrect , I am not
inclined to non -suit the applicant on this basis but to rather consider the entire factual
matrix and to resolve the real dispute between the parties , as the court is required to
do.

[39] The notices are not preceded by discovery affidavits in this matter , as the main
application relates to the review application. In terms of rule 53(1) (b), the respondents
are required to file the record of the ‘…proceedings sought to be corrected or set
aside, together with such reasons as [they are ] by law required or desire [d] to give or
make …’ with the registrar of the high court .

[40] It is apparent that the relevance of the documents require d has to be viewed in
light of the review application and not in the general terms of rule 35(7) , where the
issues are defined in the pleadings and followed by discovery affidavits.

[41] The record, in terms of Uniform rule 53, consists of all the information relevant
to the impugned decision or proceedings , except privileged information , and for
information to be relevant , it must throw light on the decision -making process and the
factors that were considered in reaching the decision .6


6 Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Service Commission [2018] ZACC 8; 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC) ( Helen
Suzman Foundation ) para 17.
12

[42] The relevance of the information listed in the applicant’s notice in terms of rule
35(3) must be assessed in light of the review application and the respondents’
response to the letter dated 11 January 2023. The additional dockets required by the
applicant did not form part of the decision -making process relating to the issuing of the
warrant of arrest or the rejection of the presentations to stay the execution of the
arrest. This much was communicated to the applicant on 31 March 2023 after the
applic ant rejected an invitation to examine the original dockets.

[43] The applicant fails to mention this response and makes a case for the
respondents’ failure to respond to the 35(3) notice that was delivered after a clear
indication was given that the dockets required did not form part of the decision -making
process of the impugned decision , as the applicant was a witness in those matters
and not a suspect. The applicant does not deal at all with this fact. The applicant
issued the rule 35(3) notice while knowing the reasons why the requested documents
would not be forthco ming and , as such , cannot rely on this notice for the application.

[44] The applicant then ignores the response on oath relating to the documents
required and does not attack the non-compliance of the response but instead argues
that the documents and information required are necessary to assess the legality
and/or rationality of the decision to apply for a warrant of arrest and/or the rejection of
his representations to stay same.

[45] Rule 35(7) does not entitle the applicant to ignore the response and to demand
information that was not before the decision maker when the decision was made.
Besides this, the respondents have tendered an explanation on oath about the
required documents and this is sufficient.

[46] The applicant contends that the dockets , which did not form part of the decision
to seek a warrant of arrest , will ‘extinguish and settle the baseless allegations of the
ninth respondent’s complaint against him’. This contention loses sight of the rationale
behind the rule 53 record.

[47] The applicant also uses these proceedings to demand discovery of privileged
documents not related to the review proceedings. This is impermissible in terms of
13

rule 35. In Helen Suzman Foundation , the Constitutional C ourt held that ‘u nder rule 35
documents are discoverable if relevant, and relevance is determined with reference to
the pleadings’.7 The Constitutional C ourt went on to compare this process to the rule
53 process , and ultimately held that this process is different as relevance is assessed
as it relates to the decision sought to be reviewed.8

[48] The reading of the replying affidavit and the arguments presented against the
resistance to file irrelevant (to the decision) and/or privileged information, as part of
the review record, relate to the applicant’s desire to discredit the ninth respondent as a
complainant in the matter for which his arrest is sought. I am not persuaded that such
a challenge can be met by requiring the review court to consider statements in
dockets that relate to a criminal case against the ninth respondent in which the
applicant was a witness.

[49] The applicant also requires the mandate of the sixth respondent to investigate
him. Despite t he respondents stating on oath that such a document does not exist and
that the allocation of investigations is by virtue of the sixth respondent being employed
by the third respondent , the applicant persist s with his demand with no justification ,
except to allege that the investigation is unlawful because of some conspiracy and/or
placement of the sixth respondent in the Western Cape.

[50] It is not clear on what basis the applicant insists that the documents exist when
the respondents clearly state that they do not . However , what is clear is that the
demand for these documents , even after the respondents have given an explanation
for their absence , delays the review application. It is trite that the review application
can only be decided on the strength of the information that was before the decision
maker.

[51] Even on the merits of this case , the rule 35(7) application cannot succeed as
the record has been delivered and the absence of the documents required by the
applicant in the record has been adequately explained . Bedderson J implored the
applicant as far back as June 2023 to ‘get his show on the road’ . I share this

7 Ibid para 26.
8 Ibid para 27.
14

sentiment , as these applications have done nothing but frustrate the review
application without justification. The applicant was directed on 17 April 2023 to deliver
his supplementary papers by 27 June 2023 and is yet to comply with th at order.
[52] I conclude that the review application can be pursued with the record filed and
any attack on the inadequacy of the record can be dealt with in the review application
and the principles governing the legality and rationality of the decision in light of the
information purportedly relied on to make the decision.

[53] It follows that the application has no merit and falls to be dismissed. I now turn
to the issue of costs.

Costs
[54] The general principle is that costs follow the result. While the court retains a
discretion in relation to costs , such discretion is to be exercised judiciously. The
parties sought punitive costs against each other , with the applicant claiming that the
respondents are dilatory in their tendency to deliver their opposition s late. The
respondents , on the other hand, argued that the applicant should be directed to pay
the costs on an attorney and client scale , as his application s constitute d an abuse of
process and are designed to delay the administration of justice , as the criminal case
against the applicant cannot proceed until the review application is determined.

[55] The conclusion that the rule 35(7) application should not have been brought ,
especially after the respondents’ letter dated 31 March 2023 , is unavoidable. The
situation is worsened by the applicant’s persistence despite the explanation on oath in
the opposing affidavits. At the very least, the applicant ought to have withdrawn the
application once these affidavits were delivered after ignoring the correspondence and
failing to inspect the original dockets upon invitation to do so.

[56] The delivered record is sufficient for the applicant to mount his attack on the
decision -making process . The insistence on the procedurally flawed rule 35(7)
application does not vindicate his rights but delays the very justice he claims to seek.

[57] The rule 35(7) application was unnecessary and not in pursuit of justice. The
process followed served only to taunt the respondents and their legal representatives.
15

Court processes should not be used in this manner and as such , the costs should
follow the result on an attorney and client scale.

Order
[58] In the circumstances , I make the following order :
1. The late filing of the first, second and seventh respondents’ opposing affidavit
in the rule 30A application is condoned.
2. The application in terms of rule 30A is dismissed with costs on an attorney and
client scale.
3. The application in terms of rule 35(7) is dismissed with costs on an attorney
and client scale.




__________________
NAKO AJ

16

Appearances


Counsel for the plaintiff : Mr S Singh

Instructed by : Govender, Mchunu & Associates
First Floor, 46,48Mckenzie Road
Windermere, Durban
c/o Shaheel Singh Attorneys Incorporated
Suite 6A, Victoria Country Club Estate
18Montrose Brown Drive
170 Peter Brown Drive
Pietermaritzburg

Counsel for the defendant : Ms Z Rasool

Instructed by : State Attorney KwaZulu -Natal
6th Floor Metlife Building
391 Anton Lembede Street
Durban
c/o State Attorney KwaZulu -Natal
Satellite Office
2nd Floor, Magistrate’s Court Building
302 Church Street
Pietermaritzburg