IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
In the matter between
IZAK JACOB STEENKAMP
REHAN COETZEE
and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL
and
IZAK JACOB STEENKAMP
REHAN COETZEE
STEEN KAMP & JANSEN INCORPORATED Reportable / Not reportable
Case no: 6176/2022
First Applicant
Second Applicant
Respondent
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
THEUNIS GOOSEN
Coram:
Heard:
Delivered : Naidoo J et Opperman J
24 May 2024
29 January 2025. 2
Fourth Respondent
Summary: Application for Leave to Appeal-civil law -suspension of attorneys from
practising pending investigation of irregularities in handling of trust account and misconduct
-order not appealable -not final in effect
ORDER
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
JUDGMENT
Naidoo J (Opperman J concurring)
[1] This is an application by the applicants , Izak Jacob Steenkamp (first applicanUMr
Steenkamp) and Rehan Coetzee (second applicanUMr Coetzee), for leave to appeal
against the judgment in this matter, which was delivered on 26 September 2023. The
Legal Practice Council (LPG/respondent) opposed this application.
[2] The judgment was assailed on a number of grounds, numbering 18 in total. In a
number of instances the grounds are followed by what amounts to argument in respect
of those grounds. The grounds amount to assailing the judgment and reasoning of the
court, which is not permitted in an application such as this. I will attempt to summarise
what I consider to be the main grounds. In essence, the grounds that the court erred in
are:
a. making orders without Chapter 4 of s 43 of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (the
Act) having been complied with;
b. making orders without a disciplinary body (as defined in the Act) having been
satisfied or declaring that it is satisfied, as required bys 43 of the Act;
c. making orders without s 72(6) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979 ( read with s 116 of
the Act) having been complied with;
d. making orders whilst, for the purposes of s 72(6) of the Attorneys Act 53 of 1979,
the charges against the applicants were dis~issed by the Disciplinary Committee in June 3
2021;
e. finding that the LPC was entitled to the relief that it sought, whereas the LPC has
not made out a proper case for the suspension of both applicants;
The applicants conclude by asserting that they do not consider the judgment to be an
interlocutory order but one which is final and definitive in effect. 4
[3] It is by now well settled in our law that an applicant was, previously , merely required
to show that there is a reasonable possibility that another court, differently constituted,
would find differently to the court against whose judgment leave to appeal is sought. It is
clear from s 17(/), set out above, that the situation is now somewhat different, and an
applicant for leave to appeal is required to convince the court that there is a reasonable
prospect of success and not merely a possibility of success.1
[4] In a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in the case of Ramakatsa and
Others v African National Congress and Anothe~ the dicturn of the court at para 10 adds
further clarity:
'I am mindful of the decisions at high court level debating whether the use of the word "would" as
opposed to "could" possibly means that the threshold for granting the appeal has been raised. If a
reasonable prospect of success is established, leave to appeal should be granted. Similarly, if there
are some other compelling reasons why the appeal should be heard, leave to appeal should be
granted. The test of reasonab le prospects of success postulates a dispassionate decision based on
the facts and the law that a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that
of the trial court. In other words, the appellants in this matter need to convince this Court on proper
grounds that they have prospects of success on appeal. Those prospects of success must not be
remote, but there must exist a reasonab le chance of succeeding . A sound rational basis for the
conclusion that there are prospects of success must be shown to exist.'
[5] The judgment in this matter sets out fully the reasons for and the grounds upon whic_h
the order for suspension , and other relief was granted, and I do not intend to repeat the
1 See in this regard The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen and 18 others 18 2014 JDR LCC, which was cited
with approval in a number of cases, such as Matoto v Free State Gambling and Liquor Authority [2017) ZAFSHC
80, a decision emanating from this Division, and also a Full Court decision in Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Others v Democratic Alliance [2016] ZAGPPHC 489.
2 Ramakatsa and Others v African National Congress and Anofher[2021] ZASCA 31.
5
judgment. The applicants persist with arguments that this court rejected as unsustainable .
For example, the applicants alleged that the disciplinary Committee granted absolution from
the instance or discharged the applicants. In para 9 of the judgment this Court said:
'The Disciplinary Committee rejected the application for absolution from the instance, but found that
the Investigating Committee did not in fact follow the correct procedure in referring the matter to it.
Hence the Disciplinary Committee found that the matter was not properly before it, and dismissed the
proceedings'.
At para 21 this Court continued:
'In addition, their argument that the Disciplinary Committee of the LPC dismissed the merits of the
matter, cannot be sustained , as that Committee was specific in finding that due to the investigations
not being properly undertaken , the matter was dismissed. It did not deal with the merits in relation to
the finding it made, and most certainly did not exonerate the respondents of wrongdoing and
misconduct' .
[6] The applicants now deny that it is common cause that they closed their practice,
Steenkamp De Villiers and Coetzee, without informing the LPC, and moved their staff,
infrastructure and files to Steenkamp & Jansen Inc. This is what emerged from the evidence.
It seems that in the application for leave to appeal, the applicants attempt to re-argue the
matter. The suspension order is not a final order, nor does it have the effect of a final order.
It is also not appealable . It has come to our attention that in November 2024, the applicants
brought an application to set aside the suspension order. Judgment in that matter was handed
down on 4 December 2024. The court there ordered as follows:
1. 'The first respondent shall, as undertaken , serve its detailed charge sheets on the applicants
on/or before 15 January 2025.
2. The disciplinary hearings shall, as undertaken, be scheduled to start not later than 31 March
2025 and continued until finalised.
3. The first respondent shall finalise its disciplinary proceedings against the applicants on/or
before 31 May 2025, failing which their suspensions shall lapse automatically .
4. The application is removed from the roll, but, in the event of the first respondent failing to
comply with either paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 supra, leave is granted to the applicants to set the
application down for hearing on the opposed motion court roll with 21 days' notice to the first
respondent, which notice shall be accompan ied by their supplementary affidavits.
5. In the event of a notice of set down as envisaged in paragraph 4 supra, the first respondent
shall file an answering supplementary affidavit within 7 days, whereafter the parties shall file
supplementary heads of argument in accordance with the practice directives of this court.
6. Costs shall stand over for later adjudication if required.'
[7] It is clear that the applicants' argument, in this matter, that the suspension order
does not stipulate a date when the LPC's investigations should conclude, has been
addressed , in the judgment of 4 December 2024. Clear time frames have been ordered
for the commencement date of the investigat ions, the serving of charge sheets in respect
of such investigations and for the finalization of such disciplinary proceedings . As indicate
in the judgment in this matter, investigations of this nature take time, but limits have been
imposed on the LPC for the finalization of such proceedings , thus mitigating the prejudice
to the applicants , which they complain about.
[8] In considering the grounds proffered by the applicants, in the application for leave
to appeal, my view is that they have no reasonable prospects of success on appeal. In
the circumstances, I make the following order:
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with costs.
I concur.
OPPER 6
Appearances
For the1st Applicant:
Instructed by:
For the 2nd Applicant
Instructed by:
For the Respondent
Instructed by: ADV HJ BENADE
FS LAW INC
BLOEMFONTEIN
MR R COETZEE
IN PERSON
Mobile: 0835609189 7
ADV N SNELLENBURG SC
SYMINGTON DE KOK INC
BLOEMFONTEIN