IN THE COMPETITION APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case no: 252/CAC/Aug24
In the matter between:
TAKATA SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED Appellant
and
THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA First Respondent
TAKATA CORPORATION Second Respondent
TRW AUTOMATIVE INC. Third Respondent
TRW OCCUPANT RESTRAINTS SOUTH AFRICA INC. Fourth Respondent
AUTOLIV INC. Fifth Respondent
AUTOLIV SOUTHERN AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED Sixth Respondent
Coram: VALLY AJA, NKOSI AJA , and MURPHY AJA
Heard : 22 August 2024
Delivered : 16 January 2025
Summary: Competition law – approach to a simultaneous appeal and review of the
same case – appeal and review of the decision of the Competition Tribunal - whether the
Tribunal’s decision dismissing Takata SA’s exceptions is (a) appealable and, if so,
whether Takata SA has made out a case for the relief it seeks in its appeal, and; (b)
2
reviewable and, if so, whether Takata SA has made out a case for the relief sought –
court held where an appeal and a review are simultaneously brought the complaint in
each case must be different, failing which the party should be allowed to institute only the
appeal or the review proceeding – appeal dismissed – review dismissed.
ORDER
On appeal from: The Competition Tribunal
1. The appeal is dismissed .
2. The review is dismissed.
3. The appellant is directed to pay the costs of the appeal as well as the costs of the
review , including the costs of two counsel, where employed.
3
JUDGMENT
Vally and Nkosi AJA (Murphy AJA concurring)
Introduction
[1] This matter comes before us as an appeal and/or review application. It is brought
by Takata South Africa (Pty) Limited (Takata SA), an erstwhile subsidiary of Takata
Corporation ( Takata Corp ) based in Japan, against the decision of the Competition
Tribunal (the Tribunal) to dismiss the exceptions raised by Takata SA to 21 complaint
referrals (referrals) brought by the Competition Commission (the Commission) against
Takata SA, Takata Corp and four other manufacturers and suppliers of the Occupant
Safety Systems (OSS) componen ts, comprising the automotive passenger airbags, the
steering wheel airbags and the seatbelts that are fitted in motor vehicles.
[2] Takata SA and the other parties were supplying the OSS components concerned
to the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) of motor vehicles. In each referral the
Commission sought an order declaring that Takata SA and the other parties contravened
section 4(1) (b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 ( the Act).
Factual background
[3] On 3 August 2012, the Commission initiated a complaint against various parties
operating in the market for the manufacture and supply of the OSS components. Between
March and June 2018, the Commission filed a total of 21 complaint referrals against, inter
alia, Takata SA and Takata Corp. Takata Corp excepted to each of those referrals on the
ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction over it as a peregrinus , while Takata SA
excepted thereto on the grounds that each referral failed to disclose a cause of action
‘and/or ’ was vague and emba rrassing.
4
[4] In respect of Takata Corp’s exceptions, the Tribunal, at the instance of the parties,
stayed the exception proceedings pending the outcome of the Competition Appeal Court’s
judgment in Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Others1 (Forex ) because similar questions
of jurisdiction had been raised in that matter. Following the decision of this Court in Forex ,
the Commission delivered a combined supplementary affidavit with a view to addressing
the concerns raised by Takata Corp and Takata SA in their respective exceptions.
Thereafter, Takata Corp elected not to pursue its exceptions, while Takata SA persisted
with its exceptions on the basis that the Commission’s supplementary affidavit had failed
to cure any of the defects raised in the exceptions.
[5] On 10 May 2021, the Tribunal issued directions, inter alia : that Takata SA must file
its answering affidavits in relation to the 21 complaint referrals brought against it by the
Commission , despite the fact that Takata SA had taken an exception to the referrals. In
other words, it directed that Takata SA plead over and; that the Commission must
thereafter file its replying affidavits. Both parties duly complied with the directions issued
by the Tribunal. However, Takata SA contends that it filed its answeri ng affidavit under
protest.
[6] The 21 exceptions were argued jointly before the Tribunal on 2 June 2022, and
were all dismissed by the Tribunal on 8 December 2023, some 18 months after the
hearing. At this stage, we pause to mention that the 18 months’ delay in issuing the
Tribunal’s decisi on is, in itself, a cause for concern, particularly as it adds to the already
lengthy delay in the resolution of this matter. This is not the first case where the Tribunal
has taken so long to issue its decision. While w e are not provided with the reasons for
this, we do, nevertheless, voice a concern about such a lengthy delay .
[7] The Tribunal essentially found that the Commission’s complaint referrals
complied with the requirements of rul e 15(2) of the Tribunal Rules (the Rules ) and
dismissed the exceptions . It found that the referral does disclose a cau se of action
1 Competition Commission v Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Other s 2020 (4) SA 105 (CAC).
5
and that it contained sufficient particularity to enable Takata SA to discern what case
it is required to meet . Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, Takata SA
proceeded to lodge its appeal and/or review application s to have the Tribunal
decision s set aside by this Court.
[8] Takata SA adopted a catch -all approach to the matter. It appeals the decision of
the Tribunal, yet at the same time applies for the decision to be reviewed. It characterises
its case as one of an ‘appeal and/or a review’. The characterisation is clumsy , to say the
least. It is not clear whether both processes are to be treated as complement ary to each
other or whether they are to be treated as disparate and separate. This caused
unnecessary confusion, which was exacerbated by the fact that the grounds of review
are, in the main , the same as the grounds of appeal . We deal with this in greater detail
below.
The Act
[9] The Act allows for this Court to entertain an appeal of a decision of the Tribunal
which is an administrative body. It also allows this Court to review any decision of the
Tribunal. Section 37(1) of the Act provides:
‘(1) The Competition Appeal Court may –
(a) review any decision of the Competition Tribunal; or
(b) consider an appeal arising from the Competition Tribunal in respect
of –
(i) any of its final decisions other than a consent order made in
terms of section 63; or
(ii) any of its interim or interlocutory decisions that may, in terms
of this Act, be taken on appeal. ’
Grounds of Appeal
[10] Takata SA contends that the Tribunal made a number of material errors in its
decision dismissing the exceptions. These , according to it , are as follows. Fi rstly, the
Tribunal found that t he Commission had pleaded that Takata SA acted in the fulfilment of
6
the design and overall strategy of its parent company, Takata Corp . This was never the
Commission’s pleaded case, and, in any event, even if this were proven , it is insufficient
to warrant a finding that Takata SA contravened s 4(1)(b) of the Act . Secondly, the
Commission argued that following upon the conclusion of the collusive agreements
between Takata Corp and others, an inference could be drawn that Takata SA was itself
a party to the said agreements . This, once again, was n ot the Commission’s pleaded
case . Thirdly, the Tribunal improperly relied upon its answering affidavit, which was filed
under protest, to find that T akata SA understood clearly the case of the Commission.
[11] Takata SA asks this Court to uphold its appeal and find that the referral fails to
disclose a cause of action . It asks further that this Court dismiss the case against it
altogether , rather than allow the Commission to remedy the defective referral as it is
incurable.
Grounds of R eview
[12] The review is brought in terms of s 6 of the Promotion of Adminis trative Justice Act
3 of 2000 (PAJA ), alternatively in terms of the principle of legality.
[13] The grounds raised by Takata SA are: the Tribunal took account of irrelevant
considerations; the Tribunal’s decision was materially influenced by an error of law in that
it concluded that Takata SA was itself a party to the agreement by virtue of its conduct
after the agreement was concluded by Takata Corp and the other colluding parties ; and,
the Tribunal’s decision was irrational having regard to the information before it .
[14] The contention that the Tribunal committed an error of law is its main ground and ,
in fact, the only ground of review that was pursued. But all three grounds are really a
repetition of what it raises in its appeal. And, it seeks the same relief as it does in the
appeal , which is to set the referral aside and not allow the Commission to remedy it as it
is incurably defective.
7
The I ssues
[15] The issues for determination are whether the Tribunal’s decision dismissing Takata
SA’s exceptions is (a) appealable and, if so, whether Takata SA has made out a case for
the relief it seeks in it s appeal , and; (b) reviewable and, if so, whether Takata SA has
made out a case for the relief s ought .
Appeals and Reviews
[16] An appeal and a review are distinct legal processes aimed at attending to different
sets of grievances raised by parties aggrieved by an order, judgment or decision. An
appeal in the normal sense is a formal request made to a higher court to reconsider a
decision made either by a lower court , or in certain circumstances, such as the present
case, by an administrative tribunal. The two processes and the out comes that follow in
each case are different. An appeal against a decision of an administrative body is only
available to a party if allowed by statute ,2 as in this case.
[17] One of the first cases dealing with the differences between an appeal and a review
was Tickly .3 Tickly was decided long before the enactment of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 (Constitution). The court there pointed out that
in general there are two types of appeals: an appeal in the wide sense and one in the
narrow sense. Both forms of appeal involve a re -hearing of the matter. However, in the
former case, the re -hearing takes place, ‘with or without additional evidence or
information’ ,4 whereas in the latter, which is also referred to as an ‘ordinary appeal’, the
re-hearing is ‘limited to the evidence or information on which the decision under appeal
was given and in which the only determination is whether th at decision was right or
wrong’ .5 The appeal before us falls into this latter category.
2 Hotel Association of S.R. v S.R. L iquor Licensing Board 1958 (1) SA 426 (SR) at 429D.
3 Tikly and Others v Johannes N.O. & Others 1963 (2) SA 588 (T).
4 Id at 590G.
5 Id at 590H .
8
[18] A review on the other hand may involve additional evidence or information, with a
focus not on whether the decision, order or judgment was right or wrong, but whether the
decision -makers ‘exercised their powers and discretion honestly and properly’.6 A
reviewing court restricted its focus to the decision -making process and steered clear of
examining the decision itself.7 This very narrow approach to a review was the mark of the
law for a long time. However, the law evolved over time, and in the process has moved
away from the supine approach o f looking only at the ‘decision -making process’ while
ignoring the decision itself . It now scrutinises the decision itself. The extent of the court’s
scrutinising powers (also referred to as grounds of review) until the early 1990s is best
captured in Johannesburg Stock Exchange :
‘Broadly, in order to establish review grounds it must be shown that the
president failed to apply his mind to the relevant issues in accordance with
the 'behests of the statute and the tenets of natural justice'. … Such failure
may be shown by proof, inter alia , that the decision was arrived at arbitrarily
or capriciously or mala fide or as a result of unwarranted adherence to a fixed
principle or in order to further an ulterior or improper purpose; or that the
president misconceived the nature of the dis cretion conferred upon him and
took into account irrelevant considerations or ignored relevant ones; or that
the decision of the president was so grossly unreasonable as to warrant the
inference that he had failed to apply his mind to the matter in the man ner
aforestated. Some of these grounds tend to overlap.’ 8 (Case references
omitted.)
[19] Proof of a decision -maker erring by ‘failing to take into account relevant facts’
or incorrectly ‘taking onto account irrelevant facts’ were accepted as satisfying the
requirement that the decision -maker ‘ failed to apply his mind to the relevant issues
in accordance with the behests of the statute and the tenets of natural justice ’. Over
time, these have been treated as independent grounds of review. Still an ‘error of
6 Id at 590 H-591init.
7 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v Evans [1982] 3 ALL ER 141 [HL] at 154d .
8 Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Another v Witwatersrand Nigel Ltd and Another 1988 (3) SA 132 (A)
at 152A -D.
9
law’ by the decision -maker did not constitute a basis for a court to interfere with the
decis ion-maker’s decision. Soon enough, this changed when in the early 1990’s
Corbett CJ in a landmark judgment addressed the issue directly and decided it.
Corbett CJ had this to say on the issue :
‘To sum up, the present -day position in our law in regard to common -law
review is, in my view, as follows:
(1) Generally speaking, the non -performance or wrong performance of a
statutory duty or power by the person or body entrusted with the duty
or power will entitle persons injured or aggrieved thereby to approach
the Court for relief by way of common -law review.
(2) Where the duty/power is essentially a decision -making one and the
person or body concerned (I shall call it "the tribunal") has taken a
decision, the grounds upon which the Court may, in the exercise of its
common -law review jurisdiction, interfere with the decision are limited.
(3) Where the complaint is that the tribunal has committed a material error
of law, then the reviewability of the decision will depend basically upon
whether or not the Legislature intended the tribunal to have exclusive
authority to decide the question of law concerned. This is a matter of
construction of the statute conferring the power of decision.
(4) Where the tribunal exercises powers or functions of a purely judicial
nature, as for example where it is merely required to decide whether or
not a person's conduct falls within a defined and objectively
ascertainable statutory criterion, then the Cour t will be slow to conclude
that the tribunal is intended to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide all
questions, including the meaning to be attached to the statutory
criterion, and that a misinterpretation of the statutory criterion will not
render the de cision assailable by way of common -law review. In a
particular case it may appear that the tribunal was intended to have
such exclusive jurisdiction, but then the legislative intent must be clear.
10
(5) Whether or not an erroneous interpretation of a statutory criterion, such
as is referred to in the previous paragraph (i e where the question of
interpretation is not left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal
concerned), renders the decision invalid depends upon its materiality.
If, for instance, the facts found by the tribunal are such as to justify its
decision ev en on a correct interpretation of the statutory criterion, then
normally (ie in the absence of some other review ground) there would
be no ground for interference. Aliter , if applying the correct criterion,
there are no facts upon which the decision can reasonably be justified.
In this latter type of case it may justifiably be said that, by reason of its
error of law, the tribunal "asked itself the wrong question", or "appli ed
the wrong test", or "based its decision on some matter not prescribed
for its decision", or "failed to apply its mind to the relevant issues in
accordance with the behests of the statute"; and that as a result it s
decision should be set aside on review.
(6) In cases where the decision of the tribunal is of a discretionary (rather
than purely judi cial) nature, as for example where it is required to take
into account considerations of policy or desirability in the general
interest or where opinion or estimation plays an important role, the
general approach to ascertaining the legislative intent may b e
somewhat different, but it is not necessary in this case to expand on
this or to express a decisive view. ’ 9
[20] By this judgment an error of law by an administrative body was now included as a
ground for review. However, w hile the ground s for review were now considerably
expanded they, nevertheless , did not transform a review into an appeal. That distinction
remained intact. An appeal still remained the more intrusive intervention by a court in
regard to the decision taken by an administrative body. An appeal requires a court to
consider whether a decision was correct or not. A review ing court, on the other hand, is
not accorded the same power.
9 Hira v Booysen 1992 (4) SA 69 (A) at 93A –94A.
11
[21] The enactment of the Constitution impacted considerably on this area of law .
Section 33(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘everyone has a right to administrative
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’ . Section 33 further enjoined the
legislature to enact legislation to give effect to this right. PAJA is the legislature’s response
thereto. The grounds of review laid out in Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Hira have
now been codified in s 6 of PAJA .
[22] A revi ewing court is now enjoined by the Constitution to scrutinise the merits of the
decision in a more intrusive manner than was previously allowed .10 Administrative
decisions are now required to be ‘reasonable’ in order to pass muster. This is so because
administrative law assumes special importance in our legal system . In the words of the
Constitutional Court (CC):
‘… administrative law, which forms the core of public law, occupies a special
place in our jurisprudence. It is an incident of the separation of powers under
which courts regulate and control the exercise of public power by the other
branches of government. I t is built on constitutional principles which define
the authority of each branch of government, their interrelationship and the
boundaries between them. ’11
[23] While a court is now empowered to examine whether a decision is reasonable , the
grounds of review remained the same. A reasonableness test has only expanded the
scope of a review not created a new ground of review. A detailed exposition of the test
and its evolution is to be found in Black Eagle .12 However, just as in the case of an error
of law, the distinction between a review and an appeal remains intact. A court exercising
review functions is still required to ensure that it does not arrogate for itself powers that
have been reserved for the administrative body , as O’Regan J observe d:
10 See the quote from the speech by Lord Brightman in [18] above.
11 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 (2)
SA 674 (CC) at [45].
12 Black Eagle Project Roodekrans v MEC: Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment,
Gauteng Provincial Department and Others [2019] 2 All SA 322 (GJ) at [32] – [38].
12
‘Although the review functions of the court now have a substantive as well
as a procedural ingredient, the distinction between appeals and reviews
continues to be significant. The court should take care not to usurp the
functions of administrative agencies. Its task is to ensure that the decis ions
taken by administrative agencies fall within the bounds of reasonableness
as required by the Constitution. ’13
[24] Finally on this issue, the test of reasonableness is not applicable in all review cases
brought before the court. In some the test is much narrower. This is so when the review
is brought under the principle of legality, as it is in this case. I n such a case the test is one
of rationality and not reasonableness.
Appeal and review simultaneously in the same case
[25] The issue to consider in a matter where the review and the appeal are
simultaneously brought is which application should be considered first. This would
depend on the grounds relied upon in each application. If the review involves a complaint
only about the process , or if the challenge therein is against the jurisdiction of the
administrative body to entertain the matter, while the appeal is against the merits of the
decision, it would make sense to consider the review first and if it is successful, the appeal
would be redundant . However, in this case, Takata SA ’s grounds of appeal and review
are largely the same. It indicated that its appeal is the primary case before the C ourt, and
that the review should only be considered if the appeal is disallowed or is dismissed . We
adopted the approach suggested . In any event, it made no significant difference as to
which application was considered first as the grounds of appeal and review are identica l.
What Takata SA has done is repeat the same grievances it raised in the appeal in its
review, only this time it characteri sed them as ‘failure to take into account relevant factors’,
and ‘error of law’. But the substance of the complaint is the same as it raises under the
appeal where it says, ‘the Tribunal committed the following misdirections ’ and then list s
them. The list consists of alleged facts the Tribunal ignored or failed to give sufficient
13 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4)
SA 490 (CC) at [45].
13
weight to , and of an allegation that the Tribunal made an incorrect legal finding , or failed
to make the correct one.
[26] More importantly, we hold that where an appeal and a review are simultaneously
brought the complaint in each case must be different, failing which the party should be
allowed to institute only the appeal or the review proceeding. It must make an election t o
that end and be bound by it. To expand: assume the appeal is heard first and is granted,
the review would automatically fall away as the decision would ha ve been set aside and
corrected. O n the other hand, should the appeal fail , the effect is that the d ecision is found
to be correct. It cannot thereafter be reviewed – by applying the review tes ts of rationality
or reasonable ness – set aside and sent back to the administrative body (which is the
normal remedy in a review) , or even replaced by the reviewing court , as that court had
just found the decision to be correct. In short, i t makes no sense and serves no purpose
in traversing the grounds raised in an appeal, and if found to be either correct or wanting ,
re-traverse the same g rounds in a review .
Appealab ility
[27] In our law, i nterlocutory rulings, including the rulings on exceptions, are ordinarily
not appealable primarily because they are interim in nature.14 By way of the most recent
authority to that effect, we were referred by Mr Ng cukaitobi for the Commission, to Ciba
Packaging where the Supreme Court of Appeal ( SCA) held:
‘The general principle is that the dismissal of an exception is not appealable,
save where the exception challenges the jurisdiction of the court. This Court,
in TWK Agriculture Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Hoogveld Boerderybeleggings (Pty)
Ltd and Others , recently confirmed this.’15
14 See Zweni v Minister of Law and Order 1993 (1) SA 523 (A) at 532 I-533A .
15 Ciba Packaging (Pty) Ltd t/a Cibapac v Timelink Cargo (Pty) Ltd [2023] ZASCA 161 para 9
14
[28] However, the test of the appealability of an interlocutory decision has since
advanced following the judgement of the CC in Lebashe .16 Current ly, ‘the test of
appealability is the interest of justice, and no longer the common law test as set out in
Zweni ’.17 In fact, it was on the basis of the appealability test applied in Lebashe that this
Court held in Forex that an interlocutory decision of the Tribunal is only appealable if the
interest of justice would be served by allowing the appeal .18
[29] It was argued by Mr Wilson, for Takata SA, that many of the factors taken into
account by this Court in Forex are equally applicable in this case. These include, so he
argued, the reputational risk arising from the alleged collusion , which Takata SA is likely
to suffer if its exceptions are not upheld, and which will result in Takata SA effectively
having to defend itself in 21 trials . This, submitted Mr Wilson , tips the interests of justice
scales in favour of allowing the appeal.
[30] In our view, the reliance on the factors taken into account in Forex is not helpful .
The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Forex . As correctly pointed
out by Mr Ngcukaitobi, the appeals in Forex were brought by, inter alia , the peregrin us
parties who challeng ed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal over them. Takata SA, on the other
hand, is an incola and, as such, is clearly subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Thus,
there can be no controversy over the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
[31] In the present case, Takata SA has failed to show that the interests of justice
warrant an appeal being entertained for the following reasons:
1 The decision that is sought to be appealed against falls outside the
perimeters of s 37(1) (b)(i) of the Act, which requires that the decision of
the Tribunal be ‘final ’;
16 United Democratic Movement and Another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Limited and Others
(2023) (1) SA 353 (CC) .
17 Id at [43].
18 It needs to be pointed out that the quotation in Forex at [59] is inaccurate. The word ‘not’ between
the words ‘certainly‘ and ‘opened‘ has been e rroneously omitted.
15
2 It was held by this Court in Shoprite19 that the interests of justice test
has not made the requirements of appealability set out in Zweni
redundant.20 The fact that the decision of the Tribunal herein is not final
in effect, not definitive of the rights of parties and, does not have the
effect of disposing of, at least, a substantial portion of the relief claimed
in the main proceedings , means that Takata SA will not suffer
irreparable harm if the appeal is not granted by this Court ;21
3 It is our considered view that it is neither desirable nor in the interests
of justice to delay the proceedings in this matter any further, particu larly
as the matter has already been subjected to an inordinate delay of more
than 12 years since its inception.
[32] For these reasons, we hold t hat the question posed in the preceding
paragraphs regarding the appealability of the Tribunal decision must be answered
in the negative.
Reviewab ility
[33] Having concluded that the decision of the Tribunal is not appealable on the facts
and circumstances of this case, the next question is whether the same decision is
reviewable on the grounds relied upon by Takata SA . Takata SA relies on the same
grounds in support of both the appeal and the review. That, as we say in [26] above
cannot be allowed. A review on grounds different from that of the ones raised in the appeal
may well be competent , but this has not occurred here . Allowing the review in these
circumstances would result in subverting the law regarding appealability of interlocutory
19 Competition Commission v Shoprite (183/CAC/Apr20CT).
20 Id at [20].
21 See Machele and Others v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 257 (CC) where the CC, at [23], held:
‘The primary consideration in determining whether it is in the interests of justice for a litigant
to be granted leave to appeal against an interim order of execution is, therefore, whether
irreparable harm would result if leave to appeal is not granted. The applicant would have to
show that irreparable harm would result if the interim order w ere to be granted. A court will
have regard to the possibility of irreparable harm and the balance of convenience’.
16
orders. Takata SA ’s attempt to circumvent the in surmountable difficulty of the non -
appealability of an interlocutory order by seeking to rely on the review should the appeal
fail or be disallowed is tantamount to abusing the process of court .
Conclusion
[34] For the reasons set out above, we conclude that Takata SA ’s appeal as well
as its review application should be dismissed.
Costs
[35] On the question of costs, it is of note that in the experience of this Court that parties
habitually appeal against the decision of the Tribunal or seek to review it , even in
circumstances where there is absolutely no merit in challenging the decision of the
Tribunal either on appeal or by way of review . In our view, this is one such case. In the
circumstances, the Commission should not be deprived of its costs , such costs should
include the costs of two counsel, where employed.
Order
[36] In the result, the following order is made:
1 The appeal is dismisse d.
2 The review is dismissed.
3 The appellant is to pay the costs of the appeal as well as the costs of the
review, inc luding the costs of two counsel where employed.
17
Acting Judge of Appeal
Competition Appeal Court of South Africa
if· __ _________..\.,____
ME Nkosi
Acting Judge of Appeal
Competition Appeal C
J Murphy
Acting Judge of Appeal
Competition Appeal Court of South Africa
18
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Appellant: J Wilson SC and S Quinn
Instructed by: Primerio Law Incorporated
Counsel for the Respondent: T Ngcukaitobi SC , M Nxumalo and M Lengane
Heads of Argument compiled by: T Ngcukaitobi SC,
I Kentridge, M Nxumalo and M Lengane
Instructed by: Ndzabandzaba Attorneys , Sandto n