Matlole v Mafube Local Municipality and Others (J 421/2020) [2020] ZALCJHB 71 (6 May 2020)

48 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Resignation — Withdrawal of resignation — Applicant, a municipal manager, resigned on 30 January 2020, which was accepted by the municipality — Applicant later sought to withdraw resignation but was denied by the MEC — Court held that resignation was clear and unambiguous, and could not be retracted without employer's consent — Application for interdict to compel payment of salary dismissed as applicant failed to establish a prima facie right.

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[2020] ZALCJHB 71
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Matlole v Mafube Local Municipality and Others (J 421/2020) [2020] ZALCJHB 71 (6 May 2020)

the labour court of South
Africa,
(Held at JOHANNESBURG)
Not
reportable
CASE NO: J 421/2020
In the matter between:
MOJALEFA
JOSEPH MATLOLE
Applicant
and
MAFUBE
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
First
Respondent
JABULANI
ELLIOT SIGASA (MAYOR)
Second
Respondent
MOSES
TEKOETSILE MOREMI (ADMINISTRATOR)
Third
Respondent
MARIA
MATSATSI MOFOKENG (SPEAKER)
Fourth
Respondent
THEMBENI
NXANGISA (MEC)
Fifth
Respondent
Enrolled: 6 May 2020.
The parties agreed that the matter be decided in Chambers on the
papers.
Judgment
delivered: This judgment is delivered by email, addressed to the
parties’ representatives on 6 May 2020 at 14:00,
which the
deemed date and time of delivery.
JUDGMENT
VAN NIEKERK J
[1]
This is an urgent application in which the applicant seeks an order
for a rule
nisi
calling on the respondents to show cause why a
final order should not be made interdicting and restraining them from
stopping the
applicant’s monthly salary, and directing them to
pay his salary into a nominated bank account. I will deal with the
matter
as an urgent application, although claims sounding in money
only are not ordinarily regarded as urgent. If the application is to

be struck from the roll for lack of urgency, it is unlikely in the
present circumstances that the applicant will be able to obtain
a
hearing date for some time. It is in the interests of both parties
that this matter be disposed of sooner rather than later.
[2]
The applicant is the municipal manager and an employee of the first
respondent (the
municipality). The applicant and the municipality
concluded a contract of employment on 2 January 2018. On 30 January
2020, the
applicant resigned from the municipality’s employ by
giving a calendar months’ notice. The applicant states that he

did so on the basis of an instruction issued by the fifth respondent,
the MEC. On 28 February 2020, the applicant withdrew his
resignation.
He was on sick leave from 2 to 20 March 2020, and was surprised not
to receive his salary on 26 March 2020. The respondents
contend that
the applicant resigned, that his resignation was accepted by a
special meeting of the council on 30 January 2020,
and that his last
day of work was thus 28 February 2020. They aver that the applicant
is thus not entitled to the salary he claims.
[3]
The applicable legal principle is clear. Notice of termination of
employment by an
employee is a final unilateral act which once given,
cannot be withdrawn without the consent of the employer (see
Mafika
v SA Broadcasting Corporation Ltd
[2010] 5 BLLR 542
(LC), and
Lottering and others v Stellenbosch Municipality
[2010] 12
BLLR 542
(LC).
[4]
The applicant’s letter of resignation is cast in clear and
unequivocal terms
he states:
Dear
Mayor
Re: Resignation of MJ Matlole as
Municipal Manager
My discussion and consultations with
you and other leaders on above mentioned subject refers.
It is with heavy heart that I tender
my resignation as Municipal Manager of Mafube Municipality…
This letter serves to notify that my
last day of duty will be on the 28 February 2020.
[5]
To the extent that the applicant’s case is premised on the
assertion that he
was interested by the MEC to resign with the object
of his being employed in provincial government, this is denied by the
MEC.
In terms of the principles that govern the determination of
factual disputes, I must accept that denial.
[6]
In short, the applicant resigned in clear and unambiguous terms. His
resignation was
formally accepted by his employer on 30 January 2020.
It is not open to the applicant in these circumstances to seek to
retract
his resignation. The applicant remained employed until 28
February 2020 and was paid up to and including that date. There is no

further remuneration owing to him.
[7]
In so far as the applicant seeks an interim mandatory interdict, the
requirements
for interim relief in this court are no different to
those that apply in the High Court - a clear right or a
prima
facie
right established though open to some doubt, a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief
is not granted
and the ultimate relief sought is granted, a balance
of convenience in favour of granting interim relief, and the absence
of an
any other satisfactory remedy (see
Spur Steak Ranches Ltd v
Saddles Steak Ranch
1996 (3) SA 706
(C)). In proceedings such as
the present, where interim relief is sought pending the determination
of a main dispute, it is also
incumbent on an applicant to
demonstrate some prospects of success in the pending action.
[8]
For the above reasons, the applicant has failed to establish a clear
right or a
prima facie
right although open to some doubt. The
application thus stands to be dismissed.
[9]
Finally, the respondents seek an order for costs on a punitive scale.
The rule that
costs follow the result is not ordinarily applicable in
this court, where the requirements of the law and fairness generally
militate
against orders for costs in cases where disaffected
individuals pursue legitimately harboured grievances against their
employers.
In the present instance however, the filing of the present
application was misguided, and it would be unfair to saddle the
ratepayers
of the first respondent with the costs of opposition to
these proceedings. In the exercise of the broad discretion granted to
the
court by s 162 of the LRA, the requirements of the law and
fairness are best satisfied by an order for costs on the ordinary
scale.
I make the following
order:
1.
The application is
dismissed, with costs.
André van Niekerk
Judge
of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES
For the applicant:
Ntsoane Attorneys
For the respondents: Adv.
BS Nene SC, instructed by the state attorney, Bloemfontein