Lotz v Mehleketo Resourcing (Pty) Ltd and Another (C 424/18) [2019] ZALCCT 9 (2 April 2019)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Retrenchment — Procedural and substantive fairness — Applicant contended that his retrenchment was unfair and sought to hold the second respondent jointly liable under section 200B of the Labour Relations Act — Applicant, a project manager, was retrenched due to project delays and lack of necessary signalling experience as per client’s requirements — Consultation process followed, but applicant argued it was inadequate and lacked meaningful engagement — Court held that the retrenchment was justified based on redundancy and that the consultation, while not perfect, did not amount to unfairness — Second respondent not held liable as no evidence of intention to defeat employment law.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter was an unfair dismissal dispute in the Labour Court concerning a dismissal for operational requirements (retrenchment). The applicant, Mr J J S Lotz, alleged that his retrenchment by the first respondent, Mehleketo Resourcing (Pty) Ltd, was substantively and procedurally unfair. He further sought to hold the second respondent, EOH Holdings Ltd, jointly and severally liable for any relief granted against the first respondent, relying on section 200B of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.


The proceedings took the form of a trial in the Labour Court. Evidence was led by the respondents through Mr Travis Barnard (a human resources business partner of the second respondent who worked with the first respondent) and Mr Niren Singh (an executive director of the first respondent). The applicant testified in support of his own case.


The dispute arose from the applicant’s removal from a client-facing project and the employer’s ensuing decision to retrench him on the basis that his position had become redundant, coupled with the asserted need for specific railway signalling expertise. The judgment addressed both the fairness of the retrenchment and the attempt to attribute liability to a related corporate entity under section 200B.


2. Material Facts


The applicant was a project management professional with engineering and management qualifications. He was employed by the first respondent under a written offer dated 26 May 2016, which described the first respondent as a business within the EOH group of companies (the second respondent being the holding company within that group, as characterised in the evidence and documentation before the Court).


From 26 July 2016, the applicant served as the project manager of the Western Cape Re-signalling Project in Cape Town. The client was Thales. The work involved replacement of mechanical interlocking devices with electronic interlocking devices on railway lines and required in-depth signalling experience. When the applicant started, the project was about 5% complete, and by November 2017 it had reached 42% completion, measured as acceptable-quality work completed against the whole job.


It was not suggested to the applicant during the relevant period by either Thales or the first respondent that he was performing poorly or unable to do his job. However, once testing commenced in August 2017, Thales identified shortcomings in the work and raised concerns with Mr Singh during November 2017, stating that it was unhappy with the applicant’s involvement and wanted him removed from the project. Thales’s stated position was that the applicant was a good project manager but lacked the appropriate signalling experience. Mr Singh discussed this with the applicant, who was surprised, and Mr Singh unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Thales to change its view. Thales did not want the applicant involved in the project.


The first respondent offered the applicant a severance package, which he did not accept. The applicant had legal advice from the end of 2017. On 15 January 2018, the first respondent issued a notice in terms of section 189(3) of the Labour Relations Act, proposing retrenchment. The stated rationale was that, due to project delays and quality issues, the client had accelerated and rescheduled work, shifting project requirements to milestone delivery and correct quality in railway signalling, requiring signalling experience for operational execution. The employer proposed a selection method described as the employee whose job was redundant and indicated that one employee would be affected. It also stated that it would look for suitable alternative positions within the first and second respondents.


Consultation meetings were held on 16, 22, and 25 January 2018, and the minutes were not disputed. At the final meeting the first respondent communicated that the applicant would be retrenched, confirmed by letter dated 29 January 2018. The applicant contended that contract managers reporting to him had extensive signalling experience and therefore it was not necessary for him to personally have extensive signalling experience. The respondents’ position was that those managers’ experience was maintenance-oriented and not adequate, and that the project manager role itself required in-depth signalling expertise.


It was common cause in the case, as treated by the Court, that the applicant’s position was redundant. The applicant was not consulted on the roles of certain other employees (identified in evidence as Messrs Labuschagne, Marshall, Mostert and Todkill) nor the possibility of bumping them. Mr Todkill replaced the applicant on the project. The applicant later obtained fixed-term employment in Granada commencing 1 May 2018.


3. Legal Issues


The Court was required to determine, first, whether the second respondent could be held jointly and severally liable for any order against the first respondent under section 200B of the Labour Relations Act. This primarily concerned the application of a statutory provision to the corporate and employment relationship facts placed before the Court, including whether there was evidence that the corporate structure or inter-entity arrangements were intended to defeat employment law or had that effect.


Secondly, the Court had to decide whether the applicant’s retrenchment was substantively fair and procedurally fair under the Labour Relations Act, particularly with reference to the consultation obligations in section 189. This required evaluation of both law and fact, and especially the application of legal standards (meaningful joint consensus-seeking consultation, consideration of alternatives, disclosure of information) to the consultation process and the options said to have existed to avoid dismissal.


Within the fairness enquiry, the central questions included whether the employer’s reliance on the notion of “redundancy” as a selection criterion was unfair in context, whether the employer approached consultation with a closed mind, and whether the employer failed to consult adequately regarding bumping and alternative positions, including potential vacancies within the second respondent’s operations.


4. Court’s Reasoning


Section 200B liability


The Court rejected the applicant’s attempt to hold the second respondent liable under section 200B. The applicant relied on features of the corporate relationship, including that the first respondent was a wholly-owned subsidiary and that it paid a management fee for shared services. The Court held that these features, without more, did not justify section 200B liability. It found no basis to suspect, and no evidence suggesting, that the relationship between the entities was structured with the intention to defeat employment law or that it had the effect of doing so. The Court considered the group corporate structure to be one generally applied by corporate groups and found no merit in the section 200B contention on the facts presented.


General retrenchment principles and consultation


The Court set out the governing approach to operational requirements dismissals by reference to authority emphasising that employers must have a bona fide operational rationale and must comply with the consultation obligations in section 189, which requires a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process and the provision of relevant and sufficient information enabling informed representations. The Court also accepted that an employer should not approach consultation with a predisposition to a predetermined solution, while recognising that the duty to consult is not abstract and must be assessed contextually.


A key contextual premise in the Court’s reasoning was that it was undisputed that the applicant’s post was redundant. The Court reasoned that, because redundancy had been dealt with in November 2017, re-consulting in January on whether the position was redundant would have been artificial. The real subject for consultation was therefore the consequences of the redundancy for the applicant’s continued employment, specifically whether he could be relocated, placed into alternative vacancies, or retained through bumping. In this connection, the Court relied on the principle that an incumbent of a redundant post is not automatically dismissed; dismissal becomes fair only once relocation opportunities have been explored and exhausted.


“Redundancy” as a selection criterion


On the applicant’s argument that “redundancy” was used as an unfair selection criterion, the Court compared the case before it to the authority relied upon by the applicant. It concluded that, although the term “redundancy” may have been described in an incorrect context, on the facts it functioned as a description of the circumstance exposing the employee to retrenchment rather than an independently applied and unfair selection method. The Court did not accept that this point, in itself, rendered the dismissal unfair.


Closed mind, bumping, and alternatives


The Court approached the central procedural enquiry by identifying that the only practical alternatives to retrenchment were placement into a vacant post within the first or second respondent, or placement through bumping into a post for which the applicant qualified.


In relation to a senior project manager role associated with Gauteng (referred to in evidence via the position held by Mr Marshall), the Court noted evidence that the role was effectively vacant by the end of 2017 and that the client (Siemens) allegedly required even more onerous signalling experience than Thales. The Court accepted, as an unchallenged premise in the case, the respondents’ reliance on the client’s view about signalling requirements. However, it held that this did not mean the applicant’s actual signalling ability should have been excluded from the subject matter of consultation. The Court considered that the employer seemed to have relied on Thales’s opinion without a consultative exploration of the applicant’s capabilities in signalling and whether his skills could be coordinated with other team members’ skills. It found no evidence that this was meaningfully addressed in consultation.


The Court treated the failure to consult on this Gauteng opportunity as significant because it appeared to be the only realistic opportunity to avoid retrenchment, and thus not merely an abstract or theoretical complaint. It concluded that the failure to consult on this aspect was unfair and was probably attributable to the employer having a closed mind in this regard.


Regarding bumping of lower-level employees (construction managers reporting to senior project managers), the Court found it unrealistic to have consulted on bumping employees who earned substantially less than the applicant (at most a fraction of his remuneration). As to Mr Labuschagne, the Court reasoned that bumping would not have made sense because he earned less than the applicant and had longer service. The Court also rejected the applicant’s contention that the second respondent should have considered bumping an employee worldwide throughout the group to accommodate him, noting that it was not presented with authority establishing such an obligation and was not aware of any.


As to bumping Mr Todkill, the Court found the proposition difficult to understand in context because Mr Todkill actually succeeded the applicant on the same project and apparently possessed the required signalling skills, which aligned with the employer’s operational need as characterised in the section 189(3) notice.


Vacancies within the second respondent and disclosure of information


The Court considered the consultation concerning vacancies in the second respondent to have been insufficient. It accepted evidence that the second respondent was a large employer (about 11 000 employees) and that steps were taken, including circulating the applicant’s CV to HR practitioners and making enquiries at divisional level. However, it held that fair consultation required a more comprehensive report-back and discussion on vacancies, and that the applicant’s complaint about not being given vacancy information was not merely theoretical. The Court accepted that there may have been limited vacancies at the applicant’s seniority level, but nonetheless held that meaningful consultation demanded more engagement on this issue.


Whether the applicant bore responsibility to raise the deficiencies


The respondents argued that the applicant’s seniority and access to legal advice meant he should have raised issues he wanted to consult on. The Court rejected this as determinative. It reasoned that employees facing retrenchment experience difficulty even if senior, and that it is not realistic to expect an employee to press issues where it appears the employer’s stance is fixed. The Court found that the applicant did participate, make proposals, and object to perceived unfairness, and it concluded that the failure to consult properly on the key issues could not be attributed to the applicant.


Overall fairness assessment and remedy


The Court ultimately drew a distinction between substantive and procedural fairness. It held that the retrenchment was substantively fair, but procedurally unfair, with procedural unfairness lying in the failure properly to consult about possible vacancies in the second respondent and about the senior project manager position in Gauteng.


In determining compensation, the Court took into account that the employer did not fall far short in attempting to consult, and that the applicant obtained fixed-term work from 1 May 2018. It awarded compensation equivalent to two months’ remuneration, quantified using the common-cause annual remuneration figure.


On costs, the Court applied the approach endorsed in the cited authority concerning Labour Court costs discretion, and it declined to award costs, finding no party acted frivolously in the main issues, while noting that the section 200B claim may have been frivolous but took little time and did not justify a costs order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Court declared that the applicant’s dismissal was procedurally unfair but substantively fair. It ordered the first respondent to pay the applicant compensation of R310 000.00, being two months of remuneration calculated on an annual remuneration of R1 860 000. The Court made no order as to costs. The claim seeking to hold the second respondent liable under section 200B was rejected.


Cases Cited


Super Group Supply Chain Partners v Dlamini & another (2013) 34 ILJ 108 (Labour Appeal Court)


National Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v John Thompson Africa (2002) 23 ILJ 1839 (Labour Court)


O'Doyle v All Circle Screenprint CC (1999) 20 ILJ 191 (Labour Court)


Sikhosana & others v Sasol Synthetic Fuels (2000) 21 ILJ 649 (Labour Court)


SA Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Louw (2018) 39 ILJ 189 (Labour Appeal Court)


Member of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal v Dorkin N.O. (2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (Labour Appeal Court)


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), including section 189, section 189(3), section 189A (referred to in the principles discussion), and section 200B


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Court held that there was no factual or evidential basis to impose joint and several liability on the second respondent under section 200B merely because the first respondent formed part of the second respondent’s corporate group and used shared services.


On the merits of the retrenchment, the Court held that the applicant’s position was redundant and that the dismissal was substantively fair, but that the employer failed to meet the procedural requirements of a fair consultation process. The procedural unfairness was located in the failure to consult properly about alternative employment possibilities, specifically possible vacancies in the second respondent and the Gauteng senior project manager opportunity. Compensation, rather than reinstatement, was awarded, reflecting the Court’s evaluation that the employer’s procedural shortfall was relatively limited and the applicant secured alternative employment shortly after dismissal. No costs order was made.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that a dismissal for operational requirements is permissible only where there is a bona fide operational rationale and the employer complies with the consultation obligations in section 189 of the Labour Relations Act. Consultation must be a meaningful joint consensus-seeking process, including giving the employee a fair opportunity to make representations and providing relevant and sufficient information to enable informed proposals.


The judgment reinforced that an employer should not conduct consultation with a closed mind and should take appropriate measures to avoid dismissal where practical. At the same time, the judgment accepted that section 189 should not be applied in an overly abstract or absurdly prescriptive manner; fairness must be assessed contextually.


A further principle applied was that redundancy of a post does not automatically entail dismissal of the incumbent. The incumbent is “dislocated”, and dismissal is fair only once alternatives such as relocation to suitable vacancies or bumping have been explored and exhausted through fair consultation.


Finally, in relation to costs in labour litigation, the judgment applied the approach that costs are not automatic and should generally be awarded where litigation is conducted frivolously, and it declined to award costs where neither party’s conduct justified such an order on the overall circumstances described in the judgment.

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[2019] ZALCCT 9
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Lotz v Mehleketo Resourcing (Pty) Ltd and Another (C 424/18) [2019] ZALCCT 9 (2 April 2019)

THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Not Reportable
Case No: C 424/18
In
the matter between:
LOTZ,
J J S

Applicant
and
MEHLEKETO
RESOURCING (PTY) LTD         First
Respondent
EOH
HOLDINGS LTD

Second
Respondent
Heard:
11- 13 March 2019
Delivered:
02 April 2019
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
NIEUWOUDT,
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The
applicant contends that he was retrenched and that his retrenchment
was procedurally and substantively unfair. He also contends
that the
second respondent should be held jointly and severally liable for any
order that this Court may make against the first
respondent and for
this proposition he relies on the provisions of section 200B of the
Labour Relations Act
[1]
(the
Act).
[2]
Mr Travis Barnard, who was, at the relevant time the human resources
business
partner of the second respondent, but working for the first
respondent, and Mr Niren Singh, an executive director of the first
respondent testified on behalf of the respondents. The applicant
testified in support of his own case.
Salient
facts
[3]
The applicant is a project management professional with a BSc degree
in
mechanical engineering, an MBA and a diploma in project
management.
[4]
He was employed by the first respondent in terms of a letter styled

Offer and conditions of employment”
dated 26 May
2016. The letter records his position as project manager and
describes the first respondent as a business within the
EOH (second
respondent) group of companies.
[5]
On 26 July 2016 the applicant assumed the position of project manager
of the Western Cape Re-signalling Project, based in Cape Town. The
client of the project was Thales. This project was the first
of its
kind in South Africa and included the replacement of mechanical
interlocking devices by electronic interlocking devices
on railway
lines. It required in-depth signalling experience.
[6]
When the applicant commenced employment, the project was 5% of
completion
and in November 2017, it had achieved 42% of completion.
This measurement means the percentage of work of acceptable quality
completed,
gauged against the whole job.
[7]
The applicant reported to a project admin manager (De Beer) who was
employed
by Thales, on a weekly basis. It was not suggested to him by
either Thales or the first respondent that he was performing poorly

or that he was unable to do his job.
[8]
Thales discovered shortcomings in the work done when it started
testing
in August 2017. Thales discussed these issues with Mr Singh
during November 2017, and informed him that it was not happy with the

applicant and that it wanted him removed from the project. Its
position was that the applicant was a good project manager but that

he didn’t have the appropriate signalling experience.
[9]
Mr Singh discussed the issue with the applicant who was surprised
about
it. At the instance of the applicant, Mr Singh approached
Thales about the issue a second time and tried to persuade it to
change
its mind. He was unsuccessful. Thales did not want the
applicant involved anywhere in the project. The first respondent
offered
the applicant a severance package but he did not accept it.
[10]
The applicant was in receipt of legal advice from the end of 2017. On

15 January 2018 the first respondent handed a notice in terms of
s189(3) to the applicant. The reason for the proposed retrenchment
is
described as:

Due
to the project delays resulting from various reasons including the
poor quality of workmanship the client has accelerated the
project
and consequently rescheduling the works. The project requirements
have shifted to ensuring milestone achievements as well
as the
correct quality in terms of Railway Signalling. To this end
signalling experience is required to meet the operational execution.”
[11]
The first respondent proposed that the method of selection for
retrenchment
should be the employee whose job is redundant and it
envisaged that one employee would be affected. It informed the
applicant that
it would look for suitable alternative positions for
him within the first respondent and the second respondent. The notice
stated
that the applicant should prepare for the consultation and
that, should he require any further assistance or have any proposals,

he should deal with them during the consultation sessions.
[12]
Consultation sessions occurred on 16, 22 and 25 January 2018. The
minutes
of these meetings were not in dispute. At the last session on
25 January 2018, the first respondent informed the applicant that
he
would be retrenched and this was confirmed by way of a letter dated
29 January 2018. The applicant contended that he had a number
of
contract managers reporting to him, who had extensive signalling
experience, and that it was thus not necessary for him to personally

have extensive signalling experience. The respondent countered that
their experience was of a maintenance nature, which was not
adequate
and that the position itself required in-depth signalling experience.
[13]
The applicant was not consulted on the positions of Messrs
Labuschagne,
Marshall, Mostert and Todkill or the possibility of
bumping them. Mr Todkill replaced the applicant on the project. The
applicant
obtained fixed term employment in Granada with effect from
1 May 2018.
Evaluation
[14]
The applicant contended that the second respondent ought to be
jointly
and severally liable for any judgment against the first
respondent in terms of section 200B of the Act. He relied on various
reasons,
all of which relate to the fact that the first respondent
operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of the second respondent and
that
it pays a management fee to the second respondent for various
shared services. There is no merit in this contention. There is no

reason to suspect, let alone any evidence to suggest, that the first
and second respondent had the intention to defeat the purpose
of any
employment law or that their relationship had the effect of doing so.
The corporate structure of the second respondent is
one that is
generally applied by groups.
[15]
Although pleaded, the applicant did not contend during the
proceedings
that the first respondent should have insisted to
continue to employ him despite the attitude of Thales and that the
fact that
he was dismissed at the instance of a third party caused it
to be substantively unfair. His case was that:
15.1.
The use of redundancy as a selection criterion was unfair.
15.2.
The first respondent approached the retrenchment with a closed mind
and did not consult with
a view of seeking consensus.
15.3.
The first respondent ought to have considered bumping as an
alternative
to retrenchment both in
the first respondent and the second respondent.
15.4.
The first respondent did not provide him with any information to
enable
him to make meaningful
proposals about possible positions in the
second respondent.
[16]
The respondents countered that the applicant was a senior employee
and
that he had access to legal advice. He should thus have raised
issues had he wished to consult on, during the consultations. These

issues will be dealt with in turn. Before doing so, it might be
useful to set out the applicable legal principles.
General
principles
[17]
In
Super
Group Supply Chain Partners v Dlamini & another
[2]
the Labour Appeal Court held that:
[24]
It is trite that an employer is permitted to dismiss an employee for
its operational requirements. However, for the employer
to do so
successfully, it is obliged to have a bona fide economic rationale
for the dismissal and to comply with the provisions
of s 189 as well
as s 189A of the Act where applicable. Section 189 imposes an
obligation on the employer to consult the employee
or its
representative on the matters listed in subsection (2). There is a
duty on the employer not only to consult the affected
employee(s) but
to take appropriate measures on its own initiative to avoid and
minimize the effect of the dismissal. The consultation
envisaged by
the Act is a 'meaningful joint consensus-seeking process' in which
parties to the process should attempt to reach
some agreement on a
range of issues that may best avoid the dismissal and where not
possible to ameliorate the effects of the dismissal
for operational
requirements.
[25]
An employer should not approach the consultation process with a
predisposition to a particular solution but approach the process
with
a mind open to persuasion to alternatives that are practical and
rational. The employee party or its representative should
be given a
fair opportunity to suggest ways in which job losses might be avoided
or the effects of the dismissal might be ameliorated
before the
dismissal. There also rests a duty on the employer to provide the
employee or his or her representatives with relevant
and sufficient
information that would place them in a position to make informed
representations and suggestions on the subjects
specified for the
consultation. It is not fair for an employer to shirk its statutory
duty to consult and create an onus on an
employee to ensure that he
or she chases the employer around to ensure that consultation takes
place.”
Redundancy
as a selection criterion:
[18]
Mr Venter
contended that the first respondent applied redundancy as a selection
criterion and submitted that this was unfair. He
referred to para 260
of
National
Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v John Thompson Africa
[3]
where the Court stated:

Redundancy
is not a selection criteria (sic) let alone being a fair one. It is a
consequence of restructuring or changing the operations
of an
organization. From his explanation it is clear that Mr Rube did not
in fact apply redundancy as a selection criterion, despite
it being
listed as such.”
[19]
A consideration of the facts of that matter, compared to the facts of

the instant matter, show that in both cases, redundancy, although
being described in the incorrect context, was no more than the
fact
that exposed the employees to the possibility of retrenchment.
Closed
mind
[20]
The duty to
consult is not an abstract theoretical one and does not exist in a
vacuum. Mr Lennox referred to
O'Doyle
v All Circle Screenprint CC
[4]
,
where the Court held that:
[23]
I do not believe that the Act imposes upon employers the burden of
acting illogically. It only
stands to reason that the circumstances
in which a branch manager's services are terminated are somewhat
different from the ordinary
worker. Each case will have to depend on
its own facts. I believe that s 189 of the Act is there to protect
employees from unfair
retrenchments and not to be over-prescriptive
to the extent of absurdity.
[21]
In
Sikhosana
& others v Sasol Synthetic Fuels
[5]
the Court held at 655F that:

Compliance
with s 189, in short, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the fairness or unfairness of the applicable
act of
retrenchment. The section gives content and colour to fairness in
retrenchment and its significance as such should not be
underrated;
but ultimately it provides only a guide for the purpose, and cannot
be treated as a set of rules that conclusively
disposes of the issue
of fairness.”
[22]
It is undisputed in this matter that the position of the applicant
was
redundant. This issue had been dealt with in November 2017 and to
consult about it again in January would have amounted to a sham.
What
was up for consultation was the consequences of the redundancy of the
position on the continued employment of the applicant.
[23]
In
SA
Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Louw
[6]
the Labour Appeal Court said the following about the consequences of
a redundancy:

Axiomatically,
an incumbent of a redundant post is not automatically dismissed; that
person is merely dislocated and only after
the opportunities to
relocate that person in another suitable post have been explored and
exhausted, may they be fairly dismissed.”
[24]
The only practical alternatives to retrenchment were employing the
applicant
in a vacant position in the first or second respondent or
in a position where the applicant bumped the incumbent of a position
for which he qualified.
[25]
For the reasons set out below, it does appear as if not much time was

spent in the consultation process on the issue of bumping. Was this
the consequence of a closed mind or the result of the realities
of
the situation?
Bumping
[26]
The position of Mr Marshall was that of project manager for the
Gauteng
project that was equivalent to the one that the applicant
managed in the Western Cape. The evidence was that the position was
actually
vacant by the end of 2017 and that the closing date for
applications was 12 December 2017. It is thus not strictly speaking
an
issue of bumping. However, the evidence was that Siemens, who was
the client of that project, had even more onerous requirements
for
signalling skills and experience than Thales did.
[27]
There is no indication that this aspect was raised during the
consultation.
The first respondent seemed to rely on the opinion of
Thales that the applicant did not have appropriate signalling
experience.
There is, however, no evidence before the Court that the
opinion of Thales was warranted. Accepting (because it was not
challenged)
that it was not unfair that the retrenchment of the
applicant was caused by the opinion of Thales and accepting that
Siemens had
even higher requirements in respect of signalling than
Thales; this does not mean that the signalling ability of the
applicant
should not have been the subject matter of consultation to
ascertain exactly what the applicant’s abilities with regard to

signalling were and how his ability could be co-ordinated with the
abilities of other team members. The unchallenged evidence was
that
it was not.
[28]
This aspect was thus not a theoretical issue, it seemed to have been
the only realistic opportunity to avoid the applicant’s
retrenchment. It was thus unfair not to consult on it and this was

probably caused by the fact that the mind of the first respondent was
closed on this aspect.
[29]
There were 20 to 30 people in the first respondent who reported to
the
senior project managers. In the trial they were referred to as
construction managers. They earn, depending on whose evidence is

accepted, between 10% to 25% of what the applicant had earned. Under
the circumstances it is not realistic to have consulted on
bumping
one of them.
[30]
Then there was Mr Labuschagne, a civil and building project manager;
but he earned less than the applicant and had longer service. It
would thus not have made sense to consider bumping in this regard

either. The applicant suggested that the second respondent should
have considered bumping an employee worldwide throughout the
second
respondent in order to accommodate him. The Court was not presented
with any authority placing such an obligation on an
employer and is
not aware of any.
[31]
Lastly, it was contended that the possibility to bump Mr Todkill
should
have been the subject of consultation. This proposition is not
easy to understand due to the fact that he in fact succeeded the

applicant in the Western Cape project and apparently had appropriate
signalling skills.
Vacancies
in the second respondent:
[32]
The second respondent is a large company employing about 11 000
people.
Mr Barnard testified that he had sent the CV of the applicant
to HR practitioners in the second respondent to look for vacancies.

Mr Singh asked the divisional director, to whom he reported, about
opportunities for the applicant. The applicant complains that
he was
not given any information about vacancies at all to enable him to
consult on the issue. This is not a theoretical or an
abstract issue.
Accepting that there would not have been many potential vacancies at
the level of the seniority of the applicant;
fair consultation
required a more comprehensive report back and discussion on this
aspect.
Obligation
on the applicant to raise issues:
[33]
Employees who are faced with retrenchment go through a difficult
time.
This is true even for senior employees. It is not realistic to
expect them to push against a door that appears to be closed. The

applicant participated in the consultation process, he made proposals
and objected to issues that he deemed to be unfair.
[34]
The Court is satisfied that the blame for the failure of the first
respondent
to consult on the issues set out above, cannot be laid at
the door of the applicant.
Conclusion
[35]
The retrenchment of the applicant was substantively fair but
procedurally
unfair. The procedural unfairness lies in the failure to
properly consult about possible vacancies in the second respondent
and
the position of senior project manager in Gauteng. The first
respondent did not fall far short in its endeavours to consult and

this fact should be reflected in the relief awarded to the applicant.
[36]
The Court was made aware of a tender made by the first respondent to
the applicant. This tender did not influence the Court in deciding on
an appropriate amount of compensation. What did play a role,
was the
relatively small degree of the neglect by the first respondent and
the fact that the applicant secured employment, albeit
on a fixed
term and in another country, on 1 May 2018. Compensation in the
amount of two months’ remuneration is appropriate.
It is common
cause that the applicant earned R1 860 000 per year. Accordingly, two
months’ remuneration amounts to R310 000.
Costs
[37]
The
applicant was in agreement that the approach to costs set out by the
LAC in
Member
of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal v Dorkin N.O.
[7]
should
be followed. The respondents submitted that the applicant should at
least be ordered to pay the costs from the date that
the offer had
lapsed. If the ordinary civil rules applied, the applicant would have
been liable for the costs from that date, not
having secured a better
result than the offer.
[38]
The test in
Dorkin
suggests that costs should be ordered if a
party was frivolous in bringing or conducting a suit. There are three
issues:
38.1.
Was the applicant acting frivolously in rejecting the offer? The
Court does not think so.
38.2.
By the same token the Court does not believe that the respondents
were frivolous in defending the action.
38.3.
Whilst the Court is of the view the applicant may have been frivolous
in bringing the claim under section
200B of the Act, virtually no
time was devoted to this issue. Further, the respondents used one set
of legal representatives.
[39]
Accordingly, it would be appropriate to make no order as to costs.
[40]
In the premises, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The dismissal of the applicant is procedurally unfair.
2.
The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicant R310 000,00.
3.
There is no order as to costs.
H. Nieuwoudt
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:         Ferdi
Venter
Instructed
by:
Van Gaalen Attorneys
For
the Respondent:   M A Lennox
Instructed
by:
Botoulas Krause & Da
Silva Inc
[1]
66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
(2013) 34 ILJ 108 (LAC).
[3]
(2002) 23 ILJ 1839 (LC).
[4]
(1999) 20 ILJ 191 (LC).
[5]
(2000) 21 ILJ 649 (LC).
[6]
(2018) 39 ILJ 189 (LAC) at para 19.
[7]
(2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (LAC).