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[2019] ZALCCT 9
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Lotz v Mehleketo Resourcing (Pty) Ltd and Another (C 424/18) [2019] ZALCCT 9 (2 April 2019)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Not Reportable
Case No: C 424/18
In
the matter between:
LOTZ,
J J S
Applicant
and
MEHLEKETO
RESOURCING (PTY) LTD First
Respondent
EOH
HOLDINGS LTD
Second
Respondent
Heard:
11- 13 March 2019
Delivered:
02 April 2019
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
NIEUWOUDT,
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The
applicant contends that he was retrenched and that his retrenchment
was procedurally and substantively unfair. He also contends
that the
second respondent should be held jointly and severally liable for any
order that this Court may make against the first
respondent and for
this proposition he relies on the provisions of section 200B of the
Labour Relations Act
[1]
(the
Act).
[2]
Mr Travis Barnard, who was, at the relevant time the human resources
business
partner of the second respondent, but working for the first
respondent, and Mr Niren Singh, an executive director of the first
respondent testified on behalf of the respondents. The applicant
testified in support of his own case.
Salient
facts
[3]
The applicant is a project management professional with a BSc degree
in
mechanical engineering, an MBA and a diploma in project
management.
[4]
He was employed by the first respondent in terms of a letter styled
“
Offer and conditions of employment”
dated 26 May
2016. The letter records his position as project manager and
describes the first respondent as a business within the
EOH (second
respondent) group of companies.
[5]
On 26 July 2016 the applicant assumed the position of project manager
of the Western Cape Re-signalling Project, based in Cape Town. The
client of the project was Thales. This project was the first
of its
kind in South Africa and included the replacement of mechanical
interlocking devices by electronic interlocking devices
on railway
lines. It required in-depth signalling experience.
[6]
When the applicant commenced employment, the project was 5% of
completion
and in November 2017, it had achieved 42% of completion.
This measurement means the percentage of work of acceptable quality
completed,
gauged against the whole job.
[7]
The applicant reported to a project admin manager (De Beer) who was
employed
by Thales, on a weekly basis. It was not suggested to him by
either Thales or the first respondent that he was performing poorly
or that he was unable to do his job.
[8]
Thales discovered shortcomings in the work done when it started
testing
in August 2017. Thales discussed these issues with Mr Singh
during November 2017, and informed him that it was not happy with the
applicant and that it wanted him removed from the project. Its
position was that the applicant was a good project manager but that
he didn’t have the appropriate signalling experience.
[9]
Mr Singh discussed the issue with the applicant who was surprised
about
it. At the instance of the applicant, Mr Singh approached
Thales about the issue a second time and tried to persuade it to
change
its mind. He was unsuccessful. Thales did not want the
applicant involved anywhere in the project. The first respondent
offered
the applicant a severance package but he did not accept it.
[10]
The applicant was in receipt of legal advice from the end of 2017. On
15 January 2018 the first respondent handed a notice in terms of
s189(3) to the applicant. The reason for the proposed retrenchment
is
described as:
“
Due
to the project delays resulting from various reasons including the
poor quality of workmanship the client has accelerated the
project
and consequently rescheduling the works. The project requirements
have shifted to ensuring milestone achievements as well
as the
correct quality in terms of Railway Signalling. To this end
signalling experience is required to meet the operational execution.”
[11]
The first respondent proposed that the method of selection for
retrenchment
should be the employee whose job is redundant and it
envisaged that one employee would be affected. It informed the
applicant that
it would look for suitable alternative positions for
him within the first respondent and the second respondent. The notice
stated
that the applicant should prepare for the consultation and
that, should he require any further assistance or have any proposals,
he should deal with them during the consultation sessions.
[12]
Consultation sessions occurred on 16, 22 and 25 January 2018. The
minutes
of these meetings were not in dispute. At the last session on
25 January 2018, the first respondent informed the applicant that
he
would be retrenched and this was confirmed by way of a letter dated
29 January 2018. The applicant contended that he had a number
of
contract managers reporting to him, who had extensive signalling
experience, and that it was thus not necessary for him to personally
have extensive signalling experience. The respondent countered that
their experience was of a maintenance nature, which was not
adequate
and that the position itself required in-depth signalling experience.
[13]
The applicant was not consulted on the positions of Messrs
Labuschagne,
Marshall, Mostert and Todkill or the possibility of
bumping them. Mr Todkill replaced the applicant on the project. The
applicant
obtained fixed term employment in Granada with effect from
1 May 2018.
Evaluation
[14]
The applicant contended that the second respondent ought to be
jointly
and severally liable for any judgment against the first
respondent in terms of section 200B of the Act. He relied on various
reasons,
all of which relate to the fact that the first respondent
operates as a wholly owned subsidiary of the second respondent and
that
it pays a management fee to the second respondent for various
shared services. There is no merit in this contention. There is no
reason to suspect, let alone any evidence to suggest, that the first
and second respondent had the intention to defeat the purpose
of any
employment law or that their relationship had the effect of doing so.
The corporate structure of the second respondent is
one that is
generally applied by groups.
[15]
Although pleaded, the applicant did not contend during the
proceedings
that the first respondent should have insisted to
continue to employ him despite the attitude of Thales and that the
fact that
he was dismissed at the instance of a third party caused it
to be substantively unfair. His case was that:
15.1.
The use of redundancy as a selection criterion was unfair.
15.2.
The first respondent approached the retrenchment with a closed mind
and did not consult with
a view of seeking consensus.
15.3.
The first respondent ought to have considered bumping as an
alternative
to retrenchment both in
the first respondent and the second respondent.
15.4.
The first respondent did not provide him with any information to
enable
him to make meaningful
proposals about possible positions in the
second respondent.
[16]
The respondents countered that the applicant was a senior employee
and
that he had access to legal advice. He should thus have raised
issues had he wished to consult on, during the consultations. These
issues will be dealt with in turn. Before doing so, it might be
useful to set out the applicable legal principles.
General
principles
[17]
In
Super
Group Supply Chain Partners v Dlamini & another
[2]
the Labour Appeal Court held that:
[24]
It is trite that an employer is permitted to dismiss an employee for
its operational requirements. However, for the employer
to do so
successfully, it is obliged to have a bona fide economic rationale
for the dismissal and to comply with the provisions
of s 189 as well
as s 189A of the Act where applicable. Section 189 imposes an
obligation on the employer to consult the employee
or its
representative on the matters listed in subsection (2). There is a
duty on the employer not only to consult the affected
employee(s) but
to take appropriate measures on its own initiative to avoid and
minimize the effect of the dismissal. The consultation
envisaged by
the Act is a 'meaningful joint consensus-seeking process' in which
parties to the process should attempt to reach
some agreement on a
range of issues that may best avoid the dismissal and where not
possible to ameliorate the effects of the dismissal
for operational
requirements.
[25]
An employer should not approach the consultation process with a
predisposition to a particular solution but approach the process
with
a mind open to persuasion to alternatives that are practical and
rational. The employee party or its representative should
be given a
fair opportunity to suggest ways in which job losses might be avoided
or the effects of the dismissal might be ameliorated
before the
dismissal. There also rests a duty on the employer to provide the
employee or his or her representatives with relevant
and sufficient
information that would place them in a position to make informed
representations and suggestions on the subjects
specified for the
consultation. It is not fair for an employer to shirk its statutory
duty to consult and create an onus on an
employee to ensure that he
or she chases the employer around to ensure that consultation takes
place.”
Redundancy
as a selection criterion:
[18]
Mr Venter
contended that the first respondent applied redundancy as a selection
criterion and submitted that this was unfair. He
referred to para 260
of
National
Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v John Thompson Africa
[3]
where the Court stated:
“
Redundancy
is not a selection criteria (sic) let alone being a fair one. It is a
consequence of restructuring or changing the operations
of an
organization. From his explanation it is clear that Mr Rube did not
in fact apply redundancy as a selection criterion, despite
it being
listed as such.”
[19]
A consideration of the facts of that matter, compared to the facts of
the instant matter, show that in both cases, redundancy, although
being described in the incorrect context, was no more than the
fact
that exposed the employees to the possibility of retrenchment.
Closed
mind
[20]
The duty to
consult is not an abstract theoretical one and does not exist in a
vacuum. Mr Lennox referred to
O'Doyle
v All Circle Screenprint CC
[4]
,
where the Court held that:
[23]
I do not believe that the Act imposes upon employers the burden of
acting illogically. It only
stands to reason that the circumstances
in which a branch manager's services are terminated are somewhat
different from the ordinary
worker. Each case will have to depend on
its own facts. I believe that s 189 of the Act is there to protect
employees from unfair
retrenchments and not to be over-prescriptive
to the extent of absurdity.
[21]
In
Sikhosana
& others v Sasol Synthetic Fuels
[5]
the Court held at 655F that:
“
Compliance
with s 189, in short, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for the fairness or unfairness of the applicable
act of
retrenchment. The section gives content and colour to fairness in
retrenchment and its significance as such should not be
underrated;
but ultimately it provides only a guide for the purpose, and cannot
be treated as a set of rules that conclusively
disposes of the issue
of fairness.”
[22]
It is undisputed in this matter that the position of the applicant
was
redundant. This issue had been dealt with in November 2017 and to
consult about it again in January would have amounted to a sham.
What
was up for consultation was the consequences of the redundancy of the
position on the continued employment of the applicant.
[23]
In
SA
Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Louw
[6]
the Labour Appeal Court said the following about the consequences of
a redundancy:
“
Axiomatically,
an incumbent of a redundant post is not automatically dismissed; that
person is merely dislocated and only after
the opportunities to
relocate that person in another suitable post have been explored and
exhausted, may they be fairly dismissed.”
[24]
The only practical alternatives to retrenchment were employing the
applicant
in a vacant position in the first or second respondent or
in a position where the applicant bumped the incumbent of a position
for which he qualified.
[25]
For the reasons set out below, it does appear as if not much time was
spent in the consultation process on the issue of bumping. Was this
the consequence of a closed mind or the result of the realities
of
the situation?
Bumping
[26]
The position of Mr Marshall was that of project manager for the
Gauteng
project that was equivalent to the one that the applicant
managed in the Western Cape. The evidence was that the position was
actually
vacant by the end of 2017 and that the closing date for
applications was 12 December 2017. It is thus not strictly speaking
an
issue of bumping. However, the evidence was that Siemens, who was
the client of that project, had even more onerous requirements
for
signalling skills and experience than Thales did.
[27]
There is no indication that this aspect was raised during the
consultation.
The first respondent seemed to rely on the opinion of
Thales that the applicant did not have appropriate signalling
experience.
There is, however, no evidence before the Court that the
opinion of Thales was warranted. Accepting (because it was not
challenged)
that it was not unfair that the retrenchment of the
applicant was caused by the opinion of Thales and accepting that
Siemens had
even higher requirements in respect of signalling than
Thales; this does not mean that the signalling ability of the
applicant
should not have been the subject matter of consultation to
ascertain exactly what the applicant’s abilities with regard to
signalling were and how his ability could be co-ordinated with the
abilities of other team members. The unchallenged evidence was
that
it was not.
[28]
This aspect was thus not a theoretical issue, it seemed to have been
the only realistic opportunity to avoid the applicant’s
retrenchment. It was thus unfair not to consult on it and this was
probably caused by the fact that the mind of the first respondent was
closed on this aspect.
[29]
There were 20 to 30 people in the first respondent who reported to
the
senior project managers. In the trial they were referred to as
construction managers. They earn, depending on whose evidence is
accepted, between 10% to 25% of what the applicant had earned. Under
the circumstances it is not realistic to have consulted on
bumping
one of them.
[30]
Then there was Mr Labuschagne, a civil and building project manager;
but he earned less than the applicant and had longer service. It
would thus not have made sense to consider bumping in this regard
either. The applicant suggested that the second respondent should
have considered bumping an employee worldwide throughout the
second
respondent in order to accommodate him. The Court was not presented
with any authority placing such an obligation on an
employer and is
not aware of any.
[31]
Lastly, it was contended that the possibility to bump Mr Todkill
should
have been the subject of consultation. This proposition is not
easy to understand due to the fact that he in fact succeeded the
applicant in the Western Cape project and apparently had appropriate
signalling skills.
Vacancies
in the second respondent:
[32]
The second respondent is a large company employing about 11 000
people.
Mr Barnard testified that he had sent the CV of the applicant
to HR practitioners in the second respondent to look for vacancies.
Mr Singh asked the divisional director, to whom he reported, about
opportunities for the applicant. The applicant complains that
he was
not given any information about vacancies at all to enable him to
consult on the issue. This is not a theoretical or an
abstract issue.
Accepting that there would not have been many potential vacancies at
the level of the seniority of the applicant;
fair consultation
required a more comprehensive report back and discussion on this
aspect.
Obligation
on the applicant to raise issues:
[33]
Employees who are faced with retrenchment go through a difficult
time.
This is true even for senior employees. It is not realistic to
expect them to push against a door that appears to be closed. The
applicant participated in the consultation process, he made proposals
and objected to issues that he deemed to be unfair.
[34]
The Court is satisfied that the blame for the failure of the first
respondent
to consult on the issues set out above, cannot be laid at
the door of the applicant.
Conclusion
[35]
The retrenchment of the applicant was substantively fair but
procedurally
unfair. The procedural unfairness lies in the failure to
properly consult about possible vacancies in the second respondent
and
the position of senior project manager in Gauteng. The first
respondent did not fall far short in its endeavours to consult and
this fact should be reflected in the relief awarded to the applicant.
[36]
The Court was made aware of a tender made by the first respondent to
the applicant. This tender did not influence the Court in deciding on
an appropriate amount of compensation. What did play a role,
was the
relatively small degree of the neglect by the first respondent and
the fact that the applicant secured employment, albeit
on a fixed
term and in another country, on 1 May 2018. Compensation in the
amount of two months’ remuneration is appropriate.
It is common
cause that the applicant earned R1 860 000 per year. Accordingly, two
months’ remuneration amounts to R310 000.
Costs
[37]
The
applicant was in agreement that the approach to costs set out by the
LAC in
Member
of the Executive Council for Finance, KwaZulu-Natal v Dorkin N.O.
[7]
should
be followed. The respondents submitted that the applicant should at
least be ordered to pay the costs from the date that
the offer had
lapsed. If the ordinary civil rules applied, the applicant would have
been liable for the costs from that date, not
having secured a better
result than the offer.
[38]
The test in
Dorkin
suggests that costs should be ordered if a
party was frivolous in bringing or conducting a suit. There are three
issues:
38.1.
Was the applicant acting frivolously in rejecting the offer? The
Court does not think so.
38.2.
By the same token the Court does not believe that the respondents
were frivolous in defending the action.
38.3.
Whilst the Court is of the view the applicant may have been frivolous
in bringing the claim under section
200B of the Act, virtually no
time was devoted to this issue. Further, the respondents used one set
of legal representatives.
[39]
Accordingly, it would be appropriate to make no order as to costs.
[40]
In the premises, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The dismissal of the applicant is procedurally unfair.
2.
The first respondent is ordered to pay the applicant R310 000,00.
3.
There is no order as to costs.
H. Nieuwoudt
Acting Judge of the
Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicant: Ferdi
Venter
Instructed
by:
Van Gaalen Attorneys
For
the Respondent: M A Lennox
Instructed
by:
Botoulas Krause & Da
Silva Inc
[1]
66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
(2013) 34 ILJ 108 (LAC).
[3]
(2002) 23 ILJ 1839 (LC).
[4]
(1999) 20 ILJ 191 (LC).
[5]
(2000) 21 ILJ 649 (LC).
[6]
(2018) 39 ILJ 189 (LAC) at para 19.
[7]
(2008) 29 ILJ 1707 (LAC).