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[2019] ZALCJHB 347
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NTM obo Molema and Others v Botselo Holdings (Pty) Ltd (J1006/2016) [2019] ZALCJHB 347; (2020) 41 ILJ 701 (LC) (29 November 2019)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case
no: J 1006/2016
In
the matter between:
NTM
obo SHADRACK MOLEMA & 224
OTHERS
Applicants
and
BOTSELO
HOLDINGS (PTY)
LTD
Respondent
Date
heard: 8 – 10 October 2019
Delivered:
29 November 2019
Summary
- Failure to adhere to ultimatums - Even where employees on an
unprotected strike fail to adhere to six ultimatums and two
court
orders this does not entitle the employer to dismiss them without
holding a disciplinary hearing or at least attempting to
hold one.
Dismissals procedurally unfair.
Procedurally
unfair dismissal – Even though dismissals procedurally unfair,
where employees engaged in an unprotected strike
for 12 days and
ignored six ultimatums and two court orders to return to work, the
requirements of fairness are better met by denying
them compensation.
JUDGMENT
CONRADIE,
AJ
[1]
In this case the National Transport
Movement (the union) is acting on behalf of 225 of its members (the
individual employees) who
were dismissed by the respondent (the
company) for participating in an unprotected strike in 2016.
Background
[2]
The company was established 37 years ago
and is based in Delareyville in the North West Province.
[3]
The company conducts business in the
farming and maize milling industry and its main clients are Kelloggs,
Bokomo and Simba.
The company also supplies “chop”
which is a by-product of the milling process to various farmers in
the surrounding
area.
[4]
At the time of the dismissal, the
company employed approximately 370 people and was the biggest
employer in Delareyville.
[5]
Other than the strike, which is the
subject of this judgment, the company had never faced industrial
action prior to 2016.
[6]
During June or July of 2015 the union
started engaging with the company seeking organizational rights. A
meeting took place
between the company and the union on 29 July 2015
where it was agreed that if the union reached 30% representation a
recognition
agreement would be concluded.
[7]
On 18 December 2015, prior to the
conclusion of a recognition agreement, the union submitted a written
proposal in respect of wages
and other benefits. In the union’s
proposal, signed by its Deputy General Secretary, it proposed that
the parties meet
on 9 January 2016 to negotiate the proposal.
[8]
Despite the proposed meeting date of 9
January 2016, the union referred a refusal to bargain dispute to the
CCMA on 6 January 2016.
According to the union’s
referral, the company refused to negotiate wages with the union.
[9]
While the parties were able to sign a
recognition agreement on 25 January 2016, the refusal to bargain
dispute was still conciliated
on 29 January 2016 and an advisory
award issued on 8 February 2016.
[10]
The advisory award was to the effect
that the parties should attempt to resolve the dispute in terms of
the recognition agreement.
The commissioner was also of the
view that the dispute was prematurely referred to the CCMA and as
such it did not have jurisdiction
to entertain the dispute. She
directed that the file be closed.
[11]
On 12 February 2016 the union requested
a meeting with the company to discuss wages.
[12]
On 18 February 2016 the company sent the
union a letter informing it that following a verification exercise it
was determined that
the union only had 44% representivity. Further,
it was pointed out that in terms of the recognition agreement the
right to
bargain about wages only arises when the union has majority
representation.
[13]
On 8 March 2016 the union notified the
company of its intention to commence with strike action on 14 March
2016 as a result of the
company’s refusal to meet its wage
demands. According to the union, a dispute in respect of the
wage negotiation demands
was referred to the CCMA in December 2015.
[14]
On 9 March 2016 the company wrote to the
union informing it, that any strike action would be unprotected and
that it would seek
to interdict the strike in the Labour Court.
[15]
On 10 March 2019 the company’s HR
Manager, Ian. Putter (Putter), received a call from the union’s
Deputy General Secretary
who wanted to talk about how to handle the
“wage situation” within the context of the intended
strike. The Deputy
General Secretary undertook to get back to
Putter but failed to do so.
[16]
The strike action commenced on 14 March
2016. That same day the company again informed the union that
the strike was unprotected
and requested it to call off the strike by
12h00 failing which the company would approach the Labour Court for
relief.
[17]
The union did not call off the strike
and a further letter was sent to it on 14 March 2016. In terms
of this letter, the employees
were given an ultimatum to call off the
strike by 15h00 and to return to work or face disciplinary action.
[18]
As the union and its members did not
return to work on 14 March 2016, the company launched an urgent
application in this Court to
interdict the strike.
[19]
A further ultimatum was served on the
union on 16 March 2016 at approximately 09h00, directing the
employees to return to work on
17 March 2016 at 07h00, failing which,
the company would take disciplinary action which could lead to
dismissal.
[20]
On 18 March 2016 La Grange J issued a
final order that the strike action was unprotected and interdicted
further strike action by
the union’s members. That same
day the company sent a further ultimatum to the union calling on its
members to report
for duty on Saturday 19 March 2016 at 07h00. In
this ultimatum, the company recorded that the Labour Court held that
the
strike was unprotected and that the union’s members were
interdicted from participating in the unprotected strike.
[21]
In
what appeared to be a positive move, on 18 March 2016, the General
Secretary of the union wrote to the company informing it that
the
leadership of the union was calling off the strike with immediate
effect following on the order of the Labour Court. He
further
recorded that the union would do everything in its power to ensure
that its members returned to work. The employees
did not
however return to work on 19 March 2016. Instead the union
served a notice of appeal on the company on Saturday 19
March
2016.
[1]
[22]
On 19 March 2016 the company sent a
letter to the union again recording that should the employees not
return to work by Monday 21
March 2016, an urgent application for
leave to execute the order of La Grange J would be launched. It
also stated that any
refusal by the employees to return to work would
be viewed in a very serious light and may lead to disciplinary
action.
[23]
The employees did not return to work,
and on 22 March 2016, the company launched an application for leave
to execute and enforce
the order of La Grange J. The
application was granted by Steenkamp J on 24 March 2016. The
Court also ordered the union
to direct its members not to
participate, or to continue to participate, in the unprotected strike
and interdicted the union’s
members from participating in the
unprotected strike.
[24]
Notwithstanding the above Court order,
the union’s members did not return to work on 24 March 2016.
As a result, a further
ultimatum was issued that day calling on the
employees to report for duty on Saturday 26 March 2016 at 07h00.
Attached to
the ultimatum was a copy of this Court’s
order of 24 March 2016. In light of the Court order, the
company urged the
union to communicate with its striking members with
a view to them adhering to the ultimatum. It was specifically
recorded
that: “
The union and
the striking members should take note that employees that proceed
with the strike will be dismissed
”.
[25]
The union and its members did not report
for work on 26 March 2016 and gathered at the gates of the company.
No production
took place on 26 March 2016.
[26]
As a result of their participation in
the unprotected strike, the individual applicants were dismissed.
It is in dispute whether
the dismissals took place on 25 or 26 March
2016. The company afforded the union’s members a right to
appeal against
their dismissals by 4 April 2016.
[27]
On 27 March 2016 the union’s
members placed steel barricades at the Respondent’s gates,
blocking the entrance.
[28]
On 29 March 2016 the company launched
another urgent interdict in the Labour Court seeking to restrain the
union’s members
from being within 500 meters of the main gate
of the company. That same day a
rule
nisi
was issued against the union
and its members. The
rule nisi
was confirmed on 9 June 2016.
[29]
The company’s Financial
Manager, Reginald Scholtz (Scholtz), testified that as a result of
the strike the company incurred
losses amounting to R2.9 million over
that period.
Issues
to be decided
[30]
In terms of the pre-trial minute, the
issues to be decided are as follows:
30.1
The date of dismissal of the Applicants. The Respondent alleges
it was on the 26
th
of March 2016 whereas the Applicant
alleges it was on the 25th March 2016.
30.2
Whether the Applicants were dismissed fairly having regard to the
procedures followed as well as the substantive
grounds.
30.3
Whether the Respondent was consistent in the application of
discipline.
30.4
Whether the Applicants had legitimate reasons for refusing to return
to work as per the ultimatums and interdicts
granted.
30.5.
Whether the Applicants were dismissed prior to the date of 26 March
2016 at 07:00, as set out in the ultimatum
or not.
Evaluation
The
date of the dismissal
[31]
The ultimatum of 24 March 2016 called on
the union’s members to report for duty on Saturday 26 March
2016 at 07h00.
[32]
The ultimatum was sent to the union’s
General Secretary, Ephraim Mphahlele (Mphahlele), who also
represented the employees
in this Court. Mphahlele was
requested to inform the union’s members of the ultimatum.
It was also pointed out
to him that a copy of the letter would be
handed to the shop stewards on the morning of 24 March 2016.
[33]
The union argued that despite the
ultimatum calling on its members to report for duty at 07h00 on 26
March 2016, the company proceeded
to dismiss its members on 25 March
2016. It relies, opportunistically in my view, on the fact that
the dismissal letter is
dated 25 March 2016. The letter was,
however, attached to an email from Putter to the General Secretary
and Deputy General
Secretary of the union. The email was sent
at 11h32 on 26 March 2016 and informs the recipients that the
dismissal letter
“
was handed
out to the striking employees at 11h00 this morning.”
The attachment is described as “
2016
03 24 Dismissal letter to striking employees.docx”.
The
union pounced on these dates to argue that the dismissal was effected
prior to the deadline in the ultimatum expiring.
[34]
Putter however testified that he drafted
the dismissal letter after 06h00 on the morning of 26 March 2016 in
anticipation of the
employees not reporting for work. The
letter was only issued later that day at about 11h00. Putter
kept a detailed
strike journal which was introduced as evidence and
he testified to its contents. With reference to 26 March 2016
he records
that when he arrived at the mill at 06h00 the entrance was
barricaded by the strikers.
[35]
Putter and the payroll administrator
prepared the dismissal documents. By 09h30 they had still not
handed out the dismissal
letter. They informed the police of
the plan and asked them to tell the striking employees that those
that wanted to come
in could do so. Those that did not want to
come in would be dismissed. At 11h00 it was decided to hand out
the dismissal
letter.
[36]
Putter called one of the shop stewards,
Shadrack Molema, and told him that he wanted to speak to the rest of
the shop stewards.
Molema tried to call two other shop stewards
but they walked away. Molema eventually caught up with them and
a short discussion
took place. Putter and the Operations
Manager, Len Steyn, tried to walk closer to the shop stewards, but
they walked away
and climbed into a car and ignored them.
[37]
They then proceeded to hand the
dismissal letters out to the striking employees who refused to take
the letters. One employee,
Petrus Mofokeng, grabbed a stack of
letters from Putter’s hands and threw it into the air. The
rest of the letters
were put next to the stop sign where the
employees were assembled. The employees also threw these
letters into the air.
[38]
At about 15h00, on his way home, Putter
called the General Secretary and the Deputy General Secretary of the
union, but neither
of them answered their phones. He left a
message and later the General Secretary called him back. He was
surprised
to learn that the employees were still striking and
indicated that the union had informed the employees of the Court
order.
Putter informed him that the employees were dismissed
that morning. When asked why the employees did not return to
work the
General Secretary indicated that the shop stewards were
immature.
[39]
Putter also referred to photographs in
the bundle showing that on 26 March 2016 the entrance to the Mill was
blockaded.
[40]
Scholtz
corroborated Putter’s version. He
was present on 26 March 2016 when the dismissals took place and
testified that when
the ultimatums were issued the employees turned
away when they tried to speak to them. Further, the date on the
email attachment
and the dismissal letter were incorrect as the
dismissal letters were only handed out on 26 March 2016, that being
the day on which
the decision was taken to dismiss the striking
employees.
[41]
Under cross-examination, Putter
explained that the attachment was described as “
2016
03 24 Dismissal letter to striking employees.docx”
because
he used a template of the letter of 24 March 2016. He cleared
the contents of the letter of 24
March, typed the dismissal letter,
but did not change the name of the document.
[42]
It was put to Putter that the dismissal
took place on 25
March
2016, despite the terms of the ultimatum. Putter maintained his
version and indicated that 25
March
2016 was Good Friday and he was not at work. It was also put to
Putter that on 26 March 2016 the union officials presented
themselves
at the company to seek clarity regarding the dismissal. This
was strongly denied by Putter who indicated that
none of the union
officials were present hence his telephone call to them.
[43]
Mr Thabane, a shop steward, testified on
behalf of the employees. According to him, the striking
employees were dismissed
on 25
March 2016 and they subsequently
informed the union. The union leaders said they would come to
the mill on 26 March 2016,
which they did. The company was
however adamant that they were dismissed. He also questioned why, if
the letter was incorrectly
dated 25 March 2016 , Putter did not
approach them and say it was an error.
[44]
There is no merit in the unions’
attempt to argue that the employees were dismissed prior to 26 March
2016. Besides
the fact that Putters evidence was not seriously
challenged, the pre-trial minute records that it is common cause that
“
the Applicant and its members
continued to refuse to work on 26 March 2016 and collected at the
gates of the Respondent. No
production took place on the 26
th
of March 2016.”
In any
event, I find it remarkable that if indeed the employees were
dismissed before the expiry of the ultimatum that the
union did not
immediately write to the company to bemoan this fact. I would
imagine that it would be outraged by what would
be extremely bad
faith on the part of the company.
[45]
I have difficulty in accepting much of
the evidence of Mr Thabane, particularly given his position as a shop
steward. This
is supported by the following:
45.1
It was put to Thabane that it
was common cause in the pre-trial minute that the employees refused
to work on 26 March
2016. When asked why the workers refused to
work, if they were under the impression that they had already been
dismissed,
Thabane was evasive in his response and when the question
was repeated, he stated “
I
do not know what transpired in the pre-trial
”.
45.2
When it was put to Thabane that the CCMA
had rejected the refusal to bargain referral on the basis that it was
a premature referral
and in closing the case the CCMA referred the
employer and employees to resolve the dispute (negotiations) in terms
of the recognition
agreement, Thabane responded to say “
this
is not known to me
”.
45.3
When asked why the employees continued
to strike despite the union having informed them that the strike
action was illegal, Thabane
responded that information was conveyed
to the union via the employer and not directly to him and that the
employees believed the
strike was legal.
45.4
When asked who informed him that the
strike was legal, Thabane responded that even if he had not received
the information from a
specific person “
we
were embarking on a legal strike”
.
He went on to say that he was not at work at the time just
preceding the strike, however, when he returned to work, he was
informed by fellow employees that the strike was legal. In
response to a question from me during argument, his representative
conceded that Thabane’s view that the strike was protected was
incorrect.
45.5
Thabane conceded that the employees
had received notification from the union to call off the strike as
it was unprotected,
but then proceeded to justify their behaviour on
the basis that “
before any
strike action commenced the process to be followed was to approach
the CCMA, from there we received an advisory award.
A
certificate was issued indicating that employees were permitted to
embark on a strike that was legal. As employees
we always
thought it was legal given the certificate from the CCMA”.
45.6
When asked why the employees did not
stop the strike following the first Court order, Thabane conceded
that he was aware that there
was an order flowing from an urgent
application, but that the employees were appealing the order and
until the appeal was heard,
they would continue on the strength of
the CCMA certificate. When asked why they did not adhere to the
second Court order
he replied that “
I
am not in a position to respond
”.
45.7
It was put to Thabane that it was common
cause that the employees were in contempt of two Court orders and
that a reason should
be furnished as to why this was the case. He
replied that “
as employees we
did not believe that we were in contempt of any order, rather we were
embarking on a legal strike”
.
45.8
Even though he was a shop steward,
throughout his testimony, Thabane persisted that he was a mere
employee and any communications/negotiations
between the union and
the company were, for the most part, not conveyed to the employees.
45.9
When asked whether he had received any
of the six ultimatums or Court orders, Thabane denied receiving any
of them and said that
it was the first time he had seen these
documents in Court.
[46]
Thabane
was one of 225 applicants in this case. Surely if the
termination letter was issued on the 25th of March 2016 this
would be
easy to corroborate by calling any of the other applicants to testify
to this effect. The senior leadership of the
union, based on
the version put up by the employees, could also have corroborated
Thabane’s evidence. This did not
happen. Instead,
after leading only the evidence of Thabane, the union closed its
case. In assessing why a witness
was not called to put a
version before the Court it was held in
Heath
v A & N Paneelkloppers
,
[2]
relying on the Labour Appeal Court judgment of
Absa
Investment Management Services (Pty) Ltd v Crowhurst
[3]
,
that:
“
'[I]t
is long established that the failure of a party to call an available
witness may found an adverse inference, the inference
being that the
witness will not support — and may even damage — that
party's case
.”
[47]
In the circumstances, I accept the
company’s version that the employees were dismissed on 26 March
2016 in accordance with
the ultimatum.
Procedural
Fairness
[48]
The employees were dismissed without a
disciplinary hearing having been convened.
[49]
The company did however offer the
employees the right to appeal the decision to dismiss them.
[50]
On 31 March 2016 the union submitted an
appeal against the dismissal of the members. The appeal grounds
are scant and simply
record the following:
50.1
“
It
is submitted that the Appellants’ dismissals are unfair as the
Appellants were never accorded the right to a disciplinary
hearing.
50.2
It is further submitted that the
Appellants’ dismissals are unfair as the employer followed no
procedure in dismissing the
Appellant.
50.3
It is further submitted that the
Appellants’ dismissals were unfair as the Appellants were
instructed to return back to work
on the 26
th
March 2016, and mysteriously got dismissed on the 25
th
of March 2016.
50.4
It is further submitted that the
dismissals of the Appellants are unfair as the Appellants were to go
back to work, but that they
first would want to talk to the managing
director, who refused to address them.
50.5
Finally, the Appellants would advance
further Appeal grounds at the Appeal hearing
”.
[51]
On 13 April 2016 the company wrote to
the union, taking cognizance of “
the
mass appeal”
on behalf of the
union’s members. The company indicated that it would
deviate from it’s normal procedure and
would deal with the
appeal process on paper. The company outlined the appeal
procedure to be as follows:
51.1
“
Any
further appeal grounds on behalf of the ex-employees must be
submitted in writing
.
51.2
Due to the extraordinary
circumstances individual ex-employees who want to do so must be
afforded the opportunity to submit written
appeals independent from
the mass appeal.
51.3
The ex-employees must also be given
the opportunity to submit mitigating circumstances in writing
.
51.4
An independent chairperson will be
appointed to conduct the appeal hearing on paper and the results will
be communicated in writing
.
51.5
Any further written appeal grounds
and/or mitigating circumstances from individual dismissed employees
must be submitted by Tuesday,
19 April 2016 at 12:00".
[52]
The company reinstated five of the
dismissed employees who submitted individual appeals. The rest
of the employees did not
take up the opportunity.
[53]
The reasons advanced by the company for
not complying with the
audi alteram
principle in respect of the disciplinary hearing include that the
employees:
53.1
would not adhere to instruction;
53.2
walked away and threw documents in the
air when the company tried to hand it to them;
53.3
were given ultimatums; and
53.4
were provided with an opportunity to
submit individual appeals against their dismissals.
[54]
Item 6(2) of the Code provides that
prior to a dismissal for participation in unprotected strike action:
“
The
employer should, at the earliest opportunity, contact the Trade Union
official to discuss the course of action it intends to
adopt. The
employer should issue an ultimatum in clear and unambiguous terms
that should state what is required of the employees
and what sanction
will be imposed if they do not comply with the ultimatum. The
employees should be allowed sufficient time
to reflect on the
ultimatum and to respond to it, either by complying with it or
rejecting it. If the employer cannot reasonably
be expected to extend
the steps to the employees in question, the employer may dispense
with them”.
[55]
According
to Cheadle
et
al
[4]
,“
The
purpose of these steps is to enable the strikers and the Union to be
aware of the consequences of their actions and to reconsider
their
position. The Union should be informed that the strike is
unprotected and that disciplinary steps will be taken which
may lead
to dismissal. The union plays a vital role in resolving an
unprotected strike and should, as soon as possible, be
given a
reasonable opportunity to speak to the members and make
representations on their behalf
”.
[56]
In
Modise
& others v Steve’s Spar Blackheath
[5]
,
it
was emphasized that the main intention of an ultimatum is to “
give
the workers an opportunity to reflect on their conduct, digest issues
and, if need be, seek advice before making a decision
whether to heed
the ultimatum or not”.
It
was also held that in keeping with the
audi
alteram partem
rule, unprotected strikers must be given a hearing as well as an
ultimatum prior to dismissal. The only justification for
failing to hold a hearing is if the strikers impliedly or expressly
waive their rights to a hearing. “
Such
waiver cannot however be inferred from the strikers’
non-compliance with the ultimatum, as the hearing and the ultimatum
serve different purposes”
[6]
.
The Court went on to explain that:
“
The
purpose of the hearing is to hear what explanation the other side has
for its conduct and to hear such representations as it
may make about
what action, if any, can or should be taken against it. The
purpose of an ultimatum is not to illicit any
information or
explanation from the workers but to give the workers an opportunity
to reflect on their conduct, digest issues and
if need be, seek
advice before making a decision whether to heed ultimatum or not
The
nature and formality of the hearing will depend on the
circumstances. It can be collective in nature.”
[7]
.
[57]
The
ultimate test however is whether the strikers were given a fair
opportunity to state their case before a decision was taken
to
dismiss them
.
[8]
In
Karras
t/a Floraline v SASTAWU and others
[9]
the Labour Appeal Court followed the approach in
Modise
and held that section 188(1)(b) requires the observance of the
audi
rule in all instances of dismissal, regardless of the reason.
[10]
According to the Court, the only difference would be that in a case
of collective misconduct, the opportunity to state a
case will
ordinarily be given to the collective, usually the trade union, if
one is involved. The Court held that the approach
is consistent
with Article 7 of the ILO Termination of Employment Convention, 1982
(No 158), which provides that: “
[t]he
employment of a worker shall not be terminated for reasons related to
the workers conduct or performance before he is provided
an
opportunity to defend himself against the allegations made, unless
the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this
opportunity.
”
[11]
[58]
Ultimately,
the consideration is whether the strikers or the union were given a
reasonable opportunity to make representations before
the strikers
were dismissed for participating in an unprotected strike. The
circumstances faced by both the employer and
employees should dictate
what procedural steps are reasonably practical and fair in the
context
[12]
[59]
The real reason advanced by the company
for not convening a disciplinary hearing is that when they previously
tried to hand documents
to the employees (the ultimatums and Court
orders) they refused to accept it. The refusal was also
accompanied by the employees
walking away and destroying the
documents. I do not believe that this explanation is sufficient
to justify not at least attempting
to hold a disciplinary hearing.
While tensions between the employees and the company were high during
the strike and there
was a police presence there is nothing to
suggest that the climate was of such a nature that the company had no
choice but to deviate
from the requirement to hold a disciplinary
hearing. Neither of the Court orders issued prior to the
dismissal of the employees
addressed issues of misconduct on the part
of the employees. The orders were focussed on the unprotected
nature of the strike.
Putter’s strike journal also does
not paint the picture of a violent strike where the employees were
out of control.
This does not mean that I accept that there was
no intimidation or violence, but rather, the point is that, the
circumstances were
not of such a nature that the company could not
even consider holding a disciplinary hearing or affording the
employees an attenuated
form of
audi
.
It could have held a collective disciplinary hearing or it could have
invited the union to give written reasons why its
members should not
be dismissed, following on their refusal to comply with a string of
ultimatums, and two Court orders.
While there were regular
interactions between the company and the union, this was in the main
when the company communicated the
ultimatums and Court orders (which
had already been given to the employees) to the union. There
were no meetings where the
company asked the union for submissions
prior to taking the decision to dismiss.
[60]
Although
the employees were afforded an appeal, I do not believe that this
cured the failure to adhere to the
audi
alteram
requirement. The facts of the present case are similar to those
in
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v I G Tooling and
Light Engineering (Pty) Ltd
.
[13]
In that case, three ultimatums were issued and a mass dismissal
took place without a pre-dismissal hearing. There were
however
several engagements with the union regarding the continuous
unprotected strike action and three agreements in an effort
to avoid
such action was also concluded. It is worth quoting quite
extensively from the judgment of La Grange J.
[14]
“
In
relation to whether the subsequent automatic right of appeal
rectified the absence of an opportunity to make representations,
I
accept that it has been held that an appeal can sometimes cure the
procedural defect of not conducting an original enquiry or
procedural
failures in the initial inquiry
.
It is not an inviolable rule and will
depend on the circumstances. As the LAC stated in
Semenya
& others v CCMA & others
:
[30]
I have referred to the Slagment decision to illustrate the point that
in that case the Appellate Division held that the rules
of natural
justice had been complied with where there had been no hearing before
the employees were dismissed but there had been
one albeit in the
form of an appeal hearing after they had been dismissed. The court
found that the appeal hearing had effectively
undone whatever
unfairness had been occasioned by the absence of a hearing before the
dismissal. My reference to the Slagment case
should not be construed
as in any way an endorsement of the view or proposition that where a
person is entitled to a hearing at
first instance as well as to an
appeal or where he is entitled to two hearings, the holding of a fair
appeal hearing when there
was a defective first hearing or no first
hearing at all, or the holding of one fair hearing instead of two or
the holding of a
first defective hearing and a second fair hearing
satisfies the requirements of the audi alteram partem principle. I
say no more
than simply that, where a person is entitled to an
opportunity to be heard before a decision is taken and he is not
given such
an opportunity, in certain circumstances an opportunity to
be heard can be given after the decision and one of those
circumstances
is where the employee is offered a disciplinary hearing
that is as fair, if not fairer, as the hearing that he or she was
entitled
to have been afforded before the decision could be taken. I
also make the point that, where as in this case the employee is
offered
a hearing that would be chaired by a chairperson of the
employee’s choice who would make the relevant decision, then
the
audi alteram partem rule is complied with and such employee
cannot complain about procedural unfairness if he or she rejected the
offer or chose not to make use of it.
“
In
Semenya
,
the employee was actually offered a
hearing de novo before a chairperson of her own choice. In this
instance, the chairperson was
not an employee of the company, but was
also not a consensual appointee. More importantly, the chairperson
had to decide an appeal,
where employees are trying to overturn an
existing decision, rather than answering to a case against them.
Moreover, employees
had a contractual right to a hearing, even if
that right was only to a joint hearing. It is also not a case where
there was an
initial hearing which was perhaps flawed in certain
respects and those flaws could be corrected on appeal. In this
case,
a major consideration is that
,
IGT did not have a sound
justification for not providing even an attenuated form of audi that
is acceptable in strike dismissals
before it took the decision to
issue the dismissal ultimatum
.
In addition, although the LAC in
Steve’s Spar expressly left open the question whether an
opportunity to be heard should be
offered, in a case such as this
where the final ultimatum is not merely issued with the threat of
subsequent disciplinary action
which could result in dismissal, but
is issued with a pre-determined sanction, the imperative for inviting
representations before
giving effect to it, is even more compelling.
In this regard, the following dictum in the case of
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) v CBI Electric African
Cables
is also of relevance:
[36]
Contrary to the court a quo’s finding, I am not satisfied that
the respondent complied with its obligation to provide
the employees
with an opportunity to be heard before effecting the dismissals after
the expiry of the ultimatum. Prior to the pre-dismissal
meeting held
on 26 June 2007, it is apparent that the respondent had already taken
a decision that the employees who took part
in “illegal
industrial action” would be dismissed and that the day shift
employees who walked off at between 12pm and
1pm would receive a
final written warning. Therefore, no amount of persuasion by the
Union that the strike had nothing to do with
the introduction of the
new shift system but with the late and wrong payslips would have
convinced the respondent to change its
preconceived stance because
the respondent believed that “after 30 meetings plus the
previous action, the relation [was]
irreparable”. There was a
duty on the respondent to afford the affected employees an
opportunity to be heard before a decision
to dismiss them was taken.
The respondent’s failure to do so rendered its decision to
dismiss the affected employees procedurally
unfair. (Mamabolo v
Rustenburg Regional Local Council, supra, at 144B–C). For these
reasons I hold that the employees’
dismissals were procedurally
unfair.(emphasis added)”
[15]
“
Further,
even if I assume its favour that it was impractical to convene a mass
enquiry at the time, it did not even attempt to call
for
representations before taking the decision to dismiss. It may have
been a different matter if that had also been genuinely
impractical,
but there were no exceptional circumstances which prevented it from
asking the union to make representations by the
afternoon before the
deadline ran out as to why it should not dismiss the strikers. The
right to a hearing prior to dismissal would
be severely diluted if
the court treated the absence of a hearing as something that would
always be cured by offering a subsequent
appeal, when there is no
good justification for the failure to hold an enquiry in the first
place.
Consequently,
I am satisfied that the employer has not established that the
dismissals were procedurally fair. The fact that an
opportunity to
make representations after the fact may mitigate that does not
detract from the fundamental unfairness of denying
the strikers an
opportunity to make representations beforehand”.
[16]
[61]
As I have stated above, I am not
convinced that the circumstances were such that the company could not
hold a disciplinary hearing
or at least attempt to hold one.
There are also no exceptional circumstances which prevented the
company from asking the
union to make representations as to why its
members should not be dismissed. Putter did call the General
Secretary of the
union on the day of the dismissal, but this was to
tell him that his members were dismissed.
[62]
As in the
IG
Tooling
case, the chairperson of the
appeal hearing was not an employee of the company, but was also not a
consensual appointee. Also,
the chairperson had to decide an
appeal, where the employees would be trying to overturn an existing
decision, rather than answering
a case against them. This is
also a case where although three of the ultimatums preceding the
final ultimatum threatened
disciplinary action, one of which
indicated that continued action could lead to dismissal, the final
ultimatum contained a pre-determined
sanction of dismissal.
According to the ultimatum “
The
union and the striking members should take note that employees who
proceed with the strike will be dismissed.
”
[63]
Despite continuously referring to the
holding of a disciplinary hearing, the company ended up dispensing
with this hearing, for
reasons I have already found not to be
compelling, and proceeded to dismiss the employees. This course
of action is not that
surprising if regard is had to the company’s
policy on “
Handling Strikes and
Work Stoppages
”. Clause
5.6.1 of this policy provides that once the deadline in an ultimatum
has expired and the striking employees
have not returned to work
“
their services shall be
terminated”.
[64]
In the circumstances, I find that the
dismissals were procedurally unfair.
Substantive
Fairness
[65]
In
National
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) v CBI Electric African
Cables
[17]
the
LAC set out the test for substantive fairness in dismissals for
participation in unprotected strike action:
“
Item
6(1) and (2) of the Code deals with the substantive fairness of
strike dismissals and provides as follows:
“
6.
Dismissal and industrial action. –
(1)
Participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions of
Chapter IV is misconduct. However, like any other
act of
misconduct, it does not always deserve dismissal. The
substantive fairness of dismissal in these circumstances must
be
determined in the light of the facts of the case, including –
(a)
the seriousness of the contravention of this Act;
(b)
attempts made to comply with this Act; and
(c)
whether or not the strike was in response to unjustified conduct by
the employer.
(2)
Prior to dismissal the employer should, at the earliest opportunity,
contact a trade union official to discuss the course of
action it
intends to adopt. The employer should issue an ultimatum in clear and
unambiguous terms that should state what is required
of the employees
and what sanction will be imposed if they do not comply with the
ultimatum. The employees should be allowed sufficient
time to reflect
on the ultimatum and respond to it, either by complying with it or
rejecting it. If the employer cannot reasonably
be expected to extend
these steps to the employees in question, the employer may dispense
with them.”
[18]
“
It
is clear from the provisions of section 68(5) that
participation in a strike that does not comply with the provisions
of
Chapter IV (strikes and lock-outs) constitutes misconduct and that a
judge who is called upon to determine the fairness of the
dismissal
effected on the ground of employees’ participation in an
illegal strike should consider not only item 6 of the
Code but also
item 7 which provides as follows:
“
7.
Guidelines in cases of dismissal for misconduct.
Any
person who is determining whether dismissal for misconduct is unfair
should consider –
(a)Whether
or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating conduct
in, or of relevance to, the workplace; and
(b)
If a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not –
(i)the
rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard;
(ii)
the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have been
aware, of the rule or standard;
(iii)the
rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; and
(iv)
dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the
rule or standard”.
[19]
“
In
my view the determination of the substantive fairness of the
strike-related dismissal must take place in two stages, first under
item 6 when the strike related enquiry takes place and secondly,
under item 7 when the nature of the rule which an employee is
alleged
to have contravened, is considered. It follows that a strike-related
dismissal which passes muster under item 6 may nevertheless
fail to
pass substantive fairness requirements under item 7. This is so
because the illegality of the strike is not “a magic
wand which
when raised renders the dismissal of strikers fair” (National
Union of Mineworkers of SA v Tek Corporation Ltd
and others (1991)
12 ILJ 577 (LAC)). The employer still bears the onus to
prove that the dismissal is fair”.
[20]
“
In
his work Grogan, expresses the view that item 6 of the Code is
not, and does not purport to be, exhaustive or rigid but
merely
identifies in general terms some factors that should be taken into
account in evaluating the fairness of a strike dismissal.
He,
therefore, opines that in determining substantive fairness regard
should also be had to other factors including the duration
of the
strike, the harm caused by the strike, the legitimacy of the
strikers’ demands, the timing of the strike, the conduct
of the
strikers and the parity principle. I agree with this view as
the consideration of the further factors ensures that
the enquiry
that is conducted to determine the fairness of the strike-related
dismissal is much broader and is not confined to
the consideration of
factors set out in item 6 of the Code”.
[21]
Item
6
[66]
In my view, the contravention of the LRA
in this case was extremely serious. The issue relating to the wage
demand was never conciliated.
This is a violation of section
64(1)(a) of the Act. While the union submitted wage proposals
to the company on 18 December
2015, the only referral to the CCMA was
on 6 January 2016, in respect of a refusal to bargain dispute.
During evidence, it
was suggested that a referral to the CCMA
was made in December 2015. However, no such referral was
submitted into evidence.
[67]
The union also made no attempt to comply
with the LRA and blatantly ignored two orders of this Court. I
have already rejected
the evidence of Mr Thabane that he was not
aware of any of the ultimatums or Court orders. On 18 March
2016, following the
judgment of La Grange J, handed down that same
day, it appeared as if some sanity was prevailing when the union
placed on record
that it would do everything in its power to ensure
that the employees returned to work. However, the very next day
the union
served a notice to appeal the Labour Court’s decision
on the company.
[68]
The union also embarked on strike action
in contravention of the recognition agreement. In terms of the
recognition agreement,
no party would take part in industrial action
unless the applicable dispute procedure in the agreement had been
exhausted. The
dispute procedure required that a dispute be
declared in writing informing the other party of the issue in dispute
and the desired
outcome. This was to be followed by a dispute
meeting where the parties would endeavour to resolve the dispute. No
dispute was brought to the attention of the company. While the union
did request a meeting with the company on 12 February 2016
to discuss
wages, it appears that this meeting did not take place. What
happened is that on 8 March 2016 the union proceeded
to notify the
company of its intention to commence with strike action on 14 March
2016 as a result of the company’s refusal
to meet its wage
demands.
[69]
In this case, the strike was not in
response to any unjustified conduct on the part of the company. The
employer concluded
a recognition agreement with the union which
regulated negotiations, including those in respect of wages.
What was required
of the union was to comply with the recognition
agreement and the LRA.
[70]
As far as item 6(2) is concerned, I have
already dealt with this extensively above. The company issued
six ultimatums in the
hope of getting the employees to return to
work. The employees were allowed sufficient time to reflect on
the ultimatums
in order to make an informed decision.
Item
7
[71]
The LRA prohibits the participation in
unprotected strikes. Section 68(5) provides that should an
employee participate in
a strike that does not comply with the
provisions of the LRA, it may constitute a fair reason for dismissal.
[72]
The recognition agreement also provides
that a party to the agreement shall not participate in industrial
action, unless the applicable
dispute procedures have been
exhausted.
[73]
The company’s policy on “
Handling
Strikes and Work Stoppages”
also regulates strikes and makes it clear what the consequences of
unprotected strike action will be.
[74]
The prohibition of unprotected action is
clearly valid, in particular, given its basis in statute.
[75]
As far as consistency is concerned, the
company had not previously faced industrial action, so the
consistency of the company’s
application of the law cannot be
tested at this level. The company allowed five employees to
return to work, but this followed
on them submitting individual
appeals which convinced the company that they should be allowed to
return to work.
[76]
There is no doubt in my mind that
dismissal was the appropriate sanction in the circumstances.
Compensation
[77]
In
South
African Revenue Services v CCMA and others
[22]
,
the Constitutional Court quoted the LAC judgment in
Kemp
t/a Centralmed v Rawlins
[23]
which
outlined the considerations a Court may take into account in deciding
on compensation:
“
To
compensate or not to compensate and if compensation is to be awarded
for what period, is a function of the judicious exercise
of the
discretionary power that an arbitrator or the court has in terms of
section 194(1) of the LRA.”
Zondo
JP outlined the applicable factors in these terms:
“
There
are many factors that are relevant to the question whether the court
should or should not order the employer to pay compensation.
It
would be both impractical as well as undesirable to attempt an
exhaustive list of such factors. However, some of
the relevant
factors may be given. They are:
(b)
Whether the unfairness of the dismissal is on substantive or
procedural grounds or both substantive and procedural grounds;
obviously it counts more in favour of awarding compensation as
against not awarding compensation at all that the dismissal is both
substantively and procedurally unfair than is the case if it is only
substantively unfair, or, even lesser, if it is only procedurally
unfair.
(c)
In so far as the dismissal is procedurally unfair, the nature and
extent of the deviation from the procedural requirements;
the minor
the employer’s deviation from what was procedurally required,
the greater the chances are that the court or arbitrator
may
justifiably refuse to award compensation; obviously, the more serious
the employer’s deviation from what was procedurally
required,
the stronger the case is for the awarding of compensation.
(d)
In so far as the reason for dismissal is misconduct, whether or not
the employee was guilty or innocent of the misconduct; if
he was
guilty, whether such misconduct was in the circumstances of the case
not sufficient to constitute a fair reason for the
dismissal.
(e)
The consequences to the parties if compensation is awarded and the
consequences to the parties if compensation is not awarded.
(f)
The need for the courts, generally speaking, to provide a remedy
where a wrong has been committed against a party to litigation
but
also the need to acknowledge that there are cases where no remedy
should be provided despite a wrong having been committed
even though
these should not be frequent.
(g)
In so far as the employee may have done something wrong which gave
rise to his dismissal but which has been found not to have
been
sufficient to warrant dismissal, the impact of such conduct of the
employee upon the employer or its operations or business.
(h)
Any conduct by either party that promotes or undermines any of the
objects of the Act, for example, effective resolution of
disputes.”
The
LAC in
Kemp
also stated that:
“
I
do not think that the provisions of sec 193(1)( c ) of the Act give
the Labour Court or an arbitrator the kind of power which
would
enable it or him to grant or refuse an order of compensation on
identical facts as it or he sees fit. In my view the ultimate
question that the Labour Court or an arbitrator has to answer in
order determine whether compensation should or should not be granted
is: which one of the two options would better meet the requirements
of fairness having regard to all the circumstances of this
case? If
however the Court or arbitrator answers that the requirements of
fairness, when regard is had to all of the circumstances,
will be
better met by denying the employee compensation, no order of payment
of compensation should be made. If the Court or arbitrator
answers
that the requirements of fairness will be better met by awarding the
employee compensation, then compensation should be
awarded. When that
question is answered, the interests of both the employer and the
employee must be taken into account together
with all the relevant
factors. In my view, where the court or an arbitrator decides the
issue of whether or not to award the employee
compensation, it does
not exercise a true discretion or a narrow discretion. The
determination of that question or issue requires
the passing of a
moral or value judgment. It is decided or determined on the basis of
the conceptions of fairness because the Court
or arbitrator has to
look at all the circumstances and say to itself or himself or herself
as the case may be: What would be more
in accordance with justice and
fairness in this case? Would be to award compensation or would it be
to refuse to award compensation?
It or he or she would then have to
make the decision in accordance with its, his or her sense of which
of the two options would
better serve the requirements of justice and
fairness.”
[24]
[78]
I have taken into account the interests
of both the company and the employees as well as all the relevant
circumstances in deciding
whether or not to grant compensation.
[79]
In my view, the requirements of fairness
will be better met by denying the employees compensation.
While, in the end, the
company did not hold a disciplinary hearing,
it endured the unprotected strike for nearly two weeks, incurring
substantial losses
in the process and tried through six ultimatums
and two court orders to get the employees to return to work.
Without detracting
from what I said above, it also offered an appeal
and reinstated five employees pursuant to their appeals. On the
other hand,
the union and its members ignored the ultimatums and
showed flagrant disregard for two orders of this court. The
union opportunistically
built it’s case on no more than a
bona
fide
mistake relating to the
dismissal date. It only called one witness in support of its
case who was less than honest with this
court. When asked why
he did not adhere to the two court orders, which he conceded knowing
about, he replied that
“
as
employees we did not believe that we were in contempt of any order,
rather we were embarking on a legal strike.”
His representative had no choice during
argument but to distance himself from this statement.
[80]
In the circumstances, the employees are
not entitled to any compensation for the procedurally unfair
dismissals.
Costs
[81]
The
union did not seek a costs order against the employer, even though it
felt that the employer frivolously dismissed the employees.
The
union further submitted that the Court should consider the judgment
of
Sibongile
Zungu v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal and Others
[25]
in which it was held that
“
the
rule of practice that costs follow the result does not govern the
making of orders of costs in this
Court”
. The employer argued that the only way that this Court could
show its dissatisfaction was through a costs order in favour
of the
employer.
[82]
My decision not to award compensation
speaks to my dissatisfaction with the conduct of the union and its
members. I am therefore
not inclined to also make a cost order
against the union.
[83]
In the circumstances, I make the
following order:
Order
1.
The dismissal of the individual
applicants was substantively fair but procedurally unfair.
2.
The individual applicants are not
entitled to any compensation in respect of their procedurally unfair
dismissals.
3.
No order is made as to costs.
___________________
BN
Conradie
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
Applicants:
Mr
E Mphahlele of the National Transport Movement
Respondent:
Advocate PH
Kirstein
Instructed
by: Johanette Rheeder
Attorneys Incorporated.
[1]
This was a notice to appeal the judgment of La Grange J. Leave to
appeal was denied on 5 October 2016.
[2]
[2015] 36
ILJ
1301 (LC) at para 51.
[3]
[2006] 27
ILJ
107
(LAC) at para 14.
[4]
Cheadle
et
al
Strikes
and the Law
(2017) at 212.
[5]
[2000]
5
BLLR
496
(LAC) at para 73.
[6]
See
Cheadle
et
al
Strikes
and the Law
214.
[7]
At
para 73.
[8]
See
Cheadle et al
Strikes
and the Law
215 and
Modise
at para 96.
[9]
[2001]
1
BLLR
1(LAC).
[10]
At
para 25.
[11]
At
para 26 and
Modise
at para 30.
[12]
See
Cheadle et al
Strikes
and the Law
216.
[13]
(JS763/06) [2018]
ZALCJHB
181
(15 May 2018).
[14]
At
para 103.
[15]
At
para 104.
[16]
At
paras 105-6.
[17]
[2014] 1
BLLR
31
(LAC).
[18]
At
para 27.
[19]
At
para 28.
[20]
At
para 29.
[21]
At para 30.
[22]
[2017]
1
BLLR
8
(CC) at para 50.
[23]
[2009] 30
ILJ
2677 (LAC).
[24]
At
para 22.
[25]
[2018] ZACC 1
at para 24.