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[2019] ZALCJHB 342
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Morobane v Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR26/18) [2019] ZALCJHB 342 (19 November 2019)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not
Reportable
case
no:
JR
26/18
In
the matter between:
DANIEL
PETER
MOROBANE
Applicant
and
THE COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION
MEDIATION
AND ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
JOHAN D STAPELBBERG
Second Respondent
FILM
AND PUBLICATION BOARD
Third Respondent
Heard
:
13 November 2019
Delivered
:
19 November 2019
Summary:
An opposed review application – where a commissioner issues
a ruling when the CCMA is
functus officio
–
such a ruling is a nullity since it was issued without the necessary
jurisdictional power. Held: (1) The ruling issued by
the second
respondent is hereby reviewed and set aside. (2) No order as to
costs.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA,
J
Introduction
[1]
This opposed review application raises the question whether the
Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) has the
necessary jurisdiction to exercise statutory powers twice. The review
application before me seeks to review and set aside a condonation
ruling, in terms of which the second respondent refused to condone
a
late referral of a dismissal dispute for conciliation. The
application is opposed by the third respondent.
Background
facts
[2]
Given
the
fulcrum
upon which this review application must rotate, it is unnecessary for
the purposes of this judgment to punctiliously set out the
facts of
this case. Briefly, the relevant facts are that on or about 16
July 2015, the applicant, Daniel Peter Marobane was
dismissed by the
third respondent. Aggrieved by his dismissal, the applicant referred
a dispute alleging unfair dismissal within
the time period prescribed
in the Labour Relations Act
[1]
(LRA). On 9 September 2015, after performing the statutory function
of conciliation and mediation, the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) issued a certificate certifying that
the dispute of alleged unfair dismissal remains unresolved.
The next
statutory course open for the applicant was to request resolution of
the dispute through arbitration or refer for adjudication.
[3]
The applicant took neither of the courses
open to him. He was subsequently wrongly advised by Jansen and Jansen
Attorneys to instead
re-refer the same dispute to the CCMA for
conciliation. This re-referral was made in August 2017, which was
obviously done outside
the prescribed time period. Owing to that, the
applicant was again wrongly advised to seek condonation for the late
referral. The
application for condonation was considered by the
second respondent, who in turn issued the impugned ruling refusing to
condone
the late re-referral. The applicant was aggrieved by the
ruling and approached this Court for a relief. Initially, the
application
was enrolled before my sister Lallie J, but could not be
heard due to power failure as occasioned by load shedding.
Mercifully,
the application was enrolled before me within a short
space of time.
The
issue raised
mero motu
[4]
The applicant challenged the award on a
number of grounds. However, at the commencement of the hearing of the
application, this
Court
mero motu
raised the legal question whether the CCMA was not
functus
officio
when it entertained the second
referral, the consequence of which being that the CCMA lacked the
necessary jurisdictional power
and accordingly the ruling is a
nullity and ought to be set aside on that basis alone. The Court
debated the issue with Advocate
Bekker, appearing for the third
respondent owing to the fact that the applicant was appearing in
person and is not legally trained
to have understood the legal point.
Submissions
by Mr Bekker
[5]
On the point, Mr Bekker submitted that
since the ground is not foreshadowed in the applicant’s papers
it should not be entertained.
Further, he submitted that since the
applicant has abandoned the first referral, he should stand or fall
by the second referral.
Since the condonation application was rightly
refused, the application for review must fail, so went the
submission.
Evaluation
[6]
Perhaps
the best place to start is to consider the question whether a Court
of law is entitled to
mero
motu
raise a question of law even if not specifically raised in either of
the parties’ papers. The general rule is that a Court
of law
should not decide issues irrelevant to the outcome of a case
[2]
.
In
Minister
of Justice and Correctional Services v Walus
[3]
President Maya, writing for the majority had this to say:
‘
[23] …However,
where a point of law is apparent on the papers (even where it has
been expressly abandoned) but the common
approach of the parties
proceeds on a wrong perception of the law…
the court is not
only entitled, but it is also obliged,
mero motu
,
to raise the point of law and require the parties to deal with it.
Otherwise it would be bound to make a decision that is premised on an
incorrect application of the law, despite the accepted facts,
merely
because a party failed to raise the legal point, as a result of an
error of law on his part. That would infringe the principle
of
legality.’
[7]
This Court was thus obliged to raise the issue of
functus officio
as it was blatantly apparent that the applicant referred a dispute
and the dispute was entertained by the CCMA. Accordingly, the
argument by Mr Bekker that this Court should not entertain the point
is rejected.
Was
the CCMA
functus officio
?
[8]
It
does seem that Mr Bekker, reluctantly though, accepted that the
doctrine of
functus
officio
does apply to CCMA rulings. The Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in
PT
Operational Services (Pty) Ltd v RAWU obo Ngwetsana
[4]
confirmed
that the doctrine does apply to CCMA commissioners. The doctrine has
been explained to mean that a person who is vested
with adjudicative
or decision making powers may as a general rule exercise those powers
only once in relation to the same matter.
With regard to the matter
before me, section 135 (1) of the LRA provides that when a dispute
has been referred to the Commission,
the Commission must appoint a
commissioner to attempt to resolve it through conciliation. Section
135 (2) states that the appointed
commissioner must attempt to
resolve the dispute through conciliation.
[9]
It is thus crystal clear that the statutory power
of the commission, in relation to a referred dispute is to attempt
resolution
through conciliation. There can be no doubt that the
dispute of the applicant was and remained that of an alleged unfair
dismissal.
It may well be so that the applicant and or the
conciliating commissioner at one stage labelled it an automatically
unfair dismissal.
However, it remains so that the dispute was with
regard to the dismissal of the applicant. It is undisputed that on 05
August 2015,
the applicant referred to the CCMA a dispute challenging
the fairness of his dismissal occasioned on 16 July 2015. Such a
referral
ignited the powers bestowed on the CCMA in section 135. It
is evident that the CCMA did exercise those powers on 9 September
2015.
[10]
Section 135 (5) provides that when conciliation
has failed, the appointed commissioner must issue a certificate
stating whether
or not the dispute has been resolved. There is no
dispute that on 9 September 2015, a certificate of non-resolution was
issued.
The legal effect of this administrative function of issuing a
certificate is that it proves that conciliation was attempted and
it
failed. Put differently, it is proof that the CCMA has exercised its
statutory powers over the dispute. Once that happened,
on application
of the doctrine of
functus officio
,
the CCMA is not empowered to again attempt resolution of the same
dispute.
[11]
Despite
that, Jansen and Jansen Attorneys, incorrectly advised the applicant
to on 22 August 2017 re-refer the same dispute for
conciliation. This
advice was blatantly wrong. It is patently clear that the applicant
as advised by Jansen and Jansen was at sea
with regard to the correct
legal position, when regard is had to annexure D to the re-referral
form. In there, the second referral
was labelled as a reinstatement
of an existing matter. This labelling is wrong and demonstrative of
lack of understanding of the
legal position. However, this lack of
understanding of the legal position did not license the CCMA to
entertain the second referral.
The second referral was a futile
exercise. The second referral did not occur in a situation where the
applicant had withdrawn the
first referral
[5]
.
The first referral was processed and the statutory power was
exercised upon it. This point, the second respondent was alive
to. In his unnecessarily detailed ruling, he said the following:
[12] …It
was
not necessary to re-refer the same dispute for conciliation
, as
he had even.
[12]
The above statement is correct in law.
Surprisingly, the second respondent proceeded to attempt to exercise
statutory powers over
this unnecessary referral. All the second
respondent was required to do was to decline jurisdiction over the
matter. Section 191(1)
obliges a party to refer a dispute about the
fairness of a dismissal within 30 days of the dismissal. Should an
employee fail to
do so timeously, the commission may permit him or
her to do so outside the prescribed period if good cause is shown.
[13]
The
exercise that the second respondent was engrossed with, which gave
birth to the impugned ruling, is one that is permitted in
section 191
(2) only in respect of one referral. Since the second respondent was
considering whether or not to allow the re-referral,
that exercise is
not one sanctioned by the Act
[6]
,
thus
brutum
fulmen
.
The applicant was not entitled to refer the same dispute again. Any
attempt to allow him to do what he is not entitled to do was
and is a
futile exercise. On application of the doctrine of
functus
officio
,
the second respondent had no powers to do what he did. A decision
taken without jurisdictional powers is a nullity and can be
set aside
on that ground alone. In
Eskom
v Marshall and others
[7]
,
the Labour Court held thus:
‘
The authorities
are trite that a court of law or tribunal that issues an order where
it has no jurisdiction to do so acts
ultra
vires.
The result is that the order is a nullity. See
Immelman
v Keller
1903 20 SC 3
and
Visser
v Van Der Heever
1934
CPD 315.’
[8]
Did
the applicant abandon the first referral?
[14]
Mr
Bekker was insistent in his submission and repeatedly stated that the
applicant abandoned the first referral. I fail to comprehend
this
submission. The scheme of the LRA is such that a dismissal dispute
could be resolved employing three different processes.
The first of
which is conciliation. This is a distinct process. Only once it fails
to resolve a dispute, would a party move to
either of the two that
follows, namely arbitration or adjudication. It is common cause that
the applicant had exhausted the first
process in relation to the
dispute. The fact that he did not progress to the second available
stages cannot suggest that he has
abandoned the referral. The
referral was made and processed at the first stage. That being the
case how can the applicant abandon
something that is already
processed? In order to progress to the arbitration stage, a
request
[9]
to that effect must
be made. In order to progress to the adjudication stage, an employee
must refer the dispute to the Labour Court.
[10]
[15]
It is fact that the applicant did not request
arbitration nor refer the unresolved unfair dismissal dispute for
adjudication. That
does not imply that the applicant has lost the
right to request arbitration nor refer for adjudication. That right
remains intact.
The question whether he shall be allowed to request
arbitration or refer for adjudication outside the prescribed time
periods is
a question to be decided by the appointed arbitrator, if a
request is made, or the appointed judge if a referral is made. It is
not a matter to be decided by this Court. In my view, there is no
evidence that the applicant has abandoned the unfair dismissal
dispute, if that is what Mr Bekker meant to submit.
Conclusion
[16]
In summary, by application of the doctrine
of
functus officio
,
the ruling of the second respondent was issued without the necessary
jurisdictional powers, thus a nullity and susceptible to
being set
aside as such. The condonation application ought not to have been
entertained. Accordingly, even though this Court sets
aside the
ruling, it cannot condone the late re-referral as same was not
authorised in law. Accordingly, it is my considered view
that the
first referral has not been abandoned by the applicant. It is, in my
view, incapable of abandonment, in so far as conciliation
is
concerned. Conciliation on the referral has happened.
[17]
In the results I make the following order:
Order
1.
The
condonation ruling issued by the second respondent on 28 November
2017 under case number GATW 12420-17 is a nullity and thus
reviewed
and set aside.
2.
There is no order as to costs.
_______________________
G. N. Moshoana
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
In Person.
For
the Respondents:
Advocate W P Bekker.
Instructed
by:
Gildenhuys Malatji Inc, Pretoria.
[1]
No. 66 of 1995, as amended.
[2]
See:
Four
Wheel Drive CC v Leshni Rattam N.
O
(1048/17) [2018] ZASCA (26 September 2018).
[3]
[2017] 4 All SA 1 (SCA).
[4]
[2013] 3 BLLR 225 (LAC).
[5]
See
Ncaphayi
v CCMA
[2011]
32 ILJ 402 (LC)
[6]
See
Premier
Gauteng and Another v Ramabulana N.O
[2008] 29 ILJ 1099 (LAC) at paragraph [24] The effect of the above
is that in this case the employee party did not need to make
a
second referral of the dispute… The conciliator granted that
condonation.
He
should have held that the second referral was incompetent as a
dispute that has already been competently referred to conciliation
cannot be referred to the same process for the second time.
[25] Although the conciliator
had
no jurisdiction
to deal with such a referral and such condonation
[7]
[2003] 1 BLLR 12 (LC).
[8]
See also:
Botha
v Department of Education (Limpopo Province) and Others
(2008) 29 ILJ 624 (LC) at para 55 and 56.
[9]
Section 191 (5) (a) the council or Commission
must
arbitrate the dispute at the request
of the employee
[10]
Section 191 (5) (b) the
employee
may refer
…