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[2019] ZALCJHB 310
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Petro Chem Technical Service (Pty) Ltd v Motor Industry Bargaining Council Dispute Resolution Centre and Others (J1744/16; JR2275/13) [2019] ZALCJHB 310; (2020) 41 ILJ 1216 (LC) (14 November 2019)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG.
Reportable
Case No: J1744/16
JR2275/13
In
the matter between:
PETRO
CHEM TECHNICAL
SERVICE
(pTY) LTD
Applicant
And
MOTOR
INDUSTRY BARGAINING
COUNCIL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE
First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
RUSSEL MOLETSANE
N.O
.
Second Respondent
PATRICK
MUTEMA
Third
Respondent
NAPE
CORNELIUS MAPUMA
Fourth Respondent
Heard:
11
July 2019
Date
Delivered
:
14 November 2019
Summary:
Review of arbitration award – practice and procedure –
Practice Manual of the Labour Court – clause 11.2.7
–
excessive delay in prosecution – clause 11.4.1 – failure
to progress review application - by the time review
was heard, the
application had in effect lapsed and been archived in terms of
Practice Manual of the Labour Court - as such this
court has no
jurisdiction – the applicant should have filed a separate rule
11 application seeking condonation for the undue
delay –
failure to subsequently demonstrate truly exceptional considerations
and good cause, Labour Court lacks the jurisdiction
to hear the
review application.
JUDGMENT
YEATES
AJ
Introduction.
[1]
This matter concerns a joint set down of the Applicant's application
under
case number J1744/16, to stay the enforcement of the
arbitration award, which underpins this review application, which has
been
brought in terms of
section 145
of the
Labour Relations Act 66
of 1995
, as amended ("
LRA
").
[2]
The Applicant, Petro-Chem Technical Service ("
Applicant
")
seeks to review and set aside the arbitration award of the Second
Respondent, acting in his capacity as Arbitrator under
the auspices
of the First Respondent, the Motor Industry Bargaining Council
Dispute Resolution Centre.
[3]
Rule 23
of the Rules for the Conduct of Proceedings in the Labour
Court ("
Labour Court Rules
") permits this court to
make an order consolidating any separate proceedings pending before
it if it deems the order to be
expedient and just.
[4]
I can see no reason why the matters referred to above should not be
consolidated
as both matters emanate from the same facts.
[5]
It is a well-established principle in this Court that, in terms of
the
Labour Court Practice Manual ("
Practice Manual
"),
a review application is urgent, and that the prosecution of a review
must be completed in 12 months. Where this does not
happen, the
review application lapses and is archived.
[6]
The Practice Manual however does provide litigants with some relief,
as
it provides that if this period cannot be complied with, then at
least good cause must be shown in order to resuscitate the review
application – i.e. a proper condonation application must be
brought, explaining the reason for the delay.
[7]
In his judgment in the matter of
Matsha and Others v Public Health
and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining Council and Others
(2019) 40 ILJ 2565 at [1], Snyman AJ, in my view, accurately reflects
this Court's sentiment when confronted with review applications
which
have been excessively delayed on the part of the applicant –
"[1]
In
Toyota SA Motors (Pty) Limited v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and others
[1]
the court expressed the following sentiment
:
"Excessive
delays in litigation may induce a reasonable belief, especially on
the part of a successful litigant, that the order
or award had become
unassailable. This is so all the more in labour disputes."
[2]
However, and despite this sentiment, this Court is still being
inundated by applications in terms of rule 11 of the Labour Court
Rules to dismiss review applications for a lack of diligent
prosecution thereof by litigants. Not only does this unnecessarily
clog up the court roll, but it leaves a dispute which was always
intended to be expeditiously resolved, hanging in the air. This
kind
of situation creates uncertainty, may compound liability and serves
to disappoint parties before this Court seeking nothing
else but
justice. After all, justice delayed is justice denied.
"
[8]
The operative effect of a review application which has lapsed in
terms
of clause 11.2.7 of the Practice Manual, is that it is no
longer properly before this Court, and the Court lacks the requisite
jurisdiction to determine the review application, unless good cause
has been shown, and the matter is re-instated by an order of
this
Court.
Background
[9]
This matter, unfortunately, has a long and complex history.
[10]
The Third Respondent ("
Mr Mutema
") was employed by
the Applicant on 8 November 2010 as a mechanic and was dismissed on 2
April 2013 for gross dishonesty. It
was alleged that the Third
Respondent fraudulently completed a trade union membership form on
behalf of one Mr Knowledge Magwaza
("
Magwaza
"),
without his permission. The Fourth Respondent ("
Mr Mapuma
"),
a boilermaker in the Applicant's employ, was also dismissed by gross
negligence, in that it was alleged that he failed
to check if the
membership form of Mr Magwaza, was false before handing it over for
deduction from his salary.
[11]
The Third and Fourth Respondents both became members of the United
Chemical Industries
Mining Electrical State Health and Aligned
Workers Unions ("
UCIMESHAWU
"). They conducted
recruitment activities amongst the Applicant's employees on behalf of
UCIMESHAWU.
[12]
On or about 30 January 2013, the Applicant charged the Third
Respondent with gross misconduct
and dishonesty. The Applicant
alleged that the Third Respondent forged or falsified a trade union
membership application form,
as if it constituted a membership form
completed by Knowledge Magwaza, who at the time of the completion of
the forged document
was on leave in his home country, Zimbabwe.
[13]
The Fourth Respondent was similarly charged with gross misconduct and
dishonesty, as well
as gross negligence. The Applicant alleged that
the Fourth Respondent submitted the forged or falsified trade union
membership
form by leaving it on the desk of Elrina Rheeder, the
Applicant's financial administrator at the time, for processing.
[14]
On 2 April 2013, following a formal disciplinary inquiry, the Third
Respondent was found
guilty of gross dishonesty and the Fourth
Respondent was found guilty of gross negligence. Subsequently, they
were summarily dismissed
with effect from 2 April 2013.
The
Arbitration
[15]
UCIMESHAWU, on behalf of the Third and Fourth Respondents, referred
an unfair dismissal
dispute for arbitration to First Respondent. The
Applicant was duly represented at the arbitration proceedings by
J.J.M. Kruger
("
Kruger
"), a member of the AHI
Employer's Organisation. The matter came before the Second Respondent
who heard the matter on 26 August
2013 in Randburg.
[16]
On 10 September 2013, the Second Respondent issued his arbitration
award in which he found
the dismissal of the Third Respondent to be
substantively unfair in that Applicant acted inconsistently. He
further found the dismissal
of the Fourth Respondent to be
substantively unfair in that Applicant did not prove that the reason
for dismissal was a fair reason
related to his conduct.
In
the Labour Court
[17]
The Applicant, once again represented by Kruger, instituted review
proceedings in this
Court in terms of section 145 of the LRA on 23
October 2013 under case number J2275/2013.
[18]
The First Respondent delivered the record of the arbitration
proceedings to the Registrar
of the Labour Court on 2 December 2013.
Applicant subsequently uplifted and then filed the record of
proceedings with the Registrar
on 28 March 2014.
[19]
The Applicant filed its supplementary affidavit, without any
condonation application, only
on 8 August 2014.
[20]
The Third and Fourth Respondents filed their Notice of Intention to
Oppose the review application
on 2 December 2014.
[21]
The Applicant only prepared the review application court file on 13
June 2016 when it filed
its indices.
First
section 158(1)(c) application
[22]
On 21 November 2013, and whilst the review proceedings were pending,
UCIMESHAWU launched
an application under case number J2418/2013 in
terms of section 158(1)(c) in order to make the arbitration award an
order of court.
[23]
This application was apparently brought without the knowledge of the
Third and Fourth Respondents.
The Applicant, duly represented
by Kruger, successfully opposed the application and this application
appears now to have fallen
away.
Second
section 158(1)(c) application
[24]
However, on 28 May 2014 another application in terms of section 158
(1)(c) was launched
under case number J1314 / 2013, this time by the
Third and Fourth Respondents acting in their personal capacities and
without the
assistance of their trade union.
[25]
The matter came before Snyman AJ in the Applicant's absence and on 17
September 2014, the
Second Respondent's arbitration award was made an
order of court.
First
rescission application
[26]
The Applicant, this time represented by Marcus Malan Attorneys, and
on 25 November 2014,
launched an application to rescind the default
court order under case number J1314/2013, on the basis that the
Applicant was unaware
of any litigation against it under this case
number. Interestingly, however, the Applicant's founding papers in
this application
were deposed to by Kruger.
[27]
In his supporting affidavit in the Applicant's rescission
application, Kruger notes the
following at paragraph 4.2 thereof –
"
As our
Supplementary Affidavit is duly delivered, I consequently submit it
is now the duty of the Respondents to file their Answering
Affidavit.
It appears they prefer another route to finalize the matter rather
than to participate in the Reviewing Application."
[28]
Accordingly, the Applicant's rescission application came before
Louw AJ on 5 January
2016, who granted the application for
rescission.
Urgent
application to stay enforcement
[29]
During the week of 7 August 2016, the Sheriff of Germiston South
attended at the Applicant's
premises and proceeded to attach 3 Light
Delivery Vehicles in execution of the Arbitration Award.
[30]
The Applicant launched an urgent application under case number
J1744/16 to stay the enforcement
of the Arbitration Award.
[31]
The urgent application came before Whitcher J who handed down her
order on 1 September
2016 staying the enforcement of the award,
pending the outcome of the review application.
Second
rescission application
[32]
Finally, after further postponements granted by Prinsloo J at the
pre-enrolment hearing
of the matter, this review application was set
down for argument on the opposed motion roll on 22 August 2018.
[33]
The Applicant was not in attendance at the hearing of the matter.
[34]
The matter came before Moshoana J who made the following order –
a.
The application for review under JR2275/13 is hereby dismissed.
b.
The award made by the Dispute Resolution Centre Bargaining Council
is
hereby made an order of court.
c.
The applicant in the review application and the respondent in
the
section 158(1)(c) application is to pay the costs of both
applications.
[35]
On 25 September 2018, the Applicant again applied for the
rescission of the court
order.
[36]
The matter came before Nkutha-Nkontwana J who rescinded the court
order which dismissed
the review application and ordered on 5
February 2019 that the Registrar enrol the matter on an expedited
basis on the opposed
motion roll.
[37]
The matter was finally set down for argument on 11 July 2019.
Issues
for determination
[38]
Whether this court has the requisite jurisdiction to determine this
review application.
Evaluation
[39]
In
National
Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town
and Others
[2]
Ngcobo J said:
"By their very
nature labour disputes must be resolved expeditiously and be brought
to finality so that the parties can organize
their affairs
accordingly. They affect our economy and labour peace. It is in the
public interest that labour disputes be resolved
speedily . . ."
[40]
Rule 11(4)
of the Labour Court Rules further provides that in the exercise of
its powers and in the performance of its functions,
or in any
incidental matter, the court may act in a manner that it considers
expedient in the circumstances to achieve the objects
of the Act. Any
delay in the resolution of labour disputes undermines the primary
object of the LRA
[3]
.
[41]
The Practice Manual gives effect to this primary object.
[42]
In the
matter of
Tadyn
Trading CC t/a Tadyn Consulting Services v Steiner and Others at
p
aragraph
11, the court refers to
In
re: Several matters on the urgent court roll 18 September 2012
[4]
,
where the court held that in law the Judge President was entitled to
issue practice directives relating to the procedure of setting
down
matters on the roll.
[43]
This was
discussed further in
Ralo
v Transnet Port Terminals and Others
in paragraph 9 of the judgment by Van Niekerk J
[5]
:
"I agree. The
practice manual contains a series of directives, which the Judge
President is entitled to issue. In essence,
the manual sets out what
is expected of practitioners so as to meet the imperatives of respect
for which the court as an institution,
and an expeditious resolution
of labour disputes (see paragraph 1.3). While the manual acknowledges
the need for flexibility in
its application (see paragraph 1.2) its
provisions are not cast in the form of a guideline, to be adhered to
or ignored by parties
at their convenience."
[44]
In
paragraph 14 of
MJRM
Transport Services CC v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
,
it is expressed that "
inasmuch
as the provisions of the manual call for flexibility in their
application where required, litigants are nevertheless bound
by
them
[6]
."
[45]
Clause 11.2.7 of the Practice Manual reinforces that a review
application is by its nature
an urgent application. Therefore, an
applicant in a review application is required to ensure that all the
necessary papers in the
application are filed within twelve (12)
months of the date of the launch of the application and the registrar
must be informed
in writing that the application is ready for
allocation for hearing. Where this time limit is not complied with,
the application
will be archived and be regarded as lapsed unless
good cause is shown why the application should not be archived or be
removed
from the archive.
[46]
The Practice Manual came into effect during April 2013. The review
application
in casu
was instituted on 23 October 2013.
Therefore, the Practice Manual applies to the review application.
Whilst the Supplementary Affidavit
was filed out of time on 8 August
2014, there was no further steps taken by the Applicant to progress
the review application until
the Third and Fourth Respondents filed
their Notice of Intention to Oppose to the review application on 2
December 2014.
[47]
This date is important. Even if one were to give the Applicant the
benefit of the doubt
concerning the late filing of its supplementary
papers, the Applicant was required to comply with clause 11.2.7 by 23
October 2014
in order to avoid its review application lapsing.
[48]
This is evident in the wording of clause 11.2.7 which reads –
"11.2.7
A review application is by
its nature an urgent
application. An applicant in a review application is therefore
required to ensure that all the necessary papers
in the application
are filed within
twelve (12) months of
the date of the launch of the application (excluding Heads of
Arguments) and the registrar is informed in
writing that the
application is ready for allocation for hearing. Where this time
limit is not complied with, the application will
be archived and be
regarded as lapsed unless
good
cause is shown why the application should not to be archived or be
removed from the archive.
"
[49]
The Applicant does not at any stage inform the registrar that the
application is ready
for allocation for hearing, be it on the opposed
or even the unopposed motion roll.
[50]
On the contrary, the Applicant's representative, Kruger, appears to
be waiting for the
Third and Fourth Respondents to file their
answering affidavits. This is evident from his supporting affidavit
in the rescission
application under case number J1314/14.
[51]
The Applicant's logic in this regard, is however fundamentally
flawed.
[52]
It appears from the papers in the matter that the Third and Fourth
Respondents only served
and filed their Notice to Oppose the review
application on 2 December 2014. There was no reason for the Applicant
to wait for their
answering papers. However, even if the Applicant
were under the impression that the review application was opposed,
the Applicant
failed to progress the review application within the
requisite 12-month period with due regard to clause 11.4 of the
Practice Manual
which reads –
"11.4.1If the
respondent has delivered a notice of intention to oppose but fails to
deliver an answering affidavit within the
prescribed time limit, the
registrar must at the request of the applicant, enrol the application
on the opposed motion roll and
serve a
notice of set down to
all parties.
"
Hearing
of the matter 11 July 2019
[53]
At the hearing of this matter on 11 July 2019, I specifically
requested the Applicant's
representatives to address this Court on
good cause for the reinstatement of the review application.
[54]
Adv Crouse advanced eight grounds upon which the Applicant relied to
substantiate good
cause. In summary, the Applicant's representations
in this regard were the following:
a.
Adv Crouse submitted that given the multiple section 158(1)(c)
applications which were launched by UCIMESHAWU and the Third and
Fourth Respondents' respectively, the Applicant was too busy opposing
these applications as well as launching an urgent application to stay
the enforcement of the arbitration award, in order to progress
the
review application;
b.
It was also submitted at the hearing of the matter that the
Applicant
could not progress its review application, as the Third and Fourth
Respondents did not serve and file any answering papers
in opposition
to the review application;
c.
The Applicant further relied on the court order of Prinsloo
J dated
26 October 2017, wherein the review proceedings were postponed and
ordered the Registrar to enrol the matter on an expedited
basis;
d.
A further pre-enrolment hearing was held during 2018 and was
presided
over by Van Niekerk J. Adv Crouse argued that the matter was
considered ripe for hearing as no objection had been raised;
e.
At both of the above hearings, the Respondents were present
and
represented and did not raise any jurisdictional challenges;
f.
In both the above hearings the respective Judges 'seemed
happy'
regarding the times and the pleadings being filed;
g.
The Applicant did rely on the court order of Prinsloo J which
provided that the matter be set down for hearing; and
h.
Adv Crouse argued that by virtue of the court order of Prinsloo
J and
the pre-enrolment hearing of Van Niekerk J, the Labour Court's
jurisdiction to hear the review application was confirmed.
[55]
In considering these grounds for good cause, I simply cannot agree
with the Applicant's
submissions as constituting grounds for good
cause to reinstate the review application.
[56]
The court
in
Allround
Tooling v NUMSA and another
held that a practitioner's busy schedule is not an acceptable
explanation for delay in observing time limits
[7]
.
This approach was followed in
Minister
of Social Development v Veldhuizen
[8]
.
For this reason, the fact that the Applicant's representatives were
busy with the other applications brought forward, is insufficient.
[57]
The Applicant's contention that it could not progress its review
application in the absence
of the Respondents answering papers is
equally flawed. I have already referenced clause 11.4.1 of the
Practice Manual above in
this regard. The Applicant had ample
opportunity, even after filing its supplementary affidavit late on 8
August 2014, to request
the Registrar to set the matter down, and
thus avoiding the review application from lapsing.
[58]
The Applicant's reliance of the court order of Prinsloo J is
perplexing. Even though it
may not be evident on Prinsloo J's court
order itself, a file note made on the court file indicates that the
matter was postponed
sine die,
because the pleadings filed by
the Applicant contained comments and remarks made by the Applicant
and the court could not consider
the papers with personal comments
and notes.
[59]
It therefore appears to me that Prinsloo J could not have considered
the merits of the
review application and the postponement was given
in order to afford the Applicant party an opportunity to file
unmarked pleadings.
[60]
In
NUMSA
v Hillside Aluminium
[9]
Murphy AJ wrote at paragraph 12:
"…to do
justice to the aims of the legislation, parties seeking condonation
for non-compliance are obliged to set out
full explanations for each
and every delay throughout the process. An unsatisfactory and
unacceptable explanation for any of the
periods of delay will
normally exclude the grant of condonation, no matter what the
prospects of success on the merits."
[61]
On this basis alone, Prinsloo J would not have considered the
timelines, let alone considered
any resemblance of a condonation
application for good cause. There were no submissions made to
Prinsloo J concerning the time periods,
to which she could have
applied her mind, before ordering the Registrar to set the review
application down on an expedited basis.
At the very least Prinsloo J
would not have known, given the reason for the postponement of the
matter, that she would be 'confirming'
the Labour Court's
jurisdiction as argued by Adv Crouse. I am of the view that the
Applicant's submission in this respect, is opportunistic.
[62]
The Applicant's reliance on the pre-enrolment hearing presided over
by Van Nierkerk J is
equally opportunistic. The purpose of the
pre-enrolment hearings was to determine whether matters were ready
for set down in order
to alleviate the burden on the court roll of
unnecessary postponements and preliminary points. It was not an
in-depth analysis
of the merits of the matter. Jurisdictional
challenges could be raised at any point in time, notwithstanding the
features of the
pre-enrolment process.
[63]
I do not agree that the Honourable Justices' failure to raise
lateness during the respective
pre-enrolment hearings, confirmed the
Labour Court's jurisdiction or created an impression that a
substantive application for reinstatement
of the review application
was not necessary.
[64]
According
to Lallie J, in
Kula
v Nxuba Local Municipality and Another
,
"in
the absence of reasonable explanation for the delay, there is no need
to consider the prospects of success
[10]
."
[65]
In the
absence of an application to reinstate the review application, the
Court cannot exercise its discretion in a vacuum. To,
therefore,
request the Court to exercise its discretion, and to ignore the fact
that no formal request or application has been
made is indeed a big
ask, which the Court cannot accede to
[11]
.
[66]
The law is
quite clear in that should I determine the review in the absence of a
substantive reinstatement application, I would
be doing so without
having the requisite jurisdiction
[12]
.
[67]
However, where submissions were advanced on behalf of the Applicant
for good cause, I find
that the Applicant failed to discharge this
onus.
[68]
The
dictum
in
Ferreira
v Die Burger
[13]
has particular relevance
in
casu
,
where the court said:
"I am sympathetic
to the fact that the applicant may have a case but, were we to grant
this application, this court would subvert
a crucial principle in
matters which deal with personal relationships, namely labour
relations, that these disputes have to be
dealt with expeditiously
and finalized as quickly as possible. Where in a case such as this,
there has been so flagrant of violation
of the rules, then, as
Myburgh JP correctly decided, a lack of any explanation at all shrugs
off other considerations."
[69]
In his
judgement in the matter of
Matsha
and Others v Public Health and Social Development Sectoral Bargaining
Council and Others
[14]
Snyman
AJ echo's my own sentiment in this matter -
"[22] The
Practice Manual is not just some sort of guideline which litigating
parties may or may not comply with at their leisure,
but has binding
force, just like the Labour Court Rules.
[15]
It follows that the applicants were obliged to comply with clause
11.2.7. Compliance means, in the context of the current
matter, that
the record had to have been filed within 12 months of the date when
the applicants brought the review application.
That due date was
therefore 5 November 2017 and was clearly not met.
[23] What is then the
consequence of such a failure to comply? First, and upon the expiry
of the time period, it caused the review
application to lapse, and
following on, the archiving thereof. The result of this was described
in Macsteel Trading Wadeville v
Van der Merwe NO and others
[16]
as follows:
"As indicated,
the review application was archived and regarded as lapsed as a
result of NUMSA's failure to comply with the
Practice Manual. There
was also no substantive application for reinstatement of the review
application, and no condonation sought
for the undue delay in filing
the record. As contended for by Macsteel, the Labour Court was, as a
matter of law, obliged to strike
the matter from the roll on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, alternatively, give Macsteel an
opportunity to file a separate
rule 11 application demonstrating why
the matter should be dismissed or struck from the roll on the basis
of undue delay.""
[70]
Following the dicta of
Macsteel
, wherein the facts are very
similar to the present circumstances, the correct approach would have
been for the Applicant to request
a postponement of the matter, and
to bring a substantive Rule 11 application.
[71]
On the issue of costs, I am mindful of the fact that at no stage,
other than the filing
of their heads of argument and supplementary
heads of argument, did the Third and Fourth Respondents serve and
file any pleadings
in the review application. It is unfortunate that
this Court's time and resources were wasted over the course of years
when the
main review application had indeed already lapsed. Multiple
court applications were brought, and numerous court orders were
handed
down without any of the parties detecting that the review
application had lapsed, until this Court
mero motu
raised the
question about its jurisdiction, which it is entitled to do
.
Unfortunately, there is no mechanism in place whereby the Registrar
of the Labour Court can notify litigants that their review
applications have lapsed by operation of clause 11.2.7 of the
Practice Manual. Often jurisdictional challenges are raised in
opposing
parties' submissions and pleadings and in this current
matter, not even the Third and Fourth Respondents representative
raised
the issue of the Court's jurisdiction.
[72]
In light of the above, I am of the view that it would not be just and
equitable to punish
the Applicant with an adverse costs order.
Conclusion
[73]
In conclusion, I find that in the absence of truly exceptional
considerations and good
cause, which the Applicant failed to
demonstrate, this Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear this review
application, as the application
has lapsed in terms of clause 11.2.7
of the Practice Manual.
Order
1. The
Applicant's application under J1744/16, and the review application
under JR2275/13 are hereby consolidated
under JR2275/13.
2. The
review application under case number JR 2275/13 has lapsed and been
archived in terms of Practice Manual
of the Labour Court.
3.
Labour Court lacks the jurisdiction to hear the review application.
4. No
order as to costs.
______________
YEATES
AJ
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicant:
Advocate Johan Crouse
Instructed
by Henk Kloppers
For
the Respondent:
A Goldberg of Goldberg Attorneys
[1]
(2016) 37 ILJ 313 (CC) [also reported at
[2015] JOL 34970
(CC),
[2016] 3 BLLR 217
(CC),
2016 (3) BCLR 374
(CC) – Ed] at para
[45].
[2]
(2003) 24 ILJ 95 (CC) [also reported at
[2003] JOL 10448
(CC),
2003
(2) BCLR 154
(CC) – Ed] at para [31]. See also
Billiton
Aluminium SA Ltd t/a Hillside Aluminium v Khanyile and Others
(2010) 31 ILJ 273 (CC) [also reported at
[2010] JOL 25025
(CC),
[2010] 5 BLLR 465
(CC),
2010 (5) BCLR 422
(CC) – Ed] at para
[46];
Strategic
Liquor Services v Mvumbi NO and Others
(2009) 30 ILJ 1526 (CC) [also reported at
[2009] 9 BLLR 847
(CC),
2009 (10) BCLR 1046
(CC) – Ed] at paras [12]–[3].
[3]
Toyota
SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
[2016] 3 BLLR 217
(CC) at para 1.
[4]
[2014] 5 BLLR 516 (LC).
[5]
[2015] 12 BLLR 1239 (LC).
[6]
[2017] 1 BLLR 40 (LC).
[7]
[1998] 8 BLLR 847
(LAC) at para 10.
[8]
[2009] JOL 24322
(LC) at para 27.
[9]
[2005] ZALC 25
;
[2005] 6 BLLR 601
(LC).
[10]
[2016] 1 BLLR 55
(LC) at para 7.
[11]
South
African Municipal Workers Union obo Mlalandle v South African Local
Government Bargaining Council and others
[2017] JOL 37418
(LC) at para 11.
[12]
Macsteel
Trading Wadeville v Francois van der Merwe N.O and Others
(JA67/2016)
[2018] ZALAC 50
; (2019) 40 ILJ 798 (LAC) (12 December
2018) at para 25 ("
Macsteel
").
[13]
(2008) 29 ILJ 1704 (LAC) at para [8].
[14]
[2019] JOL 45094 (LC)
[15]
See
Sepheka
v Du Pont Pioneer (Pty) Ltd
(2019) 40 ILJ 613 (LC) [also reported at
[2018] JOL 40493
(LC) –
Ed] at para [7];
National
Education Health and Allied Workers Union on behalf of Leduka v
National Research Foundation
(2017) 38 ILJ 430 (LC) at para [31].
[16]
See
fn
12 supra