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[2019] ZALCJHB 265
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PSA obo Molosiwa v Department of Education and Sports Development North West and Others (JR1735/15) [2019] ZALCJHB 265; [2020] 1 BLLR 67 (LC) (4 October 2019)
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case No: JR 1735/15
In the matter between:
PSA obo G B
MOLOSIWA
Applicant
and
DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND
SPORTS
DEVELOPMENT-NORTH WEST
First Respondent
COMMISSIONER: THANDO
NDLEBE
Second Respondent
EDUCATION LABOUR
RELATIONS COUNCIL
Third Respondent
Delivered:
4 October 2019
JUDGMENT
MABASO,
AJ
Introduction
[1]
A school principal (the applicant) accused by his employer, the
second respondent
(the Department) of three counts of executing
corporal punishment on three high school learners was found guilty of
these charges
during the disciplinary hearing. The Chairperson
imposed a sanction of demotion from being a principal to be a school
based Head
of Department (the HOD). He internally appealed this
decision to the Member of Executive Council (the MEC). Without
hearing further
submissions from the applicant, the MEC unilaterally
substituted the Chairperson’s sanction with one of dismissal.
Subsequently,
the applicant, assisted by his union the PSA (the
union) declared an unfair dismissal dispute against the Department
before the
Education Labour Relations Council (the Bargaining
Council) which appointed the arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute who
later concluded
that the dismissal was fair as he found no fault on
the approach taken by the MEC. The applicant has approached this
Court challenging
this finding. The second respondent is
opposing this application.
[2]
Questions answered in this judgment are whether:
2.1
The arbitrator committed a reviewable irregularity in concluding that
the applicant’s
dismissal was substantively fair?
2.2
The arbitrator committed a reviewable irregularity by finding that
the dismissal was procedurally
fair, despite the applicant not being
given an opportunity to present evidence during the appeal?
2.3
The arbitrator committed a reviewable irregularity in concluding that
the delay in finalising
the outcome of the appeal was procedurally
fair?
The
arbitration
[3]
The evidence of the Department, in summary, is that: Ms Bagenti
testified that she
was a learner at a High School which the applicant
worked. On 18 May 2011, the applicant arrived in their class and
found that
the class was not cleaned, he then ordered all the female
learners to stand up. He proceeded to hit the whole class and later
took
both her and a fellow learner, Kristina, to the staff room where
he proceeded to assault them. When Kristina tried to give an
explanation
the applicant slapped him. Ms Bagenti further stated that
the applicant was accused of assaulting Matlholwa at a funeral. As a
result of this conduct, on a Monday when learners were about to write
exams, other learners disrupted the exams by burning tyres
and
complaining that the applicant had assaulted the learners.
[4]
The second learner, Matlholwa, testified that together with other
learners and the
applicant attended the funeral of a fellow learner.
He was not able to get transportation to the graveyard as the bus was
already
full, he saw the applicant’s bakkie then went to ask
for a lift. When they reached the grayeyard he was slapped on his
cheek
by the applicant. The applicant accused the applicant of
undermining him and telling him that “he has children”.
[5]
The third learner, Pokwane, the president of Learner Representative
Council (LSC),
contended that he was told about the assault of
Matlholwa and then proceeded to where the incident allegedly was
taking place.
He found Matlholwa who complained about pains on his
cheek, and indeed observed marks of hands on Matlholwa’s face.
Clearly
this evidence corroborated Matlholwa's evidence in respect of
assault, but then the remaining issue was who had assaulted
Matlholwa.
The applicant denied this accusation.
[6]
Mr William Modiroa, the assistant Labour Relations Manager of the
Department, testified
that he was involved in the investigation of
the allegations against the applicant. He explained the process which
was followed.
He further explained the reasons which caused the delay
in instituting and finalising the disciplinary hearing.
[7]
The applicant also testified. When asked as to whether he
administered corporal punishment
to the learners on 11 May 2011, he
answered that “
in as far as I am concerned I don’t
recall myself administering corporal punishment to the learners on
the said date
”. When he was asked about the incident at the
graveyard, denied that he had hit Matlholwa, but confirmed that he
did speak
with him.
[8]
At the conclusion of the arbitration, the arbitrator concluded that
the applicant
did commit the offences charged with, therefore, the
dismissal was substantively fair. In support of this conclusion, the
arbitrator
proceeded to summarise the evidence presented and under
the analysis of evidence, deals with the procedural aspect of
dismissal
wherein he concludes that paragraph 9(5) of the Employment
of Educators Act
[1]
(the Act)
allows the appeal authority, the MEC, to amend the sanction in the
manner which he/she deems fit and appropriate therefore
he concluded
that the MEC acted within her powers to amend the sanction from
demotion to dismissal.
[9]
In respect of the delay in finalising the disciplinary hearing, the
arbitrator confirmed
that the applicant’s concern was that the
respondent took more than a year to respond to his appeal
application. Therefore,
it was unreasonably lengthy. According to the
arbitrator, the question that he had to ask himself was whether the
applicant suffered
prejudice for the delay as a result of the
finalisation of the appeal. He opined that there was none, moreover,
he concluded that
the dismissal was procedurally fair.
Grounds
for the review application
Were
the offences committed
?
[10]
In respect to charges 1 and 2, it is contended that the arbitrator
failed to take into account
the probabilities.
[11]
In respect of charge 3, it was submitted that the arbitrator failed
to apply his mind to the
totality of the evidence before him, and to
resolve the necessary disputes of fact, to make proper findings
concerning which witnesses
to believe. As the applicant contends that
the arbitrator gave no basis for why he preferred the version of the
learner over the
evidence of an independent member of SAPS who was
present at the time the alleged incident took place.
[12]
The first question that one will easily ask himself is why would the
learners gang up against
the principal of the same school that they
are attending and make such serious allegations against him. However,
Mohammed JA in
S
v Ipeleng
[2]
,
answered this type of a question as follows, which authority I opine
that it applies even in labour disputes,
‘
it
is a wrong approach in a criminal case to say 'What should a witness
for the prosecution come here to commit perjury'? It might
equally he
asked: 'Why does the accused come here to commit perjury?' True, an
accused is interested in not being convicted, but
it may be that an
inspector has an interest in securing a conviction. It is, therefore,
quite a wrong approach to say 'I ask myself
whether this man has come
here to commit perjury, and I can see no reason why he should have
done that; therefore his evidence
must be true and the accused must
be convicted'. ’
[13]
In the matter of
CUSA
v Tao Ying Metal Industries and Others
[3]
,
the Constitutional Court held that an umpire needs to decide the real
dispute between the parties, ignore unnecessary counterclaims,
and
reach the desired outcome based on the evidence that was properly
placed before him.
[14]
In deciding a review application, the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) in
Shatterprufe
(Pty) Ltd v Sesani NO and Others
[4]
held thus:
‘…
A
review of a CCMA award is permissible only if the defect in the
proceedings falls within one of the grounds in section 145(2)(a)
of
the LRA. For a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to
a gross irregularity as contemplated by section 145(2)(a)(ii),
the
arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the enquiry or
arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be unreasonable
if it is one that a reasonable arbitrator could not reach on all the
material that was before the arbitrator. Thus, even had the
arbitrator committed an irregularity by not resolving the factual
disputes, it was incumbent on the court to enquire further to
determine if the outcome was unreasonable, which, for the reasons
given, in this case it was not.’
[15]
I confirm that the arbitrator committed irregularity by not giving
reasons as to why he
accepted the evidence of the Department as
compared to the applicant’s. However, I have perused the
records of the arbitration,
and conclude that the arbitrator did deal
with the question of whether the applicant committed the offences
charged with, for example,
as highlighted above in respect of the
issues of whether the applicant assaulted Matlholwa at the graveyard,
there was corroborating
evidence before the arbitrator that Matlholwa
had marks on his face when Pokwane approached him and this was
immediately after
the applicant had spoken to him, therefore, taking
into account the totality of evidence, Matlholwa was assaulted. As to
who did
this, there was evidence that the applicant asked Matlholwa
to follow him until they reached a place where cars were parked, away
from the graveyard, and that is where Matlholwa was hit by the
applicant. On the balance of probabilites, the applicant was
the perpetrator because why would the applicant ask Matlholwa to
follow him just to ask him a question. Despite the arbitrator
not
stating the reasons of accepting the department’s evidence, I
conclude that he did not commit reviewable irregularity.
[16]
In respect of the incident of 11 May 2011: taking into account the
answer that was provided by
the applicant in paragraph 7 above, and
the totality of the evidence before the arbitrator, I conclude that
that the applicant
indeed committed the offence. As much as there
were inconsistencies in respect of the evidence of the Department,
such inconsistencies
were not material as the arbitrator answered the
question that he had been called upon to decide and an error of facts
alone does
not call for the setting aside of an arbitration award.
Procedural
unfairness
[17]
The applicant contends that the arbitrator committed a reviewable
irregularity by not taking
into account that the appeal hearing
should have been conducted speedily. Therefore, the delay should have
had an impact on the
sanction of dismissal because this demonstrated
that the employment relationship had not irreparably broken down.
Further, this
rendered the dismissal, under the circumstances, to be
procedurally unfair.
[18]
The applicant further submits that the MEC in unilaterally amending
the sanction of demotion
to one of dismissal made an error of law,
therefore, the arbitrator’s finding that the MEC had the power
to impose a sanction
of dismissal is unreasonable. He contends that
he should have been warned prior to the increase in sanction.
[19]
It is further submitted that the arbitrator made an error of law by
not following the LAC judgment,
South
African Revenue Service v CCMA and Others
[5]
and that of
Rennies
Distribution Services (Pty) Ltd v Biermann.
[6]
This ground has no merits.
[20]
The applicant further states that the arbitrator failed to determine
one of the issues that were
before him, in that the applicant alleged
that he was not provided with an opportunity to testify at the
hearing. Therefore the
arbitrator failed to deal with the procedural
fairness of the dismissal.
Ground
one: The delay in prosecuting the DC/ Appeal
[21]
A reviewing court has to answer
inter
alia
the following questions, depending on the ground raised, as set out
in
Goldfields
Mining South Africa (Kloof Gold Mine) (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
[7]
,:
‘
(i)
...
(ii)
Did the arbitrator
identify
the dispute he was required
to arbitrate (this may in certain cases only become clear after both
parties have led their evidence)?
(iii)
Did the arbitrator
understand
the nature of the dispute
he or she was required to arbitrate?
(iv)
Did he or she deal with
the substantial merits
of the
dispute? and
(v)
Is the arbitrator’s decision one that
another
decision-maker reasonably have arrived
at based on
the
evidence.
’
(Emphasis added.)
[22]
During opening statements, before the arbitrator, the applicant
advised the arbitrator that he
was challenging both the procedure and
reason for dismissal. Concerns about the flaws relating to the
interpretation of the provisions
of the Act and how the procedure
transpired in handling the disciplinary process. The issue of delay
in finalising both the disciplinary
and appeal hearings. The
Department stated that the problem was about the changing of the MECs
(this was not evidence). However,
a letter that was received by the
applicant indicates otherwise, suggesting that the MEC’s office
might have misplaced the
appeal papers. The applicant resubmitted it
in July 2013.
[23]
The applicant was charged in terms of Act. Schedule 2 provides that,
‘
2.
Principles.—The principles underlying the Code and Procedures
and any decision to discipline an educator are
that—
(a)discipline
is a corrective and not a punitive measure;
(b)discipline
must be applied in a
prompt,
fair, consistent and just’
[8]
[24]
The LRA provides for the speedy resolution of disputes in the
workplace and it must be concluded
in the shortest time frame.
[9]
[25]
The Constitutional Court in
Stokwe v Member of the Executive
Council: Department of Education, Eastern Cape and Others,
in
expounding the question of the delay in an internal disciplinary
hearing provided these salutary paragraphs:
’
[71] This also
accords with the general principles of how delay impacts the fairness
of disciplinary proceedings.
The
question of whether a delay in finalisation of disciplinary
proceedings is unacceptable is a matter that can be determined on
a
case-by-case basis. There can be no hard and fast rules
.
Whether the delay would impact negatively on the fairness of
disciplinary proceedings would thus depend on the facts of each
case.’
[10]
And
the Court further held that,
‘
The
requirement of promptness not only extends to the institution of
disciplinary proceedings, but also to their expeditious completion.
If an employee is retained in employment for an extended period after
the institution of disciplinary action, it
may
indicate that the employment relationship has not broken down.
An
appeal procedure is a separate facet of the disciplinary procedure
and must be conducted with the same degree of alacrity for
procedural
fairness to be fulfilled
.’
[11]
(Court’s
emphasis).
[26]
The Labour Court, regarding the assessment of delay held that: (a)
The delay has to be unreasonable.
In this context, firstly, the
length of the delay is important. The longer the delay, the more
likely it is that it would be unreasonable.
(b) The explanation for
the delay must be considered. In this respect, the employer
must provide an explanation that can
reasonably serve to excuse the
delay. A delay that is inexcusable would normally lead to a
conclusion of unreasonableness. (c)
It
must also be considered whether the employee has taken steps in the
course of the process to assert his or her right to a speedy
process.
In other words, it would be a factor for consideration if the
employee himself or herself stood by and did nothing
.
(d) Did the delay cause material prejudice to the employee?
Establishing the materiality of the prejudice includes an assessment
as to what impact the delay has on the ability of the employee to
conduct a proper case. (e)
The
nature of the alleged offence must be taken into account.
The offence may be such that there is a particular imperative to have
it decided on the merits. This requirement, however,
does not
mean that a very serious offence (such as a dishonesty offence) must
be dealt with, no matter what, just because it is
so serious.
What
it means is that the nature of the offence could in itself justify a
longer period of further investigation
,
or a
longer period in collating and preparing proper evidence, thus
causing a delay that is understandable
.
(f) All the above considerations must be applied, not individually,
but holistically.
[12]
[27]
A dismissal must be considered against its facts and circumstances.
In
casu
, in applying the principle above, this Court has to
take into account that the person who was tasked to investigate the
dispute
between the Department and the applicant is the arbitrator.
If a party is challenging a decision of the arbitrator, he must not
only show that the arbitrator committed irregularity but that such
prevented him from having a trial of issues.
[28]
The challenge before the arbitrator in respect of the procedural
aspect, was that the Department
took time to charge the applicant and
to finalise the appeal in respect of the period of time of the
alleged offences and the conclusion
of the disciplinary hearing.
Having considered the records and the nature of the offence the
applicant faced, I am convinced that
the Department provided an
excusable reason for the delay and its primary reason was that it had
to do a proper investigation.
Therefore I conclude that the
Department preferred “
an explanation that can reasonably
serve to excuse the delay”.
[29]
In respect of the delay in finalising the outcome of the appeal, the
evidence before the arbitrator
was that the applicant after being
notified of the sanction of demotion, lodged an appeal on 13
September 2012. Almost a year later
on 23 August 2013, he received a
letter from the Department advising him to resubmit same, which he
did. The outcome of appeal
was communicated on 12 February 2014. The
Department did not present evidence in respect of the causes for the
delay. Despite the
provisions of the LRA providing for the speedy
resolution of disputes, but the inquiry does not end here, as further
factors have
to be assessed. For example, whilst he was waiting for
the outcome of the appeal, he was based at the district office. On or
about
July 2011, he was asked to take a post of a principal at St
Mary’s School, later was asked to take one at ZM Seatlholo High
School, but he did not accept the positions as his concern was about
the issues with learners which was still pending as the outcome
of
the appeal had not been released.
[30]
The arbitrator concluded that the applicant suffered no prejudice. I
have taken into account
that the applicant confirms that besides
being based at the district office, there were positions that were
made available for
him to occupy, the Principal positions, and he
declined such positions as his concern was that he had issues with
the learners.
I have taken into account the circumstances of this
case, and I agree with the arbitrator that there was no prejudice
suffered
by the applicant.
[31]
Schedule 2 of the Act allows the retention of an employee within the
Department’s employ
whilst awaiting an outcome of the appeal,
as stated above, the applicant was transferred to the district office
therefore there
was nothing wrong about the applicant being kept in
the employ of the Department during that period, as this is in terms
of the
Act, and I do not find a convincing point as to why the
applicant will opine that the period that he spent there is an
indication
that the trust relationship had not broken down. One has
to take into account that the charges were that he hit the learners,
and
they were special measures taken to accommodate him as he was
offered interim positions but he declined them.
[32]
However, the circumstances of this case require one to ask himself a
question as to why the matter
had not been resolved by the MEC, as
there is no evidence tendered by the Department except in opening
statements, mentioned above,
it has to be reiterated that one of the
issue that was before the arbitrator was about the unexpained more
than a year period of
the delay in finalising the appeal. I conclude
that the arbitrator failed to take into account the totality of the
circumstances
of the case, therefore, the delay renders the procedure
to be unfair, as it is contrary to schedule 2 (9) of the Act which
requires
that there must be a prompt and fair procedure, as the delay
in finalising the appeal is unacceptable.
Substitution
demotion with dismissal without a hearing
.
[33]
Schedule 2, clause 9 of the Act allows an educator to appeal against
a sanction which is imposed
by a chairperson. In this matter, after
being found guilty of the three charges, the chairperson imposed the
sanction of demotion,
from principal to HOD, however, the applicant
was not satisfied with this outcome, and he exercised his right by
launching an appeal.
The MEC substituted such sanction of demotion,
with that of dismissal.
[34]
Schedule 2 provides that:
‘
9.
Appeals.—(1) An educator or an employer may appeal
against a finding or sanction by making an application in accordance
with Form E attached to this Schedule.
[Sub-item
(1) substituted by s. 6 of Act No. 1 of 2004.]
(2)
The educator or the employer must, within five working days of
receiving notice of the final outcome of a disciplinary
hearing,
submit the appeal form to the Member of the Executive Council or the
Minister, as the case may be.
[Sub-item
(2) substituted by s. 6 of Act No. 1 of 2004.]
(3)
On receipt of the application referred to in sub item (1), the Member
of the Executive Council or the Minister, as the case
may be,
must
request the employer to provide him or her with a copy of the record
of the proceedings and any other relevant documentation
.
(4)
If the Member of the Executive Council or the Minister, as the case
may be,
chooses to allow further representations by the
educator, or his or her representative or an employer, he or she must
notify the
educator or employer respectively of the date, time and
place where such representations must be made
.
[Sub-item
(4) substituted by s. 6 of Act No. 1 of 2004.]
(5)
The Member of the Executive Council or the Minister, as the case may
be, must consider the appeal, and may—
(a)uphold
the appeal;
(b)in
cases of misconduct contemplated in section 18, amend the sanction;
or
(c)dismiss
the appeal.’
[35]
The arbitrator in paragraph 50 and 51 of the award focused on the
word “amend” and then
concluded that the MEC was within
its right to substitute the finding with the one of dismissal.
However, I am of the view that
the arbitrator did not entirely
understand the issue before him in that the applicant’s concern
was that the MEC had no right
to substitute a sanction without being
allowed to make representations. What was required of the arbitrator
was not to concentrate
on the word “amend” as the enquiry
does not start there but from clause 9(3) read with (4) of Schedule 2
of the Act
[36]
I agree with the arbitrator that the MEC had a right to amend the
sanction, however, before doing that
the arbitrator should have
looked at the provisions of Schedule 2, clause 9 (4) which inter alia
provides that,
‘
If
(the MEC)…
chooses
to allow further representations by the educator, or his or her
representative or an employer, he or she must notify the educator
or
employer respectively of the date, time and place where such
representations must be made.’
[13]
[37]
My view, is that the word “chooses” as used by the Act
gives the MEC a discretion to decide to
call for further hearing in
circumstances whereby the sanction that the MEC intends to impose is
harsher than the one that a chairperson
of the disciplinary hearing
had imposed. Therefore, before the MEC could amend the sanction to a
harsher one he would have to hear
the other side, the employee,
whereby he would have to provide the date, time and place where such
representations must be made.
Meaning, an employee has to be notified
of a potential increase in his sanction so that proper
representations such as mitigating
factors can be presented before
the MEC as it is my view that the MEC cannot be given carte blanche
in deciding on matters of this
nature, without allowing an employee a
right to be heard.
[38]
An employee who is appealing a finding of a chairperson of the
disciplinary hearing is communicating
to the higher authority his
unhappiness, and if such employee was to be dismissed without being
allowed to be heard, that would
be unfair. I therefore conclude that
the MEC had no right to substitute the demotion with dismissal
without giving the applicant
an opportunity to make representation.
This means that the arbitrator failed to investigate this aspect
which results to his award
to be partly reviewable.
Replace
dismissal with demotion or order compensation
?
[39]
The applicant is alleging that he was not given an opportunity by the
MEC to make submission
before dismissal ruling, therefore, as the
arbitrator failed to deal with this issue, this court has powers to
substitute the arbitrator's
conclusion with an order that would be
appropriate taking into the circumstances of this matter.
[40]
Section 194(1) of the LRA says:
‘
The Labour Court
or the Arbitrator must require the employer to reinstate or re-employ
the employee unless –
(a)the employee does not
wish to be reinstated or re-employed;
(b)the circumstances
surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment
relationship would be intolerable;
(c)it is not reasonably
practicable for the employer to reinstate or re-employ the employee;
or
(d)the dismissal is
unfair only because the employer did not follow a fair procedure.’
[41]
The applicant joined the school in 1992 as a teacher in the year
1994, he was then promoted to
be a deputy principal, and in 1996, he
was appointed as the principal until his dismissal in 2013. The
applicant prides himself
as a person who managed to increase the
grade 12 results for 3 to 4 years in succession.
[42]
The Constitutional Court in
South
African Revenue Service v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
[14]
referring
with approval the
dictum
in
Toyota
SA Motors (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration
held
that:
‘
The Labour Court
or an Arbitrator should carefully consider the options of remedies in
section 193(1) as well as the effect of the
provisions of section
193(2) before deciding on an appropriate remedy. A failure to have
regard to the provisions of section 193(1)
and (2) may lead to the
Court or Arbitrator granting an award of reinstatement in a case in
which that remedy is precluded by section
193(2).’
[43]
Given that the arbitrator made an error of law in not properly
applying his mind to the provisions
of clause 9(4) of schedule 2 of
the Act, may this Court order reinstatement in the demoted position
or compensation? It has to
be remembered that the applicant confirms
that following the charges that he was found guilty of, he was
removed from the school
and was based at the district office where he
was offered a position of being a principal in another school,
pending the outcome
of the appeal, he declined because of the issues
he had with the learners. The applicant has not shown remorse despite
being convicted
of three serious misconducts. I conclude that the
applicant cannot work with learners, therefore continued employment
would be
intolerable.
[44]
And reinstatement cannot be possible taking into account the
circumstances of this case and further
the charges that the employee
was found guilty of and dismissed for, in that corporal punishment is
an assualt and is no longer
legal in this country and is against the
law.
[45]
Therefore, I conclude that compensation would be appropriate, as to
how much would be the next
inquiry. Taking into account the number of
years that the employee has worked and that the internal Chairperson
had imposed a sanction
of demotion, and that this Court confirms the
gulity verdict, I therefore conclude that the following order will be
appropriate.
[49]
In the premises, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The arbitration award under case under case number
PSES694/13/14NW is reviewed and set aside and
replaced with the
order that,
‘
1.
The dismissal of the Applicant by the Head of Department of Education
and Sport Development
was was substantively fair but procedurally
unfair,
2.
The Head of Department of Education and Sport Development is
ordered to pay the applicant a salary equivalent to 6 months
calculated
at the date of dismissal.’
_____________________
S
Mabaso
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
Mr H Pretorius
Instructed
by:
Macgregor Erasmus Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
Mr Chwaro
Instructed
by:
Motshabi & Modiboa Attorneys
[1]
Act
76
of 1998.
[2]
1993 (2) SACR 185
TPD at 189.
[3]
[2009] 1 BLLR 1
(CC); (2008) 29 ILJ 2461 (CC).
[4]
[2014] ZALAC 44
(10 September 2014) at para 29.
[5]
(2016) 3 BLLR 297 (LAC).
[6]
[2009] 7 BLLR 685
(LC).
[7]
[2013] ZALAC 28
;
[2014] 1 BLLR 20
(LAC); (2014) 35 ILJ 943 (LAC) at
para 20. (
Goldfields
)
[8]
Court bolding and underlining.
[9]
Gcaba v
Minister for Safety and Security and Others
2010 (1) SA 238
(CC);
2010 (1) BCLR 35
(CC); (2010) 31 ILJ 296 (CC);
[2009] 12 BLLR 1145
(CC) at para 1. See also Schedule 2, 2 (g) of
the Act.
[10]
(CCT33/18)
[2019] ZACC 3
; (2019) 40 ILJ 773 (CC);
2019 (4) BCLR 506
(CC);
[2019] 6 BLLR 524
(CC) (7 February 2019) at para 71.
[11]
Id at para 67.
[12]
Confirmed
by the CC in Stokwe’s judgment, fn 10 above.
[13]
Court emphasis.
[14]
[2017] 1 BLLR 8
(CC) at para 38.