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[2019] ZALCJHB 201
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NUMSA obo Mathonsi v SCAW Metals (Pty) Ltd and Others (JR2803/16) [2019] ZALCJHB 201; (2020) 41 ILJ 254 (LC) (20 August 2019)
IN THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Reportable
Case no: JR2803/16
In the matter between:
NUMSA obo VUSI
MATHONSI
Applicant
and
SCAW METALS (PTY)
LTD First
Respondent
METAL
AND ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES
BARGAINING
COUNCIL
Second
Respondent
IMTHIAZ SIRKHOT N.O.
Third Respondent
Heard:
18
July 2019
Delivered: 20
August 2019
Summary:
Application to review and set aside arbitration
award – review test – reasonableness of
arbitrator’s
decision – onus of proof properly discharged –
credibility of witnesses –
Commissioner’s
finding of procedural and substantive fairness was substantiated by
the evidence
–
review application dismissed.
JUDGMENT
DEANE
AJ
The Parties
Before I move onto a
brief introduction in this matter, I have decided to firstly deal
with the Parties herein due to the inconsistent
referral of said
parties in the records.
[1]
The Applicant is the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa
(NUMSA), acting
on behalf of Mr Vusi Mathonsi (hereinafter
“Mathonsi”), who was the employee.
[2]
The First Respondent is Scaw Metals (Pty) Ltd, the Employer of the
employee.
[3]
The Second Respondent is the Metal and Engineering Industries
Bargaining Council (MEIBC)
established in terms of section 117 of the
Labour Relations Act.
[1]
[4]
The Third Respondent is Imthiaz Sirkot N.O. (hereinafter “the
Commissioner”
and/or “Arbitrator”), who was
appointed to arbitrate a dismissal dispute between the Applicant and
the First Respondent.
Introduction
[5]
This is an application to review and set aside an arbitration award,
handed down by
the Commissioner under case number MEGA47012 issued on
18 November 2016. In terms of this award, the Commissioner held that
the
dismissal of Mathonsi by the First Respondent was procedurally
and substantively fair.
[6]
The Application for Review is opposed by the First Respondent.
Material Background
Facts
[7]
Mathonsi worked for the First Respondent as a Charge and Mentor
whilst also performing
the duties of an Assistant Administrator.
[8]
Mathonsi reported directly to Mr Melodie Segole (Segole), the Melt
Shop Manager.
[9]
Mathonsi was paid on a weekly basis and he was accustomed to
receiving overtime payments.
[10]
On 6 February 2015, Segole sent an e-mail to Mathonsi instructing him
that all overtime needs
to be signed by him, for approval, and that
no overtime shall be paid without pre-approval.
[11]
On 12 February 2015, management issued an internal memorandum to
staff regarding,
inter
alia
,
concerns about control weaknesses and possible fraud relating to
overtime and the commissioning of an investigation in relation
thereto.
[2]
[12]
It is common cause that despite these communication Mathonsi did not
seek pre-approval for overtime.
[13]
On 17 February 2015, Segole sent a further e-mail instructing
Mathonsi to comply with the instructions
regarding the
pre-authorisation of overtime, to which Mathonsi responded to on 18
February 2015. The contents of these communications
are provided in
detail in the records.
[14]
As a result of the controls that were implemented pertaining to
overtime, Mathonsi ceased to
work on Sundays and consequently, his
weekly salary was reduced by 50 percent. Mathonsi was upset about
this and personally blamed
Segole for this reduction in his salary.
[15]
On 17 March 2015, Mathonsi was alleged to have entered Segole’s
office wherein he physically
assaulted Segole. Mathonsi was
subsequently charged with physical assault and following a
disciplinary hearing, he was dismissed
on 24 June 2015.
[16]
Upon his dismissal, Mathonsi referred an unfair dismissal dispute to
MEIBC, whereupon the Arbitrator
was appointed to arbitrate the
dispute.
[17]
The Arbitrator concluded that the dismissal was both procedurally and
substantively fair.
Grounds for Review
[18]
The main basis of this review is that the Applicant contends that the
Commissioner committed
a gross irregularity in that the Commissioner
failed to appreciate the totality of evidence presented before him;
in deciding on
the probabilities of the issues that were placed
before him; and in determining the credibility of witnesses.
[19]
The Applicant maintains that it is this gross irregularity on the
part of the Commissioner, that
prevented the Applicant employee from
having a fair trial, and which led to an unreasonable decision by the
Commissioner.
The Test on Review
[20]
The test that the Labour Court is required to apply in a review of an
arbitrator’s award
is, “is the decision reached by the
commissioner one that a reasonable decision-maker could not
reach?”
[3]
[21]
In
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd
and
Others
[4]
the
Constitutional Court very clearly held that the arbitrator’s
conclusion must fall within a range of decisions that a reasonable
decision-maker could make, and the reasonableness test is still aptly
described in the pre-
Sidumo
case
of
Computicket
v Marcus NO and Others
[5]
where it was held that “the question I have to decide is not
whether [the arbitrator’s] conclusion was wrong but whether
...
it was unjustifiable and unreasonable”.
[22]
As the Court rightly pointed out in
The
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Myers and
Others
[6]
“….whatever one’s personal view may be, the test
as set out in
Sidumo
...
is whether or not the arbitrator’s decision that dismissal is
an appropriate sanction is a decision that a reasonable
decision-maker could reach”.
[23]
In determining whether the result of an arbitrator’s award is
unreasonable, the Labour
Court must broadly evaluate the merits of
the dispute and consider whether, if the Arbitrator’s reasoning
is found to be
unreasonable, the result is nevertheless capable of
justification for reasons other than those given by the
arbitrator.
[7]
The
result will, however, be unreasonable if it is entirely disconnected
with the evidence, unsupported by any evidence and involves
speculation by the arbitrator.
[8]
[24]
An award will no doubt be considered to be reasonable when there is a
material connection between
the evidence and the result or, put
differently, when the result is reasonably supported by some
evidence. Unreasonableness is,
thus, the threshold for interference
with an arbitrator’s award on review.
[25]
In
Gold
Fields
Mining
SA (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA
,
[9]
the
Court rejected a piecemeal or fragmented approach to reviews, where
each factor that the commissioner failed to consider is
analysed
individually and independently, for principally two reasons. The
first is that it “assumes the form of an appeal”
and not
a review, and the second is that it is mandatory for the reviewing
court to consider the totality of the evidence and then
decide
whether the decision made by the arbitrator is one that a reasonable
decision-maker could make. To evaluate every factor
individually and
independently, it observed, is to defeat the requirements in s 138 of
the Labour Relations Act in terms of which
the arbitrator is required
to deal with the substantial merits of the dispute between the
parties with the minimum of legal formalities,
albeit expeditiously
and fairly.
[10]
[26]
On this approach, therefore, the failure of a commissioner “to
mention a material fact
in his or her award”, or “to deal
in his/her award in some way with an issue which has some material
bearing on the
issue in dispute”, or “commits an error in
respect of the evaluation or consideration of facts presented at the
arbitration”
[11]
would
not, in itself, render the award reviewable.
Having
considered the evidence at arbitration, the Court held “….I
cannot accept that the arbitrator’s decision
fell outside of
the band of decisions to which reasonable people could come”.
[12]
[27]
In
Fidelity
Cash Management Service v CCMA and Others
[13]
Zondo
JP applied the
Sidumo
test
thus:
‘
It
will often happen that, in assessing the reasonableness or otherwise
of an arbitration award or other decision of a CCMA commissioner,
the
court feels that it would have arrived at a different decision or
finding to that reached by the commissioner. When that happens,
the
court will need to remind itself that the task of determining the
fairness or otherwise of such a dismissal is in terms of
the Act
primarily given to the commissioner and that the system would never
work if the court would interfere with every decision
or arbitration
award of the CCMA simply because it, that is the court, would have
dealt with the matter differently.’
And that:
‘
The
test enunciated by the Constitutional Court in
Sidumo
for
determining whether a decision or arbitration award of a CCMA
commissioner is reasonable is a stringent test that will
ensure that
such awards are not lightly interfered with. It will ensure that,
more than before, and in line with the objectives
of the Act and
particularly the primary objective of the effective resolution of
disputes, awards of the CCMA will be final and
binding as long as it
cannot be said that such a decision or award is one that a reasonable
decision-maker could not have made
in the circumstances of the case.
It will not be often that an arbitration award is found to be one
which a reasonable decision-maker
could not have made but I also do
not think that it will be rare that an arbitration award of the CCMA
is found to be one that
a reasonable decision-maker could not, in all
the circumstances, have reached.’
[28]
The test that this Court must apply in deciding whether the
arbitrator’s decision is reviewable
is whether the conclusion
reached by the arbitrator was so unreasonable that no other
arbitrator could have come to the same conclusion.
[29]
It is on this basis that I proceed with the merits of the application
below.
Legal Considerations
and Analysis
[30]
Both the Applicant and Employer’s versions are recorded in
detail in the Transcribed Record
[14]
and in the Arbitrators Award
[15]
and it will therefore not be repeated in detail herein. Only those
salient facts pertinent to this Review Application will be referred
to.
[31]
The dispute came before the Commissioner, who was tasked with
determining the substantive and
procedural fairness of the dismissal.
[32]
On the issue of procedural fairness, the Applicant contends that he
was denied the opportunity
to appeal his disciplinary sanction. No
evidence, in writing or otherwise was brought before the Arbitrator
to show that Mathonsi
had exercised his right to appeal and that such
appeal was denied by the First Respondent.
[33]
On the basis of the substantive fairness of the dismissal, Mathonsi
denies the physical assault
on Segole, contending that such assault
could not have taken place by virtue of the fact that he (Mathonsi)
did not even see his
manager on the day of the alleged assault.
The
Applicant contends that the “
bone
of contention
”
between the employer and the employee, was whether or not Segole was
assaulted and if he was assaulted then the enquiry
was whether he was
assaulted by Mathonsi.
[16]
The
Applicant further contends that “
the
onus was on the company to show by way of evidence that Mathonsi was
responsible for the acts of assault to Mr Segole
”.
[17]
[34]
Mathonsi further argues that he and his manager had an “
unhealthy
relationship
”
and he maintains that this acrimonious relationship was the reason
Segole was fabricating the charge of assault to “
get
rid
”
of him.
[18]
[35]
At the arbitration hearing, both parties were represented. The First
Respondent led the evidence
of four witnesses whilst the employee led
the evidence of two witnesses.
[36]
The first witness for the First Respondent was Segole. Segole led
evidence outlining the reasons
that he believed led to the physical
assault by Mathonsi, on himself. Segole led evidence whereby the
First Respondent required
that for future overtime claims, all
overtime needed to be signed by him for approval and that according
to the company policy,
no hours shall be paid without
pre-approval.
[19]
He showed
proof, via e-mails
[20]
of
this, as well as e-mail proof of Mathonsi’s displeasure at this
request;
[21]
together with
Mathonsi’s continued disregard to comply with the request,
[22]
and evidence of Mathonsi’s lack of regard for following what
has been shown to be a lawful request from the company authorities
was also provided.
[23]
As a
consequence of the controls regarding overtime being implemented,
Mathonsi’s weekly salary was reduced by half. Mathonsi
was not
precluded from working overtime but he was first required to apply
for pre-approval of said overtime.
[37]
It is clear from the e-mail communication that Mathonsi held Segole
responsible for the reduction
in his salary, without appreciating
that Segole was merely the implementer of a decision taken by
management of the First Respondent.
[38]
Segole further led evidence through the company’s clocking card
system
[24]
showing that
Mathonsi was at work on the day of the assault and that Mathonsi was
at work before him. Evidence was led showing
that due to the
structural settings of the offices, Mathonsi in all probability knew
that Segole was at work and in his office.
[25]
It is clear from a reading of all the evidence before me, that
Mathonsi was at work, he was at work earlier than Segole and that
he
did in fact see Segole on the day in question.
[39]
As to whether Segole did in fact sustain an injury and that he
sustained it at work, the Commissioner
considered the photographic
evidence,
[26]
the evidence of
the other witnesses regarding the injury,
[27]
the medical certificates,
[28]
as well as the employees routine practice once they clock in.
[29]
Based on this evidence, the probability that Segole sustained an
injury whilst at work was highly likely.
[40]
Evidence was then led whereby it was maintained that in December
2014, Mathonsi lodged a grievance
against Segole. In that enquiry,
Mathonsi called Ms Thato Seotsanyana (Seotsanyana), as witness to
assist him. No conclusive evidence
implicating Mr Segole was found.
[41]
Under cross-examination and re-examination, Segole’s version
was examined and tested.
[42]
The First Respondent thereafter called their second witness. The
second witness was Mr Emile
Timmins (Timmins), a Foundry Manager of
26 years’service with the company (the First Respondent).
Timmins corroborated Segole’s
physical assault, whilst also
being one of the persons who took photographs of Segole’s
injury.
[30]
He also attested
to Segole’s emotional and physical state at the time.
[31]
Timmins further led evidence of Mathonsi’s previous
disciplinary record wherein he was formerly found guilty of assault
on another employee.
[32]
In
that case, Timmins testified that Mathonsi once again called
Seotsanyana as a witness to assist Mathonsi in his case.
[33]
Pursuant to the disciplinary enquiry being held Mathonsi was issued
with a final written warning, which warning had lapsed at the
time of
the Arbitration.
[34]
Timmins
was cross-examined and re-examined on his evidence.
[43]
The Employer’s next witness was Mr Freddy McDugal, a pattern
shop manager who was in the
employ of the First Respondent for 36
years. He supported Timmins version that Segole was clearly in need
of medical attention
due to an altercation that had occurred
[35]
and he was the one to drive Segole to the First Aid Medical
Centre.
[36]
[44]
The First Respondent’s fourth and final witness was Mr Rene
Muller (Muller), a maintenance
manager who confirmed Timmins’
version that Segole informed them both that he had been assaulted by
Mathonsi, and that Segole
was in pain from the injuries that were
clearly visible to him.
[37]
Muller also testified to various injuries on Segole’s person
and which was furthermore evidenced by a doctors medical certificate
which certificate attributed said injuries to blunt force trauma.
[38]
The First Respondent then rested its case after showing
prima
facie
proof of Mathonsi’s misconduct.
[45]
With regards to the
onus
,
in an unfair dismissal case relating to misconduct, the “evidentiary
burden” starts with the employer but once the
employer provides
prima
facie
proof of the misconduct as alleged, the “evidentiary burden”
shifts to the employee to prove his own defence. If the
employee then
fails to put up a defence or fails to prove his defence, the
employer’s
prima
facie
proof of misconduct becomes conclusive proof and the employer has
then discharged the “overall onus” that always rested
with it.
[39]
[46]
In his evidence, Mathonsi maintains his innocence in the alleged
physical assault and further
maintains that because he did not see
Segole on the day in question he could not have physically assaulted
him. Mathonsi maintains
that there was a conspiracy to get rid of
him.
[40]
[47]
Seotsanyana, an ex-employee of the First Respondent and who had
worked as a production administrator,
then testified in support of
Mathonsi and stated that contrary to Segole’s statement she did
not bear witness to the alleged
assault.
[41]
She also denied having a close relationship with Mathonsi
[42]
despite being carbon copied in on e-mails to Segole,
[43]
e-mails that clearly amount to insubordination and insolence.
[44]
After Seotsanyana concluded her evidence, she being the final
witness, the Applicant rested its case.
[48]
Once all evidence has been led and closing arguments were submitted,
then and as the Applicant
rightly puts it, the Arbitrator “
had
to evaluate all evidence properly presented before him, and make
probability findings, and once this has been done, he (is)
required
to decide on the credibility
”
[45]
of the evidence and witnesses.
[49]
In
National
Union of Mineworkers and Another v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and Others,
[46]
the
Court said the following as to the establishment of probabilities:
‘
The
locus classicus
on this issue is the judgment in
Govan
v Skidmore
where the court held
that it was trite law that 'in general, in finding facts and making
inferences in a civil case, the court may
go upon a mere
preponderance of probability, even though its so doing does not
exclude every reasonable doubt, so that one may,
by balancing
probabilities select a conclusion which seems to be the more natural,
or plausible, conclusion from amongst several
conceivable ones, even
though that conclusion be not the only reasonable one'.
[50]
In this case, the Commissioner specifically dealt with the issue of
the credibility of witnesses,
and based on this he accepted the
evidence of the First Respondent. The reasons given by the
Commissioner is that he properly considered
all of the evidence
before him and on
a
proper construction of the evidence, including the
totality
of all of the witnesses oral testimonies;
the
medical reports, the photographs, the clock report from the
company;
[47]
evidence led as
to the structure of the office and evidence as to the antagonism
Mathonsi felt towards Segole wrongly believing
that Segole was the
reason for the rule regarding overtime.
[51]
Furthermore, I am satisfied in accepting that the most natural and
plausible conclusion to be
drawn from the evidence in this case is
that Mathonsi indeed committed the assault.
The
Commissioner’s finding that this was indeed the case is thus
entirely sustainable, and certainly not irregular. It is,
in short, a
reasonable outcome.
[52]
In
National
Union of Mineworkers and Another v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and Others
[48]
the
Court went on to say that:
‘
The
issue of the importance of credibility findings made by the
commissioner being accepted in this court on review was made by
Mr
Snider
,
who represented the third respondent. He submitted that it was the
commissioner who sat in the arbitration proceedings, looked
at the
witnesses, listened to them, and assessed their credibility, and on
review, this court should not readily interfere with
this, as the
commissioner was in the best position to make these findings. I agree
with these submissions. This court should not
readily interfere with
credibility findings made by CCMA commissioners, and should do so
only if the evidence on the record before
the court shows that the
credibility findings of the commissioner are entirely at odds with or
completely out of kilter with the
probabilities and all the evidence
actually on the record and considered as a whole. Findings by a
commissioner relating to demeanour
and candour of witnesses, and how
they came across when giving evidence, would normally be entirely
unassailable, as this court
is simply not in a position to contradict
such findings. Even if I do look into the issue of the credibility
findings of the second
respondent in this case, I am of the view that
the record of evidence in this case, if considered as a whole simply
provides no
basis for interfering with the credibility findings of
the second respondent. There is simply nothing out of kilter between
the
evidence by the witnesses on record and the credibility findings
the second respondent came to. The evidence on record in my view
actually supports the second respondent's credibility findings. The
credibility findings of the second respondent therefore must
be
sustained.’
[53]
The Commissioner analysed and discussed the probabilities of both
parties’ versions
[49]
and found that based on the evidence before it, that it was Mathonsi
that fabricated his version and that Mathonsi’s witness,
Seotsanyana was complicit in this fabrication.
[50]
Based on the evidence before him, he found that because Seotsanyana
was a witness for the Applicant at a previous assault case,
that she
was once again called as a witness in support of his version, that
she was copied in on e-mails when she had nothing to
do with the
pre-approval for overtime work, the Commissioner concluded that it
was more probable than not that Seotsanyana and
Mathonsi enjoyed a
close relationship.
[51]
He
found that during her testimony Seotsanyana was an evasive witness
and she was not forthcoming as to what happened on the day
of the
assault.
[52]
Her credibility
as a witness was therefore in question and the Commissioner rightly
found that she was not credible.
[53]
On the other hand Segole’s witnesses provided corroboratory
evidence in support of Segole’s version of events, making
his
version more probable.
[54]
[54]
A consideration of the evidence presented by the witnesses as
contained in the transcript convinces
me that the same reasoning as
posited in the
National Union of
Mineworkers and Another v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
case
applies equally. There is simply nothing on the transcript to show
that the credibility finding of the Commissioner is completely
out of
kilter with the evidence or the probabilities.
[55]
The First Respondent, through its witnesses and documentary evidence
established
a prima facie
case of misconduct arising from the physical assault, which then
shifted the evidentiary burden to the employee to present evidence
that would exonerate him from blame in this regard.
[56]
However
and as the Commissioner reasoned,
“
the
version of the applicant is one of bare denial, i.e. that he had not
assaulted Segole
”.
[55]
In
my view, and taking into account the factual evidence, there is
simply no basis to interfere with the Commissioner having preferred
the evidence of the First Respondent to the Applicant’s
evidence. The reasons provided by the Commissioner are in my view
correct, and certainly substantiated by the transcript. No case
has been made out by the Applicant, in its founding or supplementary
affidavits, as to why such a preferring of evidence by the
Commissioner should be interfered with in this instance.
[57]
Furthermore, the Commissioner’s award passes the test for
reasonableness set out in
Herholdt
in that it cannot be said to be entirely disconnected with, or
unsupported by the evidence. The evidence led at the arbitration
clearly bears out the fairness and reasonableness of confirming
the sanction of dismissal imposed by the First
Respondent
at the disciplinary hearing.
[58]
In light of these considerations, the decision of the Commissioner in
finding that the dismissal
was both procedurally and substantively
fair does not in my view, fall outside of a range of reasonable
responses to the Applicant’s
case.
[59]
Having due regard to the reasoning of the Commissioner on the
evidence before him at the arbitration,
it is clear from an analysis
of the award that the Commissioner properly weighed up all of the
evidence before him – the
totality of the circumstances, in the
parlance of
Sidumo
–
and it is in the light of all those circumstances that he found that
dismissal was a fair sanction.
Conclusion:
[60]
In conclusion, the Applicant’s review has no basis as the
Commissioner’s finding
of procedural and substantive fairness
was substantiated by the evidence and is not in any way irregular.
[61]
The conclusion that the Commissioner reached is one that a reasonable
decision-maker would have
come to and I am, therefore, unable to
conclude that his decision was one that a reasonable decision-maker
could not reach.
[62]
The finding must accordingly, be upheld.
Order
:
[63]
In the premises, I make the following order:
(1)
The Review Application is dismissed.
(2)
There is no order as to costs.
__________________
T Deane
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court
APPEARANCES
For the
Applicant: Adv.
NL Dyirakumunda
Instructed
by: Ruth
Edmonds Attorneys Inc
For
the Third Respondent: Prences
Mohlahlo
[1]
Act 66 of 1995.
[2]
Transcribed
Record dated 19/10/2016 at pg 21. (Transcribed Record).
[3]
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC) at para 110. (
Sidumo
).
[4]
Ibid
at paras 118-119.
[5]
Computicket
v Marcus NO and Others
1999 (20) ILJ 343 (LC) 346.
[6]
The
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Myers
and Others
CA 4/09 (unreported), Labour Appeal Court, Cape Town (2 March 2012)
at paras 103-104. (
Myers
).
[7]
See
National
Union of Mineworkers and Another v Samancor Ltd (Tubatse
Ferrochrome) and Others
2011
ZASCA 74
(25
May 2011).
[8]
Herholdt
v Nedbank Ltd
(701/2012)
2013 ZASCA 97; 2013 (6) SA 224 (SCA); 2013 (11) BLLR 1074 (SCA);
2013 (34) ILJ 2795 (SCA) (5 September 2013). (
Herholdt
).
[9]
Gold
Fields Mining SA (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA
2014 (1) BLLR 20
(LAC). (
Gold
Fields
).
[10]
Gold
Fields
at paras 18-21.
[11]
Ibid
at para 20.
[12]
Myers
at paras 103-104.
[13]
Fidelity
Cash Management Service v CCMA and Others
2008
(3) BLLR 197
(LAC)
at paras 98-100. (
Fidelity
Cash Management Service
).
[14]
See
Transcribed Record.
[15]
Arbitration
Award dated 13/11/2016 at pgs 2-5. (Arbitration Award)
[16]
Founding
Affidavit of Prudence Gqoba at pg 5 para 9.
[17]
Ibid
at
para 10.
[18]
Arbitration
Award at pg 5 para 26.
[19]
Transcribed
Record at pgs 20-21.
[20]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pgs 17-19.
[21]
Transcribed
Record at pgs 22-23.
[22]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pg 16-18.
[23]
Transcribed
Record at pgs 19-20, 24-27.
[24]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pg 5.
[25]
Arbitration
Award at pg
[26]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pgs 8-13.
[27]
Arbitration
Award at pg 7 para 30.
[28]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pgs 14-15.
[29]
Arbitration
Award at pg 7 para 31, specifically with regards to them changing
into PPE overalls.
[30]
Transcribed
Record at pgs 82-83.
[31]
Ibid
pgs
81 and 84.
[32]
Ibid
at
pg 86.
[33]
Ibid
at
pg 101.
[34]
Ibid
at
pg 87.
[35]
Arbitration
Award at pgs 110-111 and 115.
[36]
Transcribed
Record at pgs 17 and 109.
[37]
Arbitration
Award at pgs 118 and 120.
[38]
Index
to the Bundle of Documents A at pgs 14-15.
[39]
Woolworths
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others
2011 (32) ILJ 2455 (LAC) at para 34.
[40]
See
Transcribed Records.
[41]
Ibid
at
pgs 85-86 and 91.
[42]
Ibid
at
pgs 103-104.
[43]
Ibid
at
pgs 95-96.
[44]
Arbitration
Award at pg 6 para 26.
[45]
Founding
Affidavit of Prudence Gqoba at pg 5 para 11.
[46]
National
Union of Mineworkers and Another v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and Others
2013 (34) ILJ 945 (LC) at para 37.
[47]
That it was more probable that Mathonsi did see Segole and that he
was responsible for the assault on Segole.
[48]
National
Union of Mineworkers and Another v Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration and Others
at para 31.
[49]
Ibid
at
pgs 6-8.
[50]
Ibid
at
pg 7 paras 31 and 32.
[51]
Ibid
at
pg 7 para 32.
[52]
Ibid
at
pg 6 first paragraph.
[53]
Ibid
at
pg 8.
[54]
Ibid
at
pgs 7-8.
[55]
Ibid
at
pg 5.