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[2019] ZALCJHB 75
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Baloi and Another v Maddox Adams International South Africa (Pty) Limited (J203/16) [2019] ZALCJHB 75 (18 April 2019)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
JOHANNESBURG
Not
Reportable
Case no: J203/16
In
the matter between:
DENNIS
BALOI
First
Applicant
CASWELL MOZAMANE
BALOI
Second Applicant
and
MADDOX ADAMS
INTERNATIONAL
SOUTH
AFRICA (PTY) LIMITED
Respondent
Decided:
In chambers
Delivered:
18 April 2019
JUDGEMENT:
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
NKUTHA-NKONTWANA. J
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application for leave to appeal brought by the applicants
against the whole judgment and order of this Court handed down
on 15
August 2018. The application is opposed by the respondent. In the
impugned judgment I dismissed the applicants’ application
for
declaratory order in terms of section 197 and 197A of the Labour
Relations Act
[1]
(LRA) with no
order as to costs.
Grounds of the leave
to appeal.
[2]
The application for leave to appeal is
hinged on,
inter alia
,
the following grounds:
2.1.
The Court disregarded the respondent’s concession that it
effectively took over the business
of the applicant’s erstwhile
employer, Rofo Equipment CC (Rofo Equipments), which was sequestrated
in June 2001.
2.2.
The Court incorrectly found that there were no contracts of
employment at the time
when Rofo Equipments was sequestrated.
2.3
The Court erred in its finding that prescription was applicable.
The test for leave to
appeal
[3]
It
is trite that in an application for leave to appeal, the applicants
must convince the court
a
quo
that they have a reasonable prospect of success on appeal. In
Seatlholo
and Others v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers
Union and Others
[2]
this Court confirmed that the test applicable in applications for
leave to appeal is stringent and held as follows:
“
The
traditional formulation of the test that is applicable in an
application such as the present requires the court to determine
whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court may come to
a different conclusion to that reached in the judgment that
is sought
to be taken on appeal. As the respondents observe, the use of the
word “would” in s17(1)(a)(i) are indicative
of a raising
of the threshold since previously, all that was required for the
applicant to demonstrate was that there was a reasonable
prospect
that another court might come to a different conclusion (see Daantjie
Community and others v Crocodile Valley Citrus Company
(Pty) Ltd and
another (75/2008)
[2015] ZALCC 7
(28 July 2015). Further, this
is not a test to be applied lightly – the Labour Appeal Court
has recently had occasion
to observe that this court ought to be
cautious when leave to appeal is granted, as should the Labour Appeal
Court when petitions
are granted. The statutory imperative of the
expeditious resolution of labour disputes necessarily requires that
appeals be limited
to those matters in which there is a reasonable
prospect that the factual matrix could receive a different treatment
or where there
is some legitimate dispute on the law (See the
judgment by Davis JA in
Martin and East
(Pty) Ltd v NUM
(2014) 35 ILJ 2399
(LAC), and also Kruger v S
2014 (1) SACR 369
(SCA) and the ruling by
Steenkamp J in
Oasys Innovations (Pty)
Ltd v Henning and another
(C 536/15, 6
November 2015)”.
[4]
Turning
to the present matter, I do not intend to regurgitate the findings in
the main judgment as they are explicit. Having considered
the various
grounds of appeal as well as the written submissions filed by both
parties in support of their respective cases, I
am convinced that the
applicants have not demonstrated that ‘there is a reasonable
prospect that the factual matrix could
receive a different treatment
or that there is some legitimate dispute on the law’ as
envisaged by section 17(1)(a) of the
Superior Courts Act.
[3]
The application for leave to appeal should therefore be refused.
[5]
On the issue of costs; it is trite that in
this Court costs do not follow the result. In this instance, I deem
it inappropriate
to burden the applicants who are individual
litigants with costs.
[6]
In the circumstances, I make the following order:
Order
1.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed with no order as to
costs.
__________________
P. Nkutha-Nkontwana
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
[1]
Act
66 of 1995 as amended.
[2]
(2016) 37 ILJ 1485 (LC) at para 3.
[3]
Act 10 of 2013.