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[2019] ZALCJHB 71
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Maile v FOSKOR (Pty) Ltd (JR1148/2014) [2019] ZALCJHB 71 (2 April 2019)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not reportable
Case No: JR 1148/2014
In the matter between:
RONALD
MAILE
Applicant
and
FOSKOR (PTY)
LTD
First
Respondent
COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
Second
Respondent
NELSON LEDWABA
N.O
Third Respondent
Heard: 29
May 2018
Delivered:
2 April 2019
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE,
J
Introduction
and background:
[1]
The applicant (Mr Maile) seeks an order reviewing and setting aside
the
arbitration award issued by the third respondent (Commissioner)
dated 24 April 2014 in terms of which his claim of an
alleged unfair labour practice against the first respondent (Foskor)
was dismissed.
[2]
The review application was filed some three days outside of the
statutory
time periods. Foskor did not oppose the application for
condonation in that regard, and given the obviously short period of
the
delay and the explanation proffered in that regard, condonation
ought to be granted.
[3]
Central to Maile’s claim of an alleged unfair labour
practice
was whether he was entitled to a retainer/scarcity allowance
introduced by Foskor at the workplace in 2008, which was applicable
to technical trainers and as further extended to other trainers in
2011.
[4]
Foskor introduced a scarcity allowance at the workplace in 2008 as a
means
to increase remuneration, and to attract and retain scarce and
critical skills in the technical fields such as technical operators,
artisans, technicians, planners, technologists, engineers, and
technical trainers. The scheme was then in 2011 extended to
operations
trainers where Maine was employed as one of the SHEQ
trainers. As at 1 April 2013, employees who qualified were
paid
R5000.00.
[5]
Maine left the employ of Foskor in March 2017. He had started
his
employment with Foskor in 1994 as an Artisan. He moved up the
ranks and was employed as SHEQ Trainer since 2010. Despite the
scarcity
skills allowance having been extended to the operations
trainers, he was nonetheless excluded, hence he lodged an internal
grievance
in September 2013.
[6]
The outcome of that grievance was essentially that Maile was not paid
the scarcity allowance due to the fact that his remuneration was
already significantly more than that of other SHEQ trainers and
the
rest of the operations trainers who were granted the allowance from
November 2011. It was further established that as
at
October 2013, Maile’s total remuneration was still more
than that of his fellow trainers despite the fact that the
other
trainers’ remuneration also included the scarcity allowance.
The
arbitration proceedings and the award:
[7]
Having referred an alleged unfair labour practice dispute to the
Commission
for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), and
when attempts at conciliation failed, the dispute came before the
Commissioner
for arbitration, where Maile’s case was as
follows;
7.1
He seeks to claim the scarcity allowance from 2011 when it was
extended to other
trainers. The basis of his claim was that other
employees,
viz
Messrs Xulu and Vorster, who were employed in
similar positions had benefitted from the scarcity allowance scheme,
whilst he was
excluded.
7.2
His contention was that the scarcity allowance was not based on
employees’
remuneration but was granted across the board in
identified areas. He reiterated that some of those trainers at his
level were
paid more than him and were still granted the allowance.
This was despite it being put to him under cross-examination and his
concessions
that other employees (Moshweu and Xulu) who were employed
in the same position as Maile, earned less than him even if they were
paid the allowance.
[8]
Foskor’s contentions were that the scheme was implemented in
order
to ensure that technical operators were paid a competent salary
as opposed to getting an increase. After the scheme was extended
to
operational trainers, and upon Maile having lodged a grievance,
investigations have revealed that Maine’s salary (cash
component and cost to company) was way above that of other trainers,
which would have meant that if he benefitted from the scheme,
this
would have widened the gap between his salary and that of other SHEQ
trainers at his level, thus making it unfair. The reason
that Maile’s
package was higher than the others was that he was previously
employed as a Superintendent SHEQ, and when his
position became
redundant, he was offered a lower position as an alternative, but had
retained his then salary. It was then decided
that he could not be
eligible to receive the scarcity allowance.
[9]
In substantiation of the above contentions, the evidence of Alexander
Liversage on Foskor’s behalf was that;
9.1
He was employed as the Specialists Operational Benefits responsible
for benefits
at Foskor. Foskor has three categories of trainers,
viz
,
SHEQ Trainers, Operational Trainers, and Technical Trainers.
9.2
Liversage made reference to remuneration earned by other trainers
such as Messrs
Moshweu, Makhoba and Vorster and contended that the
differences in their salary/remuneration as opposed to that of Maile
was due
to a variety of factors including different circumstances
pertaining to their appointments such as moving up the ranks;
salaries
having changed over the years with increments; or that those
employees could have negotiated their salaries at the time of their
employment.
9.3
Maile according to Liversage was not granted the scarcity allowance
as he was
already highly remunerated before the allowance was
introduced to other trainers in 2011, which was meant to increase
salaries
of trainers without increasing the cost to company
component.
[10]
The Commissioner having heard the evidence concluded that;
10.1
It should be accepted that on the evidence of Liversage, Maile earned
more than the other SHEQ
Trainer (Xulu) and other technical trainers.
10.2
In regards to whether Maile was a qualified Artisan or not, any
evidence in that regard ought
to be disregarded as it only came to
light during his re-examination. The Commissioner further rejected
the evidence in that regard
as it was introduced without an
application, and further since Foskor had not had an opportunity to
rebut it.
10.3
Maile’s claim was not based on his contract of employment nor
was it part of his remuneration,
and that this was however a ‘right
and a benefit acquired subsequent to a policy discussion on the
allowance’.
10.4
Liversage’s evidence in regard to the background as to how the
scheme came about remained
unchallenged, and Maile did not fall
within the category of the recipients, and thus could not demonstrate
any unfairness in implementing
the scheme.
10.5
Maile could not demonstrate that he was entitled to the allowance.
There was nothing to suggest
that besides being a trainer, he had
executed similar work requiring the same tools of trade and benefits,
and there was no unfairness
established as he had earned way above
most of his counterparts.
The
grounds of review:
[11]
Maile seeks to have the Commissioner’s award reviewed and set
aside on a variety
of grounds including that;
11.1
The findings are defective and unreasonable.
11.2
The finding that no unfair labour practice was committed simply
because he happened to earn more
than what was paid to other
technical trainers constituted misconduct and a failure by the
Commissioner to apply his mind to the
evidence.
11.3
The Commissioner ignored the evidence that he had skills required in
order to qualify for the
allowance, and had assumed without evidence
that he did not have the required skills to execute his duties.
11.4
The Commissioner’s decision to ignore evidence in
re-examination which confirmed that Maile
had the necessary
qualifications for the payment of the allowance was defective,
unreasonable and a misdirection, particularly
since such evidence was
not new evidence.
11.5
The Commissioner’s finding that the claim pertained to a
benefit acquired from Foskor’s
policy is contradictory and
demonstrated a failure to appreciate the issues for determination.
11.6
The Commissioner considered irrelevant evidence that he earned more
than other trainers, and
ignored the fact that an employee did not
have to earn less than one’s colleagues to be entitled to the
allowance
[12]
Foskor submitted that the award was not reviewable as the
Commissioner’s findings
were rational, reasonable and
consistent with the material before him. It was further submitted
that the Commissioner considered
all the relevant material before
him, including the reasons for introducing the allowance and the
manner with which Foskor had
exercised its discretion. It was
contended that the Commissioner reached a decision that cannot be
said to be one which is unreasonable.
[13]
It was further denied that the Commissioner committed misconduct by
finding that Foskor’s
conduct was not an unfair labour
practice; or that he failed to apply his mind to certain material
evidence or issues before him.
It was denied that the Commissioner
had considered irrelevant evidence such as Maile’s earnings; or
that he ignored material
facts such as the evidence of Maile’s
skills and qualifications as an artisan, which in any event was
irrelevant to the payment
of the allowance. It was submitted that
Maile’s case was not that he was entitled to an allowance by
virtue of it being due
and payable to artisans since 2008, but that
he was entitled to the allowance as a SHEQ trainer and by it having
been extended
to trainers in 2011.
Evaluation:
[14]
The test on
review is trite as re-stated in
South
African Breweries (Pty) Ltd v Hansen and Others
[1]
in the
following terms;
‘
The
test that the Labour Court is required to apply in a review of an
arbitrator’s award was settled by the Constitutional
Court in
Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines Ltd and Others (Sidumo)
.
It is
that an arbitration award is reviewable if the decision reached by
the arbitrator was one that a reasonable decision-maker
could not
reach. Essentially, this test requires the Labour Court, sitting as a
court of review, to enquire whether the decision
under review is one
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach on the evidential
material available. On this test, an arbitration
award based on
defective reasoning by an arbitrator may still pass the muster
required in reviews, provided that the result is
one that a
reasonable decision-maker could have reached. This was clarified by
the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Herholdt v Nedbank Limited
(Congress of South African Trade Unions as amicus curiae)
as
follows;
‘
For
a defect in the conduct of the proceedings to amount to a gross
irregularity as contemplated by s 145(2) (a) (ii) …the
Arbitrator must have misconceived the nature of the inquiry or
arrived at an unreasonable result. A result will only be
unreasonable if it is one that a reasonable Arbitrator could not
reach on all the material that was before the Arbitrator. Material
errors of fact, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an award
to be set aside, but are only of any consequence if their
effect is
to render the outcome unreasonable.’
In
Gold Fields Mining
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Kloof Gold Mine) v Commission for
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others
(Gold Fields),
this Court refined the
Sidumo
test by introducing
a
two-stage enquiry
.
In short, this requires the Labour
Court to consider two issues: The first is whether the applicant has
established an irregularity.
This irregularity could be a material
error of fact or law, the failure to apply one’s mind to
relevant evidence, or misconceiving
of the enquiry or assessing
factual disputes in an arbitrary fashion. The second is whether the
applicant has established that
the irregularity is material to the
outcome by demonstrating that the outcome would have been different
having regard to the evidence
before the arbitrator. An arbitration
award will, therefore, be considered to be reasonable when there is a
material connection
between the evidence and the result.’
(Citations omitted)
[15]
To the extent that Maile considered the non-payment of the allowance
as an unfair labour
practice, section 186(2)(a) of the Labour
Relations Act, which was relied upon in referring the dispute to the
CCMA provides that:
(2)
‘
Unfair labour practice
‘ means any unfair act or
omission that arises between an employer and an employee involving—
(a)
unfair conduct by
the employer relating to the promotion, demotion, probation
(excluding disputes about dismissals for a reason relating to
probation) or training of an employee or relating to the provision
of
benefits to an employee.”
[16]
In his
referral before the CCMA, Maile alleged that; ‘
The
employee is not getting company benefits in the form of scarcity
allowance’
.
To the extent that this is the case, it can be accepted on the
authority of
Apollo
Tyres South Africa (Pty) Ltd v CCMA
[2]
that
since the scarcity allowance came about as a result of Foskor’s
policy or practice of rewarding scarce skills with the
objective of
retaining them, and further since the payment of any such an
allowance was discretionary as evinced from the outcome
of the
grievance hearing, the allowance is deemed to be a benefit. It
follows that the Commissioner’s findings that the allowance
arose out of a practice rather than out of the contract of employment
cannot be faulted.
[17]
The onus to
establish that conduct complained of constitutes an unfair labour
practice within the meaning of section 186(2) of the
LRA rests on the
employee
[3]
. The employee must
therefore be able to lay the evidentiary foundation for his or her
claim of an unfair labour practice.
[18]
In this
case, once it was accepted that the scarcity skills allowance was a
benefit payable at the discretion of the employer, and
that all the
trainers except for Maile were paid such an allowance, the next
enquiry was whether Foskor acted fairly
[4]
in exercising that discretion in depriving Maile of the allowance
[5]
.
[19]
In considering whether Foskor exercised its discretion fairly in
denying Maile the allowance,
the starting point is an examination of
the scheme, its objectives, and criteria (if any), in implementing
it. It needs to be said
from the onset that the basis upon which the
allowance in this case was payable and the criteria used in
distinguishing Maile from
the other trainers is not immediately
discernible. This is so in that there is no written policy regulating
the granting and payment
of the allowance. It was however not
seriously disputed that the allowance was granted at Foskor’s
discretion.
[20]
What is however clear is that
the allowance came
about as a result of a motivation to increase the remuneration of the
trainers without increasing costs to company
. The allowance
was granted to all the trainers with the objective of retaining them
as they were skilled. The department in which
Maile is employed
consisted of 13 trainers categorised as 6 Technical Trainers who had
all received the scarcity allowance since
2008; 5 Operations Trainers
who received the allowance from November 2011, and two SHEQ Trainers
consisting of Maile and Xulu.
Xulu received the allowance in the
amount of R5000.00 as at October 2013, whilst Maile did not.
[21]
Two main
reasons were advanced for not paying Maile the allowance as evident
from the grievance outcome
[6]
.
In substantiation of these reasons, Foskor had at the arbitration
proceedings, referred to various payslips of the other trainers
and
those of Maile, which reflected that the cash components of other
trainers,
viz
,
Xulu, Mosweu, Sekgobela, Paulse and Roos, even with
the
R5000.00 allowance,
were
still significantly lower than that of Maile. Even if comparisons
were to be made with the only other SHEQ Trainer, Xulu, the
latter’s
cost to company as already indicated was also lower than that of
Maile. That evidence, despite Maile’s protestations
that he had
a less cash component, was incontrovertible.
[22]
In the
light of the above reasons, the next enquiry would be to determine
whether any criteria were used in granting the allowance.
In this
regard, on Liversage’s version, the purpose of the allowance
was to attract and retain technical staff due to skills
shortage
[7]
.
He further added that at the time that the scheme was extended, Maile
was not working as an Artisan to qualify for the allowance.
[23]
It can be
accepted from the record and the evidence presented before the
Commissioner that the reasons for implementing the scheme
in 2008 and
as further extended in 2011 were not placed in dispute. The only
difficulty however with Liversage’s evidence,
is that the fact
that Maile was not an Artisan at the time the scheme was extended to
other trainers was not the reason he was
denied the allowance as
evident from the grievance outcome. The contention that Maile was not
an Artisan is equally without merit
as it was always his case that he
was a qualified Artisan
[8]
. The
Commissioner’s conclusions therefore that evidence in regards
to Maile being an Artisan was raised for the first time
under
re-examination were not supported by the evidence before him. That
issue was raised by his representative in his opening
remarks and
also attested to by him in his own evidence.
[24]
From the above, it follows that the Commissioner’s further
conclusions that Maile
was not granted the allowance because of his
skills or lack thereof, or that he was not an Artisan at the time the
scheme was implemented
or extended is equally a misdirection, as it
was never Foskor’s case that skills or lack thereof was a
consideration.
[25]
Any further reliance by Foskor on the scheme having been extended to
trainers according
to categories is equally not sustainable, as Xulu,
who was a SHEQ Trainer, was granted the allowance. The scheme was
implemented
across the board to the trainers without any further
qualification and granted at Foskor’s discretion.
In
the end, the Commissioner’s findings that the onus was on Maile
to prove that he had the necessary skills required for
the granting
of the allowance, or that Maile did not fall within the category of
recipients are clearly without foundation and
not supported by the
evidence before him.
Furthermore, in the light of the reasons
given in the grievance outcome which laid the basis of an alleged
unfair labour practice
claim, Foskor could not adapt its reasons for
denying Maile the allowance as its case progressed at the arbitration
proceedings.
[26]
In the
light of the Commissioner’s flawed reasoning and the errors and
irregularities pointed out, the issue is whether these
flaws, when
assessed
and
determined, can be said to have a distorting effect on his conception
of the enquiry, the determination of the issues before
him, and the
ultimate outcome
[9]
. As already
pointed out and based on what was said in
Herholdt
,
an
arbitration award based on defective reasoning by an arbitrator may
still pass the muster required in reviews, provided that
the result
is one that a reasonable decision-maker could have reached.
[27]
The determination of the issues then turned on whether Foskor’s
decision not
to grant Maile the allowance on the basis of his
remuneration being more than that of other SHEQ Trainers and the rest
of the operations
trainers who started getting the allowance since
November 2011, and further due to his total remuneration
being more
than that of his fellow trainers as at November 2013,
despite the fact that the other trainers’ remuneration included
the scarcity allowance, was fair or not.
[28]
Maile considered his exclusion in the light the explanation proffered
by Foskor as being
unfair as he was part of a category of employees
identified as beneficiaries. The issue however in the light of the
common cause
facts that other trainers were granted the allowance is
whether Foskor’s discretion in that regard in excluding him was
exercised
fairly. The Commissioner in arriving at his decision glibly
addressed this issue by stating that; ‘
I am not convinced
that the Applicant backed his assertions taking into cognisance the
fact that he earned way above most of his
counterparts’
[29]
Ordinarily, and to the extent that the Commissioner had not in detail
dealt with the question
whether the discretion in question was
exercised fairly or not, there would have been cause to remit the
matter back to the CCMA.
It was however argued on behalf of Maile,
and correctly so, that all the material is before the Court for it to
determine the matter.
In the circumstances, no purpose would be
served by remitting the matter back to the CCMA, particularly since
it is for the review
court to determine whether the irregularities
pointed out are so gross as to have led to an unreasonable outcome.
As was stated in
Herholdt
,
errors of fact, are not in and of themselves sufficient for an
arbitration award to be set aside, but are
only
of any consequence if their effect is to render the outcome
unreasonable.
[30]
In determining whether in excluding Maile from the benefit of the
allowance Foskor exercised
its discretion fairly, and further based
on the reasons and explanation proffered, it is my view that it was
at that point that
Maile’s claim collapsed for the following
reasons;
30.1
Notwithstanding Maile’s protestations, the payslips of other
individuals referred to at
the arbitration proceedings clearly
pointed that he earned significantly far more than the other trainers
even if the latter benefitted
from the allowance. In this regard, his
cash component and cost to company were higher than the other
trainers.
30.2
The fairness of the discretion exercised has to be assessed within
the context of the primary
purpose of implementing the allowance,
which was primarily to retain scare skills. That issue was not in
dispute. A second consideration
was that the scheme was implemented
in order to increase the remuneration of trainers without increasing
their cost to company.
Third, it was Foskor’s case that to have
granted Maile the allowance, it would have further increased his cost
to company,
and also created an unfair position for other trainers as
he would have earned even far higher than them.
30.3
From Maile’s evidence, I did not understand his case to be that
he disputed the rationale
that the allowance would have increased his
cost to company and also created unfairness as he would have earned
far higher than
his colleagues. His main contention was that one’s
remuneration was not or should not have been a consideration when
granting
the allowance. This however cannot be so, in that, if he was
granted the allowance, that would have resulted in an increase in his
cash component and cost to company. This would clearly not only have
defeated the purpose of the scheme, but also created an even
wider
gap between his cash component and that of colleagues.
30.4
In the light of the above, it should be concluded that there was a
rational basis for excluding
Maile from benefitting from the
allowance, and if he could not successfully attack the basis of the
exercise of the discretion
in not granting him the allowance, then
there would be no basis for any conclusion to be reached that the
discretion was exercised
unfairly,
arbitrarily,
capriciously or in bad faith.
30.5
Thus, notwithstanding the
flawed reasoning by the
Commissioner and the errors and irregularities pointed out, his
finding ultimately that Maile had not demonstrated
that Foskor’s
conduct amounted to an unfair labour practice falls within a band of
reasonableness.
[31]
In the light of the above conclusions, it follows that the
application for review ought
to be dismissed. I have further had
regard to the requirements of law and fairness in regards to the
issue of costs. I am of the
view that the facts and circumstances of
this case do not warrant a costs order.
[32]
Accordingly, the following order is made;
Order:
1. The late
filing of the review application is condoned.
2. The
Applicant’s application to
review and set
aside the arbitration award issued by the Third Respondent is
dismissed
3. There is no
order as to costs.
___________________
Edwin
Tlhotlhalemaje
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicant:
P
Mashishi
Instructed
by: E.S
Makinta Attorneys
For
the First Respondent:
M Edwards
Instructed
by: Bowman
Gilfillan INC
[1]
(2017) 38 ILJ 1766 (LAC);
[2017] 9 BLLR 892
(LAC) at paragraphs 10 -
11
[2]
[2013] ZALAC 3
;
[2013 BLLR 434
(LAC); (2013) 34 ILJ 1120 LAC
Where
it was held that;
“
[50]
In
IMATU obo Venter v Umhlathuze
Municipality,
the Labour Court
followed the
Protekon
approach.
It then concluded that:
‘
The
more plausible interpretation is that the term “benefits”
was intended to refer to advantages conferred on employees
which did
not originate from contractual or statutory entitlements, but which
have been granted at the employer’s discretion
.
’
It
seems to me that the court in
IMATU
was concerned
that if benefits include a statutory or contractual right or
entitlement, the right to strike may be curtailed.
As pointed out
above employees will have an election to strike or go the
arbitration/adjudication route in respect of many rights
disputes.
In my view, the better approach would be to interpret the term
benefit to include a right or entitlement to which the
employee is
entitled (
ex contractu or ex lege
including rights
judicially created) as well as an advantage or privilege which has
been offered or granted to an employee
in terms of a policy or
practice subject to the employer’s discretion. In my judgment
“benefit” in section
186 (2)(a) of the Act means
existing advantages or privileges to which an employee is entitled
as a right or granted in terms
of a policy or practice subject to
the employer’s discretion. In as far as
Hospersa, GS4
Security
and
Scheepers
postulate a
different approach they are, with respect, wrong.
[51]
This approach will also
put paid to the anomaly created by
Hospersa.
An
employee who wants to use the unfair labour practice jurisdiction in
section 186 (2) (a) relating to promotion or training
does not have
to show that he or she has a right to promotion or training in order
to have a remedy when the fairness of the
employer’s conduct
relating to such promotion (or non-promotion) or training is
challenged. On the other hand where an
employee wants to use the
same remedy in relation to the provision of benefits such an
employee has to show that he or she has
a right or entitlement
sourced in contract or statute to such benefit.”
[3]
See
City
of Cape Town v SA Municipal Workers Union on behalf of Sylvester and
Others
(2013) 34 ILJ 1156 (LC) at para 19; and
Department
of Justice v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration
and Others
(2004) 25 ILJ 248 (LAC) at para 73, where it was held that;
“…
An
employee who complains that the employer's decision or conduct in
not appointing him constitutes an unfair labour practice
must first
establish the existence of such decision or conduct. If that
decision or conduct is not established, that is the end
of the
matter. If that decision or conduct is proved, the enquiry into
whether the conduct was unfair can then follow. This is
not one of
those cases such as disputes relating to unfair discrimination and
disputes relating to freedom of association where
if the employee
proves the conduct complained of, the legislation then requires the
employer to prove that such conduct was fair
or lawful and, if he
cannot prove that, unfairness is established. In cases where that is
intended to be the case, legislation
has said so clearly. In respect
of item 2(1)(b) matters, the Act does not say so because it was not
intended to be so...”
[4]
See
Ehlanzeni
District Municipality v South African Local Government Bargaining
Council & others
(JR1163/10)
[2014] ZALCJHB 368 (30 September 2014)
at
para [30], where it was held that;
‘…
The
concept of unfairness denotes a failure to meet an objective
standard and may be taken to include arbitrary, capricious or
inconsistent conduct, whether negligent or intended. Linked to the
concept of fairness in my view is whether the discretion was
exercised in good faith’.
[5]
See
Aucamp
v SA Revenue Service
(2014)
35 ILJ 1217 (LC) at para 29;
Public
Servants Association obo Motsekoa v Department of Sports, Arts and
Culture (
2015)
36
ILJ
808 (BCA) ;
Apollo
Tyres SA (Pty) Ltd
at
para 47, where it was held that;
‘…
Therefore even where the
employer enjoys a discretion in terms of a policy or practice
relating to the provision of benefits such
conduct will be subject
to scrutiny, by the CCMA, in terms of s 186(2)(a).’
[6]
Pages
26 – 27 of the Applicant’s Bundle of Documents, where it
was stated that;
11.
“Upon investigation, it was established that Mr Maile was not
paid the scarcity allowance due to the fact that
his remuneration
was already more than that of other SHEQ Trainers and the rest of
the operations trainers who started getting
the allowance since
November 2011;
12.
As at November 2013, Mr Maile’s total remuneration was still
more than that of his fellow trainers referred to
in paragraph 11
above- despite the fact that the other trainers’ remuneration
included the scarcity allowance.”
[7]
Transcribed
record Lines 1 – 6 P69.
[8]
See
Lines 5 – 7 at page 6; Lines 11 – 12 at page 16; Lines
5-8 at page 37 Transcribed Record
[9]
See
Head
of the
Department
of Education v Mofokeng & others
[2015]
1 BLLR 50
(LAC) at para 31