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[2019] ZALCJHB 49
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Vodacom (Pty) Ltd and Others v National Association of South African Workers (NASA) and Another (J256/19) [2019] ZALCJHB 49; (2019) 40 ILJ 1882 (LC) (4 March 2019)
the
labour court of South Africa, held at johannesburg
case no: j256/19
Reportable
In
the matter between:
VODACOM
(PTY) LTD
First
Applicant
BIDVEST
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT (PTY) LTD
Second
Applicant
BIDVEST
SERVICES (PTY) LTD
Third
Applicant
And
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN WORKERS (‘NASA’)
First
Respondent
MPHO
MOSES MOROLANE
Second
Respondent
Heard
:
14 and 25 February 2019
Delivered
:
4 March 2019
Summary:
(Interdict – unregistered union entering premises to
communicate and meet with employees of contractor
– nature of
rights infringed – jurisdiction of court to entertain interdict
concerning interference with property rights
-requirements of final
interdict met - costs)
judgment
LAGRANGE
J
Background
[1]
On 7 February 2019, the first applicant (‘Vodacom’)
initially launched this application on a semi-urgent basis
to prevent
the first respondent (‘NASA’), an unregistered union, and
its official, Mr M Morolane (‘Morolane’),
from entering
its premises and conducting any meeting on its premises.
[2]
The context in which this occurred is that the property of the
applicant is the Vodacom Midrand Campus, which houses a
number of
other facilities apart from businesses of Vodacom. The public has
access to the property through a controlled security
point and may be
restricted. Vodacom has contracted with the second applicant
(‘Bidvest Facilities’) to manage the
premises on its
behalf. Bidvest Facilities has, in turn, contracted an associated
company (‘Bidvest Services’) to perform
cleaning services
at the premises.
[3]
NASA has been attempting to organize the employees of Bidvest
Services performing the cleaning services and is pursuing
a demand
that Vodacom should insource the cleaning services it contracts to
Bidvest Facilities and employ the Bidvest Services
cleaners directly.
Initially Bidvest Services was amenable to the union holding meetings
with its employees at the premises and
did not attempt to prevent
this. However, on two occasions in early December 2018, Bidvest
Services granted permission for NASA
to meet with the staff. On each
occasion it designated a specific area for the meeting to be held,
but the union proceeded to hold
a meeting elsewhere on the premises.
On one occasion the meeting appeared to have been convened directly
in front of a function
which was being hosted by Vodacom.
Accordingly, on 11 December 2018, Bidvest Facilities and Bidvest
Services jointly refused to
grant further access to the premises for
the purpose of meeting their employees.
[4]
The union’s immediate response penned in an email by Morolane
was unequivocally defiant:
“
Do what you have
to do and we will do what we have to do for our members. Kindly cease
from treating workers as criminals, when
all they want is to have
peaceful meetings within voter come premises.”
[5]
Despite this, Morolane gained access to the premises, apparently
using a Bidvest employee’s access card, and held
an
unauthorized meeting with the employees on 16 January 2019. He also
demanded a meeting with Vodacom and threatened that if a
meeting was
not convened “all hell would break loose”. When Bidvest
Facilities wrote to NASA imploring it not to persist
with its
conduct, Morolane’s belligerent response was:
“
Kindly
note that we will continue to have meetings with our members, and you
will not stop us or any of our deployees. I engaged
with your
representatives were present in that meeting. I am further telling
you that next week we will be having a meeting at
Lapa with workers
stop us if you can.” (
sic
)
[6]
This reply referred to a meeting with representatives of Bidvest,
which did in fact take place on 16 January, at which
there was a
discussion about proper requirements that had to be met for meetings
to be held. However, Vodacom denied that any agreement
was reached
and this is not disputed by the union.
[7]
On 25 January, Morolane and other officials of NASA once again
entered the premises, without prior notice or agreement,
and held a
meeting with Bidvest employees in their canteen on the premises.
[8]
In consequence, Bidvest Services demanded a written undertaking from
the union by 1 February
2019, to stop entering its premises and
convening meetings with its members. The letter further warned that
in the absence of the
undertaking it would seek an interdict on an
urgent basis. No undertaking was forthcoming and on 29 January
capital Morolane once
again entered the premises without permission.
Further, on 4 February, the union’s attorneys wrote to
Vodacom’s attorneys.
In the replying letter, the union denied
ever holding unauthorized meetings and further advised that it was
unable to give the
undertaking requested because that would
effectively ‘disassociate’ from workers. Vodacom then
advised of its intention
to launch the interdict, which was served on
19 February.
[9]
Vodacom set out the rights it sought to assert in the following terms
in the founding affidavit, which I repeat
verbatim
:
9.1
The applicant has the right to exclusive, peaceful and undisturbed
use of its premises.
9.2
The applicant is a mobile network company that derives a significant
portion of its income from
the operations at the premises in
question. It has a right to conduct its business in a lawful manner
and without interference
and disturbance from third parties.
9.3
NASA and Mr. Morolane’s conduct unlawfully frustrates the right
of the applicant to its
use and enjoyment of its premises and to
conduct its business free of interference from the unlawful trade
union activities.
9.4
The applicant further has the right not to be intimidated through
unlawful conduct to be subject
to unlawful gatherings, not convened
in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 1993 [none of the
gatherings by NASA on the
applicants premises have the necessary
authority in terms of this act)
[10]
NASA and Mr. Morolane apparently justify their actions as a
manifestation of their constitutional
rights to Association and fair
labour practices. They have no protected rights in respect of the
applicant and its employees. The
applicant is not the employer of the
employees who are the focus of the dispute. NASA is not a registered
union and has no rights
arising from the LRA or elsewhere entitling
it to come on to Vodacom’s property and disrupt its business.
The urgent proceedings
[11]
When the application was first set down, only Vodacom and the
respondents were parties
to the application. In the course of their
argument the court raised a concern whether the labour court had
jurisdiction to hear
the application, given the fact that Vodacom is
essentially asserting its property rights to bar meetings of the
union with employees
of third parties, namely Bidvest Facilities and
Bidvest Services, on its premises. In passing, the court also noted
the absence
of the Bidvest firms as parties.
[12]
The hearing was adjourned to permit both parties to file further
heads of argument on this
issue and the respondents gave an
undertaking not to attempt to enter Vodacom’s premises pending
judgment in the application
being handed down.
[13]
In the
interval before the court reconvened on 25 February, Bidvest
Facilities and Bidvest Services applied for leave to intervene
in the
application. When the hearing resumed, the union accepted that the
two additional applicants were entitled to intervene
having a
material legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings, but
contested that they were not entitled to address the merits
of their
own entitlement to an interdict, which had been canvassed in argument
but not decided in the first hearing. There is no
authority for this
proposition and they were entitled to address the merits of the
application.
[1]
[14]
The intervening applicants aligned themselves with the case pleaded
by Vodacom, and articulated
various grounds why they had a
substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings. In summary,
these were that:
14.1 the
union’s failure to adhere to terms of access disrupted the
services they rendered to Vodacom, and
14.2
Notwithstanding their claim that they were entitled to have access to
and meet with employees on the basis of their
right to freedom of
association and fair labour practices in the Constitution, in fact
the respondents had no right to organize
and conduct meetings with
their employees because the NASA is not a registered union and the
premises of Vodacom are not the premises
of the intervening
applicants.
Urgency
[15]
The union argued that the application was not urgent because there
was no imminent meeting
on the premises which could be anticipated.
Accordingly, it argued that Vodacom was not threatened with any
imminent harm. Moreover
the union denied that the meetings which had
been held were disruptive, threatening or unruly.
[16]
It is arguable that the application could have been launched sooner
after the union refused
to give the undertaking, but the union’s
attack on urgency ignores the fact that it is precisely the
unpredictability of
its arrival at the premises, which constitutes an
ever present threat that Vodacom’s rights would be violated.
The nature
of the rights in question is discussed further below, but
where a clear right exists it is not necessary for an applicant to
also
demonstrate some other form of harm, for example in the form of
damage or losses that it might suffer, before it can assert its
right
on an urgent basis.
Jurisdiction
[17]
Section 157 of the Labour relations act 66 of 1995 (‘the
LRA’) provides:
“
(1)
Subject to the Constitution and section 173, and except where this
Act provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction
in respect of all matters that elsewhere in terms of this Act
or in
terms of any other law are to be determined by the Labour Court.
(2)
The Labour Court has
concurrent jurisdiction
with the High
Court in respect of
any alleged or threatened violation of any
fundamental right
entrenched in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and
arising from
–
(a)
employment
and from labour relations
;
…”
[18]
In
Zungu v Premier, Province of Kwazulu-Natal & another
,
the LAC reaffirmed the correct approach to determining this court’s
jurisdiction:
[17] Perhaps the
point of departure ought to be the question whether the Labour
Court is required to assess what character
the dispute manifests to
determine its own jurisdiction. It is not argued that it may not do
so, and the decision in
Gcaba v Minister for Safety &
Security & others
is dispositive of that proposition:
‘
Jurisdiction
is determined on the basis of the pleadings, as Langa CJ held
in
Chirwa
, and not the substantive merits of the case. If
Mr Gcaba’s case were heard by the High Court, he would have
failed for not
being able to make out a case for the relief he
sought, namely review of an administrative decision. In the event of
the court’s
jurisdiction being challenged at the outset (
in
limine
), the applicant’s pleadings are the determining
factor. They contain the legal basis of the claim under which
the applicant
has chosen to invoke the court’s competence.
While
the pleadings — including, in motion proceedings,
not only the formal terminology of the notice of motion, but also the
contents
of the supporting affidavits — must be interpreted to
establish what the legal basis of the applicant’s claim is
,
it is not for the court to say that the facts asserted by the
applicant would also sustain another claim, cognizable only
in
another court. If, however, the pleadings, properly interpreted,
establish that the applicant is asserting a claim under the
LRA, one
that is to be determined exclusively by the Labour Court, the High
Court would lack jurisdiction. An applicant like Mr
Gcaba,who is
unable to plead facts that sustain a cause of administrative action
that is cognizable by the High Court, should thus
approach the Labour
Court.’ (Emphasis supplied; footnote omitted.)
[18] Accordingly, the
first exercise in any proceedings is to read, as in this case,
the allegations in the affidavits, and
make the determination. It is
not, primarily, the form of relief sought, but rather the necessary
averments to demonstrate the
‘cause of action’ that
determines the ‘character’ of the dispute, although the
form of the relief, if it
is consonant with the cause of action, will
point in the same direction.”
[2]
[19]
In this
instance, the essential averments relied upon by Vodacom concerned
the alleged interference by the respondents with its
right to
undisturbed use of the property and the right to conduct its business
without unlawful interference. It further contends
that the right of
freedom of association and the right to fair labour practices,
which the respondents believe override
Vodacom’s
proprietary and business interests, cannot be asserted against it
unless provided for in the LRA. As the union
is unregistered, it
cannot even invoke the provisions of Chapter III of the LRA which can
result in a ‘sufficiently representative’
registered
union being granted rights of access and meeting facilities in terms
of s 12 of the LRA.
[3]
[20]
Clearly, the LRA does not contain provisions giving labour court
exclusive jurisdiction
to deal with the infringement of property
rights. The question then is whether the alleged or threatened
violation of any fundamental
right entrenched in Chapter 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and arising from
employment and
from labour relations;
[21]
There are two ways of approaching the question: narrowly, by
considering only the constitutional
right that the party seeks to
assert, or more broadly, by considering if the infringement of any
constitutional right arises for
consideration in matter. On either
approach the alleged infringement must also arise from ‘employment
and labour relations’.
[22]
The
narrower interpretation will be considered first. The Constitutional
Court has held that the right in s 25 of the Constitution
of an owner
of property not to be “deprived” of it “except in
terms of law of general application”, includes
deprivation of
use and enjoyment of the property.
[4]
This right which Vodacom asserts is being threatened would
provisionally bring its claim under s 157(2) of the LRA, subject only
to the requirement that the alleged violation ‘arises from
employment and labour relations’
[23]
Mr Mdludla, appearing for the respondents, argued that the phrase
‘employment and labour relations’
must be read
conjunctively, and in the absence of an employment relationship
between Vodacom and the Bidvest employees NASA is
organising, the
violation complained of falls outside the ambit of s 157(2)(a).
However, the section does not specify that the
parties to the
litigation must
be in
an employment relationship. If the
legislature wanted to restrict the interpretation solely to disputes
concerning infringement
of fundamental rights arising between
employers and their employees, it would surely have stated this
explicitly, rather than using
a phrase which essentially describes a
context from which the alleged infringement arises.
[24]
The term
‘labour relations’ is also wide in ambit, but in the
context of the LRA must at least encompass collective
labour issues
and dispute resolution, which are described in the preamble to the
LRA.
[5]
There is an
employment relationship between Bidvest Services and the employees
the union wants to meet with and have access
to. The union is clearly
attempting to exercise organisational rights which is a labour
relations matter. The demand it is making
to Vodacom, to employ the
cleaners directly is also an employment related matter and the
presentation of the demand is a bargaining
issue falling squarely
within the sphere of labour relations.
[25]
Accordingly, even if I only consider the property right Vodacom seeks
to assert and even
if I assume the phrase ‘employment and
labour relations’ must be interpreted conjunctively, I am
satisfied that an
assertion of property rights by owner of premises
vis-à-vis a union attempting to have access to a workplace on
those premises,
and to meet with employees there, involves the
alleged infringement of a constitutional right arising from
employment and industrial
relations.
[26]
The union’s submission is that the terms ‘employment’
and ‘labour
relations’ are distinct and both criteria
must be met. In my view, the proper interpretation of the phrase
‘employment
and labour relations’ is that it describes an
entire sphere of relations embracing both issues of employment and
labour relations.
If the terms were to be treated as distinct, no
case involving an individual employment relationship where a
constitutional right
was at issue could be entertained by the court
because the collective ‘labour relations’ component would
be absent.
That could never have been the legislature’s
intention.
[27]
Considering a broader interpretation of the alleged infringement of a
constitutional right,
it is not implausible to argue that the union’s
own allegation that the affected employees’ right to freedom of
association
and to fair labour practices is threatened by the
application could also satisfy the first part of the jurisdictional
requirement
of s 157(2)(a) , even though that is an alleged
consequence of the right asserted by Vodacom, rather than the cause
of action in
the application. However, it is unnecessary to attempt
to answer this definitively on the facts in this case in the light of
applying
the narrower interpretation above.
[28]
In relation to the Bidvest companies, they assert
inter alia
that
the interdict is necessary to prevent the disruption of the services
they render to Vodacom. However, there is nothing to indicate
that
the performance of cleaning services was in any way disrupted.
Further, they argue that they have a clear right to bar
the
respondents from the premises for the purposes of gaining access to
their employees and hold meetings with them. This is because
the
union has not obtained rights of access and holding meetings using
the mechanisms of Chapter III of the LRA which regulate
the exercise
of freedom of association and organisational rights in the
workplace. There is also no collective agreement
in place,
which grants the union such rights, that it might have obtained
through the alternative mechanism of collective bargaining.
[29]
The union
contends that by not granting it access to the workplace of Bidvest
Services where its employees are situated on the premises
of Vodacom
negates their rights of freedom of association and fair labour
practices, forcing it to ‘dissociate’ from
its members.
It placed some reliance on the case of
Unica
Plastic Moulders CC v National Union of SA Workers
.
[6]
In that case an employer had sought an interdict
inter
alia
to
interdicting and restrain a deregistered union “from
approaching or being within 50 metres of the applicant's premises
and
from recruiting and writing letters to the applicant.”
[7]
The court refused the relief sought, holding that:
“
An
unregistered trade union is also not barred from recruiting members
nor is it barred from negotiating on behalf of its members.
I can
also find no basis as to why NUSAW should be interdicted and
restrained from approaching or being within 50 metres of the
applicant's premises.
An
unregistered trade union may, however, not claim, as a matter of
right any of the organizational rights provided for in the LRA
.”
[8]
(emphasis
added)
[30]
The emphasised portion of the extract above is what distinguishes the
situation in
Unica
from the situation here. In this
instance, it is the union’s insistence on exercising its right
to meet with employees
in the workplace
that Bidvest Services
is resisting. It is true that meetings with employees in the
workplace is probably the most effective way
of organising employees,
but the LRA does not even afford this right automatically to
registered unions: a registered union must
still satisfy the
requirements of being ‘sufficiently representative’ in
terms of s 11 of the LRA to exercise the rights
of access to
employees and the right to hold meetings in terms of s 12(1) and (2)
of the LRA.
[31]
If the
respondents believe the mechanisms of Chapter III, or the alternative
approach of obtaining rights through collective bargaining,
are
insufficient to give effect to the right of freedom of association,
then they would need to challenge the constitutionality
of the
offending provisions of the LRA. The Constitutional Court
reiterated the principle of subsidiarity in
Mbatha
v University of Zululand
[9]
:
[173]
Consistent with the principle of constitutional subsidiarity , where
legislation has been passed to give effect to a right
in the Bill of
Rights, a litigant is not permitted to rely directly on the
Constitution for its cause of action. In
SA National Defence
Union
, this court held that a litigant who wishes to assert a
constitutional right given effect to by legislation must rely on that
legislation,
and not directly on the right in the Bill of Rights. In
that case, the court said:
'[A]
litigant who seeks to assert his or her right to engage in
collective bargaining under s 23(5) should in the first place
base his or her case on any legislation enacted to regulate the
right, not on s 23(5). If the legislation is wanting in its
protection
of the s 23(5) right in the litigant's view, then that
legislation should be challenged constitutionally. To permit the
litigant
to ignore the legislation and rely directly on the
constitutional provision would be to fail to recognize the important
task conferred
upon the legislature by the Constitution to respect,
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights."
[10]
[32]
Therefore, as matters stand, the respondents cannot bypass the LRA
mechanisms for achieving
rights of access and convening meetings of
members at the workplace of the employer by trying to directly
enforce their constitutional
rights to freedom of association and
fair labour practices. Consequently, have no right to insist on
access to the premises
to communicate with Bidvest Services’
employees or to hold meetings with them on the premises. By the same
token, Bidvest
Services is entitled to seek relief to prevent them
from doing so in the absence of obtaining such rights through the
alternative
mechanisms of the LRA. In regard to Bidvest Services the
relief sought relates to the exercise of rights provided for in
Chapter
III, in the absence of there being an issue about whether the
right can be obtained through collective bargaining, and ultimately
falls within the labour court’s jurisdiction under s 63(1) to
(4) of the LRA, and does not fall under the jurisdiction of
any other
court.
Entitlement to final
relief
[33]
In
conclusion, I am satisfied Bidvest Services and Vodacom have
demonstrated they have clear rights to assert. In an
application
for final interdictory relief, the three requirements
which must be met are that the applicant must demonstrate (a) a clear
right;
(b) an injury actually committed or reasonably apprehended;
and (c) the absence of any other satisfactory remedy.
[11]
[34]
The injury
apprehended and already sustained is the infringement of the clear
rights as such.
[12]
Is
there a reasonable alternative remedy available to them in due
course? The respondents have shown themselves to
be adept in
avoiding the access controls to the premises by using employee’s
access cards. The respondents refuse to
give any undertaking
they will desist from accessing the premises and meeting with
employees in the absence of any right to. I
do see what alternative
remedy the applicants have in the circumstances.
Costs
[35]
Ordinarily,
I would be reluctant to grant costs and I am mindful of the decision
of the constitutional court in
Zungu
v Premier of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal & others
,
[13]
However, the respondents adopted an implacable approach in insisting
on entering and holding meetings on the property despite being
clearly told on more than one occasion they were not given
authorisation to do so. They had ample time to reflect on whether to
persist with their chosen course of action. It is also clear that
they were initially granted rights of access, but abused that
concession by arriving and entering the premises without prior
notification or ignoring designated meeting venues. Had they
not done this, they probably would still be accessing the premises
and meeting with Bidvest Services employees today. The respondents
also made no attempt to initiate the dispute procedures of the LRA to
try and obtain such rights through collective bargaining.
Lastly,
they were asked to give an undertaking not to enter premises before
Vodacom launched these proceedings, but were unwilling
to accede to
that. Had they done so, it would have obviated the need to launch the
application.
[36]
To the extent that the subsequent joinder of the second and third
respondents joined the
proceedings somewhat reluctantly and that the
second day of the hearing was occasioned by the court raising the
jurisdictional
question, I am of the view that the respondents should
not be held responsible for costs of the respondents, except those of
Vodacom
up to the end of the first day of proceedings on 14 February
2019.
Order
[1]
The second and third applicants are granted leave to intervene in the
proceedings.
[2]
The matter is heard as one of urgency and the usual forms and service
provided for in the Labour Court Rules are dispensed
with.
[3]
It is declared that the first respondent is not a registered trade
union at the time of judgement being handed down and
is not entitled
to exercise organisational rights afforded by Chapter III of the
Labour Relations Act insofar as it remains unregistered,
or
alternatively, in the absence of a collective agreement affording
it such rights.
[4]
The first respondent and any official, or office-bearer of the first
respondent, including the second respondent are interdicted
and
restrained from:
4.1
Entering, or being upon, the premises on which the first applicant,
second and third applicants
conduct business at Vodacom Midrand
Campus (comprising Vodacom World, Corporate Park, Service Park,
Commercial Park, NSN, Innovation
Centre and Business Park) situated
at 082 Vodacom Boulevard, Noordwyk, Midrand, Guateng, unless that
person has received, and is
in possession of, written permission to
do so that has been granted by the Applicant’s Managing
Executive: Employment Law,
Claire Margaret Alexandra Lapham, and then
strictly subject to any conditions that may apply in respect of such
written permission;
4.2
Conducting, organising, attending or in any manner participating in
any gathering or meeting on
the aforesaid premises;
4.3
Interfering with the first applicant’s right to undisturbed use
of its premises.
[5]
Insofar as the applicants require the assistance of the South African
Police Services (‘the SAPS’) to enforce
this order the
SAPS must do so.
[6]
The respondents are jointly and severally liable for the first
applicants’ costs incurred up to and including 14
February
2019.
_______________________
R
G Lagrange
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
FIRST
APPLICANT:
REDDING
SC
INSTRUCTED
BY ENS AFRICA
SECOND
AND THIRD APPLICANTS
FIRST
AND SECOND RESPONDENTS:
SONETTE
LANCASTER
OF
LANCASTER KUNGOANE ATTORNEYS
SIHLE
MDLUDLA
INSTRUCTED
BY NDOBELA LAMOLA INC
[1]
Erasmus:
Superior
Court Practice
,
D Loggerenberg
et
al
, RS
7, 2018 at D1-141 characterises the position of the intervening
party thus:
“
When
leave to intervene is granted by the court, the party given it is
placed in the same position as and is clothed with the
same rights
as the other parties, unless of course such rights are specifically
curtailed.”
[2]
(2017) 38
ILJ
1644 (LAC) at 1649-1650.
[3]
Sections 11 and 12 of the LRA state:
11.
Trade union representativeness
In
this Part, unless otherwise stated, "representative trade
union" means a registered trade union, or two or more
registered trade unions acting jointly, that are sufficiently
representative of the employees employed by an employer in a
workplace.
12.
Trade union access to workplace
(1)
Any office-bearer or official
of a representative trade union is entitled to enter the
employer's
premises in order to recruit members or communicate with members, or
otherwise serve members' interests.
(2)
A representative trade union is
entitled to hold meetings with employees outside their
working hours
at the employer's premises.
[4]
[4]
First
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African
Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA
Ltd t/a
Wesbank V Minister of Finance
[2002] ZACC 5
;
2002
(4) SA 768
(CC)
at
796:
“
[57] The term
'deprive' or 'deprivation' is, as
Van der Walt
(1997)
points out, somewhat misleading or confusing because it can
create the wrong impression that it invariably
refers to the taking
away of property, whereas in fact
'the term
''deprivation'' is distinguished very clearly from the narrower term
''expropriation'' in constitutional jurisprudence
worldwide'.
92
In
a certain sense any interference with the use, enjoyment or
exploitation of private property involves some deprivation in
respect of the person having title or right to or in the property
concerned. If s 25 is applied to this wide
genus
of
interference, 'deprivation' would encompass all species thereof
and 'expropriation' would apply only to a narrower
species of
interference.”
[5]
The preamble to the LRA states it is intended:
“
To
change the law governing labour relations and, for that purpose-
to
give effect to section
23
of the Constitution;
to regulate the
organisational rights of trade unions;
to promote and
facilitate collective bargaining at the workplace and at sectoral
level;
to regulate the right to
strike and the recourse to lockout in conformity with the
Constitution;
to promote employee
participation in decision-making through the establishment of
workplace forums;
to provide simple
procedures for the resolution of labour disputes through statutory
conciliation, mediation and arbitration (for
which purpose the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration is
established), and through independent alternative
dispute resolution
services accredited for that purpose;
to establish the Labour
Court and Labour Appeal Court as superior courts, with exclusive
jurisdiction to decide matters arising
from the Act;
to provide for a
simplified procedure for the registration of trade unions and
employers' organisations, and to provide for their
regulation to
ensure democratic practices and proper financial control;
to give effect to the
public international law obligations of the Republic relating to
labour relations;
to amend and repeal
certain laws relating to labour relations; and
to provide for
incidental matters.”
[6]
(2011) 32
ILJ
443 (LC)
[7]
At 445, para [1].
[8]
At 453, para [25].
[9]
(2014) 35
ILJ
349 (CC)
[10]
At 395, para [173].
[11]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221
at 227;
V
& A Waterfront Properties (Pty) Ltd & another v Helicopter &
Marine Services (Pty) Ltd & others
2006 (1) SA 252
(SCA) at para 20
[12]
See discussion in C B Prest,
The
Law of Interdicts
,
Juta, 1993 at 44.
[13]
(2018) 39 ILJ 523 (CC) at paras [22] to [26]