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[2018] ZALCJHB 428
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Chanda v Ratlou Local Municipality (J4584/2018) [2018] ZALCJHB 428 (28 December 2018)
IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not reportable
Case No: J 4584/2018
In the matter between:
TEBOGO SHADRACK
CHANDA Applicant
and
RATLOU LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY Respondent
Heard: 21 December
2018
Delivered: 28
December 2018
JUDGMENT
TLHOTLHALEMAJE,
J
[1]
The Applicant approached this Court on an urgent basis to seek orders
to set aside the decision of the Council of the Respondent
taken on
13 December 2018 to suspend or place him on forced special
leave, and to uplift the said suspension or
special leave with
immediate effect.
[2]
The Applicant is the current Municipal Manager of the Respondent,
having been appointed on 31 August 2018. He assumed
his
duties from 1 October 2018. His suspension or forced
special leave took place within six weeks of his employment.
Upon his
employment, he had concluded a contract of employment. The
Respondent’s Speaker and deponent to the answering affidavit
however denies the existence of a contract of employment between the
parties.
[3]
The Applicant’s averments in support of the relief he seeks are
as follows;
3.1. On 31 October 2018,
the Respondent’s Council took a resolution to terminate with
effect from 1 November 2018
and upon one month’s
notice, the employment of 34 employees whose contracts of employment
were converted from fixed term
to permanent employment by the
previous Municipal Manager. A dispute between these individual
employees with the Respondent is
currently pending before the
North West High Court. In that application, the Respondent seeks an
order reviewing and setting
aside the 34 employees’ contracts
of employment.
3.2. The Applicant
advised Respondent’s Council on 1 November 2018 upon
discussing the matter with the Respondent’s
Manager for Legal
Services that the proposed termination as per the Council Resolution
would not be fair. This was due to various
factors, including that
the conversions took place in September 2014; Council had
instructed legal representatives to review
and set aside the said
decision, which matter was instituted in August 2018, and still
pending before the North West High
Court. A set-down had also been
requested in that matter.
3.3. The Applicant had
further proposed to Council that legal representatives should be
invited to make representations as to how
to proceed with the matter,
in the light of the pending application.
3.4. In a response, the
Speaker of the Council wrote back to the Applicant, expressing a
different opinion, and further warning
him not to attempt to contest
the Council’s resolution. According to the Applicant, it was
expected of him to slavishly follow
and implement the decision of
Council despite the fact that it did not conform to the advice the
Council obtained from legal representatives.
3.5. At an Executive
Committee meeting (constituted by the Mayor, mayoral committee,
Municipal Manager and other Senior Managers)
held on 6 November 2018,
it was then resolved that further legal opinion be obtained on the
matter. Such legal opinion
was obtained on 11 November 2018,
which basically confirmed the view that should the affected any of
the 34 employees
approach a court on an urgent basis to interdict the
termination of their contracts, the court would not be sympathetic to
the
Respondent in the light of the pending review application before
the North West High Court.
3.6. A Special Meeting
was convened by the Council on 21 November 2018, and
nonetheless passed a resolution directing
the Applicant to terminate
the employment contracts of the 34 individual employees within 14
days.
3.7. On 13 December 2018,
the Council convened another Special Meeting to discuss an update on
the termination of the
employment contracts in question. At that
meeting, the Applicant advised that he had not carried out the
instruction to terminate
the employees’ services, and that a
legal opinion was obtained advising against taking decisions to
effect the dismissals
whilst a Court application was pending.
3.8. The Applicant upon
making his submissions was then requested to leave the meeting. He
was then called back, and was then informed
orally that Council had
resolved to place him on special leave for a period of three months.
According to the Applicant, there
was no explanation surrounding the
resolution. He was then instructed to leave the Municipality with
immediate effect, and another
person, Sejake was immediately
appointed as Acting Municipal Manager.
[4]
The applicant’s case is that the decision of the Respondent to
place him on forced special leave is unlawful for the following
reasons;
4.1 There is no provision
in law nor in his contract of employment upon which the Council may
be entitled to place him on special
leave. It is only where he was
accused of misconduct that he could be suspended pending
investigations into the allegations of
misconduct, and the Council
therefore had no grounds to suspend him, which was its real intention
in the light of his failure to
heed the unlawful instruction to
terminate the contract of employment of the 34 individual employees.
4.2 Paragraph 32 of his
contract of employment, which the Respondent seeks to deny, provides
that special leave is to be taken at
his insistence and ought not be
imposed by the Respondent.
4.3 Where the Respondent
sought to suspend him, he was supposed to have been provided
with a notice of intention to suspend,
and be afforded an opportunity
to make representations why he should not be placed on suspension.
4.4 The decision to
suspend or discuss the Applicant’s conduct was never placed on
the agenda of any meeting of the Council,
and the Council could not
have discussed the suspension without following the requisite
procedures. That decision, which was not
explained at the time,
lacked any rational basis.
[5]
The respondent opposed the application on various grounds including
that;
5.1 The urgency claimed
by the applicant is self-created, and the application was an abuse of
court process
5.2 The applicant was
placed on special leave with full pay and benefits, and therefore
suffered no prejudice during the period
of suspension
5.3 This court lacked
jurisdiction to review and set aside the resolution taken by the
respondent, and lacked the powers to uplift
the applicant’s
special leave
5.4 The applicant has not
been placed under suspension and there was no labour dispute that
justified the court’s intervention
with the respondent’s
resolution to place him on leave.
5.5 The applicant failed
to exhaust SALGBC dispute resolution procedures, and therefor the
matter was launched prematurely to this
court.
5.6 The applicant had not
yet signed a contract of employment with the respondent, and the
latter had no knowledge of the purported
contract concluded with the
applicant.
Evaluation:
[6]
Various defences raised in opposing this application clearly have no
merit;
6.1 The first is that the
Respondent’s contentions that the application is not urgent is
misplaced. The applicant having been
suspended or placed on forced
special leave on 13 December 2018, approached this Court on
18 December 2018,
and it cannot be doubted that he had
indeed acted with the necessary haste.
6.2 The facts of this
case given the issues raised in the founding affidavit and the
responses thereto, also give rise to the need
for it to be treated
with urgency. In particular, as shall be demonstrated in the course
of this judgment, the ‘forced special
leave’, which is
essentially in a guise of a suspension, is so patently unlawful, and
there is clearly no basis for any conclusion
to be reached that the
urgency claimed in this case is self-created, particularly since the
Applicant had established a clear
right to the relief that he
seeks.
6.3 The second issue
relates to the jurisdiction of this Court, a matter which is aligned
to whether the Applicant has alternative
remedies available to him.
His case is grounded on the unlawfulness of the decision taken to
place him on suspension, even if the
Respondent contends that he was
merely placed on special leave. The Applicant is not alleging
unfairness, and it is trite that
the SALGBC would not have the
requisite jurisdiction to determine the unlawfulness of the
suspension or special leave. A further
contention therefore that the
Applicant failed to exhaust internal remedies, or that this
application is premature is misplaced,
particularly since the alleged
internal remedy referred to is the SALGBC. The SALGBC cannot serve as
an ‘internal remedy’
as contended on behalf of the
Respondent. Further as shall be discussed below, despite the
Respondent having denied the existence
of an employment contract, it
nonetheless sought to rely on clause 35 of the very same contract of
employment, which reliance was
in any event misplaced.
6.4 A third consideration
is that the Respondent seeks to deny the existence of the contract of
employment relied upon by the Applicant,
on the grounds that such a
contract ought to have been signed within three months from the date
that the applicant was served with
a letter of appointment, and that
it had not been signed on behalf of the Respondent.
6.5 The letter of
appointment was signed by the Speaker of the Respondent, Tebogo
Modise on its behalf on 31 August 2018.
The contract of
employment also appears to have been signed by Modise on the
Respondent’s behalf,
albeit
it is undated. Mr Makoti’s
submissions on behalf of the applicant that it only required a naked
eye to see the similarities
between Modise’s signature on the
letter of appointment and the contract of employment is not
far-fetched.
6.6
Prima facie
, I
have no reason not to believe that a contract of employment was
entered into between the Applicant and the Respondent, which
by all
account should determine his terms and conditions of employment in
conjunction with other applicable prescripts.
6.7
It is trite
that the employment of Municipal Manager is in terms of section 54A
of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act
[1]
(The Systems Act), and that their terms and conditions of
employment are subject to the Local Government: Disciplinary
Regulations
for Senior Managers (The Regulations). Regulation 5 and 6
of the Regulations make provision for the suspension of an employee
such
as the Applicant, where there is reason to believe that he might
have been involved in acts of misconduct necessitating his removal
from his position either by means of a precautionary suspension or
ultimately, a dismissal.
6.8 The facts of this
case are curious in the extreme. First, the suspension or placing of
the Applicant on forced special leave
was never an item on the agenda
of the Special Council Meeting held on 13 December 2018. He
was verbally informed that
he was to be placed on special leave. The
respondent seeks to rely on Annexure ‘QS’ as some formal
notification by
the Council of its decision to place him on special
leave. Be that as it may, there is no evidence to indicate how that
notice
was served on him, by whom, and when. In any event, the letter
is dated 14 December 2018, and the decision to place the
Applicant on special leave was verbally communicated on 13 December
2018 and he was requested to leave the premises immediately.
6.9 Even if the letter
served as formal notice of being placed on special leave, at its
paragraph 2.1, it states that; “
The council grant the
Municipal Manager special leave to allow council through EXCO to
investigate all alleged acts of misconduct
committed by the Municipal
Manager”
(Sic)
6.10
To the
extent that any allegations of misconduct were levelled against the
Applicant, any procedure to be followed in that regard
could only be
in terms of Regulation 5 and 6 of the Regulations
[2]
,
something which the Council should be familiar with.
6.11 To the extent that
the Respondent sought to place the Applicant on forced special leave,
it should be known to it that since
the Applicant is a senior
manager, his conditions of employment are governed by the Local
Government: Regulations: Appointment
and Conditions of Employment of
Senior Managers promulgated in terms of the Local Government:
Municipality Systems Act of 2000
(the Regulations). The Regulations
recognises three circumstances or conditions which would qualify an
employee to take leave,
amongst which is family responsibility leave
and special leave. Such leave can only be granted upon the request of
the senior manager.
6.12 There is no
provisions for something called ‘forced special leave’
unless provided for in terms of Clause 32 (3)
of the Regulations,
which requires a municipality to adopt a special leave policy which
defines the circumstances and conditions
under which special leave
may be granted. To the extent that the Respondent insisted that the
Applicant is placed on special leave
rather than suspension for
alleged misconduct which still needed to be investigated, it is still
not clear what is the source document
or authority relied upon by the
Respondent in doing so.
6.13
In
Heyneke
v Umhlatuze Municipality
[3]
,
this
Court in dealing with not so dissimilar set of facts had the
following to say;
“
Special
leave that is imposed on employees is effectively a suspension in the
hope of subverting the residual unfair labour practice
provisions of
the Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 (LRA) and all the time and
other constraints that accompany suspensions.
To
discharge its onus of proving the... lawfulness of the special leave
the municipality has to show that the special leave was
at all times
at the instance of the employee and with his consent, that it was not
imposed on him, that exceptional circumstances
existed and that the
special leave resolution was adopted in good faith, and that it was
rational, reasonable, proportionate and
in the public interest.”
6.14 In this case, given
the haste and manner with which the ‘forced special leave’
was imposed on the Applicant, it
is apparent that the Respondent
sought to subvert the provisions of Local Government: Disciplinary
Regulations for Senior Managers,
and I am satisfied that the
Applicant has established a clear right to the relief that he seeks,
as no attempt was made to comply
with the provisions of the
Regulations in suspending him, and furthermore, there is no source
document or authority relied upon
by the Respondent in imposing the
forced special leave.
6.15 In this case, it can
also be safely stated that the Respondent failed to adhere to
principles of natural justice enshrined
in the Regulations, by
affording the applicant an opportunity to make representations as to
why he should not be placed on suspension
or special leave, and there
is further nothing placed before this Court that demonstrates that
the decision of the Council can
be classified as either sound or
rational.
6.16 The fact that the
Applicant is placed on special leave with full pay is equally a
concern, as it appears that public entities
are contend to incur such
unnecessary costs at the expense of the public purse without
consequences, and a simple retort that the
employee would not suffer
any prejudice. That practice of simply placing employees on paid
suspension, even if limited to three
months, is inimical to good
governance, especially when there is no rational basis for such
decisions.
[7]
There are further worrying features with this application and the
Respondent’s conduct in opposing this matter. The first
is that
despite the Respondent’s contentions that annexure ‘QS1’
to the answering affidavit, which is the purported
letter advising
the Applicant of the forced special leave, was issued or sent
to the Applicant, no attempt was made to indicate
how, when and by
whom was that document sent to him. The Court should take umbrage to
such falsehoods.
[8]
Furthermore, it appears that the Council was displeased with the
reluctance of the Applicant to implement its decision to dismiss
the
34 employees employed by the previous Municipal manager. To the
extent that the Respondent had a pending review application
at the
North West High Court in regards to the employment of the 34
employees, the haste and manner with which the Council, contrary
to
sound legal advice would want to nonetheless implement its
decision to dismiss those employees, reflects self-help and
complete
disregard of the rule of law for whatever ends it seeks to achieve.
[9]
Furthermore, there is nothing in the answering papers to support any
contention that the Applicant had gone on a frolic of his
own and
displayed open defiance of the Council for no reason. Out of concern
of the legality and fairness of implementation of
the Council’s
decision, and the foreseeable consequences thereof, the Applicant had
consulted and conferred with the Manager,
Legal Services, and
obtained legal opinion which for reasons that are not clear, the
Council seeks to ignore.
[10]
As head of
administration, the Applicant as Municipal Manager is subject to the
policy directions of the Council, but at the same
time, as the
accounting officer, and under the provisions of section 55 of the
Municipal Systems Act
[4]
, he has
an obligation to guide Council where its decisions may be patently
wrong, unlawful, irrational, unconstitutional and not
in the best
interests of the Respondent and the community it serves.
[11]
In this case, it appears that the Respondent’s Council sought
to be a law unto itself, which cannot bode well for our
constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It was therefore
telling and disconcerting, for counsel on behalf of the Respondent
to
submit that it was not for the Applicant to challenge or question the
decisions of Counsel irrespective of their lawfulness
or legality,
and that all that was required of him as an employee was to implement
those decisions. It is seriously disconcerting
therefore that
counsel, an officer of this Court can with certitude, essentially
make submissions to the effect that a Municipal
Council is
entitled to act as it pleases without due regard to its
constitutional obligations and the rule of law, and to effectively
subvert pending legal proceedings and the authority of Courts.
[12]
To conclude then in light of the above, I find that the Applicant has
satisfied the essential requirements of urgency as contemplated
in
Rule 8 of the Rules of this Court; has established a clear right to
the relief that he seeks, has no available alternative remedy,
and
would indeed suffer irreparable harm should urgent relief not be
granted.
[13]
Given the
gung-ho
manner with which the Respondent placed the
Applicant on ‘forced special leave’, which in any event
is euphemism for
a suspension, the unlawful nature of its decision
and its general approach in opposing this matter, it is my view that
the requirements
of law and fairness require that it be burdened with
a punitive cost.
[14]
The Applicant has not done this Court any favours by not citing the
individuals that took the impugned decision in this case
as
respondents for an appropriate order to be made. To the extent
however that such punitive costs are to be ultimately paid
by the
tax-payer, a copy of this judgment is to be sent to the Office of
National Treasury, for an assessment to be made as to
whether such
costs should not be classified as wasteful and fruitless expenditure,
for the purposes of taking any further action
against the individuals
in the Respondent’s Council, who took the impugned decision.
[15]
In the premises, the following order is made:
Order:
1. The Applicant’s
failure to comply with the Rules of this Court relating to form and
manner of service is condoned.
2. The decision taken on
13 December 2018 by the Council of Respondent to suspend or
place the Applicant of forced special
leave is set aside on
account of it being unlawful.
3. The Respondent is
ordered to uplift the Applicant’s special leave or suspension
with immediate effect.
4. The Respondent is
ordered pay to the Applicant, costs on attorney and own client scale,
including the costs of counsel.
5. The Registrar of this
Court is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Office of
National Treasury, for its assessment
as per paragraph [13] of this
judgment, and to make any determination as to the liability of any
individual (s) in respect
of the costs as per 4 above, incurred
by the Respondent in opposing this application.
___________________
Edwin
Tlhotlhalemaje
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES:
For
the Applicant: M.Z Makoti with l Boihang
Instructed
by: Moetsi Maredi Inc
For
the Respondent: M.J Mashavha
Instructed
by: H.R Munyai Attorneys
[1]
Act
32 of 2000
[2]
Regulations
5 and 6 read:
5. Disciplinary
procedures.
(1) Any allegation of
misconduct against a senior manager must be brought to the attention
of the municipal council.
(2) An allegation
referred to in sub-regulation (1) must be tabled by the mayor or the
municipal manager, as the case may be,
before the municipal council
not later than seven [7] days after receipt thereof, failing which
the mayor may request the Speaker
to convene a special council
meeting within seven [7] days to consider the said report.
(3) If the municipal
council is satisfied that –
(a) there is a
reasonable cause to believe that an act of misconduct has been
committed by the senior manager, the municipal council
must within
seven [7] days appoint an independent investigator to investigate
the allegation[s] of misconduct; and
(b) there is no evidence
to support the allegation[s] of misconduct against the senior
manager, the municipal council must within
seven [7] days dismiss
the allegation[s] of misconduct.
(4) The investigator
appointed in terms of sub-regulation (3)(a) must, within a period of
thirty [30] days of his or her appointment,
submit a report with
recommendations to the mayor or municipal manager, as the case may
be.
(5) The report
contemplated in sub-regulation (4) must be tabled before the
municipal council in the manner and within the timeframe
as set out
in sub-regulation (2).
(6) After having
considered the report referred to in sub regulation (4), the
municipal council must by way of a resolution institute
disciplinary
proceedings against the senior manager.
(7) The resolution in
sub-regulation (6) must-
(a) include a
determination as to whether the alleged misconduct is of a serious
or a less serious nature;
(b) authorise the mayor,
in the case of municipal manager, or municipal manager, in the case
of the manager, directly accountable
to the municipal manager to -
(i) appoint -
(aa) an independent and
external presiding officer; and
(bb) an officer to lead
evidence; and
(ii)
sign the letters of appointment.
6. Precautionary
suspension
(1) The municipal
council may suspend a senior manager on
full pay if it is
alleged that the senior manager has committed an act of misconduct,
where the municipal council has reason to
believe that-
(a) the presence of the
senior manager at the workplace may -
(i) jeopardise any
investigation into the alleged misconduct;
(ii) endanger the
well-being or safety of any person or municipal property; or
(iii) be detrimental to
stability in the municipality; or
(b) the senior manager
may-
(i) interfere with
potential witnesses; or
(ii) commit further acts
of misconduct.
(2) Before a senior
manager may be suspended, he or she must be given an opportunity to
make a written representation to the municipal
council why he or she
should not be suspended, within seven [7] days of being notified of
the council's decision to suspend him
or her.
(3) The municipal
council must consider any representation submitted to it by the
senior manager within seven [7] days.
(4) After having
considered the matters set out in sub regulation (1), as well as the
senior manager's representations contemplated
in sub-regulation (2),
the municipal council may suspend the senior manager concerned.
(5) The municipal
council must inform -
(a) the senior manager
in writing of the reasons for his or her suspension on or before the
date on which the senior manager is
suspended; and
(b) the Minister and the
MEC responsible for local government in the province where such
suspension has taken place, must be notified
in writing of such
suspension and the reasons for such within a period of seven [7]
days after such suspension.
(6) (a) If a senior
manager is suspended, a disciplinary hearing must commence within
three months after the date of suspension,
failing which the
suspension will automatically lapse.
(b) The period of three
months referred to in paragraph (a) may not be extended by council.”
[3]
(2010) 31 ILJ 2608 (LC) at para [33] – [34]
[4]
Act
32 of 2000