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[2018] ZALCJHB 397
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Sibanye Gold Limited t/a Sibanye Stillwater v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others (J 4390 / 18) [2018] ZALCJHB 397; (2019) 40 ILJ 898 (LC) (5 December 2018)
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
JOHANNESBURG
JUDGMENT
Reportable
CASE
NO: J 4390 / 18
In the matter
between:
SIBANYE GOLD LIMITED t/a SIBANYE
STILLWATER
Applicant
and
ASSOCIATION OF MINEWORKERS AND
CONSTRUCTION UNION
First Respondent
PERSONS
AS LISTED IN ANNEXURE “A”
Individual Respondents
Heard
:
4 December 2018
Delivered
:
5 December 2018
Summary:
Picketing Rules
–
section
69 of the LRA considered – Labour Court entitled to grant
urgent interim relief where picketing rules ineffective,
problematic
or breached
Picketing
Rules – section 69(12) – considering what is just and
equitable – picketing must not be rendered ineffective
–
balance to be struck between interests of parties
Picketing
– violence, unlawful conduct and intimidation – where
such conduct exists further tightening of picketing
rules justified –
compliance with section 69(1) required
Picketing
rules – amendment granted as urgent interim relief pending
further CCMA conciliation / adjudication proceedings
JUDGMENT
SNYMAN, AJ
Introduction
[1]
It is
unfortunately once again necessary for this Court to act as referee
in the case of unlawful behaviour, violence and intimidation
that
takes place during the course of protected strike action, where the
employer blames the union and the union says it is not
their or their
members’ fault. This entire state of affairs is unfortunate.
Picketing is an essential and integral part of
protected strike
action under the LRA, and unlawful conduct by striking employees
completely undermines it. As was said by Mogoeng
CJ in
SA
Transport and Allied Workers Union and Another v Garvas and
Others
[1]
:
‘…
Everyone
has the right, peacefully and unarmed, to assemble, to demonstrate,
to picket and to present petitions.' That is what s
17 of the
Constitution promises the people in South Africa.
This
means that everyone who is unarmed has the right to go out and
assemble with others to demonstrate, picket and present petitions
to
others for any lawful purpose
.’
[2]
There
are a number of judgments of this Court that expresses reservation
about what has become a normal consequence of protected
strike
action, being that of unlawful conduct by striking employees, and
which judgments are highly critical of such occurrences,
even
flirting with the proposition that such conduct should render the
strike itself unprotected.
[2]
As said by Van Niekerk J in
Tsogo
Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Montecasino v Future of SA Workers Union
and Others
[3]
:
‘…
But
the exercise of the right to strike is sullied and ultimately
eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage in acts
of
gratuitous violence in order to achieve their ends. When the tyranny
of the mob displaces the peaceful exercise of economic
pressure as
the means to the end of the resolution of a labour dispute, one must
question whether a strike continues to serve its
purpose and thus
whether it continues to enjoy protected status.’
[3]
It is
precisely to cater for these kind of occurrence that amendments were
introduced to section 69 of the Labour Relations Act
(‘the
LRA’)
[4]
so as to establish some semblance of order and peace by way of
readily enforceable picketing rules.
[5]
[4]
The
current application before me is a case in point. It is an urgent
application by the applicant in which the applicant in effect
seeks a
variation of the picketing rules issued in this matter, so as to
counter incidences of unlawful conduct by striking employees
despite
picketing rules having been issued. The application is opposed by the
respondents, who contend that the relief the applicant
seeks would
unduly infringe on their fundamental right to picket as an inherent
component of their protected strike.
[5]
When
this matter was argued before me, urgency was not placed in dispute.
I am in any event satisfied that the application is urgent,
and has
been brought by the applicant at the earliest opportunity. What is
sought is urgent interim relief, and there simply is
no substitute in
the form of other substantial redress for what the applicant is
seeking in this respect.
[6]
Section
69
[6]
Before
setting out the facts in this matter, it is perhaps best to first
deal with section 69 itself. What is settled is that it
is the trade
union that initiates the picket, and this can only take place as part
of a protected strike.
[7]
Once this has happened, either the trade union concerned or the
employer can refer a dispute to the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and Arbitration (‘CCMA’) for the purposes of
establishing picketing rules.
[8]
At the CCMA, the parties must first try and reach agreement on
picketing rules, and if they are unable to do so, the commissioner
will issue picketing rules in line with the Code of Good Practice
relating to picketing rules, and after considering
the
particular circumstances of the
workplace
or other premises where it is intended that the right to picket is to
be exercised
.
[9]
In
Verulam
Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction
Union and Others
[10]
,
the Court said:
‘…
Not
only are picketing rules there to attempt to ensure the safety and
security of persons and the employer's workplace, but if
they are not
obeyed and violence ensues resulting in non-strikers also withholding
their labour, the strikers gain an illegitimate
advantage in the
power play of industrial action, placing illegitimate pressure on
employers to settle. …’
[7]
The
purpose of section 69 has been described in
SA
Airways v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others
[11]
as follows:
‘…
what
is then exactly the purpose of s 69? The code in item 3(1) gives
guidance in this respect, and it is clear from the content
thereof
that actual strike action is contemplated. Therefore, the very
purpose of s 69, as read with the code, is to regulate protest
action
and demonstration during protected strike action, and to ensure it is
lawful and peaceful. However, and considering the
provisions of s
69(7), the section is further intended to offer striking employees
protection against discipline and undue interference
(for example by
interdicts) where the
y
conduct picketing in terms of s 69, and this picketing would attract
the same p
rotection
as a protected strike in terms of s 67. …
’
[8]
What
has then been introduced by the 2015 LRA amendments, which
inter
alia
amended section 69(8), is a new process in terms of which to ensure
compliance with picketing rules and the objective behind picketing
rules. The section provides:
‘
Any
party to a
dispute
about any of the following issues … may refer the
dispute
in writing to the Commission-
(a)
an
allegation that the effective use of the right to picket is being
undermined;
(b)
an
alleged material contravention of subsection (1) or (2);
(c)
an
alleged material breach of an agreement concluded in terms of
subsection (4); or
(d)
an
alleged material breach of a rule established in terms of subsection
(5).’
[9]
In my
view, section 69(8) created a further dispensation to deal with
unlawful conduct in the course of protected strike action.
As stated
above, the issuing of picketing rules, which all parties are obliged
to comply with, will regulate what will pass as
lawful behaviour by
striking employees and will serve to convey to all what is expected
where it comes to acceptable conduct during
the course of the strike,
whilst still allowing for peaceful protest as contemplated by the
right to picket. I believe section
69(8) was introduced to as to
encourage employers to be proactive, and approach the CCMA up front
and before the strike even starts
to determine the rules of
engagement between the parties. If these rules are breached, the
employer can then declare a dispute
under section 69(8) without
having to only resort to the Labour Court to interdict unlawful
conduct. This dispute, in the normal
course, is conciliated, and
following unsuccessful conciliation, referred to the Labour Court for
adjudication.
[12]
[10]
But
what if urgent interim intervention is still required whilst the very
dispute as contemplated by section 69(8) is still in the
throes of
conciliation and/or adjudication? In my view, the legislature
contemplated this very scenario by way of section 69(12).
It provides
as follows:
‘
If
a party has referred a
dispute
in terms of subsection (8) or (11), the Labour Court may grant
relief, including urgent interim relief, which is just and equitable
in the circumstances and which may include-
(a)
an
order directing any party, including a person contemplated in
subsection (6)
(a)
,
to comply with a picketing agreement or rule; or
(b)
an
order varying the terms of a picketing agreement or rule.
’
[11]
Section
69(12) in my view allows this Court to grant urgent interim relief,
if it would be just and equitable to do so, whilst either
conciliation of the dispute is still pending, or where adjudication
in the Labour Court is still pending. When it may be just and
equitable for the Court to do will of course depend on the particular
facts, and it will be very difficult to provide a check list
approach
in this regard. I would however venture to suggest that this kind of
urgent interim intervention would be just and equitable
where a
scenario arises that was not contemplated between the parties when
the original picketing rules were agreed to or issued
by the
commissioner, or where there is a material departure from the
picketing rules by one of the parties which may require a
further
tightening of the rules or specific enforcement by this Court. A
further built-in safeguard is of course that this kind
of urgent
relief would only be an interim measure until the dispute can either
be properly conciliated, or adjudicated.
[12]
With
the above in mind, I now turn to the merits of the application
Relevant
facts
[13]
The
applicant conducts the business of a number of gold mines. These gold
mines are divided into three business units, being Driefontein,
Kloof
and Beatrix. Doornfontein and Kloof are situate in Gauteng and North
West, and Beatrix in the Free State. The first respondent
is a duly
recognized trade union and collective bargaining agent at the
applicant, and the individual respondents are members of
the first
respondent. The National Union of Mineworkers (‘NUM’) is
the other representative and recognized trade union
in the applicant.
The first respondent represents the majority of the employees at
Driefontein, and NUM represents the majority
employees at Kloof and
Beatrix.
[14]
Wages
and conditions of employment for the particular sector are negotiated
at a central level within the Minerals Council South
Africa
(previously the Chamber of Mines) that represents various different
employers in the sector, including the applicant. On
11 July 2018,
negotiations on wages and conditions of employment for the sector,
which would apply for the period from 1 July 2018
to 30 June 2021,
commenced.
[15]
Ultimately,
a collective agreement on wages and conditions of employment was
concluded between the applicant, NUM, and two other
representative
trade unions, being UASA and Solidarity. No agreement was concluded
with the first respondent, and negotiations
with it continued.
However, and ultimately, no agreement could be concluded.
[16]
On 19
November 2018, the first respondent gave notice as contemplated by
section 64(1) of the LRA that it would embark upon strike
action in
respect of the dispute relating to wages and conditions of
employment, which strike was to commence on 21 November 2018.
[17]
Having
received this strike notice, the applicant sought to engage with the
first respondent with the view of concluding an agreement
on
picketing rules, which would apply at Driefontein, Kloof and Beatrix.
But unfortunately, no agreement on picketing rules could
be
concluded. The applicant then referring a dispute to the CCMA as
contemplated by section 69(4) of the LRA with the view of
establishing picketing rules through that forum.
[18]
The
strike then started on 21 November 2018, and according to the
applicant, was immediately marred by unlawful conduct by the striking
employees at all three operations. The applicant sought an interdict
from this Court on 22 November 2018 to interdict this unlawful
behaviour, which was granted.
[19]
The
picketing rules dispute referred to the CCMA was heard on 23 November
2018. The applicant and the first respondent both participated
in
these proceedings, and made submissions. These submissions included
designating specific picketing areas, and limiting the number
of
striking employees entitled to picket from time to time. The parties
first tried to conclude an agreement under the auspices
of the CCMA,
with the respective submissions as a basis, but were not successful
in concluding an agreement. The matter was postponed
to 26 November
2018 to allow the parties an opportunity to make further submissions
on picketing rules.
[20]
Ultimately,
and in the absence of an agreement on picketing rules, commissioner
Maboya of the CCMA issued picketing rules in terms
of section 69(5)
on 29 November 2018. I do not intend to burden this judgment by
setting out all of the picketing rules. I will
suffice by referring
to the picketing rules relevant to deciding this matter. Firstly,
specific picketing areas were designated
for each of the operations
at Driefontein, Kloof and Beatrix. Secondly, the number of employees
allowed to participate in the picket
from time to time was limited.
Thirdly, employees were prohibited from engaging in unlawful conduct.
[21]
I was
informed that this matter does not concern the operations at
Driefontein and Kloof, and only concerns the operations at Beatrix.
I
will thus specify in more detail the relevant picketing provisions
for Beatrix, which are:
21.1
Three
picketing areas were determined for what was called Beatrix 1,
Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4, in the rules. The areas were demarcated
by
way of red dots marked on what was clearly Google maps extracted in
respect of these sites.
21.2
At
Beatrix 1, no more than 400 employees were allowed to participate in
the picket at any given time. At Beatrix 3, the number was
500
employees, and at Beatrix 4 it was 300 employees.
[22]
According
to the applicant, and after the picketing rules were issued, a number
of breaches of these rules were committed by what
appeared to be the
striking employees. The applicant provided some detail of this,
including video footage. I do not intend to
repeat all the individual
instances of these picketing rules violations in this judgment.
Suffice it say, and during the period
of 30 November to 3 December
2018, it included blockading of roads, the stoning of passing
vehicles and persons, the storming of
buses, assault of a bus driver
and damage to buses, and the use of sling shots on the security
personnel and the police. This conduct
even included the assault of a
police officer and taking her fire arm and video camera.
[23]
The
main thrust of the problem however appears to be the conduct of
striking employees along the R30 road between Welkom and Theunissen.
This is a public road which gives access to the applicant’s
offices, three of the shafts and another mining company, Harmony’s
Joel Mine. The difficulty is that along the R30 and in essence
opposite the applicant’s operations, there is a tree line
within which the striking employees are able to conceal themselves
and move up and down the road, and then attack passing vehicles
and
persons with stones and sling shots.
[24]
The
applicant’s further complaint is that because of the number of
picketing areas, employees then move between the picketing
areas,
which includes the stretch of the R30 referred to, thus on face value
justifying their presence in these areas as well.
[25]
According
to the applicant, the first respondent is unable to control the
striking employees. The applicant proposes, as a result,
that the
picketing area at Beatrix be limited to one picketing area, and that
the number of employees that are allowed to picket
be limited to a
number of 50, from time to time.
[26]
The
first respondent disagrees with the contentions of the applicant.
According to the first respondent, its members are not involved
in
the unlawful conduct. It even suggested that it was the security
personnel and the police that blockaded the road. It further
complained that the applicant only provided limited examples of
unlawful conduct, and save only for one of its members that had
been
arrested, could not establish the involvement of anyone else. The
first respondent also argued that the applicant already
had the
protection of the Court Order of 22 November 2018 and could enforce
non-compliance by way of contempt proceedings.
[27]
The
first respondent argued that the limitations the applicant sought to
place on its and its members’ right to picket would
unduly
interfere with these rights and in essence negate the picket to
something that has no value. It complained that the applicant
was
seeking to derail the strike in an underhanded manner.
[28]
It is
now up to this Court to resolve this impasse between the parties and
arrive at a solution that is just and equitable, considering
that the
applicant has brought a case to the effect that the picketing rules
were not only breached, but the rules relating to
picketing areas and
number of picketing employees allowed is not workable.
Analysis
[29]
The
point of departure in deciding this matter has to be the
consideration that the 29 November 2018 picketing rules were issued
by the CCMA in terms of section 69(5) after consideration of proper
and comprehensive submissions by both parties, each setting
out their
respective positions. The commissioner has access to all the relevant
background facts and the legal positions of both
parties where it
came to picketing, and after having considered this, gave a reasoned
outcome when determining the applicable picketing
rules. If any of
the parties were dissatisfied with the picketing rules so issued, it
would have been incumbent on such a party
to challenge the picketing
rules on review to this Court.
[13]
[30]
It
follows that as a matter of principle, the picketing rules of
commissioner Maboya dated 29 November 2018 should be upheld, enforced
and applied as it stands. The applicant has sought such a prayer, and
there would be no reason not to grant it.
[31]
However,
Section 69(8) contemplates a dispute not only about a breach of the
picketing rules, but also where it is alleged that
there has been a
material contravention of section 69(1), which provides that a picket
must be called for the purposes of peacefully
demonstrating. This has
to mean that even where there is no actual contravention of the
picketing rules as issued by the CCMA,
a situation may well arise
where the application of the picketing rules as they stand would
undermine the objective of peaceful
demonstration contemplated by
section 69(1). In such a case, it has to be competent for this Court
to vary the rules so as to give
effect to this objective. My view in
this regard is reinforced by section 69(12), which provides that an
order varying the terms
of picketing rules may be made when
adjudicating a dispute under section 69(8).
[32]
In
this instance, the gist of the applicant’s case to vary the
picketing rules relate, as stated above, to the number of employees
allowed to picket and the picketing areas. According to the
applicant, this is necessary because of the fact that the first
respondent
in unable to control its members, and the picketing rules
as they stand enable the striking employees to abuse the R30
corridor,
so to speak, in effecting their campaign of unlawful
conduct and violence.
[33]
The
first respondent’s case is that the commissioner properly
arrived at a conclusion when issuing picketing rules, and there
is no
reason to interfere with it. According to the first respondent, a
further limitation of the right to picket would unduly
infringe on
the rights of the first respondent and its members where it comes to
their pursuit of protected strike action.
[34]
The
establishment of picketing rules that serve to ensure that picketing
is peaceful, lawful and orderly, but without unduly interfering
with
the rights of the employees to peacefully protest, is a very delicate
balance. In the end, what is needed is a determination
that is just
and equitable to both parties. As held in
Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration and Others
[14]
:
‘
The
matrix of permissible conduct that evolves ultimately as the
picketing rules is a particular permutation that balances logistics,
the nature of the business, the industrial relations history of the
enterprise and the union with the impact of the picket so that
the
rules are determined not too narrowly or too broadly to exacerbate
industrial conflict or obstruct the substantive resolution
of the
dispute. Thus rules that put the pickets 'out of sight and out of
mind' of the employer, a phrase coined in this application,
could, on
the one hand, prevent intimidation of non-striking workers and
customers. On the other hand, it can be counter-productive
to
workplace peace in the longer term if the picketers became
increasingly frustrated as they would be if their picket has little
impact. The employer's incentive to resolve the dispute substantively
could also diminish if the striking employees are out of
sight and
out of mind.
’
[35]
I
am compelled to agree with counsel for the first respondent that a
further limitation of the number of employees that may participate
in
the picket from time to time would cause an undue imbalance. The
commissioner decided on the limitation of numbers based on
an
assessment of the evidence, and the representations by both parties.
In arriving at this conclusion, he must have, in my view,
appreciated
what would constitute a manageable number of picketers that can be
controlled by the allocated marshals and security
personnel as
contemplated by the issued picketing rules. To limit the number of
picketers in an undue fashion renders the picket
ineffective. The
picket must have a sufficient impetus so as to convey to the employer
and third party observers, that the striking
employees are resolute
in pursuit of their demands and perhaps further pressure the employer
in acceding to these demands. Considering
that the striking employees
number in their thousands, it would in fact be insulting if only 50
of them are allowed to picket from
time to time. It would certainly
unduly detract from the impetus of the picket.
[36]
But
where it comes to the picketing areas, I prefer to the proposition
advanced by the applicant’s counsel. It is clear that
the
allocation of multiple picketing areas causes a number of
difficulties, and in fact undermine the objective of peaceful protest
in a designated area. I have no reason to doubt the case of the
applicant that the multiple picketing areas result in a movement
of
striking employees, creating the opportunity for unlawful conduct
where perpetrators may escape being identified and dealt with.
It
also causes the marshalling of striking employees and the ability not
only of the applicant, but also of the first respondent
as
responsible trade union,
[15]
to control the striking employees and ensure adherence to the
picketing rules, to be made extremely difficult. A single appropriate
picketing area would be a solution removing this difficulty.
[37]
I
may add that it would be a far more feasible proposition for the
first respondent to contend that perpetrators of unlawful conduct
are
not its members, if its members are all gathered in a single area
where it has proper control over them. A single picketing
area may
thus very well being the interest of the first respondent and its
members as well, removing all the complications of later
arguments
about who did what to whom.
[38]
The
applicant proposes a single picketing area indicated as such on a map
which is found at page 204 – annexure “SL1”
–
of the pleadings bundle. This picketing area right oppose one of the
existing picketing area for Beatrix 1 established
in commissioner
Maboya’s picketing rules, and also adjacent to the R30 on which
most of the traffic accessing the applicant’s
premises travels.
I thus accept that the proposed picketing area resorts in a general
vicinity that has been found feasible as
location for an effective
and proper picket. It is about 300 meters away from the nearest
entrance to Beatrix mine and 1 000
metres away from the hostel.
It is thus not as if the picket will be moved so far away that it
would render the picket impotent.
[39]
A
single picketing area will in my view remove the ability of striking
employees to move from area to area with all the difficulties
associated with this. I consider this kind of variation to be just
and equitable and to give effect to the requirement of a peaceful
demonstration as found in section 69(1).
[40]
Applying
the above to the facts in this case, I am satisfied that a variation
of the picketing rules are called for, but not the
extent as sought
by the applicant. The only variation that would be just and equitable
is that the various picketing areas designated
under Beatrix 1,
Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4 in the picketing rules be removed, and then
substituted with the single picketing area
as designated on page 204
(annexure “SL1”) of the pleadings. This picketing area
must be at least 30(thirty) metres
back from the road itself, a
distance contemplated by the current picketing rules.
[41]
However,
the permissible number of employees entitled to participate in the
picket from time to time must not be tampered with.
However, and
because four individual Beatrix picketing areas are to be
consolidated into one, there must be a consolidation of
the numbers.
The maximum permitted number of picketing employees from time to
time, for Beatrix, and in terms of the existing picketing
rules, is
500 (five hundred) employees. This must therefore be the permissible
number for the amended area as well.
[42]
In
conclusion, I am satisfied that the applicant has made out a case for
the variation of the picketing rules dated 29 November
2018 to the
effect that the designated picketing areas for Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3
and Beatrix 4 be removed, and substituted with
the single demarcated
picketing area as contained on the map at page 204 of the pleadings
bundle – annexure “SL1”.
A total of 500 (five
hundred) employees from time to time are entitled to participate in a
picket in compliance with the picketing
rules in such picketing area.
[43]
The
applicant has also prayed that the striking employees do not seek to
hide their identity during the conduct of the picket. The
first
respondent’s counsel indicated that the respondents have no
issue with this. There is therefore no reason why this
order cannot
be granted.
[44]
As
touched on above, the applicant in this case has sought urgent
interim relief. As such, the relief granted in terms of this judgment
can only apply until the pending dispute in terms of section 69(8) of
the LRA is either resolved at conciliation under the auspices
of the
CCMA in terms of section 69(10), or by way of final adjudication in
this Court under section 69(11). In any event, and as
said in SA
Airways,
[16]
a particular picketing agreement or picketing rules only applies to a
particular strike, and once that strike is resolved, the
relevant
rules / agreement falls away. The issue is therefore
susceptible to be revisited on each and every individual occasion,
and does not serve as some or other binding precedent covering all
future strikes.
[45]
This
then only leaves the issue of costs. Both parties have had some
measure of success. They also have an ongoing relationship
with one
another. I also accept that the picketing rules were inadequate, and
as such intervention by this Court was needed to
rectify matters. I
further consider that an issue of costs would only serve to place
further strain on the relationship where there
is still an ongoing
strike. Exercising the wide discretion I have in terms of section
162(1) of the LRA, I believe that this is
a case where no costs order
would be appropriate.
Order
[46]
In
the circumstances, I make the following order:
1.
The
Rules relating to the time limits and manners of service are hereby
dispensed with, and the application is heard as one of urgency
in
terms of Rule 8.
2.
A
Rule
Nisi
is hereby issued calling upon the respondents to show cause on 27
February 2019 at 10h00 or so soon thereafter as the matter may
be
heard, why a final order should not be granted in the following
terms:
2.1
Pending the finalisation of the dispute in terms of section 69(8)
between the applicant and the respondents, either by way of
conciliation under section 69(10), or adjudication under section
69(11), the picketing rules dated 29 November 2018 are amended
as
follows:
2.1.1
The designated picketing areas for Beatrix 1, Beatrix 3 and Beatrix 4
is removed, and substituted with the single demarcated
picketing area
as contained on the map at page 204 of the pleadings bundle –
annexure “SL1”; and
2.1.2
A total of 500 (five hundred) of the individual respondents are
entitled to participate in a picket in compliance with the
picketing
rules in the picketing in terms of paragraph 2.1.1 of this order,
from time to time.
2.2
The individual respondents are ordered to comply with the picketing
rules dated 29 November 2018, as amended by paragraphs 2.1.1
and
2.1.2 of this order.
2.3
The individual respondents are ordered not to wear balaclavas and/or
wear or utilize any other means to hide their identity.
3.
The
Rule
Nisi
issued
in terms of paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of this order, as set out
above, shall operate as an interim order with immediate
effect,
pending the return date.
4.
There
is no order as to costs.
Sean Snyman
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant:
Advocate M Van As
Instructed
by: ENS
Africa Attorneys
For the Respondents:
Advocate A Cook
Instructed by:
Larry Dave Attorneys
[1]
(2012) 33 ILJ 1593
(CC) at paras 51 – 52.
[2]
See
National
Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied Workers and Others v
Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd: In re Universal
Product Network
(Pty) Ltd v National Union of Food Beverage Wine Spirits and Allied
Workers and Others
(2016)
37 ILJ 476 (LC) at para 37;
Ram
Transport SA (Pty) Ltd v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and
Others
(2011)
32 ILJ 1722 (LC) at para 9
[3]
(2012) 33 ILJ 998
(LC) at para 13.
[4]
Act 66 of 1995 (as amended)
[5]
The amendments
were introduced by
Act
6 of 2014, with effect from 1 January 2015.
[6]
For the requirements of urgency see
Association
of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Northam Platinum
Ltd and Another
(2016)
37 ILJ 2840 (LC) at paras 20 – 26.
[7]
See
SA
Airways v SA Transport and Allied Workers Union and Others
(2013)
34 ILJ 2064 (LC) at para 49.
[8]
Section 69(4).
[9]
Section 69(5).
[10]
(2016) 37 ILJ 246
(LC) at para 15.
[11]
(2013)
34 ILJ 2064 (LC) at para 54.
[12]
Sections 69(10) and (11).
[13]
See
Consolidated
Workers Union of SA on behalf of Individual Applicants v Commission
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and
Others
(2013)
34 ILJ 2010 (LC) at paras 27 – 30.
[14]
(2006)
27 ILJ 2681 (LC) at para 31.
[15]
See
Food
and Allied Workers Union v In2Food (Pty) Ltd
(2014)
35 ILJ 2767 (LAC) at para 6;
In2Food
(Pty) Ltd v Food and Allied Workers Union and Others
(2013) 34
ILJ 2589 (LC) at 2591H-I;
Royalserve
Cleaning (Pty) Ltd v Democratic Union of Security Workers and Others
(2012) 33 ILJ 448 (LC) at para 7.
[16]
(
supra
)
at para 43.