Mashaba v Telkom South Africa (JR375/12) [2018] ZALCJHB 189 (18 May 2018)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Leave to appeal — Application for leave to appeal against judgment of substantive unfair dismissal — Respondent's failure to comply with procedural rules regarding submission of opposing arguments — Court dismisses application for leave to appeal, finding no reasonable prospect of a different outcome — Dismissal deemed automatically unfair under section 187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act due to union activities.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an application for leave to appeal decided by the Labour Court in chambers. The application was brought by Telkom South Africa (described by the court as the respondent in the main matter, but the applicant for leave to appeal) against the whole of a prior Labour Court judgment and order delivered on 11 January 2018. Ezekiel Mashaba (the applicant in the main matter) opposed the application for leave to appeal.


The procedural history recorded by the court was that the leave to appeal was served and filed on 1 February 2018, and the opposing papers (notice of intention to oppose and the response) were served and filed during 15 and 19 March 2018 respectively. The court further noted non-compliance with the time periods for the filing of submissions contemplated by Rule 30(3A) read with Clause 15.2 of the Labour Court Practice Manual, and that the leave to appeal was determined without the benefit of the applicant-for-leave’s submissions.


The general subject-matter arises from an employment dismissal dispute. In the underlying judgment of 11 January 2018, the court held that Mr Mashaba’s dismissal was substantively unfair, ordered his reinstatement, directed the employer to pay compensation equivalent to 10 months’ salary, and made an order for costs. In the leave to appeal proceedings, the central focus was the employer’s challenge to the court’s conclusions, particularly relating to the characterisation of the dismissal as automatically unfair under the Labour Relations Act.


2. Material Facts


The court treated several facts as common cause for purposes of assessing the prospects of success on appeal. Mr Mashaba was a shop steward of the Communication Workers Union (CWU) at the relevant time. He disseminated a dossier containing allegations of corruption made against various individuals within Telkom, including senior managers.


The court accepted as undisputed that, by the time Mr Mashaba disseminated the dossier, the CWU had taken ownership of the dossier and endorsed its contents. The dossier was disseminated by Mr Mashaba only to CWU and COSATU officials, and it was treated as a CWU document, whether he had been instructed to distribute it or not. The court expressly recorded that this evidence was never challenged.


On the procedural conduct of the leave proceedings, the court recorded that, although the Practice Manual provisions were explicit, Telkom’s attorneys did not file the required submissions timeously (or at all by the time the court decided the matter), despite requesting a directive and being directed to the relevant provisions. The court proceeded to determine the application in light of the statutory objective of the expeditious resolution of labour disputes.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the applicant for leave to appeal had shown that there was a reasonable prospect that another court would come to a different conclusion from that reached in the judgment of 11 January 2018.


Although the judgment was concerned with leave to appeal (a procedural threshold), the dispute turned on the application of legal principles to essentially common-cause facts, namely whether the dismissal was automatically unfair in terms of section 187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, as the court had effectively reasoned in the main judgment. The court’s assessment also engaged a discretionary or evaluative component regarding whether to grant leave, mindful of the LRA’s purpose of expeditious dispute resolution, and whether to award costs given the conduct in the leave to appeal process.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court applied the established test for leave to appeal, namely whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court may come to a different conclusion. It emphasised that this test must be applied with caution in labour matters because of the LRA’s design to achieve the expeditious resolution of industrial disputes, drawing support from the Labour Appeal Court’s guidance in Martin and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and Others. The court treated that authority as a caution against routinely permitting labour disputes to proceed through multiple appeal stages where the matter is fact-bound and raises no novel legal point.


Applying those principles to the factual matrix, the court reasoned that it was common cause that Mr Mashaba’s dissemination of the dossier occurred in his capacity as a union shop steward, and that the dossier had been adopted by the CWU and shared only with union and federation officials. On this factual platform, the court concluded that, “but for” his exercise of union activities and the distribution of the dossier, Mr Mashaba would not have been dismissed. The court accordingly reaffirmed its conclusion that the dismissal fell within section 187(1)(d) and was therefore automatically unfair.


In evaluating the multiple grounds of appeal (which the court did not repeat), the court was not persuaded that they disclosed a basis on which another court might reasonably reach a different conclusion. This led to refusal of leave.


On costs, the court took into account the applicant-for-leave’s failure to adhere to the Rules and the Practice Manual time frames, and characterised the leave application, in context, as a device delaying finalisation. Although recognising the general practice that costs do not automatically follow the result in labour matters, the court considered the circumstances sufficient to justify an adverse costs order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Court dismissed Telkom’s application for leave to appeal against the judgment delivered on 11 January 2018.


The court ordered that Telkom (described in the order as the respondent, consistent with the citation in the main matter) must pay the costs of the leave to appeal application.


Cases Cited


Martin and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and Others [2013] ZALAC 35; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC).


Philppus Johannes Lodewyk Olivier v The Gemeenskaplike Kerk and Others (Case no: JS 487/15 Unreported).


National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v Columbus Stainless [2016] ZALCJHB 344.


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), including section 187(1)(d).


Rules of Court Cited


Labour Court Rule 30(3A).


Labour Court Practice Manual, Clause 15.2.


Held


The court held that the applicant for leave to appeal failed to establish a reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different conclusion from that reached in the judgment of 11 January 2018. It proceeded on the basis that it was common cause that Mr Mashaba acted as a union shop steward when disseminating a CWU-endorsed dossier to union and COSATU officials, and that “but for” that union-related activity he would not have been dismissed, supporting the conclusion that the dismissal was automatically unfair under section 187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act.


Leave to appeal was refused, and a costs order was made against the party seeking leave due to, among other things, non-compliance with the applicable time periods and the objective of expeditious dispute resolution.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The test for leave to appeal in the Labour Court requires an applicant to show a reasonable prospect that another court may arrive at a different conclusion from the decision sought to be appealed.


In applying that test, Labour Courts must remain mindful of the statutory imperative of expeditious dispute resolution under the Labour Relations Act, and should be cautious in granting leave to appeal in matters that are capable of resolution on their facts and do not raise novel legal issues.


Where the facts demonstrate that an employee’s dismissal would not have occurred but for the employee’s exercise of union activities, the dismissal may fall within section 187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act as an automatically unfair dismissal, depending on the established factual causation and context reflected in the record.


In respect of costs, while labour matters do not invariably follow the result, a costs order may be justified where a party’s conduct undermines the expeditious resolution of the dispute, including flagrant non-compliance with applicable procedural directives and time limits.

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[2018] ZALCJHB 189
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Mashaba v Telkom South Africa (JR375/12) [2018] ZALCJHB 189 (18 May 2018)

THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case
no:
JR
375/12
In the matter between:
EZEKIEL
MASHABA
Applicant
and
TELKOM SOUTH
AFRICA

Respondent
Decided:
In chambers
Delivered:
18 May 2018
JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
NKUTHA-NKONTWANA. J
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application for leave to appeal brought by the respondent
(applicant in this application) against the whole judgment
and order
handed down by this Court on 11 January 2018. In the judgment, I
found that the dismissal of the applicant (respondent
in this
application) was substantively unfair and ordered the respondent to
reinstate the applicant and to further pay the applicant
compensation
equivalent to 10 months’ salary as well as costs of suit. The
applicant is opposing the application. The parties
are cited as they
are referred to in the judgment for expediency.
[2]
The
application for leave to appeal was served and filed on 1 February
2018. The applicant served and filed its notice of intention
to
oppose together with its response to the leave to appeal on 15 and 19
March 2018 respectively. Rule 30(3A) read with Clause
15.2 of the
Practice Manual of this Court provides that:

Within 10 days of the filing of
the application for leave to appeal, the party seeking leave must
file its submissions in terms
of Rule 30(3A) and the party opposing
the leave must file its submissions five days thereafter. An
application for leave to appeal
will be decided by the judge in
Chambers on the basis of the submissions filed in terms of Rule 30
(3A), unless the judge directs
that the application be heard in open
court.’
[3]
In terms of
the above provisions, the
dies
for filing submissions expired on 15 February 2018. On 12 April 2018,
almost two months after the respondent’s submissions
were due,
the respondent’s attorneys of record addressed a letter to my
secretary Ms Malungani recording
inter
alia
,
that they were urgently awaiting a directive from this Court on how
to proceed with the filing of submissions.
[4]
Despite
Clause 15.2 being so explicit and the expectation that legal
practitioners, like the respondent’s attorneys of record,
who
appear in this Court on regular basis ought to be aware of, a
directive was swiftly issued drawing the attention of respondent’s

attorneys of record to Clause 15.2 as per their request. Almost a
month has passed and the respondent’s attorneys of record
have
not filed their submissions yet.
[5]
I
therefore proceed to decide this application without the benefit of
the respondent’s submissions. I do so in accordance
with one of
the objects of the
Labour
Relations Act (the LRA)[1]
which
is
t
o
ensure expeditious resolution of industrial disputes. Therefore,
parties
cannot litigate at their leisure.
[2]
Merits
[6]
The
application is pegged on several grounds of appeal and I do not
intend repeating them in this judgment. Save to state that the

respondent’s impugn is essentially my finding that the
dismissal of the applicant was automatically unfair in terms of
section
187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA).
[3]
[7]
It is trite
that the applicable test in an application for leave to appeal
requires the Court to determine whether there is a reasonable

prospect that another Court may come to a different conclusion to
that reached in the judgment that is sought to be taken on appeal.
However, the Labour
Appeal Court (LAC) has cautioned this Court that the test ought not
be applied unconscientiously in light of
the statutory imperative of
expeditious resolution of labour disputes. In
Martin
and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and Others,
[4]
per Davis JA, LAC commented as follows:
‘…
The
Labour
Relations Act was
designed
to ensure an expeditious resolution of industrial
disputes.
This means that courts, particularly courts in the position of the
court
a
quo,
need to be cautious when leave to appeal is granted, as should this
Court when petitions are granted.
There
are two sets of interests to consider.  There are the interests
of the parties such as appellant, namely who are entitled
to have
their rights vindicated, if there is a reasonable prospect that
another court might come to a different conclusion.
There
are also the rights of employees who land up in a legal
“no-man’s-land” and have to wait years for an
appeal (or two) to be prosecuted.
This
was a case which should have ended in the labour court.  This
matter should not have come to this court.  It stood
to be
resolved on its own facts.  There is no novel point of law to be
determined nor did the Court
a
quo
misinterpret
existing law.
There
was no incorrect application of the facts; in particular, the
assessment of the factual justification for the
dismissals/alternative
sanctions.
I
would urge labour courts in future to take great care in ensuring a
balance between expeditious resolution of a dispute and the
rights of
the party which has lost. If there is a reasonable prospect that the
factual matrix could receive a different treatment
or there is a
legitimate dispute on the law, that is different.  But this kind
of case should not reappear continuously in
courts on appeal after
appeal, subverting a key purpose of the Act, namely the expeditious
resolution of labour disputes
.’
(Emphasis added)
[8]
Turing
to the facts in the present matter, it is common cause that the
applicant was the Communication Workers Union’s (CWU)
shop
steward when he disseminated the dossier containing allegations of
corruption that had been levelled against various individuals
within
the respondent, including senior managers. By that time, CWU had
already took ownership of the dossier and endorsed its
contents. The
applicant disseminated it only to CWU and Congress of South Africa
Trade Unions (COSATU) officials as a CWU document
whether instructed
or not. This evidence was never challenged.
[9]
It is clear
in my mind that, ‘but for’ exercising his union
activities and distributing the dossier, the applicant would
not have
been dismissed. Hence, his dismissal is automatically unfair in terms
of section 187(1)(d) of the LRA.
[10]
Having
considered all the grounds of leave to appeal
,
I am persuaded that the
respondent has failed to make out a case that another Court might
reasonably arrive at a decision different
to the one reached by this
Court. The application for leave to appeal should, therefore, be
refused.
[11]
In
deciding on the issue of costs, I have taken into account the fact
that respondent flagrantly failed to adhere to the Rules and
Practice
Manual of this Court. This application is nothing but a ruse against
expeditious finalisation of this matter and such
must be discouraged.
Even though, as a rule of practice, costs do not follow the result in
matters before this Court, this is a
typical case where the
respondent should be ordered to pay the costs.
[12]
The
following order is made:
Order
1.
The
respondent’s application for leave to appeal against the
judgment handed down on 11 January 2018 is dismissed.
2.
The
respondent
to
pay the costs of this application.
_____________________
P.
Nkutha-Nkontwana
Judge of the Labour Court
of South Africa
[1]
66 of 1995 as amended.
[2]
Philppus Johannes Lodewyk Olivier v The Gemeenskaplike Kerk and
Others
(Case no: JS 487/15 Unreported) at para 12. See also
Martin and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and
Others
[2013] ZALAC 35
; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC).
[3]
Act 66 of 1995 as amended.
[4]
[2013] ZALAC 35
; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) page 16 lines 12 - 25 and
page 17 lines 1 – 18; See also
National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v Columbus
Stainless [2016]
ZALCJHB 344 at paras 2-3.