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[2018] ZALCJHB 189
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Mashaba v Telkom South Africa (JR375/12) [2018] ZALCJHB 189 (18 May 2018)
THE LABOUR COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case
no:
JR
375/12
In the matter between:
EZEKIEL
MASHABA
Applicant
and
TELKOM SOUTH
AFRICA
Respondent
Decided:
In chambers
Delivered:
18 May 2018
JUDGMENT:
APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
NKUTHA-NKONTWANA. J
Introduction
[1]
This
is an application for leave to appeal brought by the respondent
(applicant in this application) against the whole judgment
and order
handed down by this Court on 11 January 2018. In the judgment, I
found that the dismissal of the applicant (respondent
in this
application) was substantively unfair and ordered the respondent to
reinstate the applicant and to further pay the applicant
compensation
equivalent to 10 months’ salary as well as costs of suit. The
applicant is opposing the application. The parties
are cited as they
are referred to in the judgment for expediency.
[2]
The
application for leave to appeal was served and filed on 1 February
2018. The applicant served and filed its notice of intention
to
oppose together with its response to the leave to appeal on 15 and 19
March 2018 respectively. Rule 30(3A) read with Clause
15.2 of the
Practice Manual of this Court provides that:
‘
Within 10 days of the filing of
the application for leave to appeal, the party seeking leave must
file its submissions in terms
of Rule 30(3A) and the party opposing
the leave must file its submissions five days thereafter. An
application for leave to appeal
will be decided by the judge in
Chambers on the basis of the submissions filed in terms of Rule 30
(3A), unless the judge directs
that the application be heard in open
court.’
[3]
In terms of
the above provisions, the
dies
for filing submissions expired on 15 February 2018. On 12 April 2018,
almost two months after the respondent’s submissions
were due,
the respondent’s attorneys of record addressed a letter to my
secretary Ms Malungani recording
inter
alia
,
that they were urgently awaiting a directive from this Court on how
to proceed with the filing of submissions.
[4]
Despite
Clause 15.2 being so explicit and the expectation that legal
practitioners, like the respondent’s attorneys of record,
who
appear in this Court on regular basis ought to be aware of, a
directive was swiftly issued drawing the attention of respondent’s
attorneys of record to Clause 15.2 as per their request. Almost a
month has passed and the respondent’s attorneys of record
have
not filed their submissions yet.
[5]
I
therefore proceed to decide this application without the benefit of
the respondent’s submissions. I do so in accordance
with one of
the objects of the
Labour
Relations Act (the LRA)[1]
which
is
t
o
ensure expeditious resolution of industrial disputes. Therefore,
parties
cannot litigate at their leisure.
[2]
Merits
[6]
The
application is pegged on several grounds of appeal and I do not
intend repeating them in this judgment. Save to state that the
respondent’s impugn is essentially my finding that the
dismissal of the applicant was automatically unfair in terms of
section
187(1)(d) of the Labour Relations Act (LRA).
[3]
[7]
It is trite
that the applicable test in an application for leave to appeal
requires the Court to determine whether there is a reasonable
prospect that another Court may come to a different conclusion to
that reached in the judgment that is sought to be taken on appeal.
However, the Labour
Appeal Court (LAC) has cautioned this Court that the test ought not
be applied unconscientiously in light of
the statutory imperative of
expeditious resolution of labour disputes. In
Martin
and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and Others,
[4]
per Davis JA, LAC commented as follows:
‘…
The
Labour
Relations Act was
designed
to ensure an expeditious resolution of industrial
disputes.
This means that courts, particularly courts in the position of the
court
a
quo,
need to be cautious when leave to appeal is granted, as should this
Court when petitions are granted.
There
are two sets of interests to consider. There are the interests
of the parties such as appellant, namely who are entitled
to have
their rights vindicated, if there is a reasonable prospect that
another court might come to a different conclusion.
There
are also the rights of employees who land up in a legal
“no-man’s-land” and have to wait years for an
appeal (or two) to be prosecuted.
This
was a case which should have ended in the labour court. This
matter should not have come to this court. It stood
to be
resolved on its own facts. There is no novel point of law to be
determined nor did the Court
a
quo
misinterpret
existing law.
There
was no incorrect application of the facts; in particular, the
assessment of the factual justification for the
dismissals/alternative
sanctions.
I
would urge labour courts in future to take great care in ensuring a
balance between expeditious resolution of a dispute and the
rights of
the party which has lost. If there is a reasonable prospect that the
factual matrix could receive a different treatment
or there is a
legitimate dispute on the law, that is different. But this kind
of case should not reappear continuously in
courts on appeal after
appeal, subverting a key purpose of the Act, namely the expeditious
resolution of labour disputes
.’
(Emphasis added)
[8]
Turing
to the facts in the present matter, it is common cause that the
applicant was the Communication Workers Union’s (CWU)
shop
steward when he disseminated the dossier containing allegations of
corruption that had been levelled against various individuals
within
the respondent, including senior managers. By that time, CWU had
already took ownership of the dossier and endorsed its
contents. The
applicant disseminated it only to CWU and Congress of South Africa
Trade Unions (COSATU) officials as a CWU document
whether instructed
or not. This evidence was never challenged.
[9]
It is clear
in my mind that, ‘but for’ exercising his union
activities and distributing the dossier, the applicant would
not have
been dismissed. Hence, his dismissal is automatically unfair in terms
of section 187(1)(d) of the LRA.
[10]
Having
considered all the grounds of leave to appeal
,
I am persuaded that the
respondent has failed to make out a case that another Court might
reasonably arrive at a decision different
to the one reached by this
Court. The application for leave to appeal should, therefore, be
refused.
[11]
In
deciding on the issue of costs, I have taken into account the fact
that respondent flagrantly failed to adhere to the Rules and
Practice
Manual of this Court. This application is nothing but a ruse against
expeditious finalisation of this matter and such
must be discouraged.
Even though, as a rule of practice, costs do not follow the result in
matters before this Court, this is a
typical case where the
respondent should be ordered to pay the costs.
[12]
The
following order is made:
Order
1.
The
respondent’s application for leave to appeal against the
judgment handed down on 11 January 2018 is dismissed.
2.
The
respondent
to
pay the costs of this application.
_____________________
P.
Nkutha-Nkontwana
Judge of the Labour Court
of South Africa
[1]
66 of 1995 as amended.
[2]
Philppus Johannes Lodewyk Olivier v The Gemeenskaplike Kerk and
Others
(Case no: JS 487/15 Unreported) at para 12. See also
Martin and East (Pty) Limited v National Union Mineworkers and
Others
[2013] ZALAC 35
; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC).
[3]
Act 66 of 1995 as amended.
[4]
[2013] ZALAC 35
; (2014) 35 ILJ 2399 (LAC) page 16 lines 12 - 25 and
page 17 lines 1 – 18; See also
National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa and Others v Columbus
Stainless [2016]
ZALCJHB 344 at paras 2-3.