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[2018] ZALCJHB 46
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Road Traffic Management Corporation v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR06/16) [2018] ZALCJHB 46 (8 February 2018)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case no: JR 06/16
In the matter between:
ROAD
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION
Applicant
and
THE
COMMISSION FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
ELSABE
HARMSE N.O
Second Respondent
B
MOTJOTOA
Third Respondent
Decided:
In
Chambers
Delivered:
8 February 2018
JUDGMENT-APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO
APPEAL
PRINSLOO. J
Introduction
[1]
On 19 October 2017 this Court handed down
judgment in terms of which the Applicant’s review application
was dismissed with
costs.
[2]
The Respondents filed an application for
leave to appeal against the whole of the judgment and order of this
Court. The application
was filed 11 days out of time and the
Applicant seeks condonation for the late filing of the application
for leave to appeal. I
have considered the condonation application
and condonation is granted for the late filing of the application for
leave to appeal.
[3]
The application for leave to appeal is
opposed.
[4]
Both parties have filed submissions in
respect of the leave to appeal. I have considered the grounds for
appeal as well as the submissions
made in support and in opposition
thereof and I do not intend to repeat those herein.
The
test for leave to appeal
[5]
It is trite that an applicant in an
application for leave to appeal must convince the court
a
quo
that it has reasonable prospects of
success on appeal. What the test requires is the reasonable
likelihood that another court,
presented with the same facts and
evidence as this Court, could come to a different conclusion than the
one arrived at by this
Court.
[6]
Appeals should be limited to matters where
there is a reasonable prospect that the factual matrix could receive
a different treatment
of where there is some legitimate dispute on
the law.
[7]
In
Seatlholo
and Others v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers
Union and Others
[1]
this Court confirmed that the test applicable in applications for
leave to appeal is stringent and held as follows:
“
The
traditional formulation of the test that is applicable in an
application such as the present requires the court to determine
whether there is a reasonable prospect that another court may come to
a different conclusion to that reached in the judgment that
is sought
to be taken on appeal. As the respondents observe, the use of the
word “would” in s17(1)(a)(i) are indicative
of a raising
of the threshold since previously, all that was required for the
applicant to demonstrate was that there was a reasonable
prospect
that another court
might
come to a different conclusion (see
Daantjie
Community and others v Crocodile Valley Citrus Company (Pty) Ltd and
another
(75/2008)
[2015] ZALCC 7
(28 July 2015). Further, this is not a test to
be applied lightly – the Labour Appeal Court has recently had
occasion
to observe that this court ought to be cautious when leave
to appeal is granted, as should the Labour Appeal Court when
petitions
are granted. The statutory imperative of the expeditious
resolution of labour disputes necessarily requires that appeals be
limited
to those matters in which there is a reasonable prospect that
the factual matrix could receive a different treatment or where there
is some legitimate dispute on the law (See the judgment by Davis JA
in
Martin
and East (Pty) Ltd v NUM
(2014) 35
ILJ
2399 (LAC), and also
Kruger
v S
2014 (1) SACR 369
(SCA) and the ruling by Steenkamp J in
Oasys
Innovations (Pty) Ltd v Henning and another
(C 536/15, 6 November 2015)”.
[8]
In
deciding this application for leave to appeal I am also guided by the
dicta
of
the Supreme Court of Appeal where it held in
Dexgroup
(Pty) Ltd v Trustco Group
[2]
that
:
”
The
need to obtain leave to appeal is a valuable tool in ensuring that
scarce judicial resources are not spent on appeals that lack
merit.
It should in this case have been deployed by refusing leave to
appeal.”
Grounds
for leave to appeal
[9]
In the review application, the Applicant
raised only one ground for review and this was in respect of the
amount of compensation
awarded. During argument counsel for the
Applicant made material concessions and the Applicant’s case
boiled down to nothing
more than a complaint that the compensation
awarded was ‘too much’.
[10]
I have read and considered the Applicant’s
grounds for leave to appeal and
having
considered those and applying the aforesaid principles applicable to
applications such as this one, I am not persuaded that
there are
reasonable prospects that the Labour Appeal Court would arrive at a
different conclusion than that arrived at by this
Court.
[11]
I do not intend to repeat or address all
the grounds for appeal raised by the Applicant, but to illustrate
that the application
for leave to appeal is without merit, I will
deal with some grounds for leave to appeal in detail.
[12]
The Applicant’s grounds for leave to
appeal are
inter alia,
that this Court erred in not reviewing the award when grounds to do
so existed in the review application. In view of the concessions
that
were made in Court and the fact that the review was no more than mere
unhappiness with the compensation awarded, there is
no merit in this
ground for appeal.
[13]
The Applicant also submitted that I erred
in only looking at the personal circumstances faced by the Third
Respondent upon termination
of his employment as proper factors that
were considered by the arbitrator when other factors which ought to
have been considered
were not considered.
[14]
A proper perusal of the judgment handed
down on 19 October 2017 shows that this ground for leave to appeal is
without merit.
In its review application,
the Applicant did no more than to make a bold and unsubstantiated
allegation that the arbitrator failed
to take into account relevant
factors in deciding just and equitable compensation, which Mr Botha
conceded was without merit. The
issue about the discretion of the
arbitrator to exercise a discretion in awarding compensation was
fully addressed in the judgment.
[15]
I have fully dealt in detail with the
relevant issues in my judgment and there is no need to repeat what is
stated therein for purposes
of this judgment. Grounds for leave to
appeal and submissions are meant to persuade me that there are
reasonable prospects that
another court would arrive at a different
decision.
In casu,
I
am not persuaded that there is a case made out for leave to appeal to
be granted and the Labour Appeal Court should not be burdened
with an
appeal that lacks merit.
[16] In the
resul,t I make the following order:
Order
1.
The late filing of the Applicant’s
application for leave to appeal is condoned;
2.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed with costs.
_____________________
Connie Prinsloo
Judge
of the Labour Court
[1]
(2016) 37
ILJ 1485 (LC).
[2]
Unreported
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal (687/12)
[2013] ZASCA 120
(20 September 2013).