Santam Limited v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (C912/15; C871/15) [2017] ZALCCT 29 (6 June 2017)

78 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Review of arbitration award — Third respondent dismissed for alleged dishonesty after a disciplinary enquiry — Santam Limited sought to overturn finding of substantive unfairness — Third respondent cross-reviewed finding of guilt — Court found that the evidence did not support the finding of guilt against the third respondent, rendering the award reviewable — Dismissal deemed procedurally fair but substantively unfair, leading to an order for reinstatement without loss of benefits — Each party to bear its own costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned two review applications heard together in the Labour Court, Cape Town, arising from an arbitration award issued under the auspices of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). The applicant in one review was Santam Limited (the employer), and the opposing party was Mr Kooganasen Theo Pillay (the employee), cited as the third respondent. The CCMA and the commissioner, Commissioner L.O. Martin, were cited as the first and second respondents respectively.


The litigation flowed from two disputes that had been consolidated at arbitration: an unfair dismissal dispute (following the employee’s dismissal for alleged misconduct connected to an internal email) and an unfair labour practice dispute concerning promotion (the employee’s non-appointment to a managerial position in a merged/restructured unit). The arbitration ran for an extended period (18 days), culminating in an award dated 7 September 2015.


In the award, the commissioner found that the employee’s dismissal was procedurally fair but substantively unfair, and awarded compensation equivalent to six months’ salary, while dismissing the employee’s promotion-related unfair labour practice claim. Both parties were dissatisfied: Santam sought to review and set aside the finding of substantive unfairness and the sanction-related outcome, while the employee brought a cross-review challenging the finding of misconduct (guilt), aspects of procedural fairness, and the dismissal of his promotion claim. The Labour Court determined both review applications in a single judgment.


2. Material Facts


The third respondent commenced employment with Santam on 1 July 2008 and was dismissed on 16 September 2014 following a disciplinary enquiry. Prior to dismissal, he was appointed (in June or July 2013) as caretaker of the Project Management Office (PMO). A strategy discussion emerged regarding aligning or merging the PMO with the Project Portfolio Office (PPO), with the employee contending that he was mandated to pursue a merger that would create a new combined capability (referred to as the “EPO”) and that the head of the PMO would lead the merged unit. Santam’s position was that any such alignment was subject to leadership buy-in within the relevant business unit.


An Optimization Forum was established to discuss the merger, involving business change representatives and the employee (among others). In December 2013, the employee signed a contract to become the permanent head of the PMO. During February 2014, he was advised to place the alignment process on hold due to restructuring steps being implemented.


On 13 May 2014, the employee was advised of a decision to amalgamate the PMO and PPO, and that the position of head of the amalgamated unit would be advertised internally, with the employee free to apply. The employee was dissatisfied because he expected appointment to the position without a recruitment process. He applied “under protest” but was informed on 19 July 2014 that he was unsuccessful. Ms Marelize Visser was appointed to the relevant leadership post, announced internally with effect from 1 July 2014.


Following this outcome, the employee lodged a grievance asserting that the position had been promised to him. He also sent an email on 2 July 2014 responding to the announcement of Visser’s appointment, objecting to the announcement while his grievance remained unresolved. Santam regarded aspects of that email as dishonest and charged the employee with misconduct, contending that he had falsely asserted that employees’ employment contracts had been unilaterally terminated with immediate effect, allegedly with reference to section 189 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. The employee was found guilty and dismissed.


The employee referred an unfair dismissal dispute and, separately, on 31 July 2014, referred an unfair labour practice dispute alleging unfairness in Santam’s failure to promote him to the PMC managerial post. These disputes were consolidated for arbitration.


In assessing the facts relevant to promotion, the Labour Court treated as decisive the commissioner’s finding that there was no evidential basis for an express promise by Mr Jan de Klerk to appoint the employee to the role, and that the employee had been afforded an opportunity to compete for the position.


In assessing the dismissal, the Labour Court focused on the wording of the 2 July 2014 email, the context of discussions in the grievance meeting, and particularly what Mr Kevin Wright had said and how the employee understood those statements when he wrote the email. The court regarded it as common cause that the email was distributed to multiple recipients and that the dismissal ultimately rested on the first complaint, namely distributing false and misleading information (the employee having been cleared of the second complaint and its alternative).


3. Legal Issues


The central questions before the Labour Court were whether the commissioner’s determinations were reviewable under the established reasonableness standard, and in particular whether the arbitration award was one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach on the evidence.


On the unfair labour practice (promotion) dispute, the key issue was whether the commissioner’s finding—namely that there was no proof of an express promise of promotion and that the recruitment process was fair—was unreasonable on the record.


On the unfair dismissal dispute, the key issues were whether the commissioner’s finding of procedural fairness was sustainable, whether the commissioner’s finding that the employee was guilty of distributing false and misleading information was supported by the evidence, and whether the commissioner’s remedial conclusion (compensation rather than reinstatement) was consistent with section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.


These issues involved a mixture of fact (what was communicated and understood), the application of legal standards to fact (whether the employer had proved misconduct and whether the award was reasonable), and an assessment of the statutory framework governing remedies for unfair dismissal.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Labour Court approached both reviews through the established review standard, namely whether the relevant findings fell within the bounds of reasonableness. The court specifically invoked the review enquiry associated with the Constitutional Court’s guidance in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others, emphasising that review is not an appeal and that the question is whether the outcome is one a reasonable commissioner could reach on the evidentiary material.


On the promotion-related unfair labour practice, the court held that the commissioner’s conclusion was reasonable. The employee’s case depended on an alleged promise by De Klerk, but the court accepted the commissioner’s assessment that there was no evidence to substantiate an express promise. The court attached significance to the chronology: the employee’s grievance asserting a promise arose only after he was unsuccessful in the recruitment process. The evidence recorded in the judgment included that Wright had telephoned De Klerk and that De Klerk refuted the allegation. In these circumstances, the court found no basis to interfere on review and dismissed the employee’s review challenge to the unfair labour practice outcome.


On the procedural fairness of the dismissal, the court upheld the commissioner’s finding. It reasoned that the employee had received timeous notice of the disciplinary process, was given the opportunity to be heard, and could call and cross-examine witnesses. Those features were treated as satisfying process fairness.


The court’s principal interference arose in relation to substantive fairness, specifically whether Santam had proved the misconduct underpinning the dismissal. The dismissal ultimately depended on the first charge, the allegation that the employee had distributed false and misleading information in the 2 July 2014 email. The court analysed the allegedly false portion of the email and concluded that, on its face, the employee was not merely asserting an objective fact but was relaying what he said he had been advised by Wright and another manager, in a context where he believed a legal and ethical duty arose to inform affected employees.


The court held that the commissioner’s finding that the employee knowingly disseminated false information was not consistent with the evidence, particularly Wright’s evidence and the transcript of the grievance hearing. The court noted that the commissioner accepted that Wright referred to section 189 in the grievance meeting (albeit, in the commissioner’s view, hypothetically), and that Wright’s arbitration commentary on the email was essentially that the statement was “bizarre and crazy”, rather than a clear evidential refutation that he had not said what the employee understood him to have said. The court treated the employee’s understanding at the time as central: if the employee understood Wright’s remarks to entail that termination under section 189 would follow, the court reasoned that conveying that understanding could not be characterised as the distribution of information that was false and misleading in the manner alleged.


A further component of the court’s reasoning concerned onus. It held that the onus remained on the employer to prove that the information distributed was false and misleading, and that the commissioner’s conclusion that the employee disseminated false information was not justified on the record. On this basis, the court found the guilt finding reviewable because an award inconsistent with the evidence could not be one a reasonable decision-maker would reach.


The court also addressed the commissioner’s refusal to grant reinstatement, treating this as inconsistent with the statutory scheme. It referred to section 193(2), which makes reinstatement or re-employment the required remedy unless one of the statutory exceptions is present. The commissioner had refused reinstatement on the basis that it was “better that the parties part ways” due to the employee’s resentment towards management built up over time, with reference to a meeting on 13 May 2014. The court held that this was not a proper basis to invoke the exception of intolerability in section 193(2)(b). It reasoned that intolerability must be demonstrated on evidence from the employer, and that such intolerability must be connected to the misconduct that led to dismissal; reliance on resentment expressed before the misconduct was committed was treated as an irrelevant consideration and indicative of a failure to apply the statutory test.


In relation to Santam’s review (the “first review”), the court ultimately found that the challenge to the commissioner’s sanction-related conclusion did not warrant interference under review. It reiterated that a commissioner must determine fairness without deferring to the employer, and that the task is not to reconsider sanction afresh but to assess whether dismissal was fair. The court considered that the commissioner had engaged with Santam’s evidence on sanction (including Wright’s rationale) and reached a conclusion within the range of reasonableness. However, because the court found the guilt finding unsupported by evidence, it treated Santam’s review as effectively academic in consequence, while still dismissing it.


Having found the relevant portion of the award unreasonable on substantive fairness and remedy, the court held it was in a position to substitute the outcome because all the material evidence was before it.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Labour Court dismissed Santam’s review application challenging the award.


The court dismissed the employee’s review application insofar as it challenged the commissioner’s dismissal of the unfair labour practice (promotion) claim, and upheld the finding that the dismissal was procedurally fair.


The court reviewed and set aside the arbitration award and replaced it with an order that the employee’s dismissal was procedurally fair but substantively unfair, and ordered Santam Limited to reinstate the employee without loss of benefits.


The court made no costs order in favour of either party, directing that each party pay its own costs.


Cases Cited


Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); [2007] ZACC 22; 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (as amended), including section 189 and section 193(2).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Labour Court held that the commissioner’s dismissal of the employee’s unfair labour practice claim relating to promotion was within the bounds of reasonableness and therefore not reviewable.


The Labour Court held that the commissioner’s finding that the dismissal was procedurally fair was supported by the record and not reviewable.


The Labour Court held that the commissioner’s finding that the employee was guilty of distributing false and misleading information (the misconduct forming the basis of dismissal) was not supported by the evidence, rendering the award unreasonable and reviewable.


The Labour Court held that the commissioner’s refusal to order reinstatement was inconsistent with the requirements of section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, particularly in the absence of evidence establishing statutory grounds to depart from reinstatement.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The review test applied was whether the award was one that a reasonable decision-maker could reach on the evidence, consistent with the standard articulated in Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others.


In misconduct dismissals, the employer bears the onus of proving the employee’s misconduct. A finding of guilt that is not consistent with the evidence is reviewable because it falls outside the range of reasonable outcomes.


Section 193(2) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 establishes reinstatement or re-employment as the primary remedy for substantively unfair dismissal unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. A decision-maker must apply the statutory exceptions on the evidence, and a refusal to reinstate must be justified within the framework of section 193(2).


The statutory exception of intolerability in section 193(2)(b) requires evidential support, and the intolerability relied upon must be connected to the circumstances surrounding the dismissal and the misconduct that led to dismissal, rather than unrelated historical workplace sentiments.

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[2017] ZALCCT 29
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Santam Limited v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (C912/15; C871/15) [2017] ZALCCT 29 (6 June 2017)

IN
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Not
reportable
Case
no:
C912
& 871/15
In
the matter between:
SANTAM
LIMITED
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION,
MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION

First
Respondent
COMMISSIONER
L.O.
MARTIN                                                         Second

Respondent
KOOGANASEN
THEO
PILLAY

Third Respondent
Heard
:
15 February 2017
Delivered
:
6 June 2017
Summary:
The finding that the third respondent is guilty as charged is
not
supported by the evidence thus reviewable. A finding that
reinstatement as the primary remedy is not available to the third

respondent is not consistent with the provisions of
section 193(2)
of
the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
thus reviewable. The award of the
second respondent is not one that a reasonable commissioner can
arrive at. Held (1) The first
review is dismissed. Held (2) The award
issued by the second respondent is hereby reviewed and set aside. It
is replaced with an
order that the dismissal of the third respondent
is procedurally fair but substantively unfair. Santam Limited is
ordered to reinstate
the third respondent without loss of benefits.
Held (3) Each party is to pay its own costs.
JUDGMENT
MOSHOANA
AJ
Introduction
[1]
There are two review applications that were enrolled to be heard in
one day. The first review is brought by Santam Limited (Santam).
In
the first review, the arbitrator found that the dismissal of the
third respondent was substantively unfair on the basis that
dismissal
as a sanction was not justified. Santam is seeking to overturn that
finding. At the same time, the third respondent seeks
to overturn the
finding of guilt. He brought a cross review. The second review is
launched by the third respondent seeking to challenge
a finding that
Santam did not commit an unfair labour practice in relation to
promotion. Both reviews are being opposed. This judgment
will relate
to the two review applications.
Background
facts
[2]
The third respondent commenced employment with
Santam on 1 July 2008. On 16 September 2014, after a
disciplinary enquiry,
he was dismissed. Prior to his dismissal, in
June or July 2013, he was appointed as caretaker of the Project
Management Office
(PMO). At some stage, one Mr Jan de Klerk (De
Klerk) mandated the third respondent to pursue a strategy of aligning
the functions
of the PMO and the Project Portfolio Office (PPO).
According to the third respondent the mandate was clear and simple.
It entailed
that the smaller PPO would merge into the larger PMO
thereby creating the EPO, effective 1 June 2014. The Head of PMO
would the
head this merged capability. According to Santam, the
mandate was subject to a buy-in by the leadership of the Business
Change
Unit (BCU).
[3]
A body called Optimization Forum (OF) was formed,
which comprised of business change representatives, the third
respondent and Mr
Johan Etsebeth to discuss the merger of the two
units. The OF met on a regular basis. In December 2013, the third
respondent signed
a contract to become the permanent head of the PMO.
During February 2014, the third respondent was advised to put on
hold
the aligning of PPO and PMO. The advice was brought about by the
restructuring that Mr Kevin Wright (Wright) had put in

place which would eventually lead to the merging of PPO and PMO. On
13 May 2014 the third respondent was advised of a decision
to
amalgamate PMO and PPO and that the position of the head of the
amalgamated unit would be advertised internally. He was at liberty
to
apply for the position.
[4]
The third respondent was not pleased by this
decision as he had an expectation that he would be appointed to that
position outright.
He participated in the recruitment process under
protest. On 19 July 2014, the third respondent was advised
that he had
not been successful in his application for the position.
One Ms. Marelize Visser (Visser) was the successful candidate. The
third
respondent lodged a grievance, staking a claim that the
position was promised to him. On 1 July 2014, the appointment of
Visser,
as the head of Portfolio Management Centre (PMC), was
announced through an email. On 2 July 2014, the third respondent
responded
through an email. He amongst others mentioned that he
objects to the announcement since his grievance was not finalised
yet.
[5]
On 31 July 2014, the third respondent referred an
unfair labour practice dispute. He alleged that the conduct of Santam
was unfair
in failing to promote him to the position of manager of
PMC. Pursuant to his email of 2 July 2014, the third
respondent
was charged with an act of misconduct. According to
Santam, the third respondent was dishonest when he stated to the
recipients
of his email that the current employment contracts have
been unilaterally terminated. The third respondent was found guilty
and
dismissed. Aggrieved by his dismissal, he referred a dispute
alleging unfair dismissal. The two disputes, one for unfair labour

practice and the one for unfair dismissal were consolidated. The
arbitration ran for a number of days. It ran for 18 days to be
exact.
On 7 September 2015, the second respondent rendered his
award. In relation to the unfair labour practice, the
referral was
dismissed. Regarding the unfair dismissal dispute, the second
respondent found that the dismissal was procedurally
fair but
substantively unfair and ordered compensation equivalent to six
months’ salary. As pointed out above, both parties
were
aggrieved by the award and launched separate review applications,
which were heard together.
Grounds
for the first review
[6]
Santam contends that the second respondent
misconceived the enquiry he had to conduct. He overturned a dismissal
for dishonesty
on the basis that the third respondent had a clean
record. The award is not one, which a reasonable commissioner can
arrive at.
Further, it was contended that the award is completely
irrational as being inherently contradictory. It lacked truth in some
respects.
Grounds
for the second review
[7]
The third respondent contends that the evidence
does not justify the findings, thereby; the second respondent
committed gross irregularities
and exceeded his powers. He gravely
misunderstood the evidence. He considered evidence in an extremely
selective manner, glossed
over important testimony and considered the
evidence in a piecemeal fashion as opposed to a holistic view. He
failed to apply documentary
evidence and recordings. On the unfair
labour practice dispute, the applicant largely criticized the
findings made by the second
respondent. He, in a sense, attempted to
show that there was evidence of express promise made by De Klerk,
which the second respondent
found to be lacking and insufficiently
supported. He, to a large extent, criticized every finding made by
the second respondent
in a manner that mimics an appeal.
[8]
On the unfair dismissal dispute, again, the third
respondent somewhat styled his attack in an appeal manner. Properly
considered,
the third respondent simply contends that the evidence
presented did not support the finding that he disseminated false
information
in his email of 2 July 2014. He also challenged
the procedural fairness finding. In that regard, he again raised a
number
of issues relevant to the disciplinary code and failures of
the chairperson to make certain disclosures.
Evaluation
[9]
The test for
review is by now settled. A finding must be one that falls within the
bounds of reasonableness. Given the view I take
at the end; it is
convenient to commence with the second review. I have carefully
considered the analysis by the second respondent
in relation to the
alleged unfair conduct in relation to promotion. The gravamen of the
third respondent’s case is that De
Klerk promised him the
position. This being a review and not an appeal, I need to ask myself
only one question. Is the award one
that a reasonable decision maker
will not arrive at?
[1]
Certainly the award of the second respondent with regard to the
unfair labour practice allegations falls within the bounds of
reasonableness.
[10]
The third respondent was given a fair opportunity
to contest the position. There was no evidence to support the
allegation that
De Klerk promised him the position. Strange enough,
the third respondent lodged a grievance only after he was advised
that he was
not successful. Only at that stage did he raise the issue
of De Klerk promising him the position. Wright testified that he
telephoned
De Klerk who refuted the allegations. Accordingly, I am
unable to find any basis in law to suggest that the finding that
there
is no evidence of express promise – is not supported by
evidence. Therefore, I conclude that the third respondent’s

review application in this regard must fail.
[11]
Turning to
the unfair dismissal dispute, I conclude that the finding that the
dismissal was procedurally fair is unshakeable. The
evidence showed
that the third respondent was given timeous notice. He was afforded
an opportunity to be heard, call witnesses
and cross-examine
witnesses. All of this sums up fairness in terms of process. With
regard to substantive fairness, the issue is
whether the third
respondent was guilty of the misconduct that led to his dismissal.
The third respondent faced two offences.
[2]
The third respondent was cleared of complaint 2 and the alternative.
Therefore, the dismissal of the third respondent was based
on
complaint 1. In order to justify the dismissal, Santam was obliged to
prove that the third respondent is guilty of distributing
false and
misleading information.
[12]
The email of 2 July 2014 is critical in this
regard. It is common cause that the email was distributed to a number
of recipients.
It is a duty of an arbitrator to enquire into the
guilt or otherwise of an employee dismissed on account of misconduct.
The second
respondent was supposed to determine whether the
information as distributed was false and misleading. Santam contended
that the
false and misleading part of the email was the following:

3
In my role as Head of the PMO and acting on behalf of the 19
employees, I’m responsible for, I believe you have a legal
and
ethical duty to inform all the Portfolio Management Centre employees
that they have accepted, with the appointment of Marelize
Visser,
that this “restructure” is valid and all their current
employment contracts have been unilaterally terminated
by Business
Change management with immediate effect and in terms of
section 189
of the
Labour Relations Act (as
I was advised by Kevin Wright and
Maarten Van Der Walt).”
[3]
[13]
What is
clear from the above quotation is that regarding termination in terms
of
section 189
of the
Labour Relations Act,
[4
]
the third respondent was relaying what he heard from Wright and Van
Der Walt. Instead of finding that the third respondent was
not so
advised, he finds that the third respondent misinterpreted the
reference to
section 189
by Wright during the grievance meeting. He
accepted that in the said meeting Wright did refer to
section 189
in
a hypothetical sketch. At arbitration, Wright was requested to
comment on the email of the third respondent. All he stated was
that
the statement is bizarre and crazy.
[5]
The transcript of the grievance hearing reflects that he said to the
third respondent that— “
here
is a
section 189.
I am telling you you are affected and here is a new
structure applied
”.
[6]
He mentioned all of that in reply to the question: “what
happens to Theo (third respondent)?” At this point in time
it
was already announced that Visser had been appointed. Wright
mentioned to the third respondent that Visser was entitled to
restructure the unit and if she did, there may be fewer positions to
which employees may have to apply.
[7]
[14]
If the third respondent understood Wright to mean
that Visser was entitled to restructure and terminate in terms of
section 189
, then what he conveyed in the email cannot be false and
misleading. It is important to note that having understood Wright to
mean
termination, he believed that there was a legal and ethical duty
to inform all the Portfolio Management Centre employees. The second

respondent found that the third respondent knowingly disseminated
false information on the strength of the concessions the third

respondent made during arbitration. As I see it, the third respondent
was not simply making a statement, he was stating what he
understood
Wright to be conveying at the grievance meeting. As the third
respondent testified, he understood that upon appointment
of Visser,
termination in terms of
section 189
would follow. It was only at
arbitration that Wright explained what he meant at the time. The
concessions to which the second respondent
based his conclusions that
the third respondent knowingly disseminated false information relates
to the fact that at the stage
of the announcement of appointment of
Visser, he was aware of the fact that the process of restructure of
Santam would not involve
the dismissals of anyone and no one’s
role had been terminated. Such, to my mind, does not demonstrate that
Wright did not
say what he said at the grievance meeting and
understood by the third respondent in the manner he understood him at
that time.
[15]
The onus does not shift. It is Santam’s onus
to prove that the information as recorded in the email is false and
misleading.
To my mind, the finding that the third respondent
disseminated false information is not consistent with the evidence,
particularly
that of Wright. An award that is not consistent with the
evidence cannot be one a reasonable decision maker can arrive at.
[16]
Even if I
were to accept that the finding of guilt is supported by evidence, I
have difficulty in understanding the reasoning to
deny the third
respondent the primary remedy.
Section 193
(2) is very specific.
[8]
If any of the situations mentioned in the section do not present
themselves then reinstatement must be ordered. It is unclear to
me
whether the second respondent, by refusing reinstatement, was
revoking the provisions of
section 193(2)
(b) or what? All he
says in his award is that he finds it better that the parties part
ways on account of the third respondent’s
resentment for the
respondent’s management – built up over a duration of his
sojourn with the respondent – as
stated by him at the meeting
of 13 May 2014. For the provisions of
section 193(2)
(b) to be invoked there must be evidence from the employer party to
demonstrate that continued employment would be intolerable.
Absent
that, the section cannot be invoked. It is apparent that such
evidence was not led hence reliance on the resentment as stated
in
the meeting of 13 May 2014. It ought to be borne in mind
that the intolerability of continued employment must be caused
by the
misconduct that led to a dismissal. As at 13 May 2014, the misconduct
that led to the dismissal of the third respondent
was not committed.
Therefore, taking into account what happened on 13 May 2014
evinces failure to apply mind. It is an
irrelevant consideration.
[17]
Given the
view I take, the finding that the third respondent was guilty is not
supported by the evidence renders the first review
academic. For good
measure and taking into account what I stated in the preceding
paragraph, I should briefly deal with the first
review. It is the
duty of the second respondent to consider the fairness of a dismissal
using his own sense of fairness and not
deferring to the employer.
[9]
It is indeed so that an arbitrator is not at large to consider the
sanction of dismissal afresh. All he or she is required to do
is to
consider whether the dismissal as imposed by the employer is fair or
not.
[10]
In this matter, the second respondent did not simply substitute the
sanction of Santam. In applying his own sense of fairness,
he
considered the evidence of Wright who sought to explain why Santam
imposed the sanction of dismissal. Wright, in his evidence,
suggested
that if Santam were unionized, then there would have been prejudice.
He concluded that the results of the email could
have been cured if
there was any potential prejudice. In truth it would have been easier
if Wright and Van Der Walt had responded
to the mail and refuted the
allegation that they told the third respondent that the contracts had
been terminated. I do not find
any basis in law to interfere with the
second respondent’s own sense of fairness. The conclusion he
reached on the sanction
is not one that a reasonable commissioner
could not reach.
Conclusions
[18]
In summary, it is my finding that the first review
must fail. The second review fails in so far as it seeks to attack
the unfair
labour practice findings. Therefore, the award of the
second respondent ought to be reviewed and set aside. I am in a
position
to replace the award with an order of this Court. All the
relevant evidence is before me and I am in a better position to
consider
the dispute.
Order
[19]
In the results, I make the following order:
1.
The first review application is dismissed.
2.
The award issued by the second respondent is
hereby reviewed and set aside. It is replaced with an order that the
dismissal of the
third respondent is procedurally fair but
substantively unfair. Santam Limited is ordered to reinstate the
third respondent without
loss of benefits.
3.
Each party is to pay its own costs.
_______________________
G
Moshoana
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For
the Applicant:

Adv. F Rautenbach
Instructed
by:

Maserumule Inc, Cape Town
For
the Third Respondent:
In Person
[1]
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
[2007] 12 BLLR 1097
(CC);
2008 (2) SA 24
(CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405
(CC)
[2007] ZACC 22
; ;
2008 (2) BCLR 158
(CC) at para 110.
(
Sidumo
)
[2]
These
were:
Complaint
1: Distributing false and misleading information.
Complaint
2: Conduct unbecoming of a manager by breaching the code of ethics.
Alternatively,
inappropriate and or unprofessional conduct.
[3]
Page
373 of the Arbitration Record.
[4]
66
of 1995, as amended.
[5]
Page 2163
of the Transcript lines 1-12.
[6]
Page 2160
of the Transcript lines 5-7.
[7]
Page 2159
of the Transcript lines 20-25 and 2160 lines 1-5.
[8]
Section
193(2)
provides:

(2)
The Labour Court or the arbitrator must require the employer to
re-instate or re-employ
the employee unless—
(a)
the employee does not wish to be re-instated or re-employed;
(b)
the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a
continued employment
relationship would be intolerable;
(c)
it is not reasonably practicable for the employer to re-instate or
re-employ the
employee; or
(d)
the dismissal is unfair only because the employer did not follow a
fair procedure.”
[9]
Sidumo
at para 79
where
the Court held:

To sum up. In terms of the
LRA, a commissioner has to determine whether a dismissal is fair or
not. A commissioner is not given
the power to consider afresh what
he or she would do, but simply to decide whether what the employer
did was fair. In arriving
at a decision a commissioner is not
required to defer to the decision of the employer. What is required
is that he or she must
consider all relevant circumstances.”
[10]
Id.