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[2017] ZALCJHB 312
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Wholesale Housing Supplies (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others (J1948/17) [2017] ZALCJHB 312 (29 August 2017)
Of
interest to other Judges
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
HELD
AT JOHANNESBURG
Case No: J 1948/17
In
the matter between:
WHOLESALE
HOUSING SUPPLIES (PTY) LTD
Applicant
and
NATIONAL
UNION OF METALWORKERS OF
SOUTH
AFRICA
First
Respondent
THE
PERSONS WHOSE NAMES ARE LISTED
ON
ANNEXURE “A” TO THE NOTICE OF
MOTION
Second
Respondent
Heard
:
25 August 2017
Delivered
:
29 August 2017
Summary:
(Urgent – s 68(2) requirements of the LRA met - strike
interdict – nature of strike –
collective bargaining
rights – no agreement binding employees in respect of striking
for bargaining rights – three
year wage agreement nonetheless
binding – one purpose permissible the other not)
JUDGMENT
LAGRANGE
J
Background
[1]
This application was initially launched on 21 August 2017 for a
hearing the following day. By agreement, the matter was postponed
to
permit the filing of additional affidavits and was heard on 25 August
2017. Pending the decision in this matter, the respondents
undertook
not to embark on strike action.
[2]
Presently, the applicant (‘WHS’) has four distribution
centres situated in Germiston, Pinetown, Port Elizabeth and
Cape
Town. In the Durban and Germiston centres, the first respondent,
NUMSA, currently represents less than half the permanent
workforce of
540, but represent SACCAWU 9 % of the workforce nationally, whereas
SACCAWU represents 50,7 % of employees nationally.
In terms of a
so-called “relationship agreement”, SACCAWU is recognised
as the collective bargaining representative
in the four distribution
centres as long as it represents 30% of employees in each of the four
centres. A wage agreement was concluded
with SACCAWU for the period 1
July 2016 to 30 June 2019.
[3]
In June 2016, NUMSA referred a dispute to the CCMA in which it
claimed that the applicant was “refusing to bargain with
NUMSA
for wage demands”
.
It is sort as a
resolution of the dispute that “(t)he employer must bargain
with NUMSA also in the wage negotiations.”
Ultimately, this
dispute led to a verification exercise being conducted by the CCMA in
November 2016 and an advisory award was
issued to which the result of
the verification exercise was attached.
[4]
According to the advisory award, NUMSA’s representative had
contended that SACCAWU did not have a majority and that WHS
should
have dealt with the situation in 2016 by “consolidating all the
wage demands and inviting interested unions to negotiate
with them.”
WHS contended that only SACCAWU satisfied the 30% threshold
requirement in the relationship agreement and accordingly
were
entitled to collective bargaining rights. The arbitrator found that
in terms of the verification exercise, NUMSA had representation
of
17.13% nationally. Although he did not refer to the specific figure
for SACCAWU, he noted that in terms of the verification
report,
SACCAWU did not meet the 30% threshold itself. The global figure for
SACCAWU in the verification report was determined
as 23.64%. The
arbitrator also noted pertinently that section 18 (2) of the Labour
Relations Act, 66 of 1995 (‘the LRA’)
provides that:
“
A collective
agreement concluded in terms of subsection (1) is not binding unless
the thresholds of representativeness in the collective
agreement are
applied equally to any registered union seeking any of the
organisational rights referred to in that subsection.”
The
essence of the advisory award was that, WHS was under no legal
obligation to negotiate with NUMSA and that the union could exercise
power to force the employer to the negotiating table following the
principle established in
Bader
Bop (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA and Others
.
[1]
The arbitrator urged the parties to engage with each other on the
matter in a way that would promote labour peace and good workplace
relations, and suggested that WHS should “allow NUMSA the
opportunity to negotiate and advance the interest of their members.”
The advisory award concluded by recommending that the parties should
meet within 14 days to try and agree on a compromise on a
way
forward.
[5]
Since the advisory award was issued in December 2016, nothing further
was heard until 28 June 2017 when a strike notice was
sent to the
respondent, which was withdrawn on 30 June, but reissued on 18
August. On 3 July, just after the first notice
was withdrawn,
the three year 2016 wage agreement with SACCAWU was purportedly
extended to other employees under s 23(1)(d) based
on a claim by WHS
that SACCAWU now represented 50% of the employees in the workplace.
[6]
The strike notice of 28 June 2017 notified WHS that NUMSA’s
members would be embarking on strike action “as per
the
advisory award”. On 28 July, WHS advised NUMSA under a letter
headed “Re - refusal to bargain dispute”, that
the wage
agreement with SACCAWU had been in full and final settlement of wage
demands for the three-year period and accused NUMSA
of trying to
bypass the agreement and strike as a minority union on the basis of
the membership it had in the Germiston branch
of WHS. WHS
acknowledged NUMSA’s “right not to be in agreement with
the said agreement and to seek to reopen the wage
negotiations”,
but warned that NUMSA was bound to wait until the next wage
negotiations in June 2019 if by that stage it
was sufficiently
representative to warrant bargaining rights. The letter mentioned
that the wage agreement had been extended in
terms of section 23 (1)
(d) of the LRA to “all non-parties”, but without
mentioning that this had only been done in
July 2017 and not when the
agreement was concluded in June 2016. WHS also warned that if NUMSA
persisted with the intended action,
it would seek urgent relief from
the court “as
current matters that you have raised in your
wage demands
are regulated by the current wage agreement and as a
result any contemplated strike action by your members is prohibited
in terms
of Sec 65 of the LRA”(emphasis added).
[7]
NUMSA did not respond to this letter, but on Friday 18 August a
strike notice was issued after normal business hours notifying
the
company of its intention to strike on 21 August. In this notice the
union stated inter-alia:
“
As NUMSA, we
hereby serving your company with the 48 on notice for the industrial
action
related to refusal to bargain in terms of wage negotiations
which was held in the 2016
and as the results of the matter was
referred to the third-party which is the CCMA.
Kindly take notice
further that the said
strike is related to refusal to bargain
dispute as per the attached CCM advisory
award including the CCMA
non-resolution certificate (strike certificate).”
(Emphasis
added)
[8]
Apart from its prior notification on 28 July that it would bring an
urgent application if NUMSA persisted with its strike action,
on
Sunday 20 August WHS notified NUMSA by fax of its intention to bring
this application.
Evaluation
[9]
There was no real dispute about the urgency of the application as
such, but the Court must still be satisfied that the peremptory
requirements of s 68(2) of the LRA were met. I am satisfied
that in the circumstances, the applicant gave the union adequate
notice of the application bearing in mind that the union deliberately
waited until after normal business hours on Friday before
serving the
strike notice and that WHS did notify NUMSA of its intention to bring
the application on Sunday. Under normal circumstances,
a notice serve
on Sunday might not be considered enough warning of the opportunity
to be heard before the Court took a decision,
but where notice of the
strike is given after hours on a weekend in circumstances where there
was no reason for WHS to anticipate
the strike would be revived after
the previous withdrawal and given the lack of response to its
notification of NUMSA that
the wage agreement had been extended and
that it believed the strike would be unprotected, I think the
opportunity afforded to
NUMSA to be heard was reasonable.
Consequently, the requirements of s 68(2) warranting a notice period
of less than 48 hours of
this application were met.
[10]
In response
to NUMSA’s claim that by virtue of the outcome of the
verification exercise, SACCAWU and WHS could not extend
the wage
agreement to other employees under section 23 (1) (d) of the LRA, WHS
attached schedules of union membership deductions
for SACCAWU and
NUMSA for July 2017, which is the same month the wage agreement was
extended. Those schedules showed that at the
four distribution
centres which employed 514 permanent employees, 274 of those were
members of SACCAWU and 104 were members of
NUMSA. WHS further claimed
that even at the time of the conclusion of the wage agreement in
2016, when it had eight distribution
centres, SACCAWU represented a
majority of employees at that stage too. In addition to the permanent
employees, there are 144 employees
working at the centres, who are
employed by temporary employment services. It was argued by NUMSA
that these employees should also
have been taken into account when
determining if SACCAWU was representative of the majority of
employees in the workplace. WHS
contended that because the decision
of the Labour Appeal Court in
NUMSA
v Assign Services and Others
[2]
is itself now the subject matter of a pending appeal to the
Constitutional Court, the LAC’s decision that the client of the
temporary employment service is deemed to be the sole employer of the
labour broker’s employees after three months under
SACCAWU 98A
(3)(b) of the LRA, is suspended pending the outcome of that
application. Although NUMSA raised this point as an issue
in its
answering affidavit, its attorney,
Mr
Daniels
did not pursue the point further after the current status of the LAC
decision had been mentioned by applicant’s counsel,
Mr
Van As
.
[11]
On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that at the time that the
three-year wage agreement was extended in July 2017, that
SACCAWU was
a majority union in the workplace comprised now of the four
distribution centres and that NUMSA did not meet the threshold
of 30%
union membership in the same workplace. It may be so that at the time
of the verification exercise figures were different,
but the most
natural interpretation of section 23 (1) (d) is that, it is the union
membership at the time the agreement is extended
which matters, even
though in this case the extension took place a year after it was
concluded. Consequently, it means that NUMSA’s
members employed
by WHS are bound by that wage agreement and any strike instituted
with a view to amending or renegotiating the
terms of that agreement
would be contrary to the provisions of section 65 (3)(a)(i) and
therefore unprotected.
[12]
However,
NUMSA contends that the strike is only to achieve bargaining rights
and has nothing to do with negotiations of a substantive
agreement.
On this issue, the parties are at odds. The applicant naturally
prefers to characterise the dispute as a dispute which
originated in
NUMSA not being a party to the June 2016 negotiations and that the
real object of NUMSA and its members is to try
and reopen those
negotiations. By contrast, NUMSA claims that it is merely seeking to
assert its members’ constitutional
right to strike in support
of their demand to engage in collective bargaining with WHS. On the
evidence, it is clear that the demands
are intertwined, but that does
not mean to say that they are not distinguishable. What is clear is
that, even though the ultimate
object of NUMSA and its members might
have been to renegotiate the three-year agreement, NUMSA was also
distinctly pursuing the
demand to be recognised as a bargaining
partner, even if that was to be a precursor to pursuing the
substantive demands. Such a
demand is one that minority unions have
been entitled to try and achieve through protected strike action
since the Constitutional
Court decision in
Bader
Bop
. On
the other hand, that decision did not nullify binding power of
agreements concluded by majority unions. In
Association
of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Chamber of Mines
of South Africa and Others
[3]
the Constitutional Court recently emphatically underscored the
principle that the extension of collective agreements concluded
with
majority unions under section 23 (1) (d) do not unreasonably limit
the right to freedom of association or collective bargaining.
[4]
Thus, a minority union’s entitlement to engage in protected
strike action to get a seat at the bargaining table does not
mean it
is entitled to strike to upset a bargain which has been concluded
with the majority union. That may be a source of frustration
to that
union and its members while they remain a minority in the workplace,
but it is a logical consequence of the majoritarian
principle which
the Constitutional Court has reaffirmed as a constitutionally
permissible policy.
[13]
On the facts of this case, in my view, it would be artificial to
interpret the nature of the demands underlying the intended
strike as
being exclusively either a demand for collective bargaining rights or
alternatively a set of specific wage demands relating
to the wage
agreement concluded in 2016 with SACCAWU. However, what is clear is
that, in so far as the intended strike is pursued
with the object of
undoing the agreement concluded with the majority union, a strike in
pursuit of that demand would be unprotected.
To the extent that the
demand pursued is purely to try and persuade WHS to accept that a
different membership threshold is sufficient
to participate in future
collective bargaining, then a strike in support of that demand is
unobjectionable given that the other
statutory requirements for
embarking on protected strike action have been met. In conclusion,
the order made should recognise the
different strands in the strike
demand.
Order
[1]
The forms and service provided for in the Labour Court rules are
dispensed with and the matter is treated as one of urgency
in terms
of Rule 8.
[2]
A
rule nisi
is issued calling upon the respondent is to show
cause, on 10 November 2017, why an order should not be made in the
following terms:
2.1
declaring that the strike called by the first respondent in terms of
the strike notice issued
by it on 18 August 2017, which was due to
commence at 06H00 on 21 August 2017 (“the strike”), in so
far as the strike
is in support of any demand other than a demand for
the applicant to recognise NUMSA as a collective bargaining
representative,
to be an unprotected strike as contemplated in
section 65 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (“the LRA”);
2.2
interdicting and restraining the individual respondents from
participating in the strike in support
of any demand other than a
demand for the applicant to recognise NUMSA as a collective
bargaining representative;
2.3
interdicting and restraining the first respondent (“NUMSA”)
from encouraging and/or
inciting the individual respondents to
participate in the strike in support of any demand other than a
demand for the applicant
to recognise NUMSA as a collective
bargaining representative .
[3]
Directing that the relief set out in orders 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 above
shall operate as an interim order with immediate effect pending
the
finalisation of this application.
[4]
Each party must pay their own costs for this interim application.
[5]
Service of the interim order above shall be effected:
5.1
on NUMSA per telefax on telefax number (011) 689-1701;
5.2
on the individual respondents by the sheriff of the High Court,
alternatively a duly authorised
employee of the applicant reading out
the interim order to those of the individual respondents present at
the applicant’s
premises situated at Barlow Road and Cavaleros
Drive , Jupiter Extension, Germiston (“the applicant’s
premises”)
and by affixing copies of the interim order to
notice boards at the applicant’s premises and at the main
entrance to the
applicant’s premises and by handing copies of
the interim order to such of the individual respondents who may
request a copy
of the order.
_______________________
Lagrange
J
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
APPEARANCES
APPLICANT:
M
Van As instructed by Van Veijeren Inc.
RESPONDENTS:
R
Daniels of Cheadle Thompson & Haysom Inc.
[1]
[2002] 2 BLLR 139
(L AC). Though the arbitrator cited the LAC
decision in the matter, in all likelihood the arbitrator had the
Constitutional Court
decision in mind namely,
National
Union of Metalworkers of SA & others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd &
another
2003
(2003) 24
ILJ
305 (CC) especially at 326-8, paras [39] to [43] where the right of
a minority union to institute a protected strike to obtain
collective bargaining or other organisational rights was affirmed.
[2]
[2]
(JA96/15)
[2017] ZALAC 44
(10 July 2017)
[3]
(2017) 38 ILJ 831 (CC)
[4]
At
paragraphs [41] to [58].