About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Johannesburg Labour Court, Johannesburg
>>
2017
>>
[2017] ZALCJHB 244
|
|
Wesbank A division of Firstrand Bank Limited v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and Others (JR686/14) [2017] ZALCJHB 244 (27 June 2017)
THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
JOHANNESBURG
Not
reportable
Case
no: JR 686/14
In
the matter between:
WESBANK
A DIVISION OF
FIRSTRAND
BANK
LIMITED
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION (CCMA)
First Respondent
NORMAN
MBELENGWA
N.O
Second Respondent
JOHANNA
TEBOGO KWAPE
Third
Respondent
Heard:
19 April 2017
Delivered:
27 June 2017
Summary:
Review application. Arbitrator failed to consider evidence that was
presented and decided procedural fairness when that
was not an issue
to be decided. Award is reviewed and set aside
.
JUDGMENT
PRINSLOO,
J
Introduction
[1]
The Applicant seeks to review and set aside
an arbitration award issued on 24 February 2014 wherein the Second
Respondent (the arbitrator)
found the dismissal of Ms Kwape (Kwape)
substantively and procedurally unfair and ordered that she be
reinstated retrospectively.
[2]
Ms Kwape opposed the application.
Background
facts
[3]
The background facts are herewith
summarised as follows:
[4]
The Applicant is a financial services
provider with approximately 2 900 employees. The Applicant employed
Kwape on 1 March 1998
and her services were terminated on 24 July
2014 for incapacity due to ill health. At the time of her dismissal
Kwape worked as
a voice services agent in the voice services
department. Kwape was a switchboard operator and her duties included
answering phone
calls and transferring internal and external calls to
the appropriate person or department. It is common cause that the
position
of voice services agent is considered to be the lightest
duty position within the Applicant’s structure.
[5]
On 5 May 2011 and on her way to work Kwape
was involved in a motor vehicle accident when a motor vehicle driver
plunged into her
and she suffered serious injuries. It is common
cause that the accident was not an injury on duty.
[6]
Kwape was, as a result of the accident,
booked off from work for specific periods from May 2011 until July
2013 when the Applicant
initiated an incapacity enquiry. The
incapacity enquiry was held on 12 July 2013 and after it was found
that the Applicant attempted
to accommodate Kwape over a period of
more than two years, her services were terminated for incapacity due
to ill health on 24
July 2013. Kwape lodged an internal appeal and on
12 August 2013 she was notified that her appeal was dismissed and her
dismissal
was confirmed.
[7]
Kwape referred an unfair dismissal dispute
to the First Respondent and only the substantive fairness of Kwape’s
dismissal
was challenged.
The
arbitration proceedings:
[8]
It is evident from the transcribed record
that the arbitrator recorded, at the onset of the proceedings, that
procedural fairness
was not in dispute and that he was not going to
allow any issues to be raised in respect of procedural fairness.
[9]
During the arbitration proceedings the
Applicant called four witnesses and Kwape testified and called one
witness. The assessment
of the merits of the grounds for the review
raised by the Applicant calls for a consideration of the evidence
that was adduced.
The
evidence adduced
[10]
The Applicant’s first witness was its
customer services manager, Ms Reddy (Reddy). She testified that Kwape
had been struggling
with her health since 2011 until 2013 and that
she had taken excessive sick leave during this period. Reddy
testified that the
Applicant engaged Kwape in trying to assist her
and to accommodate her. It was undisputed that the Applicant
attempted to assist
Kwape via the Applicant’s wellness program
and permanent health insurance (PHI). Reddy explained that PHI was
discussed,
offered and explained to Kwape on 12 October 2011 and PHI
was once again discussed on 23 November 2011 and copies of the
necessary
documents were given to Kwape to be completed. Kwape
returned the incomplete forms and it was discussed with her once
again and
she indicated that she wanted to discuss the PHI option
with her family first.
[11]
In July 2012 the Applicant sent the PHI
forms to Kwape’s doctors to complete and the forms were sent to
the insurer, Momentum.
Momentum rejected the PHI application in April
2013 because additional medical information was required and they
could not get
hold of Kwape’s doctors. The Applicant
subsequently met with Kwape and explained to her that she could
accept Momentum’s
decision on her PHI application or she could
appeal the decision and bring more information such as medical
reports from her doctors.
Momentum finally rejected Kwape’s PHI
application in July 2013.
[12]
Reddy explained that apart from PHI, the
Applicant also explored alternative positions, but those considered
were not feasible or
no longer existed. The mailroom could not assist
as it was overstaffed at that point, the client operations department
had no position
available and the marketing position Kwape was
interested in, no longer existed.
[13]
In April 2012 the Applicant offered Kwape
the option of working reduced hours and proposed that she worked from
08:00 – 12:00
instead of 08:00 – 16:30. Kwape was not
interested in this option as it meant a reduction in her income.
[14]
Reddy explained that the Applicant further
accommodated Kwape in that she exceeded her paid sick leave and when
she took unpaid
sick leave, the Applicant still paid her medical aid
and pension fund contributions and recovered those payments over a
period
instead of a deducting the total sum once off and leaving
Kwape out of pocket.
[15]
In May 2013 Kwape’s doctor stated
that she was unable to cope in a call centre and recommended that she
be transferred to
an alternative working environment. Reddy explained
that there was no other duty outside the call centre Kwape could be
transferred
to. She explained that the Applicant operates in
different business units and it is not possible to move employees
from one business
unit to another without the cooperation of the
heads of the relevant departments. She contacted other business
units, but they
were unable to accommodate Kwape and in her business
unit, there was no other suitable position Kwape could be
accommodated in.
[16]
The decision to terminate Kwape’s
services was based on the fact that she took excessive sick leave
during the period 2011
– 2013 and the fact that the Applicant
was unable to accommodate her in a different position.
[17]
The Applicant’s second witness was
the chairperson of Kwape’s incapacity enquiry, Mr Hardijzer
(Hardijzer). He testified
that the factors he took into account in
deciding to dismiss Kwape were that she was absent from work for
fifty percent of the
time during 2011 – 2013, that Kwape’s
PHI application was declined and that there was no sufficient reason
for Kwape
to be medically boarded, that Kwape declined the offer of a
half day position, that Kwape was unsuccessful in her application for
alternative positions and the fact that the Applicant was also unable
to place Kwape in an alternative position.
[18]
In cross-examination Hardijzer testified
that it was fair to dismiss Kwape because the position she occupied
was not demanding and
it was impossible to find a less demanding
position, she was not at work for fifty percent of the time and she
was not able to
perform in her position due to incapacity.
[19]
The Applicant also called its senior
manager in the operations division, Ms de Jager (de Jager) as a
witness. She is employed as
the call centre manager and her testimony
related to the issue of consistency. In respect of Ms Kwadi (Kwadi)
de Jager testified
that she applied for a vacant position of
receptionist at the main reception in the Wesbank building, she went
through an interview
process and she was appointed. De Jager disputed
that Kwadi was accommodated, but insisted that she applied for a
vacancy, for
which Kwape did not apply. In respect of Michelle van
Rheede van Oudtshoorn (van Rheede van Oudtshoorn), de Jager explained
that
there was another vacant receptionist position available at the
Applicant’s training rooms and three individuals were
considered
for this position, namely van Rheede van Oudtshoorn,
Elliot and Kwape. Elliot was not interested in the receptionist
position as
his future plans included a move to an IT position and
Kwape was not appointed because her average rating was below
benchmark and
her absenteeism as there is no replacement for this
position and it would have been very difficult to accommodate her in
that position.
Another consideration was the fact that Kwape did not
want to be placed in a more complex position and this position was
more complex
than the position occupied by Kwape and it required a
person who could cope with more responsibilities and difficulties.
Van Rheede
van Oudtshoorn was appointed as receptionist as a lateral
move into an existing vacancy.
[20]
In cross-examination de Jager explained
that as much as there was a need to accommodate an employee, there is
also a business to
run and both interests should be looked after.
Kwape requested to be accommodated in a less complex position and the
receptionist
position was more complex. De Jager testified that Kwape
could not be accommodated in the receptionist position as she would
not
be able to cope in a more complex role and due to her
absenteeism, it would not be easy to fulfil the functions of the
role. She
explained that she could not accommodate Kwape in a
position that was more complex than the one she occupied as she would
have
struggled even more and it would not have been good for her
health or for the Applicant’s business operations.
[21]
In cross-examination it was put to de Jager
that the Applicant is a big employer and that it was hard to believe
that there was
not a single position, place or role where Kwape could
have been accommodated where there was minimal use of the phone, as
recommended
by an occupational therapist. De Jager explained that the
only available position was in the mailing room, but the mailing room
was outsourced as it was a shrinking environment where employees had
to move out and some lost their jobs as a result and it was
not
possible to place Kwape there as there was no position available. De
Jager further explained that the possibilities to place
Kwape were
limited due to the fact that she required a role that was less
complex and despite the fact that there were lots of
vacancies, those
were more senior and more complex positions and in some instances the
positions required specific product or system
knowledge for which
Kwape was not trained. At the level Kwape needed accommodation, there
were no vacancies.
[22]
De Jager testified that there were many
attempts to accommodate Kwape which included finding an alternative
position, sending her
to the wellness centre, allowing her to go to
the doctor when she had to consult the doctor and granting her
excessive sick leave.
The medical reports that proposed that Kwape be
accommodated in an alternative position where she would not use a
phone, could
not be complied with as there was no alternative
position that could accommodate the need not to use a phone.
[23]
It was put to de Jager in cross-examination
that Kwape was able to do the work of a receptionist and that she
should have been appointed
in the receptionist position Kwadi was
appointed in. De Jager responded that the position deals directly
with customers, answering
of phones and handling of all issues.
[24]
De Jager testified that Kwape could not be
reinstated as she is unable to perform her functions due to her
ill-health and the Applicant
does not have another position available
within which Kwape could be accommodated.
[25]
Kwape testified that after the motor
vehicle accident of 5 May 2011 she was booked off sick and she
explained that the accident
affected her to the extent that she could
not do some of her duties. She testified that she could not sit, she
always had headaches
and seizures and her vision and hearing had been
affected too. In July 2013 when she was dismissed, she was in a bad
condition
and she still suffered the same effects, such as seizures
and loss of vision and hearing and she was still undergoing treatment
for that. In cross-examination Kwape conceded that prior to the
accident of 5 May 2011, she suffered from slight headaches and
seizures and she was diagnosed with epilepsy.
[26]
The medical doctors Kwape consulted
recommended that she be moved to an alternative position where she
did not have to deal with
telephone calls.
[27]
Kwape testified that since she returned to
work in 2011 the Applicant did nothing to assist her and she applied
for other positions
in other departments. She conceded that she did
not qualify for the positions. She testified that in 2011 the
Applicant presented
her with the possibility of applying for PHI and
initially she declined it because it was not properly explained to
her. On the
second occasion she applied for PHI but it was declined.
She testified that she was assisted by the wellness department since
2011
and they assisted her with counselling. Xoliswa, the consultant
at the wellness department recommended that Kwape be removed from
her
department as she was taking heavy medication. The wellness
department also recommended that PHI be considered for Kwape. Kwape
also communicated with the wellness department the recommendations
from her doctors that she be moved to an alternative position.
[28]
Kwape testified that the Applicant indeed
referred her to two medical doctors to assess her wellbeing.
[29]
In respect of the alternative positions
Kwape confirmed that the marketing department was abolished and that
there was no position
in the mail room available and that the
reduction of her working hours was not assisting her as the issue of
answering phones that
affected her and caused her headaches,
remained. She testified that Wesbank is a huge company and she had 15
years’ experience
and she could have been accommodated at
either Natis, client operation, group recovery, legal department and
insurance department
where there is no use of phones but only
administration.
[30]
Kwape conceded in cross-examination that
the receptionist position she said she should have been accommodated
in requires someone
to answer the phones, deal with clients and
bookings and that the Applicant would be prejudiced if the incumbent
is not present
every day. She also conceded that it would still
involve phone calls that cause her headaches and seizures. This
should be considered
in view of Kwape’s excessive period of
absence. In cross-examination Kwape conceded that she had been absent
for a total
of 308 days from May 2011 until July 2013.
[31]
Kwape testified that she was never given an
opportunity to recover and be accommodated where there was no use of
phones. It was
put to her that she took 308 days’ sick leave
and Kwape was asked what else she expected the Applicant to do when
there were
no positions available to accommodate her and Kwape
responded that she expected the Applicant ‘to do the right
thing.’
[32]
Kwape also conceded that she could not work
in the call centre again as she felt victimized by the people working
there and the
call centre was affecting her health.
[33]
It is evident from the transcribed record
that the arbitrator understood that procedure was not in dispute, yet
he allowed Kwape
to adduce evidence on the procedure that was
followed in her incapacity enquiry.
[34]
It is common cause that Kwape was absent
from work for a total of 117 days in 2011, 96 working days in 2012
and 95 days from January
- July 2013.
The
test on review
[35]
The
test that this Court must apply in deciding whether the arbitrator's
decision is reviewable is well established and has been
rehashed
innumerable times since
Sidumo
and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others
[1]
.
It
is ultimately a test of reasonableness. The arbitrator's decision
must fall within a range of decisions that a reasonable decision
maker could make.
[36]
In
Goldfields
Mining South Africa v Moreki
[2]
the
Labour Appeal Court held that:
“
In
short: A reviewing court must ascertain whether the arbitrator
considered the principal issue before him/her; evaluated the facts
presented at the hearing and came to a conclusion that is
reasonable.”
[37]
The
Labour Appeal Court held in
Head
of the Department of Education v Mofokeng and others
[3]
that
the arbitrator must not misconceive the inquiry or undertake the
inquiry in a misconceived manner. It was held that:
“
To
repeat: flaws in the reasoning of the arbitrator, evidenced in the
failure to apply the mind, reliance on irrelevant considerations
or
the ignoring of material factors etc. must be assessed with the
purpose of establishing whether the arbitrator has undertaken
the
wrong enquiry, undertaken the enquiry in the wrong manner or arrived
at an unreasonable result.
Lapses
in lawfulness, latent or patent irregularities and instances of
dialectical unreasonableness should be of such an order (singularly
or cumulatively) as to result in a misconceived inquiry or a decision
which no reasonable decision-maker could reach on all the
material
that was before him or her.”
[38]
These are the principles this Court should
apply in consideration of the review application.
Analysis
of the arbitrator’s findings and grounds for review
[39]
The transcribed record shows that the
arbitrator, at the onset of the arbitration proceedings, narrowed the
issues and recorded
that procedural fairness was not in dispute and
that the issue in respect of substantive fairness was that Kwape’s
dismissal
was unfair because she was not given a suitable alternative
position.
[40]
It follows that the only main issue the
arbitrator had to decide was whether Kwape’s dismissal was
unfair because she was
not given a suitable alternative position.
[41]
The arbitrator recorded that Kwape
submitted medical certificates recommending that she be placed on
light duty as the nature of
her work was not assisting her to recover
from her illness. The Applicant did not place Kwape on light duty for
reasons related
to the non-availability of positions in which Kwape
could be accommodated. In his analysis of the evidence the arbitrator
considered
the availability of positions and found that the Applicant
had a position of receptionist available, which position was given to
van Rheede van Oudtshoorn, but that Kwape should have been
transferred to that position, given the fact that the Applicant was
aware of her situation.
[42]
The arbitrator found that Kwape should have
been given an opportunity to occupy the position in compliance with
clause 10 of the
Code of Good Practice Dismissal. He held that the
Applicant’s case that the position was complex could not be
substantiated
in the absence of Kwape having worked in the position.
[43]
The arbitrator further found that if Kwape
was appointed as the receptionist, the Applicant could have impressed
it upon her that
the appointment was a way of accommodating her and
if she continued to be absent from work, the Applicant would have
been entitled
to terminate her services.
[44]
The arbitrator made a number of findings on
the PHI and the role played by the wellness department, which are in
my view not relevant
for the issue he had to decide.
[45]
The arbitrator found Kwape’s
dismissal procedurally unfair in that the Applicant did not adhere to
clause 10 of the Code of
Good Practice Dismissal.
[46]
Kwape was reinstated retrospectively.
[47]
The Applicant raised a number of grounds
for review and in my view there are three main grounds for review.
[48]
Firstly, and not surprisingly the Applicant
took issue with the fact that the arbitrator made a finding on
procedural fairness when
that was not in dispute and not an issue for
him to decide.
[49]
There is merit in this ground for review,
more so as the arbitrator recorded that procedural fairness was not
in dispute and that
he would not allow any matters on procedural
fairness to be raised during the arbitration proceedings.
Notwithstanding the arbitrator’s
aforesaid recording and the
fact that procedural fairness was not in dispute, he made findings on
procedural fairness.
[50]
The arbitrator in deciding an issue that
was not in dispute misconceived the issues he had to determine.
[51]
The second main ground for review relates
to the arbitrator’s finding that Kwape should have occupied the
receptionist position
and the gist of the Applicant’s complaint
is that the arbitrator ignored the evidence or failed to have due
regard to the
material evidence placed before him.
[52]
The arbitrator had to decide whether
Kwape’s dismissal was substantively fair because she was not
given a suitable alternative
position. This issue calls for
consideration of whether any suitable alternative work or position
was available.
[53]
Kwape’s various medical reports
recommended that she be given lighter duties, three months’
temporary incapacity leave,
prolonged leave, that she be transferred
to an alternative working environment as she is not able to cope in a
call centre environment.
[54]
It is undisputed that Kwape occupied the
position of a switchboard operator, which was a single function and
considered the lightest
duty position within the Applicant’s
structure. The reality is that there was no ‘lighter duty’
position.
[55]
As Kwape occupied the lightest duty
position and could not be moved to a lighter duty position, the issue
was to accommodate Kwape
outside the call centre, as it was an
environment within which she was unable to cope, and to place her in
a position with minimal
use of phones.
[56]
The Applicant’s version was that the
options of placing Kwape at client’s operations and the
mailroom were investigated,
but they were unable to accommodate Kwape
as they had a full complement of staff. The mailing room was
outsourced as it was a shrinking
environment where employees had to
move out and some lost their jobs as a result and it was not possible
to place Kwape there as
there was no position available.
[57]
The possibilities to place Kwape were
limited due to the fact that she required a role that was less
complex and despite the fact
that there were lots of vacancies, those
were more senior and more complex positions and in some instances the
positions required
specific product or system knowledge for which
Kwape was not trained. At the level Kwape needed accommodation, there
were no vacancies.
[58]
In respect of the receptionist position
that was given to van Rheede van Oudtshoorn the Applicant’s
evidence was that Kwape
was not appointed to this position because of
her absenteeism as there is no replacement for this position and it
would have been
very difficult to accommodate her in that position.
Another consideration was the fact that Kwape did not want to be
placed in
a more complex position and this position was more complex
than the position occupied by Kwape and it required a person who
could
cope with more responsibilities and difficulties.
[59]
Kwape requested to be accommodated in a
less complex position and the receptionist position was more complex
and Kwape could not
be accommodated in the receptionist position as
she would not be able to cope in a more complex role and due to her
absenteeism,
it would not be easy to fulfil the functions of the
role. The Applicant’s testimony was that it could not
accommodate Kwape
in a position that was more complex than the one
she occupied as she would have struggled even more and it would not
have been
good for her health or for the Applicant’s business
operations.
[60]
The Applicant’s ground for review is
that the arbitrator failed to appreciate that Kwape could not be
accommodated in a lighter
duty post and that all other posts were
more complex and based on the medical reports, Kwape would not have
been able to function
in such positions.
[61]
In my view there is merit in this ground
for review.
[62]
The arbitrator stated that de Jager
testified that Kwape was not considered for the receptionist position
due to the nature of the
position and Kwape’s rate of
absenteeism. De Jager’s evidence elaborated on the complexity
of the position, the fact
that there was no replacement for the
incumbent and that the Applicant needed someone to be in the position
every day and that
Kwape would have struggled with the position as it
was more complex and also involved phones.
[63]
Notwithstanding the Applicant’s
evidence and the arbitrator’s recording thereof, he found that
Kwape should have been
transferred to the position as the Applicant
was aware of her situation and if Kwape continued to be absent from
work, the Applicant
could have terminated her services.
[64]
The arbitrator’s finding ignored the
evidence presented as to why Kwape could not be appointed as
receptionist, it ignored
the fact that by placing Kwape in the
receptionist position, it would not have addressed Kwape’s
concerns and needs to perform
lighter duty in a less complex position
with the minimal use of phones.
[65]
Kwape conceded in cross-examination that
the reception position required someone to answer the phones, deal
with clients and bookings
and that the Applicant would be prejudiced
if the incumbent is not present every day. She also conceded that it
would still involve
phone calls that cause her headaches and
seizures.
[66]
The arbitrator ignored, alternatively
failed to have due regard to the material evidence that was placed
before him that the position
of receptionist would not have been a
suitable alternative in the circumstances. In fact, he had no
consideration of the issue
whether the receptionist position was a
suitable alternative, he merely concluded that because it was an
available position and
because the Applicant was aware of Kwape’s
situation, Kwape should have been transferred to the receptionist
position. This
finding is not reasonable and cannot stand.
[67]
Glaringly absent from the arbitration award
is any consideration of the question the arbitrator had to decide
namely whether Kwape’s
dismissal was unfair because she was not
given a suitable alternative position.
[68]
In my view the evidence adduced by the
Applicant showed that at the level Kwape needed to be accommodated,
there was no position
available and the vacant position of
receptionist, was far from a suitable alternative given Kwape’s
situation and the facts
presented in the arbitration proceedings.
[69]
The third main ground for review is in
respect of the finding that Kwape should be reinstated.
[70]
The arbitrator ordered the Applicant to
reinstate Kwape from 24 July 2013 on the same terms and conditions
applicable before the
dismissal.
[71]
The Applicant’s case is that the
arbitrator failed to consider whether reinstatement was appropriate.
This is so because he
failed to consider that there was a breakdown
of the relationship between the parties, he failed to consider the
reality of the
situation that Kwape was unable to perform her duties
and that she took excessive sick leave and still did not recover and
whenever
she returned to work, she would relapse and that situation
continued for more than two years.
[72]
The Applicant submitted that the arbitrator
ignored the fact that by July 2013 of the 616 working days Kwape was
absent due to ill
health for 308 working days. The Applicant’s
offer to Kwape to work reduced hours to accommodate her illness and
recovery
was rejected and there was no evidence as to Kwape’s
current state of health.
[73]
In my view there is merit in this ground
for review.
[74]
De Jager testified that Kwape could not be
reinstated as she is unable to perform her functions due to her
ill-health and the Applicant
does not have another position available
within which Kwape could be accommodated.
[75]
The undisputed evidence was that Kwape
could not work in a call centre and required a position with lighter
duty and no phones,
which position the Applicant does not have
available. Kwape was absent fifty percent of the time and there was
no indication that
she recovered to an extent that she would be able
to perform her duties. These issues should have been considered in
deciding whether
reinstatement is appropriate.
[76]
The arbitrator failed to consider these
material facts, because if they had been considered by the
arbitrator, he would have come
to a different conclusion. In finding
that the employee should be retrospectively reinstated, the
arbitrator provided no justification
or reason for reinstating Kwape.
The arbitrator ordered that Kwape be reinstated on the same terms and
conditions as before her
dismissal, implying that it should be in the
same position she occupied before, which is the position she is
unable to cope in.
In my view the arbitrator ignored material
evidence and misdirected himself. Had he considered the evidence
properly, he could
not have ordered Kwape’s reinstatement.
Relief
[77]
This leaves the issue of relief.
[78]
The Applicant seeks for the arbitration
award to be reviewed and set aside and to be substituted with an
order that Kwape’s
dismissal was fair.
[79]
In the event the award is set aside on
review, this Court has a discretion whether or not to finally
determine the matter.
[80]
The matter could be finally determined
where there is a full record of the proceedings before Court and
where it would be in the
interest of justice to do so.
[81]
I am in a position to decide and finally
determine the matter on the record as it is before me.
[82]
This Court has a wide discretion in respect
of costs and in my view this is a matter where the interest of
justice will be best
served by making no order as to cost.
[83]
In the premises I make the following order:
Order
1.
The
arbitration
award issued on 24 February 2014 under case number GAJB20680
is
reviewed and set aside;
2.
The arbitration award is substituted with
an order that Kwape’s dismissal was substantively fair;
3.
There is no order as to costs.
______________
Connie
Prinsloo
Judge
of the Labour Court
Appearances:
For
the Applicant : Advocate A L Cook
Instructed
by
:
Cowan-Harper Attorneys
For
the Third
Respondent
:
Mr Voyi of Ndumiso Voyi Attorneys
[1]
2007 28 ILJ
2405 (CC) at para 110.
[2]
(2014) 35
ILJ 943 (LAC).
[3]
(2015) 1
BLLR 50
(LAC).