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[2017] ZALCJHB 254
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Duda v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (JR874/14) [2017] ZALCJHB 254 (23 June 2017)
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THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, JOHANNESBURG
Not Reportable
Case No: JR 874/14
In
the matter between
GUGU
PRIDE
DUDA
Applicant
and
COMMISSION
FOR CONCILIATION, MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION
First
Respondent
KENNY
MOSIME
N.O
Second
Respondent
SABC
SOC
LTD
Third
Respondent
Heard:
5 December 2016
Delivered:
23 June 2017
Summary:
An application to review and set aside a pre-dismissal arbitration
award cannot succeed when the applicant has not proved
that the
arbitrator’s decision falls outside the bounds of
reasonableness.
JUDGMENT
LALLIE
J
[1]
The applicant seeks an order reviewing and setting aside a
pre-dismissal arbitration award of the second respondent who will
be
referred to as the commissioner in this judgment. In the award, the
commissioner found the applicant guilty of all four charges
the third
respondent had preferred against her save contravention of section 57
of the Public Finance Management Act
[1]
(PFMA) referred to in the first charge and failure to prepare
succession plans for consultants, a sub-charge of the third charge.
The application is opposed by the third respondent.
[2]
The applicant was employed by the third respondent as a Chief
Financial Officer (“CFO”) on a five year fixed term
contract commencing on 1 March 2012 and expiring on 28 February 2017.
She is a Chartered Accountant. By virtue of her position,
the
applicant was a member of the third respondent’s Board of
Directors (the board). Pursuant to a number of incidents involving
the applicant, the third respondent suspended her and brought four
charges of misconduct against her. A pre-dismissal arbitration
hearing into the allegations was held in terms of section 188A of the
Labour Relations Act
[2]
(the
LRA). It was conducted by the commissioner under the auspices of the
first respondent, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation
and
Arbitration (the CCMA). The commissioner found her guilty of all the
charges except sub-charges of the first and second charges
and took a
decision to dismiss her. It is that decision that the applicant seeks
this Court to review and set aside.
Grounds
for review
[3]
The applicant sought to rely on a number of grounds for review for
each charge she was found guilty of. Although in determining
the
reasonableness of the arbitration award I am obliged to consider the
evidence tendered at the pre-dismissal arbitration in
its totality, I
am satisfied that the applicant’s approach is not at variance
with the obligation.
[4]
The first charge reads as follows:
‘
MISCONDUCT
6. It is alleged that you are guilty
of gross dishonesty, making false misrepresentations, contravention
of section 57 of the PFMA
in that:
6.1
In a letter dated 4 May 2012 and signed by yourself, you falsely
represented to the organisers of the ICT Indaba and /or other
parties
whose identities are unknown to the SABC that the SABC would become a
broadcaster partner and sponsor of the Indaba, when
the SABC had not
approved such partnership or sponsorship;
6.2
you falsely and dishonestly represented to the GCEO, Ms Mokhobo, that
Group Exco had approved a business plan for the SABC to
participate
in the ICT Indaba as a broadcaster and sponsor when you knew that no
such approval had been granted by Group Exco.
6.3
you falsely and dishonestly represented to the GCEO, Ms Mokhobo, that
the business plan allegedly approved by Group Exco provided
for the
SABC to pay R1 000 000-00 in cash as sponsorship to the ICT Indaba
when you knew that the said business plan (which had
not been
approved by Group Exco) did not provide for any cash sponsorship or
payment of R1 000 000-00 or any cash amount to the
ICT Indaba;
6.4
you falsely and dishonestly represented to Ms Mpho Msiza, Senior
Manager; Corporate Marketing, that the GCEO, Ms Mokhobo, had
given
her approval for the preparation of a business plan for the SABC to
participate in the ICT Indaba as a broadcaster and sponsor
when you
knew that you had obtained the GCEO’s approval and signature of
the undated letter based on false and dishonest
misrepresentations;
6.5
you contravened section 57(a)-(c) of the Public Finance Management
Act of 1999 (“the PFMA”) in the process of securing
sponsorship for the Indaba.
6.6
you caused the SABC to incur irregular expenditure in contravention
of section 57 of the PFMA in that the provision of free
airtime to
the ICT Indaba, the broadcasting of the event and the payment of a
cash sponsorship in the amount of R 1 000 000-00
had not been
approved by Group Exco and the approval of the GCEO had been obtained
as a result of false and dishonest misrepresentations.’
[5]
The applicant relied on two grounds for review. The first is that the
commissioner committed a gross irregularity by his failure
to
appreciate his arbitral duties in finding that she made a false
misrepresentation to the GCEO. The second is that the finding
that
she made false misrepresentation is unreasonable because there is no
evidence that by making the misrepresentation, she did
so knowing it
to be false and intending the GCEO to act to the prejudice of the
third respondent. The essence of the third respondent’s
answer
to these grounds is that the commissioner’s finding is
consistent with the evidence tendered in connection with the
first
charge.
[6]
The factual basis of the first charge is that in 2012 the Department
of Communications (the Department) hosted the ICT Indaba
(the Indaba)
with the view of providing a platform for Africa’s ICT industry
players to network and share ideas and knowledge.
The Department
appointed Carol Bower Productions (Carol Bower) as organisers of the
Indaba and sought the third respondent to be
the broadcast sponsor
for the Indaba. There were a number of benefits that the third
respondent could gain by acceding to the Department’s
request.
On 11 April 2012, a meeting was held to discuss the possible
participation of the third respondent in the Indaba. Mokhobo
did not
attend the meeting but asked the applicant to chair it. The
Department was represented and the third respondent was also
represented by a number of senior executives including Mrs Maseko
(Maseko), its Senior Manager: Corporate Marketing:
[7]
Representatives of Carol Bower made a presentation on the reasons for
the third respondent to be the broadcast sponsor of the
Indaba. At
the end of the presentation the third respondent’s
representatives did not take a decision on its participation
but
delegated Maseko to draft a business plan giving reasons for the
third respondent to participate in the Indaba. Maseko drafted
the
business plan in which she proposed that the third respondent should
be the Indaba broadcast sponsor and grant R2m in airtime
trade
exchange and R1m cash for activation. She added that the Group Exco
should take the decision whether it was in favour or
against the
proposal. The Group Exco is the Executive Committee which consists of
the Group Chief Executive Officer, Lulama Mokhobo
(Mokhobo), the
Chief Operations Officer (COO), the Chief Financial Officer (the
applicant) and no more than 11 other members. After
a number of
meetings and exchange of email, the applicant, on 11 May 2012, wrote
and presented to Mokhobo, for her signature, a
letter approving the
participation of the third respondent as the Indaba broadcast
sponsor.
[8]
The commissioner noted that it was not in dispute that the business
plan was never approved by Exco. The two things he found
in dispute
were, whether or not the Exco resolved on the approval of the SABC’s
participation by a round robin resolution
and the Business Plan
tabled before the Exco meeting on 23 April 2012. After analysing the
evidence before him, including minutes
of the meetings and e-mail
circulated among member of senior management of the third respondent
some of which originate from the
applicant, the commissioner found
that the Group Exco had decided that a round robin resolution would
be circulated by the company
secretariat to Group Executives for them
to approve or not approve the SABC’s participation in the
Indaba. The commissioner
found that no evidence was led to prove that
the letter signed by the applicant and dated 4 May 2012 in which she
falsely represented
that the SABC would become the broadcast partner
and sponsor of Indaba, was sent to anyone.
[9]
The commissioner assessed the conflicting evidence of the applicant
and the third respondent on whether the applicant misled
Mokhobo to
sign the letter written by the applicant. He concluded that applicant
misled the GCEO by telling her that the Group
Exco had approved the
SABC’s participation. It is on the strength of the
misrepresentation that the GCEO signed the letter.
On the allegation
that the applicant had acted in contravention of section 57 (a)-(c)
of the Public Finance Management Act of 1999
(“the PFMA”)
in the process of securing sponsorship for Indaba, the commissioner
found that the third respondent had
failed to prove the breach.
[10]
The applicant submitted that the main accusation was that on 11 May
2012, she falsely or fraudulently misrepresented to the
GCEO that the
Exco had approve the business plan on 23 April 2012, when it had not
done so, thereby inducing her and intending
to induce her to confirm
in writing that the third respondent would participate in the Indaba,
to the prejudice of the third respondent.
She further submitted that
the commissioner was faced with two mutually exclusive versions. The
one by Mokhobo, that the applicant
induced Mokhobo by fraudulent
misrepresentation to approve the participation of the third
respondent in the Indaba and the applicant’s,
to the effect
that she did not.
[11]
The applicant submitted that the commissioner failed to determine the
probabilities or inherent probabilities of each version
in resolving
the mutually destructive versions before him. He found that it was
simply improbable that Mokhobo would sign the letter
of the third
respondent’s participation in the Indaba. He failed to ask
which version was internally coherent, cogent, more
credible and
supported by admitted facts and probabilities. Had he done so he
would have accepted that on 11 May 2012 when the
applicant went to
see Mokhobo, the Exco minutes had been circulated to Exco members
including Mokhobo. It is therefore unlikely
that she told Mokhobo
that the Exco minutes were being prepared. There are a number of
other objective facts which, had the commissioner
taken into account,
on the applicant’s view, he would have preferred her version.
They include the allegation that both the
applicant and Mokhobo knew
that the Exco’s approval was unnecessary as when Mokhobo signed
the letter she already knew that
the third respondent was going to
participate in the Indaba. The only issue was the extent. The third
respondent suffered no prejudice
and supported the participation.
Instead in a report to Mokhobo, Masiza confirmed that the
participation was good, successful and
benefited the third
respondent.
[12]
A proper reading of the record including the award does not support
the applicant’s version. The commissioner did not
limit his
enquiry to the evidence led by the applicant and Mokhobo only. He
considered evidence of other witnesses which was largely
unchallenged. The commissioner further considered a chain of events,
drew inferences and reached the decision that the applicant
made
herself guilty of the first charge.
[13]
A number of arguments were raised on behalf of the applicant
supporting her version that the award is unreasonable. Some arguments
are based on her allegation that the Exco’s approval was
unnecessary as other Managers had the necessary authority to approve
the business plan for the third respondent’s participation. All
the grounds for review have to be considered against the
appropriate
test. It is not enough for the applicant to point out all the errors
made by the commissioner. It is the effect of
the errors on the
commissioner’s decision that counts. The commissioner
considered the evidence and submissions on the first
charge in
detail. He applied the correct test in resolving the dispute of fact.
For his decision on the first charge to be susceptible
to review it
must fall outside the bounds of reasonableness. If the commissioner’s
decision is one which a reasonable decision-maker
could reach on all
the evidence before him, this court may not interfere with it even if
he had made a number of errors. Having
considered the evidence the
commissioner took into account and his findings on the credibility of
the applicant as a witness and
the inherent probabilities of the case
before him I could find no grounds to interfere with his finding on
the first charge.
[14]
In the second charge the following allegations are made against the
applicant:
‘
GROSS MISCONDUCT
10. It is alleged that you are guilty
of gross dereliction of your duties and/or gross negligence, in
relation to the conclusion
and implementation of the contracts with
the consultants, for the following reasons:
10.1
you failed to provide the consultants with performance agreements for
the entire duration of their contracted period in breach
of clause 8
of their respective contracts;
10.2
you failed to ensure that the consultants prepared succession plans,
and accordingly never approved any, in breach of clause
5 of their
respective contracts;
10.3
you approved and signed the consultants’ contracts, which were
vague and to the detriment or potential detriment of the
SABC in that
they do not contain any provision or annexure detailing their
specific roles, duties and responsibilities;
10.4
the contract with Mr Mdluli reflects two different national identity
numbers, […]084 on the front cover page and […]081
in
clause 1.2.9 thereof, creating confusion as to the true identity
number of the consultant;
10.5
both consultants’ contracts refer to 1 November 2011 as the
“commencement date”, (clause 1.2.6), whereas
the contract
period is stated to be from 5 March 2012 to 05 August 2012 (clause
1.2.10), which amounts to gross negligence on your
part;
10.6
the written motivation to the GCEO states that the consultants will
be engaged for a period of six months each but their written
contracts are for a period of five months each, thus creating
confusion as to the exact period for which they were engaged;
10.7
both consultants commenced rendering services to the SABC from 4
March 2012 but only signed their contracts on 9 March 2012,
thus
breaching clause 12.1 of the SABC delegation of Authority framework
(“DAF”) which prohibits the rendering of services
in the
absence of a signed contract;
10.8
from March to July 2012, Mdluli did not have a signed contract but
was still paid an amount of R669 758.06, in breach of clause
12.1 of
the DAF;
10.9
Mr Mdluli was not given notice of termination of his contract as
required by clause 5.2 of his contract, thus breaching the
contract
and exposing the SABC to potential ligation and financial loss; and
10.10you
did not allocate any duties to Ms Malebane from April 2012
until the termination of her contract, resulting in the
SABC
incurring fruitless an wasteful expenditure in breach of the PFMA, in
the amount of R 550 000-00, being the salary that she
earned whilst
performing no duties for the SABC.’
[15]
The applicant presented a motivation to Mokhobo on 2 March 2012 for
the appointment of two consultants to assist her in discharging
her
duties. Mokhobo approved her motivation and the third respondent
entered into fixed term contracts with Ms Malebane (Malebane)
and Mr
Mdluli (Mdluli). The contract with Malebane was entered into on 5
March 2012 and the one with Mdluli on 9 March 2012.
[16]
Having analysed the evidence tendered in relation to the charge the
commissioner found that the consultants were appointed
to very senior
positions. Based on the applicant’s seniority and expertise the
commissioner expressed the view that she knew
and/or ought to have
known the importance of complying with the consultant’s
contracts. He found that the applicant’s
failure to exercise
reasonable care in dealing with the consultants exposed the third
respondent to potential and actual risk of
litigation. He, however,
found her not guilty of not approving the consultants’
succession plans. The commissioner’s
finding is based mainly on
evidence he found common cause, having rejected the applicant’s
justification for her conduct.
[17]
The grounds the applicant sought to rely on are that the arbitrator’s
finding is unreasonable because no evidence was
led to support the
finding that in signing the consultants’ contracts the
applicant exposed the third respondent to potential
risk of
litigation or that she did not give Malebane work. The basis of the
third respondent’s opposition is that the commissioner
correctly found the applicant guilty based primarily on her own
admissions.
[18]
Although the applicant submitted that no evidence was led to prove
her guilt, she admitted having committed most of the conduct
which
forms the basis of the second charge. The commissioner’s
finding of guilt falls within bounds of reasonableness because
he
took into account the applicant’s seniority and expertise and
the concessions she made. The conclusion drawn by the commissioner
from the concession that the applicant failed to conclude performance
contracts for the consultants is reasonable. The applicant
conceded
that having requested the assistance of the consultants for 6 months,
Malebane completed the task she was appointed for
in June 2012,
earlier than expected. Thereafter the applicant allocated her an
additional task. She however conceded that her attempts
to meet with
her to monitor her progress were unsuccessful.
[19]
The commissioner cannot be faulted for his finding as it is based on,
inter
alia,
the applicant’s concession. The applicant’s submission
that the commissioner did not find her guilty of breaching the
PFMA
does not assist her as the commissioner unequivocally and based on
evidence before him, found her guilty of the material part
of the
second charge.
[20]
In charge 3 the following allegations are made against the applicant:
‘
GROSS MISCONDUCT
16. It is alleged that
you are guilty of gross misconduct for the following reasons:
16.1
On 12 September 2012, in breach of section 51(b)(i) and (ii) and
section 57 of the PFMA, clause 2.1.1 of the SABC fraud and
Corruption
Prevention Strategy and clause 5.5 of the DAF, you signed a blank
document with instructions that it be handed to Mr
Andries van Dyk,
thereby exposing the SABC to potential fraud, irregular and wasteful
and fruitless expenditure as the document
could have been used to
facilitate payments or benefits to which Mr Van Dyk and/or other
employees and/or third parties were not
entitled;
16.2
on 12 September 2012, contrary to the decision to place a moratorium
on ad hoc salary increases, you approved a request for
ad hoc salary
increases for SCC staff members ranging between 25%-60% to be
implemented by 15 October 2012;
16.3
your decision to approve the ad hoc salary increases for SCC staff
members even though these employees had received salary
increases as
recently as 1 June 2012 in accordance with an agreement reached by
the SABC and its trade unions is in contravention
of clause 5.5 of
the DAF, is grossly irrational and irresponsible, and amounts to
gross negligence and/or gross dereliction of
your duties;
16.4
on 12 September 2012, you undertook to pay SCC staff members an
incentive of 10-15% of debt owed to the SABC that they collected,
in
contravention of the Policy on Ad Hoc Rewarding of Staff, in that:
16.4.1 the request was not
requested by a line manager, in this case Mr Van Dyk;
16.4.2 the request and payment
were not supported by the Divisional Finance Director; and
16.4.3 the reward would not have
been self-funding as the incentive would be paid from monies due and
owed to the SABC; and
16.4.4 there was no budget for
the reward.’
[21]
On 12 September 2012, the applicant co-signed a letter with the
Manager of the Finance Shared Services Centre (SSC), Mr Van
Dyk (Van
Dyk), requesting the implementation of a salary adjustment for the
SSC staff. When this letter was signed there was an
Exco resolution
on moratorium on salary adjustments. The applicant further signed a
blank document to be attached to a memorandum
which Van Dyk had to
prepare for the salary adjustment. The commissioner found that the
applicant did not approve the salary adjustment
for the CCS staff.
She merely requested it. He, however, found that the request should
not have been made in the face of the Exco
resolution on salary
adjustments. He found that by signing the blank document, the
applicant contravened section 51 (b)(i) and
(ii) and section 57 of
the PFMA and clause 2.11 of the SABC Fraud and Corruption Prevention
Strategy.
[22]
The applicant submitted that the commissioner’s finding is
unreasonable because no evidence was led to prove that by
signing a
blank document she created a fraud risk. The only evidence was that
Van Dyk never intended using the document for any
purpose other than
that for which it was signed. The third respondent submitted that
there is no merit in the applicant’s
grounds for review as the
commissioner reasonably and correctly found that she created a risk
that made fraud possible.
[23]
An assessment of the evidence before the commissioner supports his
conclusion that the applicant made herself guilty of exposing
the
third respondent to potential fraud. The applicant conceded that she
signed a blank document. The grounds the applicant sought
to rely on
overlook the actual charge against her. The inference that the
commissioner drew from her admission and Van Dyk’s
evidence is
reasonable. It is a conclusion that a reasonable decision maker could
reach on the evidentiary material before him.
It is therefore not
susceptible to review.
[24]
In charge 4 the following allegation is made against the applicant:
‘
GROSS MISCONDUCT
19. It is alleged that you are guilty
of gross negligence, gross dereliction of duties, contravention of
the SABC procurement Policy
and section 57(a)-(c) of the PFMA, in
that you approved the business plan and the awarding of a contract to
Intenda in the absence
of:
19.1
any proof that the Acting Head of Procurement had complied with the
SABC Supply Chain and Procurement Policy by inviting a
minimum of
three quotations from prospective suppliers on its database;
19.2
any draft bid evaluation report prepared by the Bid Evaluation
Committee as proof that the procurement policy had been complied
with
and that the proposed solution was the most appropriate and cost
effective one; and
19.3
any proof that the proposal allegedly submitted by SAP CCC did not in
fact meet the requirements of the SABC as such proposal
was not
annexed to the business plan submitted to you for approval.’
[25]
The commissioner found that it was clear from the information from Ms
Dlamini (Dlamini), the Acting Head of Procurement on
which the
applicant based the decision to approve the Itenda contract that the
SCM policy had not been complied with. The policy
requires that three
quotations be made and Dlamini’s business plan refers to only
two proposals. The commissioner found that
the applicant admitted
having approved the Itenda contract as described in the charge. Her
defence was that she based her decision
on Dlamini’s
recommendation and the support of the accountant responsible for
procurement. The commissioner rejected her
defence and concluded that
she ought to have taken measures to satisfy herself that all
processes and requisite factors had been
complied with.
[26]
The applicant submitted that the finding is unreasonable as the third
respondent failed to lead evidence proving that she had
committed the
misconduct. The third respondent submitted that sufficient evidence
was led to prove the applicant’s guilt.
The commissioner’s
finding cannot be disturbed as it is based on the evidence before him
including an admission by the applicant.
His decision rejecting the
applicant’s defence is reasonable.
[27]
It was argued on behalf of the applicant that the commissioner’s
decision that she made herself guilty of the acts of
misconduct is
unreasonable as it is not supported by evidence. It was argued on
behalf of the third respondent that the decision
is unassailable. In
his reasons for finding the sanction of dismissal appropriate, the
commissioner considered the gravity of the
misconduct he found the
applicant guilty of. He expressed a dim view of the applicant as a
witness. His criticism includes the
applicant’s credibility
because, she,
inter
alia
,
denied that the signature appended to the document prepared for an
ad
hoc
reward for her staff was hers. She only conceded having signed the
document after an expert witness for the third respondent as
well as
her own had expressed the view that the signature was hers. Her
evidence lacked honesty and put to question her integrity
and
credibility. The manner in which she handled the contracts and
services rendered by the consultants proved that she acted in
dereliction of her duties. The commissioner considered the
submissions on behalf of the applicant and the third respondent. He
found that the gravity of the misconduct, the applicant’s gross
negligence, dishonesty, refusal to take responsibility for
her
misconduct and lack of remorse had destroyed the relationship of
trust between the parties. He issued the sanction of dismissal.
[28]
The applicant submitted that the commissioner’s decision to
issue the sanction of dismissal is unreasonable because no
evidence
was led to support it in relation to the second, third and fourth
charges. He failed to appreciate his mandate on sanction
in finding
dismissal appropriate in the absence of objective evidence on an
irretrievable breakdown. It was argued on behalf of
the third
respondent that the applicant’s arguments on the
appropriateness of the sanction of dismissal are without merit
as
evidence which justify the applicant’s dismissal was tendered
at arbitration.
[29]
The applicant’s case is, mainly, that the award stands to be
reviewed and set aside as it is defective as envisaged in
section 145
(2) (ii) in that the commissioner committed gross irregularity in the
conduct of the arbitration proceedings. The applicant
further
submitted that as a result of the gross irregularity, the
commissioner reached an unreasonable decision. The test for review
based on the grounds the applicant sought to rely on is as followings
in
Head
of the Department of Education v Mofokeng
[3]
:
‘
Mere errors of fact or law may
not be enough to vitiate the award. Something more is required. To
repeat: flaws in the reasoning
of the arbitrator, evidenced in the
failure to apply the mind, reliance on irrelevant considerations or
the ignoring of material
factors etc must be assessed with the
purpose of establishing whether the arbitrator has undertaken the
wrong enquiry, undertaken
the enquiry in the wrong manner or arrived
at an unreasonable result. Lapses in lawfulness, latent or patent
irregularities and
instances of dialectical unreasonableness should
be of such an order (singularly or cumulatively) as to result in a
misconceived
inquiry or a decision which no reasonable decision-maker
could reach on all the material that was before him or her.’
[30]
The reasonableness of an award is determined on the totality of the
evidentiary material before the commissioner. An assessment
of the
record including the award and submissions on behalf of the applicant
and the third respondent proves that the commissioner
identified the
dispute before him correctly. He did not misconceive it as he
undertook the correct enquiry in the correct manner.
He dealt with
the issues before him. He considered each charge in detail. He
analysed the evidence before him and applied the law
correctly.
Contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the commissioner
applied the law correctly when resolving disputes of
fact. He gave
reasons for his findings. His findings and final decision are
supported by the evidentiary material before him. He
considered the
evidence and submissions on the appropriate sanction and gave reasons
for finding dismissal appropriate. The applicant
appeared at the
pre-dismissal arbitration on serious charges involving gross
negligence and dishonesty. The grounds the applicant
sought to rely
on did not assail the reasoning of the commissioner. The
commissioner’s decision that the gravity of the misconduct
the
applicant made herself guilty of, her dishonesty and lack of remorse
warranted dismissal is equally unassailable. The applicant
therefore
failed to establish valid grounds to have the award reviewed and set
aside.
[31]
Dismissed employees who are reasonably of the view that they have a
strong case on review should not be deterred by a fear
of being
mulcted with costs orders. I am not convinced that the law and
fairness justify a costs order against the applicant.
[32]
In the premises the following order is made:
Order
1.
The
application for review is dismissed.
Z.
Lallie
Judge
of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances
For
the Applicant : Advocate Bruinders SC with Advocate Millard
Instructed
by : Mncedisi Ndlovu and Sedumedi Inc
For
the Third Respondent: Mr Maseremula of Maserumule Attorneys
[1]
Act 1 of 1999
[2]
Act 66 of 1995 as amended
[3]
[2015] 1 BLLR 50
(LAC) at para 32